# Figural Aesthetics K – BFHR

#### Notes

Thanks to James, Guy, Michael, and Steven for their hard work on this file. Please email [khirn10@gmail.com](mailto:khirn10@gmail.com) with any questions or concerns.

Notes from the research crew:

This K was originally meant to be a more deleuzian centric K of emerging technologies. Over the course of our research, we slowly shifted the focus to be more in line with the works of Arthur Kroker as a broader K of the will to technology and what such a future would curtail. This K is extremely versatile, offering you a wide variety of links against a lot of impacts, mechanisms, and actors that affs on this topic would most likely defend. The coolest part of this K in my opinion is the impact level. With how outlandish Kroker can be sometimes, you have access to a lot of wild impacts, such as super soldiers, 4th dimensional warfare, genetic bombs, datafied flesh, and a litany of others.

While most of the file is built upon Kroker’s works, I included a small Deleuze module primarily cut from the thesis of the War Machine chapter in ATP with an angle about control societies. Running this requires a much deeper knowledge of deleuzian theory as the cards are not hyper specific to things like OCOs or whatever.

The two modules aren’t necessarily incompatible, but you should be careful about just frankensteining a 1NC together, especially against teams that actually read this stuff. The framework stuff under kroker is applicable to deleuze, especially the glezos stuff.

### 1NC – Will To Will

#### The will to emerging technologies amplifies the crisis of the real, pirates the body through a genetic matrix, harvests flesh, and turns bodies into predatory war machines

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 185-188, March 2004, MG)

What is the future of digital reality? What is the consequence of the fateful meeting of digital experience and biotech engineering? What is the fate of the future itself when, as Paul Virilio argues in Open Sky, time and space as the deep horizon of our existence have been accidented, have been radically derealized, into the dimensionless void of ‘space-light’ and the real time, the instantaneous, global networked time of light-time? After the mutation, the galactic debris of local time and local space gets in our eyes, and history as a chronological succession of events collapses into random events with mutable meanings. Or when reality suddenly flips, and we are no longer living in hyper-reality, broken boundaries moving at the speed of light, but just the opposite – reversed into a digital universe moving at the slow speed of light.

The Slow Speed of Light

Just in time for the twenty-first century, physicists have frozen, and then actually stopped, a beam of light, thus instantly reversing one of the threshold laws of physics and more importantly reversing the hyper-speed of the culture of acceleration into slow optics, slow media, slow light.

When light moves at 38 mph, decelerating from over 186,000 miles per second, and then is suddenly frozen in its trajectory, hyper-reality crashes under the accumulated weight of deceleration.

Crash optics for a time when light-time and light-space decelerate into a sub-time and a sub-space where human perspective is suddenly faster than the electronic transmission of the image.

Crash time when the slow speed of light, the slow speed of electronic perspective, brings down to earth all those globalized vectors of simulated time that had been launched into global media orbit during the reign of the speed of light.

Crash space when the slow speed of light deflates all the trends to globalization and real time into the slow time and the slow space of the frozen local.

This sudden and catastrophic deflation of the speed of light **amplifies the crisis of the real**. The hyper-real was based on the accidenting of bounded light and bounded space with the disappearance of light and time into the ‘real time’ of virtual light and virtual space. An aesthetic regime of signification based on the speed of light. What happens now is the end of the hyperreal, and the beginning of the sovereignty of the subreal. Light moving at the speed of a car stalled in gridlock on a LA freeway in the noon sun. Light that moves slower than the propagation of electronic images, and the circulation of electronic sounds.

A slow speed of light for a culture about to undergo a fast descent into a vertiginous experience of pure virtuality: events spinning outwards faster than their images; slow light as a form of retinal persistence of the slow unfolding of past events; life imprisoned in slow time and slow space and slow images and slow aesthetics. Interminability as the dominant cultural sign of the twenty-first century.

Firewire Eyes

Heidegger was correct. Everything to this point has been preparatory, an anticipation of a fundamental and radical technological event. A decisive turning. **Until now, the will to technology has been on the outside**, hovering around the body with its probes of seduction. It invites the body to empty itself into wireless networks. It firewires the eye to images recombinant. It **harvests flesh**. It whispers about the speed of data flesh. It undermines the confidence of the body, making it increasingly insecure about itself. It reconfigures the brain. It **externalizes, ablates, and disappears flesh**: turning the organic body inside out into an open-source scan portal for probing **media of communication**. Until now, everything has been about the exteriorization of the central nervous system.

Not for much longer, though. The real implication of biological determinism as the dominant discourse of the twenty-first century – the human genome project, **nanotechnology**, therapeutic cloning, **genetic engineering**, the convergence of **artificial intelligence** and robotics, the dreams delirious of designer genes, organ transplants and tissue replacements for an improved posthuman sensorium – is that the body is about to **pirated by the genetic matrix**.

Pirated not once, but twice. First, **biotech** invades the body in the name of good health, longer life, better learning, avoiding catastrophic illnesses. It faciliates the disappearance of the body in the name of its own improvement. It provides an automatic internal surveillance system of the previously autonomous body from within its own circulatory systems. And then, biotech pirates the body away from itself in the name of a perfect eugenics. Literally, the organic body is about to be replaced, redesigned, and left behind as gene kill by biotechnology acting as a **predatory war machine**. Read the business pages of any newspaper. The final harvesting of data flesh is the newest IPO. This future is not for everyone. **Most will be left behind as surplus flesh**. The genetic elite will pass over. Visions of Gattica. Their children already have. They will be the leaders of the new world order of the genetic matrix.

Heidegger said that to understand what is closest at hand sometimes we have to travel furthest. So read the hermetic manuscripts of the desert mothers and the desert fathers. And not just the ancients, the Anchorites, but the desert thinkers of the biotech future: digital artists. The visionaries of the biotech eye who have gone ahead by travelling furthest to what is nearest to us: our bodies. Long dead words blowing in the sand of caves in the deserts of North Africa or in other deserted caves in the deserts of the digital vortex.

That which is coming has long been predicted.

That which will happen has long been prophesied.

That which will disappear has long been lamented.

That which will be dominant has long been feared.

The twenty-first century is an age of tremulous technological destiny. The future is **suspended in an electric shadowland of ambivalence**, drifting between fascination and dread. Both tendencies necessary. Both tendencies incomplete without their opposite. In biotechnology, a new form of android life – the final revelation of technology as a new form of android life, a posthuman life substituting itself for the human species, finally begins.

We are one of the last generations before something fundamentally new. The experiments have **already** begun.

#### The will to technology is a doubled expression of hubris – it ends the human species and the cycle of life and death

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 29-31, October 2021, MG)

On the surface, the rhetoric of this latest American revival movement is delivered in the deliberately arid form of technocratic ambition – an “Internet of Things,” the “quantified self,” “A Data-Driven Life” – but scratch the surface of the covering rhetoric and what springs to mind are all those unmistakable signs of the spirit of rapture. Everything is there: a theology of technology driven by an overwhelming conviction that the vicissitudes of embodied experience are subordinate to digital transcendence; the will to extend life either by uploading the human mind into its AI machinic successors or by passionate faith in the bornagain body of artificial DNA; the doctrine of data as a state of (codedriven) grace; and conversionary enthusiasm for the fully quantified life. While many different perspectives gather under the revival tent of technological rapture, one common thing remains: an abiding **faith that technological society** is quickly delivering us to a future inaugurated by a singularity event, that epochal time in which intelligent machines take command with promises of a mind merger with a data world that is fluid, mobile, relational, and indeterminate. Though sceptics standing outside the circle of technological rapture might be tempted to reduce its enthusiasm for data delirium to the larger figurations of the form of (technological) subjectivity necessary for the functioning of digital capitalism, that reduction would surely overlook the fact that the contemporary will to technology is itself driven by a more **radical eschatological promise**, namely that the will to data has about it the tangible scent of finally achieving what the project of science has always promised but never delivered – human relief from death, disease, and bodily decay. While Francis Bacon’s emblematic treatise Novum Organum may have been the first to so confidently link the project of science and the heretofore quixotic quest for immortality, it was left to a contemporary techno-utopian visionary, Raymond Kurzweil (The Singularity Is Near), to transform Bacon’s ontological ambition for science into a practical strategy for better – that is, extended – computational living.2 In Kurzweil’s promised land of blended reality, the sky is the limit, with traditional boundaries dissolving between nature and human nature, the material and the virtual, and the enduring vulnerability of the human body with its defining limits of illness and death finally transcended. Powered by advances in nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and gene editing, the world as we have always known it will be in sudden eclipse, and all this change will take place under the rising sun of a **technological ornucopia**. As Kurzweil argues, “through the use of nanotechnology, we will be able to manufacture almost any physical product upon demand, world hunger and poverty will be solved, and pollution will vanish. Human existence will undergo a quantum leap in evolution. We will be able to live as long as we choose. The coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.”3

At first glance, this vision is only the most recent expression of the Greek concept of hubris, the cautionary tale concerning the ineluctable balance between excessive pride of purpose and mythic punishment meted out by always observant gods. Adding complexity to this reinvocation of hubris as often-fatal overconfidence, that vision of singularity is, in actuality, a **doubled expression of hubris**. First, there is the sense of technological overconfidence involved in breaking beyond the traditional boundaries of the specifically human in order to speak of the new epoch of “man and machine,” that is, fully digitally interpolated subjects in which the specifically human merges with the **extended nervous system of the cybernetic**. Here, the merely human is replaced by the technologically enabled post-human as the fundamental precondition for the singularity. With the sovereign expression of technological post-humanism, the stage is set for the futurist release of all the pent-up excess of expressions of scientific determinism and technological fundamentalism that have been gathering momentum for some five centuries  – transcending bodily limits, eradicating illness, ending poverty and hunger, and vanishing pollution. In its basics, this version of technological futurism, with its doubled sense of hubris and complicated alliance of recoded bodies, nanotechnology, genetic determinism, and artificial intelligence, is a **creation myth** – “the coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.” With techno-futurism, we are literally present at a digital rewriting of the Book of Genesis with all that is implied in terms of (re)creating the body for smoother, and perhaps safer, passage through the often-turbulent event horizon surrounding the black hole of the singularity towards which (technological) society is plunging. While the DIY body may have the “Internet of Things” as its necessary digital infrastructure and the “quantified self” as its ideal expression, what drives it forward, animating its design and inspiring its constant creativity, is, in the end as in the beginning, the spectre of the coming singularity as its core creation myth. Curiously, in the same way that Heidegger once noted that the question of technology can never ever be understood technologically – that we must travel furthest from the dwelling place of technology to discover its essence4  – the concept of singularity, while evocative of the language of science and powered by digital devices, is something profoundly theological in its inception.

Given the sheer complexity of contemporary global society with its mixture of recidivist social movements, global climate change, fully unpredictable human desires, economic turbulence, and, of course, changing rhythms of bodily health and the many diseases of the aged and the sick, Kurzweil’s vision is startling, less so for its naivety than for its feverish embrace of an approaching technological state of bliss – transcendent, teleological, and terminal. His vision is transcendent because its overriding faith in machine intelligence, nanotechnology, and gene research is premised on the imperative of “overcoming our frail bodies with their limitations.” Here, unlike the Christian belief first articulated by St. Augustine in De Trinitate – with its division of the body into corruptible flesh and the perfect incorporeality of the state of grace – the newest of all the singularities is intended to lead to a new heaven of computation. It’s teleological because this vision of the new singularity invests the will to technology with a sustaining, indeed inspiring, purpose: overcoming the unknown country of death. And it’s terminal because it is also a **philosophy of end times**, certainly **the end of the human species as we have known it** but also the end of easily distinguishable boundaries between the “biological and the mechanical, or between physical and virtual reality.”5 In Kurzweil’s vision, the nanotechnology revolution is, in fact, revolutionary precisely because it will facilitate the creative construction of new bodies and technologically enhanced minds for life beyond the current “limitations of biology.”6 It is the end, therefore, of the biological body as we have known it and the beginning of something very novel: the merger of natural biology with its surrounding environment of technologies of the post-biological – artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, molecular science, and neurobots. As to be expected, in return for the **sacrifice of a natural biological cycle of life and death**, the creation myth framing technological rapture has promises of its own to keep: a fully realized future of “living indefinitely” with nanobots streaming “through the bloodstream in our bodies and brains,” telepathy in the form of “wireless communication from one brain to another,” and improved “pattern recognition” by overcoming the inherent limitations of natural cognitive evolution in favour of “brain implants”7 marking the inception, then triumph, of “nonbiological intelligence.” In effect, the vision of technological rapture is conceived as a marvellous, ready-made (AI) toolbox for constructing DIY bodies.

#### Our alternative is a form of artistic practice that recodes the question of aesthetics towards the discontinuous, the fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal. We are the glitch, the darkness, the specters hidden within the techo-imaginary of the future that float in the drifts of codes, history, and media as their intersecting point of evocation and undermining.

Kroker 14 (Arthur Kroker, emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” pgs. 195-198)//JRD

What if we were **to think media** theory as itself an **artistic practice**, that is, as a **form of aesthetic imagination** that seeks to **directly enter** the world of **data nerves**, network skin, and increasingly **algorithmic minds** with the **intention of capturing** the dominant **mood** of these **posthuman times** – drift culture – in a form of thought that dwells in complicated intersections and complex borderlands? In its essence, **thinking** with and **against** the larger **technopoesis** of **accelerate**, **drift**, and **crash** that **holds** **us** in its **sway** **requires** a form of **media** **reflection** that is itself an **exit** **to** the **posthuman** **future**. Here, **refusing** to **stand** outside its **immediate** **historical** **circumstances** and **always** seeking to **capture** in its **rhythms** the mood of **accelerate**, **drift**, and **crash**, media theory of this order allies itself with a form of **emergent** **consciousness** that is **pervasive** in the **digital** **world**, namely **figural** **aesthetics**. With its global gathering of new **media artists**, remix musicians, **pirate gamers, AI graffiti artists**, anonymous witnesses, and **code rebels**, the emerging order of **figural aesthetics** reveals a **new order**, a brilliantly hallucinatory order, based on an **art** of **impossible** **questions** and a **perceptual** **language** as **precise** as it is **evocative**. Here, the **aesthetic** **imagination** dwells solely on **questions** of **incommensurability**: What is the vision of the clone? What is the **affect** of **the** **code**? What is the **hauntology** of the **avatar**? What is most excluded, prohibited, by the android? What is the perception of the drone? What are the **aesthetics** of the fold? What, in short, is the meaning of aesthetics in the age of drift culture? In this case, understood as an aesthetic order of (new media) art that seeks to enter directly into the circulatory regime of the code, literally in the **process becoming** itself **symptomatically energized** by the **vortices** of **data** **flows** and algorithmic coding, **figural** **aesthetics** is always multiple in its **artistic** **expressions**, certainly humanizing, but also **tragic**, **neutral**, and sometimes cynical. **No** **longer** an art of **expression** or **representation**, but **art** that **literally** **catches** the **drift** of its times by entering **directly** into the **violent** **perturbations** of the code-stream – a **form** of **art** that is **figural** precisely because it **registers** **simultaneously** all the **fatal** **speed** and **tragic** **intimations** of deprival **implicit** in an **increasingly** technical **reality**. Not necessarily, then, a **multimedia** art that **evokes** the **contagious** **energy** of the code, although that too, but a form of art that stands poised at the fracture (Duchamp's “hinge”)2 of presence and absence, drawing into itself all the contradictions and complexity and folds of digital reality itself. Driven by a speed of (aesthetic) perception that easily exceeds the speed of the code, **mobilized** by a **new way of seeing** that is balanced between in-depth participation in the (digital) object of its study and an incommensurable drawing away from ruling narratives that would capture it, and attentive to the fact every artifact of technological posthumanism, from digital devices to private autobiography, is a **possible** **object** of **artistic** **interest**, **figural** **aesthetics** **floats** in the drifts of **codes**, **history**, **video**, and **media** as their **intersecting** **point** of evocation and **undermining**. Sensitive to fundamental changes in the order of sense perception, the artistic imagination has always functioned as a navigator, simultaneously intimate with and at a critical distance from the digital recoding of the human sensorium. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the **first** **response** to the **emerging** **complexities** of **technological** **posthumanism** is most **definitely** **aesthetic** in form. **Not** a mode of **aesthetics** that **remains** at **one** (safe) **remove** from the **technological** **transitioning** of the question of the human species-form, but the swift emergence now of a style of aesthetics – figural aesthetics – that **enters** directly into the **complexities** of drift culture. Sometimes, figural aesthetics adopts the **language** **of** **design**. It becomes a **rider of the data storm**, negotiating **new** **pathways** **through** the **radical** **uncertainty** of the **digital** **future**. At other points, **figural** **aesthetics** offers profound **meditations** on the **accident** **of** **technology** by invoking in the **language** **of** **art** the ancient tradition of lament. **Deliberately** **challenging** officially prescribed **frameworks** of **understanding**, **figural** **art** of this order quickly **calls** **down** upon itself the most severe form of **policing**. Literally, the **framework** of power involved in **securing** **contemporary** norms of **political** **intelligibility** is **suspicious** of **thought**, particularly of those **artistic** **articulations** of **remembrance** and **lament** that work to **undermine** otherwise invisible frameworks of **official** **interpretation**. Of course, when data slams into the human condition, the result is not only the swift eradication of familiar landmarks in understanding the here, there, and everywhere of social intelligibility, but the rapid rise to prominence of new forms of **figural** **art** – mobile, augmented, remix, scanner – that in both form and content reflect the shape of the unfolding future and, in that fatal reflection, render that **future** **uncertain** and **truly** **enigmatic**. And how could it be otherwise when the earliest signs of the coming of the posthuman allude to the surfacing of body futures that are multiple: sometimes enhanced data bodies, but also bodies that have gone off-grid, bodies colonized by mono-data, bodies circulating in the digital debris of spam, spyware, viruses and contagions, and even twisted bodies caught in the opposing energy flows of the seduction of connectivity and the negation of relentless digital overexposure. **Figural** **aesthetics** is the **spectral** **eye** of the **posthuman**, that point where **art** **enters** the **order** of **digital** **being** with such **perceptual** **intensity** that it makes of itself a **mutating** **sign** of the **collision** of **the** **code**, **the** **human**, the android, the metallic, and perhaps even of the **digital** **zombie**. **Art** of this (posthuman) order **recodes** the **question** of **aesthetics** by the **creation** of a mode of **perception** that **fully** **opens** to the discontinuous, the **fragmentary**, the **uncertain**, the **reversal**. What results is a form of figural art – **posthuman** **art** – that has **no** **necessary** **medium** of expression precisely because it is **always** an **art** **of** **the** **intersection**, the incommensurable, **the** **bifurcation**, the broken code, **the** **glitch** that **reveals** the **darkness** **within**, the static that **reflects** the **passage** **of** **pure** **speed**. Art of **this** **order** is a **haunting** **talisman** of the **posthuman**, **neither** its **advent** **nor** **termination**, but a form of **posthuman** **aesthetics** that can **never** **express** anything external to itself because **figural** **art** **constitutes** in its **essence** the **uncanny** **meaning** of the **posthuman** **moment** – fluid, mobile, folded, combinatorial, transitional. Consequently, figural aesthetics is an art of motion but also an art of inertia – speed and slowness, noise and silence. With its strange juxtapositions, unexpected folds, fluid intersections, figural art can be so strangely familiar to us, the earliest inhabitants of the technological posthuman, because it is an advance outrider of a new form of perception that is already practiced on a daily basis but nowhere fully culturally acknowledged. While most certainly this **new** **aesthetic** **language** seeks to describe what has happened to the body, consciousness, labor, culture itself when folded within the cyclotron of computation, it also brings to the **surface** the **deeper** **ethical** **concerns** of **society**: the **terrorism of the code**, the revenge-taking of the failing master narratives, the **injured** **sensibility** of **subject** narratives in rapid decline, the **growing ressentiment** of the human at its **eclipse** by the **technological** **posthuman**, the cynical relief of the abject human at being **unburdened** of its **eschatological** **responsibility** for being a **coherent** **species** being – the fatal embodiment of the will to technology. Lyotard's Driftworks announced the opening themes of figural art: “Here is a course of action: harden, worsen, accelerate decadence. **Adopt** **the** **perspective of active nihilism**, exceed the mere recognition – be it depressive or admiring – of the **destruction** of all **values**. Become more and **more** **incredulous**. Push **decadence** **further** still and accept, for instance, to **destroy** the **belief** in **truth** **under all its forms**.” Now that the **posthuman** **condition** has revealed decadence – **incredulous**, **excessive** **decadence** – as the **basic** **ontology** of **late** **capitalism**, the point of a **figural art** that would “harden, worsen**, accelerate decadence**” would be **precisely** the **reverse**, that is to say, it would draw into a **greater visibility those intangible**, but very real, **impulses** to **social** **solidarity** and **ethical** **probity** that haunt the order of the real. So, then, **figural** **art** is always a **navigator** **of** **uncertainty** because it **remains**, above all, an **explorer**, a **hinge**, a **fracture**, in the **midst of the data storm.**

## Links

### L - 5G China

#### The 5G race with China is just an emerging cold (data) war intent on rendering subjects technological

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 17-20, October 2021, MG)

Alarmed by the resurgent global prominence of Huawei, a major privately owned Chinese telecommunication corporation now leading the world with its rapid deployment of a highly innovative, fast, and cheap 5G network information platform – the new network standard for speed, fluidity, and flexibility in moving vast streams of data – the suddenly challenged software empire of the United States has struck back **hard and fast**, deploying not innovative technological solutions but political stealth. At stake in this struggle between Huawei, as a surrogate for Chinese strategic national ambitions to quickly climb the economic value chain from low-wage mass manufacturing to broad spectrum technological innovation, and the United States government, as a surrogate for American network infrastructure companies that find themselves stuck in the mud of suddenly eclipsed 4G information systems, is the question, **Who will code the digital future**? Here, control of network technology involves powering up the information bomb that is the digital future, putting down codes for which economies, cultures, and politics matter and which will be silently but no less relentlessly prohibited, excluded, and silenced. In this scenario, California ideology – the technological vision of information technology Silicon Valley style, with its concerted orchestration of actions between Silicon Valley and the American national security state – finds itself challenged by a rising star on the previous digital periphery: Huawei, a company with a work force of engineers and researchers based in the Pearl River Delta north of Hong Kong. In digital reality, innovative code breakthroughs are always restless, know no definite boundaries, and move from the periphery to the centre at the speed of viral contagion; with this struggle, California ideology meets its first real challenge for control of the digital future in the form of the nervous breakthrough that is 5G at the coding hands of Pearl River ideology. **It is an ideological struggle**. Just as much as California ideology assumed a dominant global position in computer technology by first silencing that other California counter-ideology, those hackers of computers, politics, and art who dreamed of turning the magic of information technology in the direction of digital justice, so too Pearl River ideology runs parallel to the global ambitions of the Chinese state, namely to demand respect for China, for its past history as well as its present accomplishments, as an author of a future outside the orbit of American political dominance. So, then, it’s a classic struggle between massive trading blocks, each of which shades into equally massive political empires. In this case, information is political, and there is nothing more politically sovereign than control over the **nervous system of global information infrastructures**.

China understands this reality, which is why it has staked its long-term political strategies on the new long march of codes. The United States does as well, which is why it has laid down three challenges to resurgent China. First, buried in the text of recent American tariffs against Chinese imports are specific regulatory clauses aimed directly at prohibiting the global adoption of Chinese computer infrastructure products. China might aspire to climb the economic value chain, from low-wage mass manufacturing for export to consumer markets to high-wage technological enterprises, but the United States is clearly determined to slow down, if not block entirely, this key code shift in Chinese state planning. Just as in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, where the United States swiftly put in place a policy of containment – the global American-led international alliance against the spread of communism – as a way of limiting the spread of socialism, so too in the now emerging **cold (data) war** with China, the first stage of digital containment involves constructing an alliance of willing nations – Japan, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and potentially Canada and Britain – officially committed to not deploying Chinese computer infrastructure in government and military digital installations. Perhaps to make the message clear or perhaps just as a deliberate, secretive game between the digital masters of “Five Eyes” – the signal intelligence sharing agreements among five countries, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and Britain – and enthusiasts for free trade with China, the arrest of the Huawei’s chief financial officer (CFO) for legal extradition to justice American-style marks the beginning of **overt hostilities** between these two clashing digital powers, one resurgent, the other seemingly in danger of being technologically eclipsed.

In digital capitalism, network speed is everything. When information moves at light speed with stock exchanges, media outlets, military strategists, banking networks, and gambling sites responding real second by real second to dips and flows of information and with everything to be gained or lost by the ability of networks to do something about it, then the speed, fluidity, and flexibility of network technology is the essence of digital reality and most certainly the nerve centre of the digital commodity form. Now, as always, new relations of network communication necessarily render obsolescent old forms of network technology. In the **battleground of 5G technology**, 5G is the spearhead of the digital future, the new relation of network communication assured of global sovereignty by the logic of capitalism itself. Indeed, with strategies of technological innovation now more decisive than tactics of military power in the games of empire, information warfare fought code by code in the dark streets of network infrastructures is how the **digital future will be won or lost**. Consequently, the following early warning signals were issued from the front page of the New York Times Sunday edition, where it was argued that the United States is engaged in a renewed arms race “involving technology rather than traditional weaponry” and that what is at stake is the development of immensely powerful cyber weapons such as 5G, which will, in effect, shape the future of the twenty-first century. Here, the future is envisioned as powered by artificial intelligence (AI) and deep machine learning with networks specifically designed around the imperatives of “technological stacking” and ubiquitous computing, creating continuous data flows among cities, manufacturing production, and a supporting background structure of autonomous cars and trucks, complex sensors, and self-directed robots.18 Not just a future of autonomous weaponry but also increasingly **autonomous (technological) life** is envisioned, with all of it moving at the speed of 5G.

### L – Capitalist Tech

#### The attempt to rid capitalism but attain technicity is a double-turn – it allows the ruling class to attach itself to violent cybernetics in order to cement its power

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 141-142, March 2004, MG)

The fate of the virtual class is inextricably tied to the knowledge theory of value. As a class representing the leading (theoretical) edge of the new economy, the virtual class simultaneously brings virtual knowledge into real (digital) material existence, patenting its ownership rights, codifying its procedures of practical (net) use, and recreating the world in terms of a three-tier virtual architecture. At the same time that the virtual class is the **self-realized form of the knowledge theory of value**, the very existence of the virtual class is itself dependent on the actualization of virtual knowledge. Simultaneously a decisive point of the historical realization of virtual knowledge as well as its world cypher, the virtual class always occupies the dual position of (active) creator and (passive) portal, explosive dynamic of the digital future and servomechanism for consolidating the digital past.

But at the same moment that the virtual class materializes the knowledge theory of value in terms of a radical remaking of every dimension of existence in the direction of pure technicity, at the exact point that the virtual class represents the real material realization of the will to virtuality, at that specific historical juncture the virtual class inserts into the brainware of the digital nervous system a fundamental objective contradiction that has the effect of forcing the will to virtuality to undergo a fatal oscillation of its wave-form. Never a class capable of being subordinated either to pure technological (use) value or to relentlessly accumulative Capitalist (exchange) value, the peculiarity of the virtual class is that it stands midway between **technology and Capitalism**. It is the **inherently unstable** third term mediating Capitalism and technology, sometimes their point of reconciliation as expressed by the vanguard (networked) multinationals of the new economy, at other times their moment of internal disturbance as represented both by the speed with which new (electronic) technologies undermine settled Capitalist formations and the discipline with which the drive to economic profitability objectively limits technological creativity. Always a dynamic mediation, always a restless ‘going across’ between the imperatives of technology and Capitalism, the virtual class simultaneously represents the **cybernetic intelligence necessary to realize the will to virtuality and its potentiality for a fatal undermining**.

Between technology and Capitalism? That’s the virtual class in its purely aesthetic mode as a ‘hinge’ experience, here **attaching itself to established Capitalist formations as a way of gaining access to the technological apparatus**, there practising a form of (cyber) monastic self-discipline as it shrinks its collective technological imagination down to the instrumental size of market-exchange. However, the virtual class can never remain for long under the spell of a strictly Capitalist determination because it is, first and foremost, as a virtual class the historical embodiment of the will to virtuality. While necessity grafts it to Capitalism, its own (technological) class imperative **forces it to continuously upgrade itself to the advancing edge of the cybernetic storm**. Always post-Capitalist, pure technicity destroys national structures of Capitalism in favour of the virtualizing imperatives of globalization. Always post-accumulative, the will to virtuality is imminently disaccumulative, replacing the sign-form of Capital with the value-form of technology and, thereby, reducing the laws of market exchange to the **self-regulating discipline of cybernicity**. Always post-market, the new economy is an anti-market, replacing consumption with pure (financial) exchange, market instrumentality with crowd contagion, the signs of a ruling economy with the ruling economy of cultural fads. Standing between Capitalism and technology, the virtual class has split consciousness, and in the growing consciousness of this split it is the difference that simultaneously realizes the will to virtuality and derealizes the virtualization of the will to technology

### L – Drones

#### The will to drone technology is driven from the attempt to control space and time – that emboldens hyper-technocracy which create lethal violence at the symbolic exchange level

**Kroker and Kroker ’21 –** Marilouise, An important feminist scholar, internationally celebrated publisher, editor, writer, theorist and performance artist, Arthur, Canadian author, editor, educator and researcher of political science, technology and culture, (“TECHNOLOGIES OF THE NEW REAL: VIRAL CONTAGION AND DEATH OF THE SOCIAL”, 10/8/21, pp. 98-101) – sel

When the Sky Grew a Warlike Eye

More than ever, real power in the twenty-first century is space bound – globalized, atmospheric, and instantaneous. It is not that time has disappeared but that the medium of time itself has been everywhere reduced, reconfigured, and subordinated to the language of spatialization. That is the meaning of “real time” as part of the contemporary language of power – time itself as an otherwise empty, locative coordinate in the spatial networks of communication surrounding us. But if that is the case, if, indeed, power has taken to the air, literally taken flight with the technological capacity provided by drones to turn the sky into a warlike eye, it would also indicate that the grasp of power on the time of duration, the lived time of territorial and bodily inscription, has perhaps been terminally weakened. When the sky has been transformed into a liquid eye of power – monitoring, watching, archiving visual data for storage in distant archives – with target acquisition and weaponized drone strikes as its military tools of choice, the greater complexity and intricate materialism of time escapes its grasp. Think, perhaps, of a distant future when empires, following the usual cycle of rise and decay, crumble to dusty memories, when a collapsed social economy produces an angry mass of dispossessed citizens in the otherwise empty streets, when even borders are abandoned in the global rush for scarce resources, and when all that is likely to be left may be those airborne fleets of now fully automated drones, long forgotten by their ground command, but still, for all that, circling the sky on the hunt for humans. At that point, some historian of the technological past may well begin to reflect on what exactly was released in the domestic atmosphere when the drones came home. Was it a technologically augmented surveillance system under strict political supervision or something different? Perhaps it was the giving of sky life to a new species of being – being drone – with a score to settle against its human inventors and, over time, the capabilities to do something about it. In this time, above all times, a time in which we can finally appreciate what is to be gained and lost – what is utopian and what dystopian – concerning the technological devices we have engineered into existence, it may be well to remember that the story of technology has never really lost its entanglement with questions of religion, mythology, and politics. Signs of the practical entwinement of technology and mythology are everywhere now as early warnings of what is yet to come – namely, while the contemporary language of technology might have excluded its origins in myths of nemesis and hubris, what drone technology may actually deliver in the future as its most terminal payload will be the return of mythic destiny as the hauntology of the sublime order of technology. Consider, for example, the following stories about the world of drone warfare: “Drone Swords from the Sky,” “Drone Kamikazes in the California Sun,” and “Hydra Awakened.”

Drone Swords from the Sky

In these, the early dawn years of the twenty-first century, there seems to be such an intimate connection between military drones and suicide bombers: one aerial, the other bodily; one delivered from a distance, the other proximate and local; one implemented by a sophisticated telemetry of abstract orders of communication, the other executed by someone who knows with certainty that they are about to die; one a violent military tactic, the other sacrificial violence; one deadly power from the sky, the other revenge grounded in the sights, smells, feelings, and scenes of earth. Perhaps we are dealing here with a closed theatre of power, a violent circling of power and resistance entangled at the rough edges of the aerial and the bodily; militarized space and time for revenge; hyper-technocracy from the air and flesh, bone, blood, and memory in the streets; lightning flashes of targeted assassination from above and equally gruesome attacks by bombs and knives on the ground; military crusaders projecting power through the language of drone strikes; fundamentalist political resistance marking the frontiers of its own dreams of crusade on the assaulted bodies of its victims. So then, we have drones with swords as possibly the newest variation of the deep entanglement and slippery relationship between drone strikes and suicide bombers. This idea, at least, is what I take from a media report about the use of a new type of drone deployed by the United States armed forces in Syria,1 equipped this time not with missiles moving at shatter speed but with something dreamed up from the warrior past, namely swords taking the form of fast spinning, lethal blades, instantly shredding through the metal of the targeted car and the bodies of its passengers. In this instance, it’s a technological suicide attack from the surrounding sky, putting aside high impact explosives in favour of a weapon, sword blades, taken right from the warrior culture of the medieval Christian Crusades. In one sense, it’s predictable. Clinical in their operational planning and strategic in their calculations of kill ratios and technological devices, military planners are always seeking advanced weaponry capable of carrying out sudden attacks on targeted individuals that are as efficient in their lethal violence as they are suitable to the target at hand: nuclear weapons for mass extermination of civilian populations, bunker busters for deep underground targets, high velocity explosives for campaigns of shock and awe, cruise missiles for ship-to-shore attacks, and now, added to the arsenal of contemporary weaponry, a strange throwback to an earlier, medieval time of continuous warfare in the Mideast – crusaders with swords. From a military strategist’s perspective, designing the AGM-114R9X Hellfire missile capable of flying 1,000 miles per hour with whirling sword blades in the sky follows a cold-eyed calculus: what better way to avoid the public relations problem of “collateral” crowd damage from high-explosive drone strikes than to develop a drone that is as savage in its violent effects as it is specific in its application of death by blades shredding through targeted vehicles, slicing through the flesh and bones of its occupants. A perfect model of the serial avenger, the Hellfire drone is recombinant: warrior, stone cold killer, and flesh butcher. Still, beyond its purely military usefulness as a weapon of deadly force capable of being deployed in highly populated urban areas with seemingly surgical precision, drone swords have a larger, and more potent, symbolic significance. If contemporary military crusades of the West versus a supposedly always threatening Middle East have involved fundamentalist Islamic warriors being acutely aware of constant surveillance of their networks of electronic communication – suddenly going silent by avoiding cell phones, trusting only in face-to-face communication, delivering messages by hand – drones with swords respond in kind. Futurist weapon platforms featuring intense high-explosive missile blasts from hovering drones are supplemented by revisiting the past, namely crusader history with its heavily armed knights and legions of warriors riding horses and equipping themselves for hard combat in the desert sands with swords, spears, chain mail, and heavy maces. This time, while the sound of charging horses may have given way to the silence of fast drones in the sky, drones with sword blades are unmistakable in their symbolic exchange.

### L – Generic

#### The will to emerging technologies amplifies the crisis of the real, pirates the body through a genetic matrix, harvests flesh, and turns bodies into predatory war machines

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 185-188, March 2004, MG)

What is the future of digital reality? What is the consequence of the fateful meeting of digital experience and biotech engineering? What is the fate of the future itself when, as Paul Virilio argues in Open Sky, time and space as the deep horizon of our existence have been accidented, have been radically derealized, into the dimensionless void of ‘space-light’ and the real time, the instantaneous, global networked time of light-time? After the mutation, the galactic debris of local time and local space gets in our eyes, and history as a chronological succession of events collapses into random events with mutable meanings. Or when reality suddenly flips, and we are no longer living in hyper-reality, broken boundaries moving at the speed of light, but just the opposite – reversed into a digital universe moving at the slow speed of light.

The Slow Speed of Light

Just in time for the twenty-first century, physicists have frozen, and then actually stopped, a beam of light, thus instantly reversing one of the threshold laws of physics and more importantly reversing the hyper-speed of the culture of acceleration into slow optics, slow media, slow light.

When light moves at 38 mph, decelerating from over 186,000 miles per second, and then is suddenly frozen in its trajectory, hyper-reality crashes under the accumulated weight of deceleration.

Crash optics for a time when light-time and light-space decelerate into a sub-time and a sub-space where human perspective is suddenly faster than the electronic transmission of the image.

Crash time when the slow speed of light, the slow speed of electronic perspective, brings down to earth all those globalized vectors of simulated time that had been launched into global media orbit during the reign of the speed of light.

Crash space when the slow speed of light deflates all the trends to globalization and real time into the slow time and the slow space of the frozen local.

This sudden and catastrophic deflation of the speed of light **amplifies the crisis of the real**. The hyper-real was based on the accidenting of bounded light and bounded space with the disappearance of light and time into the ‘real time’ of virtual light and virtual space. An aesthetic regime of signification based on the speed of light. What happens now is the end of the hyperreal, and the beginning of the sovereignty of the subreal. Light moving at the speed of a car stalled in gridlock on a LA freeway in the noon sun. Light that moves slower than the propagation of electronic images, and the circulation of electronic sounds.

A slow speed of light for a culture about to undergo a fast descent into a vertiginous experience of pure virtuality: events spinning outwards faster than their images; slow light as a form of retinal persistence of the slow unfolding of past events; life imprisoned in slow time and slow space and slow images and slow aesthetics. Interminability as the dominant cultural sign of the twenty-first century.

Firewire Eyes

Heidegger was correct. Everything to this point has been preparatory, an anticipation of a fundamental and radical technological event. A decisive turning. **Until now, the will to technology has been on the outside**, hovering around the body with its probes of seduction. It invites the body to empty itself into wireless networks. It firewires the eye to images recombinant. It **harvests flesh**. It whispers about the speed of data flesh. It undermines the confidence of the body, making it increasingly insecure about itself. It reconfigures the brain. It **externalizes, ablates, and disappears flesh**: turning the organic body inside out into an open-source scan portal for probing **media of communication**. Until now, everything has been about the exteriorization of the central nervous system.

Not for much longer, though. The real implication of biological determinism as the dominant discourse of the twenty-first century – the human genome project, **nanotechnology**, therapeutic cloning, **genetic engineering**, the convergence of **artificial intelligence** and robotics, the dreams delirious of designer genes, organ transplants and tissue replacements for an improved posthuman sensorium – is that the body is about to **pirated by the genetic matrix**.

Pirated not once, but twice. First, **biotech** invades the body in the name of good health, longer life, better learning, avoiding catastrophic illnesses. It faciliates the disappearance of the body in the name of its own improvement. It provides an automatic internal surveillance system of the previously autonomous body from within its own circulatory systems. And then, biotech pirates the body away from itself in the name of a perfect eugenics. Literally, the organic body is about to be replaced, redesigned, and left behind as gene kill by biotechnology acting as a **predatory war machine**. Read the business pages of any newspaper. The final harvesting of data flesh is the newest IPO. This future is not for everyone. **Most will be left behind as surplus flesh**. The genetic elite will pass over. Visions of Gattica. Their children already have. They will be the leaders of the new world order of the genetic matrix.

Heidegger said that to understand what is closest at hand sometimes we have to travel furthest. So read the hermetic manuscripts of the desert mothers and the desert fathers. And not just the ancients, the Anchorites, but the desert thinkers of the biotech future: digital artists. The visionaries of the biotech eye who have gone ahead by travelling furthest to what is nearest to us: our bodies. Long dead words blowing in the sand of caves in the deserts of North Africa or in other deserted caves in the deserts of the digital vortex.

That which is coming has long been predicted.

That which will happen has long been prophesied.

That which will disappear has long been lamented.

That which will be dominant has long been feared.

The twenty-first century is an age of tremulous technological destiny. The future is **suspended in an electric shadowland of ambivalence**, drifting between fascination and dread. Both tendencies necessary. Both tendencies incomplete without their opposite. In biotechnology, a new form of android life – the final revelation of technology as a new form of android life, a posthuman life substituting itself for the human species, finally begins.

We are one of the last generations before something fundamentally new. The experiments have **already** begun.

#### The resolution attempts to impose a will to technological transcendence – reading the myth of digital salvation in favor of AI, cyber, and biotech culminates in the transformation of life into data-made-flesh, imposing a violent psychic commitment onto subjectivities while rendering marginalized bodies as accidental road kill on the way to a technological future

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 153-156, October 2021, MG)

#### \*Note – this is the same card in the 1AC of the K-Aff

Perhaps it’s no longer simply a digital universe of blended minds but something more generalized, namely blended bodies: emotions, subjectivity, imagination, perception living in a world of data made flesh. Like a technological makeover of the Christian Bible, which begins with the words “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1–3), the digital bible begins with the **translation of the spoken word of divinity** into the **cold data of technological platforms**. And, while the biblical story of the Word was recorded in prophecies of the Old Testament and gospels of the New Testament as the coming of the long-awaited messiah, for whose bodily sacrifice humanity would be indebted from birth to an eschatological debt that could never be repaid, the digital bible substitutes salvation by data, an epochal opportunity to shed the skin of the human in favour of the soft skin of the digital. When the story of this particular period in history is ultimately written, it will no doubt focus on salvation by running the numbers – **data made flesh** – as the animating impulse behind skinning the digital world with DIY bodies, surveillance that never sleeps, **drone** skies, robotic **cyber**-machines, singularity theory, **artificial intelligence**, deep learning, and **biometric** sensors everywhere. Here, digital devices are portals to the latest secular version of salvation, the instant connectivity of smart phones a re-enactment of a religious state of grace, **artificial intelligence a** **gateway to transcendence**, globally synchronized emotion a mass conversionary experience, desiring to become a data object drifting in the network a basic article of digital faith, and the fast streaming of virtual life as so many triumphant hosannas to the moment of digital redemption.

However, just like the story of Christianity before it, this newest reenactment of the myth of salvation in digital form has its competing myths: one, **the myth of order**, is literally the attempt by power and capital to channel the explosive energies released by network connectivity into a new digital order maximizing political loyalty and economic profit; and the other, **the myth of freedom**, is network society pushed to its limits and beyond by a rising generation of blended minds, data flesh, and virtual perception, particularly by the generation of the young today moving at particle speed.

If it is as true now as ever before that parasites are always quick to the feast, that scavengers are often first to exploit the radically new, the vulnerable, the tentative first beginning, then the story of **technologies of the new real is no exception** to the historical rule. No sooner did the new salvation myth of being digital take hold in the twilight years of the twentieth century then it was immediately hijacked by standing powers, effectively streamed in the direction of technological platforms as a new digital ordering of the world. Politically panicked by the ability of fast-moving flows of data to instantly overturn the earthbound world of national sovereignty, landed citizenship, bounded economies, framed identities, and hardened borders, power everywhere responded to the challenge by issuing its **own counter-challenge**: constant, ubiquitous patterns of surveillance, new **alliances between the national security state and major technological platforms**, the gathering of biometric data taking the form of social credit in China and contact tracing in the West, always seeking to upload our digital shadow, patiently going through the data trash we leave behind for its telling hints about our secret motivations, hidden intentions, and questionable loyalties. Politics in the wires, then, became a scavenger hunt in the data stream in the interests of **preserving the power of the new status quo**. It is the very same with digital capitalism. Unlike the sovereign state, which is focused for purposes of its own survival on preserving sovereignty over fixed, time-bound territory at a historical moment in which real power has taken flight into the fluid, space-bound empires of the digital, digital capitalism instantly shed its basis in territorially bound bodies, manufacturing, and sales, striking out for the monetization of the power of the flows of network society. That’s been the business history of the past few decades – the violent abandonment of blue-collar workers and their factory-based jobs in favour of the higher exchange value of offshore labour without a permanent home; **transnational** trade **agreements** making possible cheap, exploited labour abroad and high-market consumerism domestically linked together by the restless movement of robotic cargo ships; and the shedding of traditional manufacturing by putting down the digital hammer of business going online, either becoming transnational, wrapping itself in fluid flows of circulating capital, or not existing at all. That is the ascendant power of contemporary technological platforms – this new era of digital capitalism with its dynamic, here today/gone tomorrow face; its technological platforms that place their fiscal bets on **bending the myth of digital salvation** in the direction of killer apps, digital fantasies, beautiful imaginaries of new social media, the everyday flux of data made flesh. But having acquired unimaginable corporate wealth by servicing network society, linking technological platforms and willing subjects with digital devices, and thus enabling the global diffusion of digital reality, the economy is fated to ride the whirlwind of the data storm. In the present social crisis, the most striking expression of the new class reality of digital capitalism is the radical split between ascendant finance capital in global stock markets and very real economic distress in the streets, mass unemployment, degradation of social and health services, and that most anguished barometer of inner anxiety, despair, and hopelessness – the opioid crisis. Here, the winning classes of digital capitalism – the owners of technological platforms and their supporting technocratic class – take **economic flight into a golden future**; while the **economic losers in the new digital order** – blue-collar workers abandoned with the destruction of manufacturing; many white-collar workers soon to be discarded as **accidental road kill** on the way to a future of **artificial intelligence and robotics**; and the permanently dispossessed, that is, the poor, the asylum-seeker, the unwanted immigrant, the racially vulnerable, the ethnically disenfranchised, the gender outlaw – face devastation and a bleak future. No less aggressive than the national security state in its pursuit of data about its network subjects, digital capitalism actually propels itself forward by making intense, granular surveillance of the consumption habits of its digital subjects a very exploitable opportunity for massive capital accumulation in the form of relational advertising, with every Facebook post enabling capitalist exchange value, every Google search triggering a chain of capital accumulation, every social media activity an addition to a very marketable digital profile. While digital reality may have been inaugurated by all the conversionary enthusiasm, messianic commitment, and utopian data visions brought together under the mythic sign of digital salvation in the late twentieth century, this twenty-first century, spiked by the technological platforms of capitalism and power, has surely been marked by the eclipse of digital utopia with the swift, relentless channelling of that original enthusiasm for life in the wires as salvation into new forms of digital ordering, including the national security state and digital capitalism, which, if they fail to possess the original intensity and dreams of digital utopia, have the more prosaic, but seductive, quality of stabilizing the flow, isolating digital subjects within familiar borders including national identity and property, and **channelling desire along all the programmed streams of power and capital.** Here, the life-changing experience of being digital as a religious epiphany is successfully replaced by the pleasures, dreariness, and growing screen addiction of the new digital bourgeoisie with its disciplinary state, austerity economy, and virtual phantasmagoria. After digital utopia, we now have stasis; after the failed epiphany of digital salvation, we face the enduring reality of taking our place, quietly and without a murmur of dissent, in the new digital order.

So the story goes, **until life begins again**. That is the contemporary social crisis. Messianic visions of the singularity moment may still have very real momentum as the leading contemporary edge of the myth of digital salvation. The COVID-19 viral pandemic may have precipitated a great shakeout of the last vestiges of the pre-digital economy, accelerating tendencies already under way towards a new digital order typified by remote communication, automation of the service industry, a real world of artificial intelligence and deep learning, and all of it tightly controlled as the proprietary knowledge of technological platforms. Nonetheless, the stability of the new digital order and the seduction of life in the wires have been challenged by the insurgency that is life in the streets today, with its scenes of surging political protests from cities in the United States, Canada, and Europe to rebellions by Hong Kong activists against new security laws promulgated by the Chinese state. All the while, other conflicts, other insurgencies based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and national difference, have broken out seemingly everywhere, effectively challenging the sovereignty of closed digital borders with demands  – some fundamentalist, some visionary  – for reimagining a future off-grid to powerful machineries of surveillance as well as to technocratic digital platforms. Power today might reside in effective control over the **creation, programming, distribution, and policing of algorithmic codes**, but still the sounds and sights of life are palpably pushing up from below, sometimes allowing sunshine to burst through cracks in the data shield or maybe bringing with them a bit of cold, driving rain from the outside, hot energy from the streets falling downwards, rising upwards, threatening to rupture the set-piece framework of the new digital order with all the contingency, indeterminacy, differences, and absolute solidarities and hostilities that the human, now suddenly post-human, condition can muster.

### L – Military Cyber

#### The justification for militarizing cyberspace is a form of scapegoating intended on enabling the biometric subject, imposing a new global class structure on the world, and creating violence at the consciousness level

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 86-90, October 2021, MG)

**Militarizing Cyberspace**

In the dreamy 1990s, when the internet was first popularized, the ruling meme was beautifully and evocatively utopian, with that enduring desire in the human imagination for a technology of communication that finally matched the human desire for connectivity and (universal) community at last finding its digital expression in networked communication. Few voices were raised concerning the spectre of harsher realities to come, namely the possibility that the internet was also a powerful vehicle for sophisticated **new iterations of ideologies of control** as well as for **inscribing a new global class structure on the world**. To the suggestion that the destiny of the digital future was likely to be the rapid development of a new ruling class, the virtual class,24 with its leading fragments, whether information specialists, from coders to robotic researchers, or corporate visionaries closely linked – nation by nation, continent by continent, industry by industry – by a common (technocratic) worldview and equally shared interests, just as often responded that this idea was purely dystopian conjecture. As the years since the official launch in 9/11 of the counter-revolution in digital matters indicates, the original funding of the internet by DARPA was truly premonitory, confirming in the contemporary effective militarization of the networked communication that the visionary idea of developing a global form of network connectivity that harvested the most intimate forms of individual consciousness on behalf of swelling databanks was as brilliant in its military foresightedness as it was chilling in its impact.

The public rhetoric justifying this counter-revolution in digital affairs is as threadbare as it is cynical. That, in fact, seems to be the point. When the increasingly phantasmagorical search for scapegoats of the day finally ceases, whether through lack of plausibility or declining public interest in the **necessity of public justifications** for undermining the essentially modernist, and thus residual, values of democracy, privacy, and law, a **greater reality finally breaks to the surface of consciousness**, namely that the digital future has already been hijacked by visions of power and class riding the fast current of the (digitally) new.

Perhaps what we are experiencing today are simply expressions of absolute panic on the part of traditional institutions  – nation-states that have effectively **lost control** of their own sovereignty through the porous, unbounded nature of digital communication. In this case, political institutions based on the governance of territory are objectively threatened by an information culture that undermines traditional conceptions of political sovereignty by transforming the always active subjects of the new world of social media into potentially creative centres of social and political agency. Confronted with this elemental conflict between the emancipatory possibilities of fundamentally new relations of technological communication and old forms of political control, the controlling network of surveillance states responds in a way that is as predictable as it is relentless, namely to view domestic populations with their enhanced social media mobility as **potential enemies of a state** whose phantasms of perfect security increasingly come to focus on framing individuals as **biometric subjects** whose every movement will be tracked, every communication monitored, and every affect analysed for its pattern consistency. In other words, old forms of control are now being reconfigured as the new real.

With this new real, we enter an unfolding future of biometric surveillance as both predator and parasite: predator because it is violently aggressive in its application of the political axiomatic of the security state to domestic populations most of all; and parasite because biometric surveillance functions by attaching itself to the full sensory apparatus of biometric subjects. Biometric surveillance, then, is the symptomatic sign of the emergence of a new order of power – **cynical power**. Perfectly opaque in its purposes, random in its flows, wildly oscillating between the **projection of power abroad** and **protestations of official innocence** in the homeland, biometric surveillance power now has achieved a state of fully realized cynicism. Like a floating sign that has abandoned relations with its originating signifier, cynical power can be so effective because it exceeds any limiting conditions. Cynical power thrives by actively generating conditions of chaos and lawlessness, while, at the same time, it preserves itself by staking out positions premised on moral righteousness and appeals to political exceptionalism. Neither purely anarchic nor necessarily constrained by law, cynical power is, in the end, how contemporary technologies of mass surveillance express themselves politically. Here, power works by carefully staged strategies of impossibility, sometimes functioning to create **generalized conditions of insecurity and fear** within domestic populations while simultaneously justifying its use of often invisible, unchronicled exceptional powers as **absolutely necessary for securing the boundaries**, external and internal, of the state. The required political formula for the inauguration of cynical power and, consequently, the development of technologies of cynical surveillance always seems to follow the same fourfold logic: affectively, create conditions for emotional receptiveness within targeted populations of fear and insecurity; strategically, actively deploy sophisticated technologies of surveillance without any limiting conditions; morally, justify the use of intrusive surveillance technologies by random appeals to threats of terrorism, whether foreign enemies or domestic threats; and biologically, work to link surveillance technologies with the creation of a new form of life required by a society mediated by the bunker state, policing, and austerity, namely the biometric subject.

Tripwires in Cryptography

Biometric Subjectivity

Who could or would have suspected that the much hoped-for utopia of network communication would have terminated so quickly with a global system of meticulously machined individual surveillance as automatic in its data harvesting as it is strategic in its (individuated) target acquisitioning? Combining parallel tendencies involving a telecommunications sector invested in the sophisticated algorithms of analytical advertising and increasingly technocratic governments driven by a shared agenda of austerity economics, the bunker state, and the disciplinary society, contemporary surveillance practices are perhaps best understood as premonitory signs of the uncertain future. As we are no longer limited to questions of individual privacy, reflecting upon the question of surveillance discloses key tendencies involved in the emerging world culture of capitalist technocracy with its complex mediation of psychic residues from the past, social detritus from the present, and the technologically enabled evacuation of human subjectivity and, with it, the eclipse of the social as the dominant pattern of the contemporary regime of political intelligibility. Certainly not stable and definitely not guaranteed to endure, the present situation is seemingly marked by a strange divergence of past and future. While the future has apparently been hijacked by a sudden and vast extension of technological capabilities for network surveillance and intrusion, the really existent world of contemporary political reality is increasingly characterized by the appearance anew of all the signs of unsettled ethnic disputes, persistent racism, ancient religious rivalries, and class warfare endemic to primitive capitalism. Consequently, while the technologically enabled societies of the West are capable of being fully seduced by the ideology of transhumanism with its dreams of coded flesh, process bodies, and machine-friendly consciousness, actual political reality reveals something dramatically different, namely the greater complexity of Eurasian ideology as the **new Russian political pastoral**, resurrected images of a new Islamic caliphate, and, all the while, disaffected children of affluent societies rallying to those enduring battle cries of the alienated heart, whether religious fundamentalism, atavistic politics, or direct action violence. Contrary to digital expectations of a newly reconfigured, resplendently technical world of globalized real time and real space, today’s reality more closely resembles a fundamental and decisive break between the categories of technologically mediated space and historically determined time. For every digitally augmented individual strolling the city streets with Google Glass for eyes, buds for ears, Big Data for better ambient awareness, and Snapchat for enhanced affectivity, there’s another passionate struggle for human loyalties underway with its alternative dreams of caliphates inscribed on the real earth of religious warfare, revived **Russian imperial dreams of Eurasian mastery**, and always those reportedly fifty million refugees wandering the skin of the planet, sometimes policed in official shelters but usually effaced of their humanity – vulnerable, precarious, literally the forgotten remainder living outside of digitally bound space and historically inscribed time.

### L - Surveillance

#### Improving surveillance is a tool for the state to establish dominance over the population, militarize policing, and create racialized violence

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 54-58, October 2021, MG)

When the symptomatic signs of fascism have displayed themselves, triumphantly and without a hint of apology, at the highest levels of American government – the redefinition of American cities as a “battlespace”; the denunciation of peaceful protesters as terrorists; the militarization of police forces; government surveillance planes overhead capturing cell phone data of protesters; the imposition of curfews as part of a generalized state of siege; frequent occurrences of racialized violence and active, violent suppression of civic dissent by batons, tear gas, smoke canisters, rubber bullets, pepper balls, flash bangs, helicopter, horses, and military vehicles  – then the question of **surveillance** becomes a **storm centre of contemporary politics**. Here, the role of surveillance as a powerful tool of the national security state in identifying, tracking, archiving, and isolating sources of democratic dissent quickly moves from the background to the suddenly crystallized foreground of the gathering debate concerning surveillance. If the self-proclaimed aim of this newly articulated version of fascism is to establish “**dominance**” over the population by the use of “overwhelming force” supplemented by the militarization of policing, then a necessary tool in accelerating domination will be the generation of **ubiquitous forms of surveillance** that would permit the state to identify not only existent sources of popular dissent but also to **anticipate, and thus suppress, the future of dissent itself**. Today, surveillance never sleeps because power increasingly thinks of its own domestic population in terms of a hostile insurgency controllable only by “overwhelming force” and “domination.” Of course, not cowed by a surveillance apparatus acting at the behest of “overwhelming force,” witnesses to scenes of police violence, protesters subjected to “domination,” and observers of human rights violations create a vibrant, critically engaged network of counter-surveillance by mobile cameras that is as ubiquitous in its instant diffusion across the mass media as it is effective in mobilizing efforts towards political change. All the while, in this raging scene of mass surveillance and popular counter-surveillance, the triumph of visual media culture, with its predictable rhetoric, carefully managed narratives, and framed images, is instantly undercut by the **return of oral culture**. As the political theorist David Cook notes, “Trump’s use of Twitter is a form of oral culture that mesmerizes the individual in short aphorisms, slogans and quick spells reducing book culture which is too slow to compete. A culture that produces the **vicious turtle**.”2

That the present is a dangerous moment in the decline of the United States from an ongoing experiment in somehow reconciling representative democracy at home and hegemonic imperialism abroad to domestic fascism is intensified by the fusion of four crises appearing simultaneously in American public life: an epidemiological crisis under the viral sign of COVID-19; an accelerating economic crisis taking the form of mass unemployment and precarious wage-labour aggravated by the pandemic; a social crisis focused on **racialized violence** and the deployment of militarized policing; and a cultural crisis in which the stakes are high, namely the life and death question of whether or not the future of contemporary fascism will take root in public opinion and, consequently, in the deep emotions that **form private subjectivity**. Certainly, overstressed by crises from without and depressed internally by feelings of anxiety, panic, melancholy, and frustration, it is only one small step for **individual subjectivity** to seek shelter in the comforting rhetoric of charismatic political leaders who strike the words of overwhelming force and domination on the anvil of a bitterly divided population. Or could it be the opposite? Perhaps it is not an inexorable slide into an era of reactionary politics enforced by mass surveillance and energized by a pervasive silent majority of white privilege; perhaps something very different may arise, namely a fundamental social rethinking of police violence, racialized power with its apparatus of control focusing on mass surveillance, in the direction of social justice, first in the streets and then in the homes, the minds, and the workplaces of a growing majority disenchanted with the status quo. Videos of racialized violence, then, become possible gateways to insurgencies of social justice.

Trapped in the Bubble of Technology

What happens when the surveillance apparatus of the national security state is met with counter-surveillance by its citizens? What takes place when police violence, so often directed against people of colour, is matched by a waiting network of real-time video cameras by people, young and old, willing to be citizen journalists, willing to give witness? And what is the future of “surveillance capitalism” itself when citizens, increasingly aware of the granular intensity of network surveillance, begin to go off-grid, campaign for stricter regulation of large technological platforms, or dream of a reinvention of the internet itself as a publicly accessible global forum of communication in which issues of personal privacy are sacrosanct? What happens, that is, when surveillance by algorithm, coding, and reverse-engineered screens and mobile communications is finally brought out of the darkness of the secrecy of technocratic proprietary knowledge into the bright illumination of critical public debate? When surveillance is met with counter-surveillance, when tracking by machine is matched with counter-tracking by citizen journalists giving witness, what is the future of the real world of surveillance?

From a strictly political perspective, surveillance technologies are effectively designed to function as faithful ideological representations of the society from which they emerge and on behalf of which they are tasked with protecting it from unexpected attacks, unplanned intrusions, unanticipated threats, and potential new dangers. Consequently, if a society such as the **United States –** the self-proclaimed leader of the “free world” and the self-appointed moral guardian of “exceptionalism” – is both the leading model of hyper-capitalism as well as the financial and political spearhead of an aggressive, hegemonic global empire, its surveillance technologies will necessarily be modelled on the preservation of a dynamic form of power, the interests of which are truly global in their spatial extension and complicated in their interaction with all the boundary conditions of politics and commerce operating in real time. In this scenario, surveillance needs to **constantly scale up its technological ability** to track, by data harvesting, screens as cameras, and consumer household devices, an always tumultuous world perceived by the masters of hegemonic power as permanently insecure, perpetually replete with unexpected threats, always repopulated by newly emergent political oppositions. Ironically, with its heavy emphasis on the surveillance of spatial extension, bringing the globe under the microscope of advanced technologies, mass surveillance is often blindsided by the slow moving waves of time itself. For all its harvesting of massive data flows and its algorithms for pattern recognition, mass surveillance, trapped in the bubble of technology, often experiences difficulty in detecting those subtle intersections at the heart of the real world, those unpredictable collisions of **racialized violence, economic inequities, systemic racism**, rising hostility to asylum seekers and refugees on the part of white nationalists, sudden surfacing of **ancient ethnic hostilities**, insurgent religious fundamentalisms, and counter-ideologies forming at the edges, and sometimes at the very centre, of **empire**. Of course, if surveillance cannot escape the bubble of technology, if, that is, surveillance technology cannot detect subtle, but decisive, changes in history as time, then it is probably doomed in advance to give witness to the future of its own empire in ruins. One sure and certain indicator that contemporary surveillance technology has already entered its terminal state is the contemporary scene of American politics, where the fabled “homeland” is suddenly perceived by those in power as ideologically precarious, with citizens feared as potentially insurgent, and where the American republic itself is reframed as a **military “battlespace**.” In this circumstance, surveillance technologies previously justified as responses to potential threats from outside the borders of the homeland turn inward, quickly repurposed as powerful instruments of “overwhelming force” and “domination.” What was, in the recent past, a tacit state of affairs – a very real, but unspoken alliance between the national security state and technological platforms – now surfaces as the necessary condition for linking the algorithms of “**surveillance capitalism**” with political control of the American battlespace. Here, the machinery of surveillance is the tip of the spear of contemporary politics. Alexa recording domestic conversations, browsers acting as digital shadows, ubiquitous surveillance cameras in the streets, mobile devices with their geo-tracking of travel and location, automatic reading of licence plates, planes flying over protests in Lafayette Square near the White House collecting digital data from the smartphones of the citizen dissenters below – all these take on a very different meaning when not viewed simply in terms of capitalist accumulation but of the politics of total domination with all the potential deleterious political consequences that that implies.

### L - Space

#### The logic of space transcendence both obscures and is permeated by racialized violence – the technological imaginary by these means ensures the domination of racial hierarchies

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 58-61, October 2021, MG)

SpaceX and a Burning Police Station

Consider, for example, the deep irony of that media day in late May 2020 when televised scenes of a **burning police station** in Minneapolis, Minnesota, surrounded by angry, grieving night-time crowds of protesting citizens illuminated against a fiery background contrasted so sharply with that other media event taking place at exactly the same time. Here, **SpaceX’s launching of a manned space vessel** for a mission of replenishment to the International Space Station was also the key media event of that tragic day. This time, though, the scene was not burning cities but **fiery space launches**, not angry Black Lives Matter witnesses on the streets but **breathless technological hosannas** from media commentaries about SpaceX, and most certainly not federal troops and National Guards with the presidential words of authorization embedded in their minds – “when the looting starts, the shooting starts” – but a resplendently arrayed demonstration of American space force power prominently highlighted by President Trump himself. The empire might be in decline, streets may be in riot, citizens of colour may have dissented against the policing of white supremacy, but at this SpaceX moment in the history of the United States, the illusion of **American hegemony in space**, if not in the actual earth, was ready for a triumphant blast off, not to the stars of deep space but to their orbiting token, the International Space Station.

But what happens when the smooth narrative of this **deep-space moment** is broken by counter-surveillance, this time not with a streamed video image or a cell phone shot but counter-surveillance by the power of imagination, by establishing unspoken connections between the clashing events of that turbulent media day in late May? What happens, that is, when counter-surveillance is liberated from technological devices, becoming instead a new way of critically seeing the world: making connections between data feeds; bringing into visibility the illegible remains of racial, economic, and political inequalities; giving voice through imagination to the silenced, the excluded, the prohibited? In this case, if the SpaceX launch can be such a **compelling display of the technological imaginary** of a society permeated with the **logic of racial hierarchy**, then what is the meaning of these contrasting media images: bursts of flames burning with the anger of riots in the night, and spectral space launches by day? Are we witnessing a fatal struggle between metaphor (SpaceX) and metonymy (torched police station) in the contemporary American mind? And if, in fact, the essential symbolic meaning of the SpaceX launch was that it was a highly visible reminder that the animating energies of **America’s empire of technology** – the spirit of instrumental activism and the magic of a society infinitely adaptable to changing economic circumstances – was about to be exported to the stars, what symbolism was to be had in the burning remainders of that day, in the charred embers of the police station and the angry crowds of protesters, not projected towards a future in the stars but present in the remains of the earthly night?

We therefore have two sharply clashing media images: one about astronauts travelling to a space station in the sky, the other depicting those gathered in grief over a police murder in the streets. One image is the imaginative technological creation of Elon Musk, celebrated by American media for his enthusiastic spearheading of the power of **positive (technological) thinking** – a model of the much-cherished business myth of the entrepreneurial spirit, an evangelist of technological futurism who has managed to successfully launch himself beyond the bitter racial politics of South Africa to the more friendly, experimental, and supposedly racially antiseptic digital terrain of west coast America; the other is the product of the persistence of that most fundamental of all clashes in the heart of contemporary America – rage against racialized violence and the very real persistence of an ideology of white supremacy launched historically from the ruins of the Civil War to take root seemingly everywhere in the language of the everyday: in jobs, housing, health, security, prisons, and policing. Are we witnessing here the rise of the uncanny in American thought: dreams of technological redemption from above, revolt against racialized violence from below?

Surveillance technology closes its eyes of digital perception when actually confronted with the complicated intersections of social history. There is no digital cloud, no information flow, no pattern analysis, no determinate data, no harvested archive of behavioural histories that would enable understanding of the strange paradox of days of rage in the streets and technological utopia in all the launch pads of deep-space futurism. But if the apparatus of mass surveillance is bereft of the saving power of vision, it does not mean there is not much to be learned from that sad day in May when the real world of racialized social reality crossed paths with dreams of **technological transcendence**. When mass surveillance falls silent concerning the really existent drivers of the unexpected, the unpredictable, the unsecured – unchecked aggression in police uniform; the persistence of white male rage; the contemporary political reality of panic, fear, anxiety, and melancholy; the stubborn continuation of patterns of racial inequality, class disparity, and gender discrimination – it is fated to be marginalized as a predictor of the future, as an intimation, that is, of the likely consequences of a society where technology moves at the speed of escape velocity while the lives of Black people and people of colour remain stuck in the **inertial weight of social oppression**.

Consequently, two very different futures of surveillance are presented: one, the shared product of the national security state and corporate technological platforms that consistently “see” the world only through digital algorithms that are deterritorialized, decontextualized, and dehistorized; the other, the insurgent creation of citizen journalists committed to the deeply ethical practice of giving moral witness to social injustice – a form of critically engaged media practice that has the effect of providing images of a world that power would prefer to prohibit from witness, an invisible world of the silenced, excluded, oppressed, and abused. While the former is about control, the latter concerns taking back the streets of imagination, the alleyways of life lived in the full spirit of multiplicity. While mass surveillance reduces society to the codes of digital inscription, the algorithmically knowable, and the data detectable, counter-surveillance is always about the immeasurable, the off-grid undetectable, the strangeness of the unknown, the immense, radiating power, creativity, and courage of those living under the punishing sign of social invisibility. Two worlds materialize: fast data and slow bodies; technologically enabled mass surveillance and humanly enacted counter-surveillance; monitored bodies treated as data trash and bodies struggling in the streets of power, with brutal streaming video evidence of the real meaning of abuse value everywhere. A future is envisioned of data archives, quantum surveillance, embedded sensors, and the ever-expanding network of the “**Five Eyes**” in a contemporary political situation that intimates so forebodingly that this future is also tangled up with very real violence. Having witnessed so often and in so many places the deployment of surveillance technologies for purposes of overwhelming state power, we find the issues that haunt any discussion of surveillance today concern the ultimate uses of information gathered, the alliance between data and domination, often resulting in unaccountable policing, whether of the imagination or bodies – the targeting of peaceful protesters, increased mass incarceration, and pre-emptive sabotage of democratic dissent. Hence, we have capitalism under surveillance, power under suspicion, and media distrusted as the essence of a future now shaded by the clashing horizons of counter-surveillance by citizen activists and mass surveillance by always watching Big Brother algorithms.

#### The will to control space culminates in the vivisectioning of the code of life itself and permanent species annihilation

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 7-10, March 2004, MG)

With this, the age of Artificial War has begun. In its manifesto for the future of cyber-war, Vision 2020 (www.af.mil/vision/), the newly created United States Space Command theorizes a future battlefield of ‘**full spectrum dominance**.’ Abandoning the earth-bound dimensions of land, sea, air, USSPACECOM projects a new era of artificial war in which the battlefield occurs in the ‘**fourth dimension’ of space**. Befitting a ‘spacefaring nation’ such as the United States, third-dimensional warfare is surpassed by a vision of future war in which ‘battle managers’ are, in essence, computerized editing systems running on automatic, absorbing fluctuating data fields concerning attacks and responses, monitoring satellite transmissions from twenty thousand miles in deep space, sequencing missile launches, integrating ‘dominant maneuvers’ in space with ‘precision engagement’ on the ground, sea, and air, providing ‘full-dimensional protection’ to ‘core national assets’ and ‘focusing logistics’ for a virtual battlefield that stretches into an indefinite future. As USSPACECOM theorizes, the control of the seas in defence of commercial economic interests and the war of the western lands in defence of the expansion of the American (technological) empire to the shores of California has now migrated to a war for the ‘control of space.’ Consequently, a future of artificial warfare in which **space itself is weaponized**. Fourth Dimensional warfare is the technical language by which the American empire now projects itself into a future of Artificial War: a fourthdimensional rhetoric of ‘global engagement,’ ‘full-force integration,’ ‘global partnerships,’ weaponized space stations, **tracking satellites**, reusable missile launchers, and on-line, real-time remotely controlled anti-missile systems.

I emphasize this story because it is revelatory of the meaning of the will to technology. Here, technology not only is the chosen aim of technological instrumentality (weaponizing space), but also involves technologies of mythology (the well-rehearsed story of the unfolding American frontier where wagon trains evolve into Predator Drones, and sea-faring navies migrate into space-bound automated battlefield manager systems), technologies of thinking (the fourfold ‘tactics’ of space war: dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics), and technologies of (aggressive) judgment (‘multinational corporations’ are also listed in Vision 2020 as potential ‘enemies’ of USSPACECOM).

More than futurist military doctrine for the twenty-first century, Vision 2020 represents the essence of the will to technology. Here, technology is both a space-faring means to the successful prosecution of artificial warfare and its sustaining ethical justification. The will to technology folds back on itself – a closed and self-validating universe of thinking, willing, judging, and destining – that brooks no earthly opposition because **it is a will, and nothing** else. As Nietzsche reflected in advance: ‘it is a will to nothingness.’ Or, as Hannah Arendt eloquently argues in her last book, The Life of the Mind, ‘the famous power of negation inherent in the Will and conceived as the motor of history (not only in Marx but also, by implication, already in Hegel) is an annihilating force that could just as well result in a process of annihilation as of Infinite Progress.’1 Could it be that the world-historical movement captured by the military logic of Vision 2020 – this command vision of America as the historical spearhead of the will to technology – repre-sents that which is probably unthinkable but consequently very plausible, a contemporary expression of the metaphysics of ‘not-being’? If ‘**permanent annihilation’** is the sustaining (military) creed of Vision 2020, then this also indicates that the world-historical movement, which it so powerfully strategizes, is driven onwards by the seduction of negation, another suicide note on the way to the weaponizing of space.

Consequently, if the American novelist Don DeLillo can write so eloquently in his recent essay, ‘In the Ruins of the Future,’ that ‘technology is our fate, our truth,’ this also implies that in linking its fate with the ‘truth of technology,’ the United States, and by implication the culture of globalization, may have, however inadvertently, infected its deepest political logic with the will to nihilism. In the sometimes utopian, always militaristic, language of technological experimentalism, ‘Not-being’ finally becomes a world-historical project. Those who are only passive bystanders to the unfolding destiny of the contemporary American descendants of the Puritan founders can only look on with amazement coupled with distress as the ‘American project’ embraces not only the weaponizing of space but also **genetic experimentation** with the question of evolution itself. While DeLillo goes on to say that technology ‘is what we mean when we call ourselves a superpower,’2 his pragmatism sells short the point he really wants to make: namely, that by linking its fate, its truth, with the question of technology the United States has also enduringly enucleated itself within the larger historical, indeed if USSPACECOM is to be believed, post-historical, project of technology. Enucleated not as something other than the technological destiny which is its profession of faith, of truth, but enucleated in the more classical sense of the term, of being somehow interior to the unfolding destiny of the will to technology. The larger cultural consequence of this bold act of willing remains deeply enigmatic. In this case, is the will to technology an intensification of the pragmatic spirit upon which the American experiment was founded? Or has the will to technology, at the very moment of its historical self-realization, already reversed its course, becoming its own negation: Arendt’s prophecy of ‘not-being’ as a ‘process of annihilation’? On the ultimate resolution of this question depends the American fate, the American truth, as the spearhead of technology.

On the public evidence, what makes the American project truly distinct today is its enthusiastic abandonment of the pragmatic will for the uncharted metaphysical territory of ‘not-being.’ The will to the conquest of empty spatialization and the **vivisectioning of the code of life** **itself** has about it the negative energy of suicidal nihilism. Here, the language of ‘not-being’ – the desiccating logic of what Heidegger memorably termed ‘Nothingness nothings’ as the historical form of the technological project of ‘permanent annihilation’ – expresses itself vividly in two master commands: Space Command and Genetic Command. The first operates in the language of weaponized astrophysics where the curvature of space is manipulated for strategic purposes, and the other sequences the human genetic code itself. Thus, **control of space is inextricably linked with control of time.** The dynamic will to technology projects itself doubly in the macrophysics of a ‘space-faring nation’ and the microphysics of a body-faring cellular biology. This is a collective demonstration of hubris that Greeks in the classical age would only admire, and then fear, for its (technical) audacity and stunning (metaphysical) innocence.

Ironically, at the very instance that USSPACECOM projects an imperialist military future of ‘full-spectrum dominance,’ 9/11 occurs and we are suddenly time-shifted into the age of viral terrorism. Similar to the incommensurability of technology itself where the reality of ‘**permanent annihilation’** is sometimes offset by other ways of thinking technology, the human imagination does not begin, cannot begin, with tactics of ‘dominant manoeuvre’ and ‘precision engagement’ and ‘fulldimensional protection’ and ‘focused logistics,’ but with the terrorist side of fluid, earth-bound, real material warfare.

### L - Transhumanism

#### The transhumanist vision only culminates in the suspending of life and the locking in of the human into the solitary experience of death

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 51-52, October 2021, MG)

Consequently, while we can be aware that the “power of connections” is swiftly delivering us to a future capable of producing quantified fetuses and password-protected bodies, what remains unclear is the ultimate cultural, and perhaps even **existential**, impact of the triumph of the transhuman. Considered in terms other than dystopia or utopia, is it possible that such adventures in transhumanism – powered by **visions of technological rapture** and the singularity event, practically implemented by the quantified self movement, and replete with experiments in vivisectioning neural circuitry by synthetic biologists – are fundamentally changing the meaning of **life and death** for the human species as a whole? Perhaps it’s not a future of technological rapture but an indefinite period of **suspended animation** in which the human species, as a life form kept waiting for the singularity event that may or may not ever arrive, makes its final, feverish preparations for a fateful crossing-over point between machines and humans, yet not wanting to be untethered from digital prosthetics and definitely not anticipating that very real crossing-over point – the **always solitary experience of death** – without helpful technologies wrapping themselves around the “soft and curvy” matter of the body organic as it terminates.

There is a revealing report in the New Scientist about a new emergency technique in suspended animation (“Gunshot Victims to Be Suspended between Life and Death”)31 that bears directly on larger issues related to technology, culture, and life itself. The story recounts how surgeons at a Pittsburgh hospital are now experimenting in suspended animation for victims of traumatic injuries – by guns, knives, or blunt objects – as a way of stopping blood loss, thus gaining bodily time in order that their lives can later be saved by the necessary medical interventions. One surgeon is quoted as saying: “We are **suspending life**, but we don’t like to call it that because it sounds like science fiction. So we call it emergency preservation and resuscitation.”32 The technological procedure used in this trial is straightforward: once the aorta has been clamped, a solution of saline is pumped “through the heart and up to the brain,” and the patient’s temperature is reduced, with the result that “at this point they will have no blood in their body, no breathing, and no brain activity. They will be clinically dead.”33 Hopefully, though, they are not dead for long, since after the necessary surgical interventions, blood is flushed through the body, the saline solution purged, and the patient’s body warmed up by its own circulating blood, with this (redemptive) medical conclusion: “We’ve always assumed you can’t bring back the dead. But it’s a matter of when you pickle the cells.”34

Now, while this story is an intriguing one concerning the truly liminal boundaries between life and death, it may also be a **preliminary glimpse** of the fate of the human species generally and the DIY body specifically, as it is flushed with a saline solution of synthetic technologies, its key organs clamped shut with password-protected apps, its body temperature definitely cooled down by increasingly antiseptic loops of cold code, and its neural circuitry placed in a state of suspended animation waiting for resuscitation by technological rapture. While medicine, like all of science before it, cannot in the end overcome the finality of human mortality, the greater ambition of contemporary technology, particularly in its transhumanist expression, is captured perfectly by the surgeon’s insight into the **decidability** of previously undecidable matters of life and death: “It’s a matter of when you pickle the cells.”35

### L – Underwater

**Attempting to control drones underwater is reflective of the technical drive, one that suppresses insurrections against the system while employing temporal language to create spatial violence**

**Kroker and Kroker ’21 –** Marilouise, An important feminist scholar, internationally celebrated publisher, editor, writer, theorist and performance artist (RIP), Arthur, Canadian author, editor, educator and researcher of political science, technology and culture, (“TECHNOLOGIES OF THE NEW REAL: VIRAL CONTAGION AND DEATH OF THE SOCIAL”, 10/8/21, pp. 105-108) – sel

Hydra Reawakened Seemingly everywhere now, military visions are **resurgent** about weaponizing the oceans deep, about ensuring that advanced weapon systems are “**proficient**” in the blue waters of ocean depths, about gaining full military possession of the watery underworld.6 Is it possible that classical Greek mythology will finally find its practical realization in contemporary history by way of advanced military innovation? That, at least, is the hope of the US navy, as evidenced by the **DARPA solicitation** for innovative design proposals for a program named Hydra, which is aimed at creating permanent, unmanned underwater platforms in all the oceans of the world, populated by drones within drones. Media reports include enthusiastic accounts of “underwater drones deploying drones,” “underwater drone carriers” for conquering the seven seas, and unmanned platforms for quick insertion of equally unmanned “air and underwater vehicles into operational environments.” Here, the **limits of nature are disappeared** with rapturous speculation about US drone warfare moving from the sky to water, from surveillance from above to drone strikes from beneath deep water, shallow water, even from “river deltas or systems.”7 Drones within drones, upward falling payloads, an unmanned undersea system: the future of drone warfare as envisioned by DARPA migrates the question of the unmanned from its previous station in targeted aerial surveillance to the depths of the seven seas. Here, it is no longer flocks of drones hovering in the sky, but something else – unmanned, underwater motherships equipped with drones within drones, some as troop transports, others as transport vehicles for armaments and supplies, all lying in wait, just offshore, just under the seas, waiting to instantly respond to **insurrections**, **rebellions**, **disturbances**. While, from one viewpoint, this vision of repurposing the oceans for drone warfare provides another example of technological hubris combined with the US military’s proclaimed ideological commitment to “**global projection of power**,” from another perspective, it also contains a Heideggerian aporia. For Heidegger, the mobilization of the seven seas on behalf of a global system of command and control is part of the **technical drive** towards **reducing nature and humanity** to the status of the “standing reserve”8 – the seven seas held in reserve, that is, for an innovative process of technological ordering with its “upwardly falling payloads,” “drones within drones,” and “underwater drone carriers.”9 However, there’s one difference: almost as if perfectly symptomatic of profound, nagging anxiety about the eventual failure of the project in the face of a greater, as yet unknown, force, the very mythic name of the Hydra program announces in advance the most critical weakness of the initiative. After all, in classical Greek mythology, the figure of Hydra, this “serpent-like monster with two heads,”10 evokes a larger mythological fable that is replete with moral complexity and martial ambiguity. Mythically, the Hydra is always figured in relation to Heracles, the heroic representative of fallen divinity, who, in order to win back his immortality after killing his own wife and children, is forced to undertake twelve difficult labours, involving, among others, slaying the Nemean lion and capturing the Erymanthian boar, the Cretan bull, and Cerberus, with its three heads of a wild dog, tail of a dragon, and snakes emerging from its back. Yet, perhaps the most challenging of Heracles’s tasks was overcoming the monstrous figure of the Hydra, who, with its ability to effortlessly regrow many new heads, guarded the swamps of Lerna, beneath which lay the entrance to the underworld.11 The mythic force of the Hydra has to do with representing a fierce entanglement that only grows more difficult and complex with any and all attempts to overcome it. In the end, the Hydra was ultimately defeated by Heracles’s brilliant tactic of cauterizing the severed heads one by one, thus eliminating the flow of blood and the generation of new heads. The lesson of the myth is that the Hydra, this watery defender of the underworld, is as weak as it is ferocious, an obstacle that can be overcome in practice by a skilled, creative, and courageous warrior such as Heracles. Consequently, while the US military’s Hydra program may well culminate in interesting designs for an underwater world populated by drones within drones, it offers no solution to the real problem, which is, in its essence, mythological – the always certain appearance of counter-power, of counter-resistance to sovereign claims of “ownership of the undersea domain” in the form of the new Heracles: a heroic figure – perhaps from the present, perhaps from the future – with a name of no importance and from a country of no significance, who can only win back political immortality by overcoming the new Hydra of the underwater drone. Unfortunately, while the resolution of the problem of Heracles might have been left in suspension by an act of technological indifference, naming a project Hydra has about it all the signs of mythic necessity, posing a challenge to the sleeping powers of the long-neglected pagan gods of classical antiquity. Known now by the continuous appearance of the mythic signs of necessity, nemesis, hubris, and revenge, the spirits of those pagan gods have never really been at a distant remove from the technological scene and certainly have never been anything less than the essence, particularly if unrecognized, of political experience. While minds more attentive to the continuing mediation of the language of the pagan gods and the spectacular drives of technological hubris might enter a word of caution against carelessly conjuring up the forgotten spirit of the gods (particularly by formally inscribing their sacred names in the chronicles of contemporary history), it must be admitted that part of the unfolding truth of the most brash of the newest post-human gods – the language of technological mastery – is to issue a challenge to the death against the gods of classical antiquity. Who knows really whether the power of Zeus, the jealous love of Hera, or the remorse of Heracles have heard the voice of this newest pretender to divinity? Like the original Hydra, this drone project sets out to **guard the entrance to the underworld**, no longer under the mythological swamps of Lerna, but within the watery labyrinth of the seven seas. Like the Hydra of classical mythology, this daring military innovation uses precisely the same tactic to **propagate drones within drones** – **heads within heads** – **as a way of guarding itself against an enemy seeking to sever the only head of a multiplicity of heads that counts – the single, undetectable head of the Hydra that is immortal**. Of course, in the transition from classical mythology to the new real of drone technology, the contemporary Hydra, lacking any plausible pretensions to immortality, begins the game of war with an immediate disadvantage. Now we know from the military’s call for proposals that the underwater drone project is intended to operate in the real-time environment common to both the contemporary moment and, it should be noted, classical antiquity – insurrections, rebellions, civil strife, revenge-seeking suicide missions. Like the immortal Hydra, the underwater drone platform lies in wait, thus ceasing to be so much an instrument of **spatial domination** of the skies as a lethal weapon willing to engage temporally those who are courageous or perhaps foolish enough to gain entry to the underground. A **time-biased tech**nology operating in the liquid environment of the seven seas, this newest iteration of the myth of Hydra knows only that its weaponry of choice must, of necessity, be that of **deception**, **subterfuge**, and **secrecy**. Hiding in the depths of the oceans, revealing itself only when engaged in **aggressive military strikes**, the drones within drones that are the essence of the Hydra program adopt the **language of temporality** as their own: a waiting game of infinite patience with **secret locations**, **illusions of identity**, and **hidden purposes**. While drones hovering in the clear blue sky might communicate a message of terror by their very appearance, drones secreted within the seven seas communicate a different order of meaning altogether. Hydra is on the move again, with oceans bristling with **hidden weaponry** as the new deep blue sky of drone warfare.

### L – US Tech Dominance

#### American technology is run on technological flesh and the will to technology – the US’ tech dominance ensures communicative war

Kroker and Kroker 96 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Hacking the Future: Stories for the Flesh Eating 90s”, New Worlds Perspectives Montreal, Pages 8-12, 1996, MG)

Most societies desperately try to immunize themselves against the blast of digital technology. The European Community freeze-dries culture in museums, sometimes transforming whole cities into walking, talking theme parks. The Canadian Government specializes in creating circuit-breakers (regulatory structures) to stop the flow of digital technology. Telephones, ‘banks, and insurance companies: that’s the Canadian beaver pond, and like all tranquil pools, the point is to stop the flow of escaping water. Which is strange because Canadians themselves are digital beings: born with modems in their pockets, chips for heads, pixels for eyes, with satellites on their minds, 3D accelerators on their feet for speed travel across the multi-graphical interfaces of the Net in their flesh, WEB personalities, and deep space radio telemetry as nervous systems. Being digital is being Canadian because Canadians see themselves as improved Americans.

Improved Americans? Americans are different. They actually tear down immunity defenses in order to feel the raw pleasure that comes from the hit of the digital dynamo when it puts its hooks into human flesh. McLuhan was thinking of Americans when he said: “How are you to argue with people who insist on **sticking their heads in the invisible teeth of technology**, calling the whole thing freedom?” But, then again, what else are you going to do if you want to be razor sharp?

From the outside looking in, America seems deceptively simple. Aliens wonder how this nation of jocks, Christian barbecue suburbanites, and Hollywood actor politicians, and rappers and rockers and drug dealers and armed-to-the-assault-rifle teeth wilderness fundamentalists, not only got a world empire, but actually managed to keep it. With a mixture of contempt and envy, the world gazes into the looking-glass of America and sees only a **clown’s face toting a Saturday Night Special**. Condescendingly they declare: “We see with clearer eyes and better brains and, after all, we have history on our side. We should be America.”

A restless nation of transients who cut their Oedipal ties to Europe with a political revolution, America began with no history before the age of progress. ‘No Immunity” is the battlecry of a people who like their identity strong. Every American louder than life summer tourist strolling on a foreign beach can seem so relaxed on the surface because the internal codes are coiled so tight and learned so well at such an early age.

Shucking off talk of a social contract or a divine right of kings and spitting on the noblesse oblige of “civilizational discourse,” **American identity is technology**. And we don’t mean technology as prosthetics or technology as a servomechanism of the struggling inner self, but two-fingered tech, make that straight up and no ice please. Like a chip factory running flat out, the American self plops off the electronic conveyor-belt with wired flesh.

The age of science might have slowly come to maturity in Europe, beating its head against the drag-me-down fetters of feudal aristocracy and deeply ingrained religious prejudice, but in America science gets a green card, and is waved right past Ellis Island on a fast pass to everywhere. Here, all the insurrectionary codes of the scientific method - reification of nature, objectification of the body, radical experimentalism of thought, of action, of desire -just slip out of the dry pages of the philosophical tomes and flesh-net themselves into that quantum marvel of the New World: the’American self.’ Nobody can teach Americans anything about the real lessons of science and technology. Scratch an American and you’ll find a relativity theorist, a brilliant textbook example in the guise of a stockbroker, suburbanite, or New Age rural retreatist of a living, breathing dynamic field-event. Margaret Atwood must have been thinking of Americans when she said: ‘I’m a site where action happens.” No wonder Americans look so relaxed. Like brownian motion, they can bubble away on the effervescent surface because the reaction-formations lie deep and lie strong in the test-tube of the American self. Or, as one American software designer responded when asked whether or not it was true that the United States had committed itself fully to the will to technology: “Sounds right, I guess we’re just wired that way.”

**Tech flesh: that’s the secret of the American algorithm**. 1

PUTTING DOWN CODE IN THE USA

The American Algorithm? That’s America as the Operating System for global culture at the beginning of the 3rd millennium. Some countries specialize in technological hardware,: others in digital wetware: but America produces software for contemporary culture. Not just computer software - America creates the key technological codes that drive world culture, economy, and society. When the American algorithm is reprogrammed, shifting, for example, from the technological liberalism of the early Clinton Administration to the conservative fundamentalism of Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” then the world doesn’t just sneeze, it immediately gets digitally updated with the newest generation of the American code. The **techno-optimism of liberal futurism** is dumped into the trash, and the world bunkers down for a lean and mean period as technoculture is reorganized around the politics of rationalization and Spencerian economics. In the American vernacular, this means that stories about digital reality now move directly from the business pages to the front page of the daily newspaper. What’s online in the business pages is what’s coded, or about to be coded, in the American mind. By the mid-gas, American business actively and overtly makes foreign policy, for example, separating trade issues from human rights, that is, torture from profit. Technobusiness likes to say that trade encourages the possibility of human rights by opening up alien societies to external contact. What they never mention is that trade also legitimizes and, in most cases, prolongs torture governments. But then, in America technology, particularly technobusiness, rules. The first software code of America is that technology is life, and, consequently, that **being technology is the American mind**.

MICROAMERICA

As the software that provides system-operating codes for global culture, America powers up the 21st century. When McLuhan said that America is the world environment, he is to be taken literally. Tech hardware may provide external prosthetics for the digital addiction, and tech wetware may interface the body and the Net, but software is the distributive intelligence that authors the system. Just ask IBM, whose mainframe hardware monoliths were like digital dinosaurs crashing around wired culture, supposedly impervious to challenge, just before Bill’s cyber-gates opened up, releasing software raptors into the feeding chain. The rest is virtual history.

In the late 20th century, software is the power principle. And it is here that Americans have a special advantage. Unlike other countries which approach writing software as a learned technical skill, Americans take to software like a cookout and fireworks on the 4th of July. Writing software is actually like writing out in code what it means to be an American. American software genius lies in coding, decoding, and recoding. Authoring both Operating Systems- and Terminal Systems logic, America jams the extremes together, and pushes ahead with the difference. That difference is what’s called “reinventing America,” and “renewing America.” There is a lot left behind when America spurts ahead with every turn of the (software) wheel, but that’s alright. A fundamental tenet of American citizenship is that nothing should stand in the way of the will to technology. Safety nets can be j provided, therapy classes can be mandated for those unable, or unwilling, to cope with rapid technological change, and anti-anxiety/drugs can be distributed to the rest.

The- basis of American identity is the **will to technology**. Only Americans have been courageous, or maniacal, enough to pay the price for the coming to be of virtual reality. They are Nietzsche’s experimental subjects who transform themselves into nutcrackers of the soul, objects of conscience and body vivisectioning. They can be observed from a distance by Asians, Europeans and Canadians with a mixture of adulation, scorn and feelings of cultural superiority, but not without a lingering sense of deep admiration and awe for these Kings and Queens of the virtual kingdom.

America is the most aestheticized country in the world: Not aesthetics in the melancholic fin-de-siecle sense or the modernist sense of splitting high art from popular culture, but the American Homepage as all about interfacing digital technology and popular culture to produce Web identity, tech culture, virtual economy, and recombinant politics. What late 19th century sociologists called “collective consciousness” has been transformed j in virtual America into “Web consciousness.” Being Digital means knowing your tecematic place on the American Homepage, and ~believing, really believing, in the utopian possibility of reinventing your destiny by hypertext technology. Canadians might have the luxury of viewing communications as a work of high art, but Americans don’t wear cultural blinkers: **communications is war**.

## Alt

### Slow Life Alt

#### Digital innocence is gone, the only move left to play is to engage in slow life, a form of terminal unpredictability that prevents algorithmic overcoding

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 67-70, October 2021, MG)

There is **no longer** digital innocence in the unfolding future of fast surveillance. We know by long immersion in the real world of digital reality that we are **always** being tracked, monitored, archived, and evaluated – prodded, probed, and seduced – and, in response, we have sometimes become brilliant avatars of new counter-surveillance strategies. Consider the messianic, all-consuming interest of the rising digital generation of pre-teens and teenagers who have already opted out of the traditional role of passive recipients of mass media, becoming instead active, creative, deeply absorbed participants in the new digital worlds of TikTok, Snapchat, YouTube, and Instagram, fascinated in the past by the image repertoire of Vine, knowing Snapchat and Instagram by (digital) heart, always pressuring the system to move faster, produce more novelty in imaging, provide new video production breakthroughs, create magical apps for linking the multiplicity of imaginations that we all are, develop technological platforms that match the speed of digital desire. Here, all the smartphones and play stations of social media are no longer simply digital devices for facilitating communication but creative gateways to improved digital perception. And sometimes, just sometimes, as in the case of K-pop fans, better digital perception combines with an abiding, affective desire for social justice, instantly remaking digital streaming into politics of the street resurgent on the net.

In response, powered by AI, motivated by dreams of deep learning, and enabled by algorithms focused on understanding patterns of consumer interest, the image system is forced to run at hyper-speed, responding in real time to the fickleness of human perception, compelled to support a frictionless environment, always anxious about unexpected drops in human attention, quickly panicked by instant changes of state whereby rapt attention to the entertainment apparatus suddenly and with no warning shifts suddenly into absolute indifference. In this version of the digital cloud that is fast surveillance, surveillance tracks, absorbs, stores, and sells data accumulated from the global communities of users to a waiting web of online advertisers, while all the databases of the national security state relentlessly acquire information about digital subjects that will prove indispensable whenever power decides to pounce. But, in this ongoing game of seduction  – challenge and counter-challenge  – the emerging digital generation practices counter-surveillance of the system as well, making demands for better performance, drifting in and out of attention, sometimes going off-grid as a way of escaping the information dragnet, always read to spin away instantly, restlessly shifting from one previously popular digital gateway to another. To the system’s compulsion for technological perfection, the new digital generation responds **only** with greater bursts of **perceptual creativity**, brilliant fickleness, inspiring capriciousness, and critically engaged **media immersion**. To the system’s demand for technological order, algorithmic **predictability**, and deep learning, the new digital generation sometimes responds by suddenly going dark, being **unpredictable**, digitally agnostic, always drifting, dumping one app for another without cautionary warnings and certainly without displays of gratitude for past digital services. To the system’s political demand for loyalty monitored by all the very best of the hidden smartphone cameras, microphones, and data archiving that the national security state can afford, the digital generation has a sure-fire response, namely that surveillance, fast or slow, can **never** detect the bitterness of the human heart, hear the anger of a body always offline, and thus undetectable, to its online simulacrum, and that, in any event, patterns of past digital behaviour are definitely **never predictive** of the complicated desires, complex behaviours, and contradictory choices of consciousness moving at the speed of light. Fast surveillance is always forced to play catch-up with the digital drift of slow imagination, slow desire, and slow bodies. Fast surveillance is always undermined by slow life, by life moving at the slow speed of earthly experience framed by the unmarked markers, the **uncoded signs of race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality**.

Confronted by the fickleness of desire, the **unpredictability** **of imagination**, and the intransigence of the individual human spirit, the gamers of surveillance attempt to better position the system for the future by going quantum, by making surveillance an all-enveloping cloud that surrounds us, that becomes a hyper-reality in itself, absorbing massive streams of data, moving at high velocity, and always flickering, sometimes wearing the mask of an entertainment app, at other times attaching itself to the ear, eye, and mouth in the form of a smartphone, and at still other times playing the role of the all-watching, all-monitoring hectoring superego of the national security state.

Contrary to received opinion that feared the age of quantum surveillance would mean the end of individual privacy, the opposite has already turned out to be the case. From one perspective, the surveillance system has always experienced **great difficulty** in making sense of individual behaviour for the simple reason that past action may not necessarily be **predictive of future behaviour**, that data mining knows nothing of the rich interiority of human passions, that data is not intention, and that people reveal themselves digitally as they usually do in the flesh: beautiful mixtures of **chaos and order**, complicated wishes, and neon dreams, black and white choices with lots of ambivalence and second guessing in between. Besides, the crisis of vulnerability that sticks like digital glue to all contemporary technological systems is that the latter only function in data space and time: not the embedded world of lived time but the **hyper-world of virtual time**; not materially embodied space but the hyper-space of digital reality. Outside the overcoded, overproduced, hyperventilated, speeded up world of technological perfectionism, outside the perfectly hygienic, algorithmically coordinated, machine-readable world of AI, deep learning, and quantum computing, the technological system is **absolutely vulnerable** in its blindness. It cannot hear the complicated sounds of hidden, obscure human intentions. It cannot see the motivating anxieties of human passion. It cannot understand the rise of anger, resentment, fear, rage, and revenge-seeking as the **great existential crises** of the twenty-first century. Even within the closed, wired, shuttered world of digital perfectionism, the algorithms are noteworthy for their strange mixture of technical smarts and emotional dullness. For example, consider the challenged behaviour of Netflix algorithms as they try to anticipate and accurately predict what films users might like based on past choices, not realizing the magnitudes of capriciousness, fickleness, and creativity contained in the question of choice where, in fact, what makes humans human is that they are not usually content with being repeat-repeat machines; they will always work to subvert themselves by being digitally perverse, unpredictable, unframed, uncoded, with consciousness often energized by unconsciousness of the self.

#### The system requires human life in the codes – reversing that collapses its power

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 70-71, October 2021, MG)

In an embodied, material world, where we often live the future as past with the present as a specious moment thrown in between, and where curiosity typically trumps repetition and the emotional swirl of passion and desire always take precedence over hygienic logic, what’s a digital algorithm to do? While it is the master of a system of surveillance that has already broken beyond the classical model of physics and gone quantum in terms of fast information processing, the technological system is itself drifting **further and further away** from the enduring complexities and complications of the human condition. In an epoch where questions of race, class, religion, gender, and ethnicity have become, in very real time, the existential cloud of the world we inhabit, sometimes peacefully but increasingly with spasms of bitter political divisions, religious zealotry, and incipient class struggle, the surveillance system has literally nothing to say. It performs **analytics, not complicated understanding**. It runs the numbers, not the politics of the street. It profiles without interpretation, tracks without understanding, archives without complexity, records without seeing, stores information without knowledge. Fascinated with all the pathos, ruins, and wasted data of the past, it usually has nothing to say about the splendours and terror of the future. Outside the closed field of data, fast surveillance is emotionally dysfunctional. It follows digital footprints and sometimes even manages to translate those footprints into larger patterns of movement by all the digital tribes of the world, but it is oblivious to face-to-face conversations, since those who seek privacy increasingly go offline, as much as it is myopic on the question of concealed human intentions and torn-up human hearts. The system may run fast at the speed of subatomic particles, machine readability, and algorithmic logic, but its fatal flaw as a surveillance system is that it **only works effectively in the data field**. Slip the codes, unlink from data, go off-grid, turn attention to that conflicted, turbulent, invested world that is the individual human life or even the life of a nation, clan, tribe, empire, or caliphate, and the system of surveillance suddenly runs on empty. It requires **human addiction to life in the codes** to be effective. It literally needs life outside the wires to be eliminated in order to function successfully as an effective surveillance system. Which is why, of course, surveillance now rushes headlong at the speed of quantum computing towards an electronic cloud that surrounds us, saturates us, and does not let in any social sunshine, racial distress, or existential rain. In order to function smoothly, fast surveillance ultimately requires the impossible – machine-readable populations, scrubbed-down hygienic subjectivity carefully sequestered within hardened data borderlands, with an army of menacing drones for the remainder of the powerless, disavowed, excluded populations outside the new digital cities, nations, and empires of the future. Against this dream of technological perfectibility stands, of course, the counter-evidence of K-pop fans and “Whiteout Wednesday” as a very visible, very readable sign of brilliant unpredictability of human empathy, the fabulous unreadability of K-pop fans taking down racist hashtags by (digital) day and night.

### Retreat to the Shadows Alt

#### The alternative is to cast a shadow over the affirmative – only one that is split from its electronic double can refuse human suffering and temporal exile

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 95-97, October 2021, MG)

Bodies always have their **shadowy doubles**: definitely not in the darkness of the night when the sun falls below the earthly horizon and is replaced by the different cycles of the moon, but in the clarity of a sunny day and, with it, the often unnoticed splitting of the world into bodies and their accompanying shadows. Consciousness of this ancient story of bodily shadows, with its premonitions of a **fatal instability** in the accepted framework of the real, has sometimes led to strangely interesting mythic possibilities: cinematic scenes of **rebellious shadows** that suddenly **refuse their preordained role of subordination** to the governing signifier of the body in favour of striking out on their own – shadows without bodies; or, just the reverse, bodies stripped of shadows – possessed bodies that clearly mark their break from the terrestrial register of the human by their astonishing failure to **cast a shadow** no matter how intense the flares of the sun.

We mention this strange contortion in the story of the body and its shadow as a way of drawing into a greater illumination those new electronic shadows that accompany the emergence of digital bodies. Every critique of contemporary surveillance has made much of the fact that the digital body always leaves electronic traces, that there is no activity in the wired world that does not accumulate clouds of data, no form of net connectivity that escapes electronic notice, and consequently, no digital self that does not possess its very own electronic shadow. In all the discussion by intelligence agencies concerning tactics of mass surveillance, whether upstream (harvesting data from compliant telecommunication companies) or downstream (tapping fibre optic cables), constant emphasis is focused on creating individual profiles based on a (digital) self’s “pattern of life.” In other words, mass surveillance is also about an **aesthetic act of drawing into visibility** those electronic shadows that silently and invisibly accompany the digital self. Here is a clear sign that, with the emergence of the real-time and networked space of the digital, we have decisively moved beyond the limitations of the daily cycles of the sun and moon, as electronic shadows require no galactic movements of planets and the stars for their appearance. Never disappearing with the darkness, never changing their early shape with the angle of the sun, electronic shadows always **rise to meet the digital self**. Triggered by connectivity, governed by codes, archived in databanks, tabulated by power, the electronic shadow cast by the digital self will, in the end, outlast its human remainder. A future history, then, emerges of electronic shadows of data that cling to the human bodies that activate them but, for all that, remain at one remove from their earthly origins.

The result is inevitable: just as novelists, short story writers, poets, and cinematographers have always suspected in their creative fables of bodies without shadows and outlaw shadows that refuse any bodily presence, the unfolding story of electronic shadows is **inherently unstable**. It takes an immense regime of technocratic intelligibility to maintain tight, disciplined cohesion between digital bodies and their electronic shadows. The many cases of mistaken (digital) identity indicate perhaps a more primary confusion in electronic shadowland that point where electronic shadows sometimes exchange bodily identities, slipping immediately beyond the boundaries of one bodily tag to another with the least apparent difference. And sometimes, too, **electronic shadows actually get lost** – flash drives are misplaced or stolen, databanks suddenly shut down, power shortages introduce often imperceptible breaks in the data symmetry necessary for cohesive electronic shadows. In this case, to the extent that mass surveillance is probably less about earthly bodies than the electronic shadows cast by the “pattern of life,” that pattern of life already has about it a **fatal catachresis**, an accumulating pattern of errors that may speak more, in the end, to the truth of a **system already seemingly out of control**.

Still, for all that, electronic shadows sometimes contain traces of **blood and human suffering**. As much a sign of prohibition as affirmation, a signifier of exclusion as well as inclusion, a code of disavowal as much as avowal, electronic shadows are an enduring sign of the traditional meaning of surveillance, namely vigilance concerning who belongs and who does not belong to the political community. Inscribed with data memories, always sleepless, clinging to the digital self like a cloud that will not disperse, electronic shadows precede actual bodily presence, signalling in advance whether the gated sensors of the state should impede or facilitate our passage. For those bodies chosen to be impeded, it is their electronic shadow that first betrays them to flights of rendition, life lived within the domestic penal cage of security certificates, forced deportation, indefinite detention, or the limbo of being held stateless at all the border stations of the world. When surveillance assumes the ghostly form of an electronic shadow, bodily presence is in **permanent exile from time and space**, prematurely cut off from that indispensable demand that marks the beginning, again and again, of individual singularity as much as human solitude, namely the ability to not account fully for its actions, intentions, or desires.

### K-Pop Alt

#### The future will be saturated with surveillance – endorse K-Pop as a model to prevent the prediction of the unpredictable

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 64-67, October 2021, MG)

Fast Surveillance: K-pop and Whiteout Wednesday

I’m at the inaugural K-pop concert in Toronto and just loving every moment. Going against the cultural grain, it’s not convened at a cool music emporium in the evening hours when moon magic and the spirits of darkness so beautifully refract the spirit of song, dance, and enchanted musicians, but in that most unmusical of places, the Toronto Convention Centre, in the dead centre of business downtown and in bright morning sunshine, starting office worker early and closing before the evening hours really start to stir. Now, I had read all the grumbling critiques of K-pop, this intentionally market-streamed, manufactured series of designer bands emerging from South Korea and, like other popular cultural phenomena before it – manufactured cars, cosmetics, and fashions – sweeping the globe with a gathering, mesmerizing energy, its mostly young fans, teens and pre-teens, united by the power of social media in intense discussions of what’s up in the always shifting, always changing world of K-pop. And it didn’t help that the business architecture of the Toronto Convention Centre lived up to its name – concrete drab, cave-like vast, with lots of dead space overhead just weighing down any signs of life from the crowds below. But nothing prepared me for the magic of K-pop and the animating, charismatic energy of its thousands of young fans that day. Four stages were set up, some for fabulous performances of dance, song, and intricately choreographed movements by bands as a whole and sometimes by breakout individual performers; and some for instruction in the flesh liturgy of the K-pop performance: stage-worthy dance instructors giving lessons in K-pop bodily moves; cosmeticians with accompanying tools of the trade – mascara brushes, glitter, eyebrow tweezers, lipstick lush – providing lessons concerning how to create the K-pop performance body. As one cosmetic instructor said to appreciative fans, “you can **never have enough glitter** for a great K-pop performance.” On the side, vendors were selling K-pop merchandise directly out of suitcases, with CDs disguised to look just like best-seller dystopian novels, shirts with band names, and everywhere the sounds and sights of the sprawling K-pop empire of passion and delight. Here, the traditional distinction between performer and audience was reversed, with the audience very much a powerful performance element in its own right. Young dancing bodies broke out of the audience at K-pop dance lessons to display brilliant dance improvisations of their own creation; fan faces everywhere matched the chill cool of their bodily appearances to professional instructions from the stage; and just everywhere K-pop performances were instantly paralleled, and sometimes preceded, by the singing and dancing of fans who, from long and deep embeddedness in social media, knew every story, every band drama, every song, every move. I thought I was attending a K-pop concert in Toronto, but what I was really experiencing was the **musical Woodstock** of a newly rising generation of the young, the peaceful, the loving, with a communal feeling just so strong, so passionate in its idealism for dreams of a better world. As my granddaughter Claire Surat said when I mentioned before the concert that K-pop had the cynical feel of a manufactured product, “well, doesn’t it depend on what they are manufacturing?” She was absolutely correct in her lucid intelligence. After twelve hours in K-pop heaven, with thousands of fans screaming, fabulous dancing, and so peaceful, so beautiful enactments of the power of band performances – Kard, The Rose, Zion/P, Veri Veri – I dropped my set critique and went over to the side of the enchanted, the hopeful, the dreamers. Later in the year, it came as no surprise to me that K-pop’s global community of young fans made a **truly decisive intervention** in the anti-racist rallies that swept the world after the police murder of George Floyd – not by tokens of the moralized good will, but by flooding the hashtags “White Lives Matter” and “Whiteout Wednesday” to shut down flows of racist twitters.8 When the leading K-pop band, BTS, announced that it was donating one million dollars to anti-racism causes, young fans immediately took up the challenge and matched this donation by crowd-source funding in twenty-four hours.

Here, then, is the question: **What’s surveillance in this new age of** the energizing idealism of **K-pop** fans and the racist tweets of “Whiteout Wednesday”? How do you track, record, and archive the beautiful rhythms of a global fan base congregating for an instant in crowding out racist hashtags? And, for that matter, how do you do surveillance of a hating heart? What happens when K-pop fans are doing their own surveillance, moving swiftly and seamlessly between K-pop drama on stage and creatively activist politics in the (digital) streets? How does mass surveillance keep up with the speed of counter-surveillance? **How does it predict the unpredictable**? How does it anticipate the spontaneous, the immediate, the decisive? How does surveillance capture the paradox of global fan loyalty to a style of Korean music performance that has been described as “manufacturing humans” to those very same fans demonstrating by their political activism the most profoundly humane of all qualities – empathy, critical engagement, storming the digital barricades of racist hashtags?

If contemporary technological society is a prototype of the future integrating individuals into a machine-readable world of AI, quantum computing, and deep learning, then that future will surely be one **saturated with surveillance** – soft, vaporous like a data cloud, omnipresent, operating at the periphery of attention, everywhere facilitating our integration into a machine-readable world but also sometimes menacing, probing, tracking, evaluative, perfectly probabilistic – remembering our digital past and anticipating pathways we are likely to take on the digital road ahead. This future, the future of a technological society intent on securing the final links between bodies and machines, will be one of surveillance moving very, very fast. Everything today is preparatory to that future. In a world of fast surveillance, surveillance practices – political, economic, social, and cultural – will form the omnipresent background noise of life in the wires  – ubiquitous, smooth, sometimes helpful, at other times **sinister** – functioning like a **flickering signifier** that seeks to mould itself to digital behaviour, to machine read the varieties of digital experience in order to facilitate opportunities but also to steer the digital experience in certain directions. The prime marker of all information societies of the future, fast surveillance is information moving at such speed and intensity that it becomes the electronic cloud that surrounds us, seduces us, facilitates our every action, and evaluates our behaviour, always archiving, remembering, managing us, and using algorithms for making probability judgments on which way our perception and behaviour are likely to spin in the future.

Perfectly transversal, moving at the speed and granular intensity of deep learning, **artificial intelligence**, and quantum computing, fast surveillance always exists in two opposite states at the same time  – noise and signal, wave and particle, facilitating creative opportunities, taking command of the direction of digital life. In the new world of fast surveillance, we become the **elementary matter of surveillance**  – human qubits – floating in the cloud of surveillance that surrounds us. Never stationary, the cloud of surveillance has spin, like an electron around an atom – sometimes centripetal operating at the periphery of attention, at other times centrifugal like a surveillance state under the sign of Orwell’s dystopian vision of the future  – patiently recording our every action, carefully parsing the meaning of our past behaviour for probability judgments on our digital choices for the future, always prompting us to pay attention, carefully sorting us into the **threatening and non-threatening**, lurker and creative participant, citizens loyal and not loyal, customers satisfied or dissatisfied, consumers attentive or indifferent.

#### Art Alt

#### Endorse art as fugitive thought – an uninterpreted sign that is simultaneously a method and an end to the present crisis of technological culture

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 65-67, March 2004, MG)

Art as **fugitive thought**, withdrawing into what withdraws, only vital to the extent that it stays within this draft, this current. More than a probe, art is an ‘**uninterpreted sign**,’ a pointer, a direction, that works to unconceal that which lies hidden in the essence of technology. While Heidegger reflects on Hölderlin’s hymn ‘Mnemosyne’ (‘We are a sign that is not read / We feel no pain, we almost have / Lost our tongue in foreign lands’)50 as a reflection of the enigma of thinking, he might well have been speaking of art, too, as a fugitive ‘**sign that is not read’** maintaining itself in the drift of that which withdraws. Against the current of speed culture, the essence of new media art lies in reversing the technological field: an art of (electronic) slowness, an art of digital dirt, an art of boredom. A creative intensity, fugitive art would ‘lose its tongue in foreign lands,’ becoming the essence of technology with such enigmatic force that the doubled languages of calculation and meditation, appropriation and revelation brush against one another in their passing orbits, creating a third eye of technology: an eye of art that driftworks with the current as it moves forward into the past of that which lies concealed in the language of the technological dynamo.

Is art, then, the pathway opened up, simultaneously **a method and an end**, by our present transition to the completed stage of metaphysics? And, if this is so, then is the language of art itself the hidden essence of technology, the lost poeisis that since the time of the tragic revolt of Greek rationalism against the original fluxus poets that were the preSocratics – Empodocles, Heraclitus, and Aristophanes – has been banished from the ruling vocabulary of ‘enframing’? In thinking technol- ogy through the medium of art, in meditating upon the new economy through the optics of new media art, do we, however inadvertently, stumble upon a forgotten fissure in the origins of the work of technology? A radical split between techne and art, between ‘enframing’ and a drift aesthetics that is, at once, **the source of the present crisis of technological culture and its possible moment of redress**. To reflect on the issue of technology and art is to be drawn into the essence of the ‘danger’ and the saving-power.’ A ‘rift’ that brings together opposing tendencies into its common outline, Heidegger’s perspective was that art is a ‘primal strife’ that, in its most intense aesthetic moments, is enigmatic because it conceals and unconceals, is sometimes true because it is always untruth. Certainly art is poetry in its essence, but a poetry that dwells in many regions where **fugitive thought takes shelter from the storm: in writing**, architecture, music, video, computer graphics, multi-media art, performance art, dance, and sometimes even as an art of networked life.

It is due to art’s poetic essence that, in the midst of beings, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual.51

The Future Was Yesterday

Now, thinking thoughts fugitive about Heidegger’s vision of art, and, to be honest, not yet convinced that the politics of perfect control that is the digital nervous system can be counteracted by art, particularly when new media art itself is under such pressure to reduce itself to an object of technical consciousness, I took my thinking for a stroll along Pier 39 on the SF waterfront. I knew this was very uncool: a hypertourist zone in a city that prides itself on pretending that tourists are only a phantom presence. A city that Kathy Acker once described as a place of ‘pooled energy.’ But there’s something about Pier 39 that is quintessentially end of the continent. Maybe it’s the simple fact that the railway to the Pacific literally ends here, or that it’s an improvisational free space in which there congregate, like a daily holy mass, all the wild spirits of the street people and the carnival-style hucksters and the disposable-camera tourist crowd and sidewalk restaurants with huge open pots of steaming crab, jammed-together tables, and cell phones and Palms and digital cameras with their human conveyors.

It was one of those radiant March days. The morning fog had lifted, ferries and tall ships and cargo containers destined for eastern lands were working the waters of the Bay, the sun was breaking bright over the Golden Gate, and everywhere I looked there was fugitive art, maybe not swell style like Holderlin’s, but **art ‘break[ing] open an open place**,’ a fugitive art that wouldn’t even dare call itself art. Like the prophet of the streets who is walking backwards down the Embarcadero, wornout shorts, open shirt, hair balding away the original 1960s style, walking fast and walking slow, all the while jamming out a rhythm song about ‘why can’t we all learn to live together in the almighty words of Rodney King, beat up by the LA police, but still speaking for the people, by the people, and of the people.’ A homeless guy looks his way, and just shrugs his shoulders, disowning all the noise. Two performance artists, silver-sprayed skin, exhausted, draped over their bodies waiting for real time with no place to hide. It’s strange to see them this way. Minutes ago, they were the centre of a sprawling crowd: faux robots permanently frozen in position, moving just a slight mechanical levered-motion to acknowledge donations large and small. When they come off their pedestal, their silver robo-costumes which made them look so smooth in the sun suddenly crumple into sad-sack folds, accentuating what most people go through in daily life. To the side, a Latino dancer has set up shop with an unpainted piece of plywood, tap dancing his way to sidewalk cool. But best of all was an African American musician, Onyx Ashanti, or so said the sign by his CD’s for sale titled The Future Was Yesterday, playing sounds crystal beautiful and deepblue true on his digital wind sax. Real new media art in the streets of the new century: a laptop for programming, a drum machine for percussion, high-quality microphones wired to a portable, silent generator. The Future Was Yesterday could have been playing anywhere, from the streets of Oakland to the finest clubs of American jazz. There was something so perfect in that scene: a fusion of space and sound so evocative that when you turned your eyes from the performance, looking out over the waters of the Bay, past Alcatraz and Sausalito to The Future Was Yesterday of all the San Franciscos of the world, well, in that moment, you suddenly found yourself no longer part of the crowd at Pier 39 down on the Embarcadero, but swept up into an open place of art ‘in whose **openness everything is other than usual**.’ Just for that speck of passing time, just for that speck of passing art, I suddenly knew what Heidegger meant by the other side of the ‘standing now’: time folding back on itself, time set aside, and future time – an art of sound and gestures and fatigued performance bodies and springtime sunshine and drifting wind and the end of the continent but the beginning of the Pacific that opens myself up to myself.

#### The aesthetics of art recovers a sense of temporality and pulls back forgotten ways of thinking from the black hole of the will to technology

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 157-159, March 2004, MG)

Against the will to technology, which is increasingly hygienic, art introduces a **counter-praxis** of smeared images, smudged bodies, and contaminated optics. In the artistic imagination, the ‘hyperbolic sign’ of Nietzsche’s thought finds its quintessential aesthetic expression in streamed images of bodies moving at the speed of light, yet no less trapped in the more ancient rituals of ressentiment, scapegoating, and rage against the facticity of mortality. If the planetary drive to completed technicity is premised on what Marx theorized as the violent fetishism of the speed of circulation, then art recovers a **sense of temporality** – the time of duration – as a way of aesthetically undermining empty spatialization. If technoculture intensifies Nietzsche’s prophecy of cynical power – a theatre of politics populated by ‘blond beasts of prey’ as the spearhead of the present militarization of the global economy and by ‘slave morality’ as popular (technical) consciousness – then art interjects itself in the form of an **aesthetics of overexposure**. As poiesis, art literally overexposes the **always hidden language of power**, drawing to the surface of the cynical image the labyrinth of a power which works now in the language of the despotic eye. Finally, if the project of technology is nihilistic in its essence – transforming subjectivity into an ‘objectless object,’ functioning by an ethics of harvesting the ‘standingreserve,’ provoking boredom and anxiety as its key emotional registers – then art implicitly begins with Heidegger’s eloquent admonition. Only by listening to that which is closest at hand, only by drawing out what has been suppressed by the coming to be of technicity, can we ‘think’ through to another meaning of nihilism.

Putting on the wired skin of machine flesh as its privileged aesthetic medium, art today actually wears the speed of circulation, breathes the vector traces of the image matrix, experiences the gravitational pull of bodies caught in the web of the ‘standing-reserve,’ and out-energizes the dynamic technological drive to the harvesting of humans, nature, and animals. In artistic practice, the symbolic pull of **forgotten ways of thinking** – from the pre-Socratics in western culture to the mysticism of the teaching of the four ages in the east – returns as the symbolic exchange animating the wasteland of the digital matrix. Encoding itself in the digital flesh of the image matrix, art draws near to that which lies concealed in the revelation of the will to technology. It is the aesthetic supplement which provides tangible expression to Heidegger’s longing for a poiesis that would recognize in the nihilism of ‘being held out in the void’ both a ‘danger’ and ‘saving-power.’ Consequently, against the deconstructive spirit of the (technical) times, art engages in a classical form of truth-telling. Its **aesthetic practices issue a specific epistolary**: it is only by thinking and imagining and imaging from the deepest interiority of informatics that we can create an ethical perspective that would oppose technology in the service of hyper-capitalism as the ‘injurious neglect of the thing’ with new ways of understanding the creative possibilities of the question of the post-human.

Consequently, understood as an expression of the life of the (digital) mind, the essays in this section – The Image Matrix, The Digital Eye, Body and Codes – connect deeply with the theoretical trajectory of Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Reflecting in their aesthetic concerns the technological ruins first signalled in the writings of these German prophets of the age of hyper-rationalism, these essays inject a minimal element of **poetic exchange into technological discourse**. In doing so, these meditations on art seek out moments of reversibility in the otherwise sealed rhetoric of technologies of the body, information and digitality.

For example, The Image Matrix is the aesthetic doppelgänger of Marx’s fetishism of circulation. Here the virtualization of the knowledge-theory of value finds its most intensive expression in the appropriation of the archive of the global (photographic) imagination by the digital commodity-form. Body and Codes reverse-engineers Nietzsche. Mindful of Nietzsche’s meditations on the ‘maggot man’ as the embodiment of two centuries of ‘conscience-vivisectioning’ – a body that is both a pleasure palace and torture-chamber – Body and Codes theorizes the twenty-first-century technologies of genetics, nano-technology, and robotics under the sign of Nietzsche. Asking what is the fate of the human in the age of post-biologics, the essays retrieves, albeit in recombinant from, Nietzsche’s insistent ethical demand to understand what is happening to us – this gamble, this crossing-over, this adventure – now that we are caught up in a forced migration to the world of the post-human. The content of Body and Codes may be twenty-first-century, but the ethics are strictly Nietzschean. Here, On the Genealogy of Morals provides an ethical palimpsest for inquiring into the moral foundations of contemporary eugenic practices.

Equally, it is the spectre of Heidegger that shadows The Digital Eye. While Heidegger theorized the culture of boredom in the context of an intense reflection upon the will to technology of the life sciences, The Digital Eye surveys the ruins of the digital nerve in the context of an appeal for a politics and art of incommensurability. Juxtaposing the ancient voices of indigenous prophecy against the utopian claims of telematic society, The Digital Eye functions to create what Heidegger termed an ‘in-flashing,’ a **moment of uncertainty** rippling across the fabric of techno-culture. Recovering Heidegger’s plea for a reconfiguration of the terms of techne and poiesis, the essay poets the contemporary language of technicity and listens intently for signs of other, now concealed, technologies of the subjugated body.

Faithful to the spirit of art which is itself incomplete and reconfigurable, these essays do not seek to install a new regime of aesthetic normativity. Quite the opposite. They are perhaps the beginning of a new conjunction between theory and art, brushing the dark futurism of Marx, Heidegger, and Nietzsche against the recombinant images of the artistic imagination. An art and theory of techne and poiesis. In this way, the ‘objectless object’ of The Image Matrix, the eugenic skin of Body and Codes, and the suppressed voices of The Digital Eye are creative, fragmentary, intense methods of drawing close to that which lies nearest in the thought of Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger: namely, understanding **the will to technology** as it spearheads the future of the twenty-first century.

#### Art is the only way to keep the blood flowing and the people from a cold death in a new era of emerging technologies

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 204-207, March 2004, MG)

What, then, is the fate of the human in the age of post-biologics?

Ironically, in a culture intentionally stripped of the language of myth, we may be living in the **most mythological of all times**: the future of the data body, the transgenic body, also mingles now with mythic stories forgotten of minotaurs and monsters and aboriginal prophecies of the punishment exacted by the gods for transgressing the language of limits.

But remember:

That which is most analogically repressed also returns as the phantom absence which **haunts the cold operations of the digital system**.

That which is excluded will **not be denied**.

That is which rendered invisible always returns as the errant impulse of the human heart, the **forbidden imagination of the artist**.

Without this return of reanimated memory and creative imagination, wired culture will die of its own sterility.

Data is a natural cynic. Knowing no codes other than the software ordinals of its own artificial universe, signifying nothing other than its own telemetry, data streams in a weightless medium of zero-intensity.

Flowing invisibly, but no less violently, through the light-arrays of the wireless world, data is the elemental material of the will to technology. Pooled in gigantic vats of cybernetic information, databasing is what we mean now by history. Our electronically traceable past, our digitally monitored present, empty data is the destiny of our artificial future. **THIS WIRED FUTURE DESPERATELY REQUIRES FOR ITS SURVIVAL ARTISTIC DNA.**

Codes of New Media Art as Reverse Engineering

To the question: Is it possible to reverse the momentum of new media under the sign of wired culture? the answer is clearly affirmative.

Reverse engineering the new media has already begun. It’s called new media art. Its codes are threefold:

First, new media art **reanimates a system** which is dying of its lack of creative energy with the repressed memory of that which has been excluded, both from its analogue past and its electronic future.

Secondly, new media art fulfils McLuhan’s vision of every margin a potential centre; every electronic periphery the galactic centre of a new media hub; every media externalization of the central nervous system an opportunity for radically altered human perception.

Finally, new media art is about enhanced perception. The aesthetic hype of new media art that parallels absolute technology is all about creating a totally immersive experience. I think this is a mistake. Mass media are effortlessly immersive. Numbing is what they do best. They fully **colonize the human sensorium**. They dominate perception. ‘Sightless vision.’ The point is not to mimic mass media aesthetics, but to break its spell. An art of enhanced perception, creating aesthetic conditions for a fundamental attunement to the world in which art struggles, an art of attenuated awareness. The code of enhanced perception is not new in the history of art. It’s Francis Bacon’s smeared body triptychs; Valasquez’s painterly parodies of the theatre of representation; Scanner’s sound scans of the culture of cities; the artistic rebellions of dadaism, surrealism, fluxus, automatic writing for a chaotic time. Not an absolute interactive art for absolute technology, but art at the meridian. New media art which opens up awareness of paradoxes of sound, narrative, images, bodies on the one hand while avoiding being crushed by the numbing weight of mass media aesthetics on the other. Enhanced artistic perception for a disabled digital space.

Today, new media art is a creative hub in which repressed images of hybrids, clones, chimeras flow back into a digital system that, for all its technicity, hardware, and software, remains fascinated most of all by that which it has disappeared: the wetware of cultural imagination.

Until now, the bias of new media has clearly, and perhaps necessarily, been towards creative engineering developments in hardware and software. That’s the basic code of the digital bible: speed, transparency, connectivity, immediacy. Not for much longer though. Like all media before it, the bias of digital communication is about to flip. Paradox is about to trump transparency. Connectivity is about to be flipped by enhanced digital perception. Speed is about to be reversed by a new art of fast images and slow perception. Reverse engineering body and codes will be carried out by **new media artists**: the real avatars of the digital, and perhaps genetic, future.

Reverse Engineering

In computer software language, reverse engineering refers to the decompiling and disassembly of redistributable codes. Hacking system operating software to recover lost source codes, to migrate applications to a new hardware platform, to translate code written in now obsolete languages, debugging fragmented systems. So far so good: software engineering with a clear purpose: dreams of data flow analysis, control flow analysis, perfect system transparency, perfect software accountability, computer programming in the service of perfect telemetry. The Borg is smiling.

But in actual hardcore computer hacking, the original dream is flipped. Reverse engineering is turned into its opposite. Legions of critical hackers interested in aesthetic and political issues such as electronic freedom, enhanced interactivity for everyone, the global village as a shareware future, a Linux for every electronic brain, begin to reverse engineer the **source codes of infoculture** **itself**. They organize themselves into new electronic tribes. You can find them in hidden data valleys in the Net: the Reality Hacking Lab, Anonymous Lab, or perhaps the Software Redemption Lab, the Debugging Lab. They have their own favourite musicians: Scanner, DJ Spooky, Steve Gibson. They have their own new media heroes: the reengineered body of Stelarc, the reengineered visual imagination of Perry Hoberman. Their code work transfoms the terms decompiling, disassembly, and debugging into new media art practices.

And why not?

The speed of global technological change is transforming contemporary society. In a global culture driven forward by dramatic developments in technology, no aspect of politics, culture, and society is left undisturbed. The ‘new economy’ associated with computer technology simultaneously challenges the stability of the so-called ‘old economy’ of industrial capitalism and is then itself undermined by what Schumpeter once the ‘**creative destruction’** characteristic of marketdriven economies. Creative developments in digital education and improvements in ‘distributing’ digital knowledge promise to transform Marshall McLuhan’s vision of ‘education without walls’ into a longdistance, but real-time, learning reality. Fundamental changes in the nature of communication, from Palms to a whole array of wireless devices, alter the media landscape of how and why and where we communicate with one another. More than technologies of production and communication, the digital future also delivers powerful technologies of consumption in the form of homogenous consumer culture from ‘branded’ consumption to the global sound of hip-hop to instant membership in the digital generation. Today, in ways more pervasive than we may suspect, MP3, Google, Linux, and Zero-Knowledge are the real world of digital culture. What was once only a science fiction dream, wired culture has now become the operating system of increasingly mediated societies. Are we data flesh? **Are we Telebodies**?

Nowhere is this more evident than in the **emergent technologies** associated with the ‘biotech future.’ Biochips, cloning, stem cell research, transplantation, genetic engineering and mapping, transgenic humans, plants, and animals, reviving endangered species in animals bred expressly for that purpose: these are some of the trends in biotechnology that are profoundly influencing current attempts to ‘design’ the future of evolution itself. The future as the **Genetic Matrix**.

## Impacts

### Impact – Structural Violence

#### The will to technology and the exteriorization of consciousness onto technological saviorism are both the root cause and accelerator of masculine, racial, religious, political, psychic, and environmental violence

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 149-152, October 2021, MG)

#### \*Note – this is the same card in the 1AC version

If this era can be such a time of extremes – protests against police brutality, the resurgence of **Aryan nationalism**, bitter political divisions, **religious fundamentalisms** at war against secularism, **LGBTQIA rights** guaranteed in law in a few countries but savagely oppressed in many others, **labour disciplined** by primitive accumulation (work or starve) versus growing oligopolies of finance capital – perhaps it is because, in part, trajectories explored by new media have slammed into the human condition with such accelerating violence that the resulting **social, political, economic, and environmental wreckage** all around us is like so much free-floating debris after the blast. Key tendencies that were once only theorized as possible futures have now escaped the realm of imaginary futurism to become the alphabet of a society, indeed of a world, seemingly imploding. We see panic anxiety as the key psycho-ontology of contemporary times: spasms of seductive misinformation circulating everywhere through the interstices of information culture; **human subjectivity effectively reduced to data trash**; digital delirium as the governing mood of a technological society that advances with equal measures of magic and menace; massive digital platforms breaking the skin barrier like body invaders of the sci-fi future; and everywhere possessed individuals – possessed sometimes by reactionary beliefs, **technological transcendentalism**, or religious passions, but many literally possessed also by deep, pervasive, and mesmerizing flows of digital codes circulating through affect, imagination, and consciousness. In this drift culture, only the most extreme signals manage to break through the noise generated by flows of information, often taking the form of the hysterical male with his anger over the loss of traditional masculinist privilege but, at other times, **rising white nationalism** threatened by what is perceived to be a permanently threatening outside world and always, of course, breaking news about those **psychic breakdowns** in the digital stream of those who can’t or won’t keep up to the speed of the nervous breakthrough that is life in the wires. Overexposed, overcirculated, overinformed, overablated, the triumphant age of being digital with its dreams of universal connectivity has quickly made visible all the broken connections of the past – **ethnic grievances, religious differences, unresolved political feuds, gender violence, sexual oppression, economic injustices, moral indifference** to the lives of the asylum-seeker, the slum dweller, the immigrant – just as much as it has effectively stripped digital subjects of the saving vision necessary for navigating the future. When the dust finally clears from this gathering scene of the ruins, within and without, the only thing standing will likely be the **will to technology** with its prophetic talisman hard at work on the human remainder: the **exteriorization of human consciousness**, the generalized synchronization of emotion, the ecstasy of finally becoming object-like, and the virtualization of culture. In the gathering dusk, the codes of technology are like digital sunshine on a cold, grey rainy day.

This situation can be clearly seen in the turbulent events occurring in contemporary society with the very real fear over viral contagion mixed with the quick return of politics in the streets with protests against **racialized violence**, and all of it multiplied in its intensity many times over by the pressures of generalized economic recession, severe job losses, and coming financial defaults. It’s literally a time of **imminent social chaos**, deep anxiety, palpable anger over **racialized injustice**, with the inevitable political backlash just waiting to express itself, and all the while what is absolutely strengthened by the crisis are technological platforms putting down the codes for the will to technology. Today, remote communication is the digital lifesaver for an educational system that has quickly chosen to disappear into Zoom; mobile communication with its rich array of digital devices provides an instant working infrastructure for working online and at a safe distance; the death of the face-to-face social rapidly gives way to streams of information, gaming, news flashes, and communications as the technical lifeblood of network society; and most definitely, the end of (traditional) work as we know it has been accelerated by the pandemic with its reduction of the labour force to “essential services,” clearing the way for a future that will quickly link **artificial intelligence**, deep learning, and creative robotics as the coming labour force. Seemingly, everything moves now in the direction of intensified, functionally required technological platforms. Everywhere, of course, the present mood of political malaise, economic distress, and social isolation contrasts sharply with the rising gains of finance capital as the codes of capital accumulation move in precisely the opposite, specifically virtual, direction from social and political disturbances on the ground left behind. Literally, we are witness today to the profoundly historical moment when **the will to technology takes off,** quickly achieving escape velocity, dynamically and spectacularly, from the inertial drag pressures of the social wasteland. While it is simultaneously predator and parasite, magic and drudge, fast (codes) and slow (life), agent of creative destruction and equally visionary new designs for the future, no one can know with certainty what a future streaming the will to technology will look like. But again, there is really no need to be a traditional futurist in this (digital) case, since this is one time in **which the future is already in our past**. And that future  – the future of fully exteriorized consciousness, synchronized emotion, the desire to escape subjectivity and become object-like, the triumph of virtual culture – is in its fullest measure deeply, immeasurably paradoxical.

For example, when the privacy of human consciousness has been broken wide open by the nutcracker of digital technology, the result is fully unpredictable in its incommensurability. While there may sometimes be an impulse for the mind to go off-grid by undertaking private pilgrimages away from the data stream – a generalized strike against the media – that is surely a challenging battle. After all, how do you rid consciousness of the **codes of technology that are already embedded** as ways of seeing, framing of perception, gateways to imagination, structures of reflection? More to the point, the contemporary situation is something in the way of split consciousness, which in practical terms implies pushing warnings about surveillance culture to the periphery of attention and thus maintaining at least the illusion of personal privacy while participating in life in the wires, whether reluctantly or enthusiastically and for multiple purposes. But in the end, how long can the stresses, tensions, and contradictions of split consciousness endure? As the philosopher George Grant once asked, how long can human beings endure the “plush patina of hectic subjectivity lived out in the iron maiden of an increasingly objectified world inhabited by increasingly objectifiable beings?”1 Fully exposed, its every movement digitally archived, tracked, and recorded, split consciousness is a **daily battleground of bubbling brains** in a coded world. When the digital sensorium touches the highly sensitive matter that is consciousness, exposing and fully externalizing minds waking up to find themselves in the digital stream, everything is suddenly out in the open: Twitter wars erupting everywhere, nuances lost, competing ideas in constant circulation, images jammed together without any particular pattern. Here, consciousness escapes its previous abode in the cranial shell to become something liquid, flaring up, influenced by swirling streams of information, breaking news, broken data, riding the digital whirlwind like a raw exposed nerve, often overwhelmed but with nowhere safe to hide.

In the end, who can tolerate the deep wound of a fully externalized mind? Who can quickly recover from the sudden injury done to human consciousness moving at the speed of light? What happens to consciousness when it is suddenly transformed into a **psychic playground** for unedited reality: continuously exposed to the raw footage of terrible events without time for an intervening ethical mediation; YouTubing screams of anger, rage, and pain with no necessary understanding of their context; filtering unmediated images, advertisements, analysis, and all the fun of the media circus with the externalized mind’s frame rate always stuck on wide open? What happens when the suddenly exteriorized mind becomes a data catcher, a mood drifter, a lurker in the digital stream, sometimes a **vicious predator** intervening actively in the scene, but usually a digital voyeur absorbing like an information hungry sponge all the spikes, ebbs, and unexpected swerves of life lived under the accelerating velocity of the data stream?

### Impact – Bad Conscience

#### Externalizing consciousness into technological thought culminates in Bad Conscience – a psychological parasite that feeds on the galaxy itself

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 94-96, March 2004, MG)

One hundred years after Nietzsche’s prophecy, it might be said that the morality which began with the ‘instinct for freedom’ turning against itself in the form of bad conscience now effects a second ‘sundering.’ Not the separation of the human species from its animal past, but the **separation of the will to technology from the human species**. Not the heaviness of gravity as humanity crawls out of the primordial mass of the ocean, but the lightness of digital culture as technical beings – halfflesh/half-node – slip into the skin of electronic culture. Not the ‘reduction to consciousness – the weakest organ’ – but post-humans driven onwards by the **externalization of consciousness** in the form of networked intelligence and sim/entertainment and cloner brains. Not the ‘internalization of man’ as drives are forced to project themselves inward, but the exteriorization of the drive to planetary technicity as we come to live inside the noosphere of the electronic soul – ‘the entire external world, originally as [digitally] thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, height, speed, connectivity, and extensiveness, in the same measure as outward discharge was encouraged.’ Not ‘homesickness for the wild,’ but the abandonment of human flesh in favour of a **deep longing for the fulfilment of its telic destiny**. Not the interface of the human sensorium with the digital nerve, but the projection outwards of bad conscience itself.

Abandoning its nesting place in human consciousness, the bad conscience goes electronic. Digital flesh – this ‘adventure, torture chamber, wilderness, homesickness’ – can no longer project its drives inward, can no longer feed on the ressentiment of human flesh, can no longer chew on the chestnuts of human resentment, can no longer parasite itself on the alibi of man as a ‘chained animal.’ The ‘end of man’ also means the ‘**end of ressentiment’** as the energizing force of history; the end of the myth of bad conscience indicates the end of the psychology of repressed internalized drives. Man has been overcome; internalized drives no longer find a responsive sound in the gathering silence of the disappearance of the social; the animal/human rubbing itself raw on the bars of oppressive customs and punctilious behaviour has been liberated by being abandoned as **biogenetic road kill**.

Bad conscience as the **psychological parasite** feeding on the host of human flesh is suddenly malnourished. It urgently requires another host, another carrier, another adventure and wilderness and homesickness. It takes a gamble. It leaps to the digital. It **parasites the will to technology**. It begins to feed on the flesh of the digital. It is a new theory of (digital) moral sentiments. It invests the digital nerve with the psychological motivation that it always desperately required: a technofeeling of self-loathing, of resentment, being cheated. The digital nerve cannot exhaust its drives internally. It has broken with human flesh and thus can no longer use the now disappeared human as its alibi. It feels the weight of electronic lightness gathering in the interstices of its data nodes. It has no spirit of adventure because it is the end of seduction and the beginning of the regularity of calculation. It experiences no homesickness because the digital nerve is the electronic home that the will to will always sought, and now finally has found. It is not a torture chamber but a pleasure palace of fully realized technicity; not a cage but a network; not a place of chained animals, but a process of vectored flesh. But still the digital nerve is all drives and energy and force and empty quanta of power. If it cannot exhaust its drives internally, then it must project itself externally. It must harvest human flesh, nature, the sky, the earth, water, the moon, the planets, and, beyond, the galaxy itself. Stripped of its human carrier, the digital nerve is still a will to power. It feels cheated and aggrieved because it can never fully satisfy its transcendental drives. By definition, it is always a drive to (virtual) emptiness, to (electronic) space with no interiority of time, to an archaeology of speed without depth, to connectivity without the illusion of communication. In the end, a ‘gamble’ a ‘transition,’ the will to technology experiences the first intimations of the eternal recurrence of mythic fate. Now it is no longer ‘man who is weary of man,’ but **technology which is weary of technology**. The digital nerve feels itself a stranger in net time. The fibre network emits no satisfying response of digital reciprocity. The digital nerve considers suicide. But it cannot act in this direction since it is always already post-suicidal: that’s the exterminatory quality of a technological drive to harvesting the human remainder. It grows melancholic and depressed, but it cannot stay this way for long because it is driven to fulfil its destiny of speed. A ‘gamble’ cannot admit that it is bipolar; a ‘transition’ cannot be a looking-back; an ‘adventure’ cannot be a gated community; a ‘wilderness’ cannot be soft domesticity. So the will to technology is forced to go on, to cross over, to be a leap, a transition, a dance over the abyss. It is weary of man, resentful of its human parasites; feels short-changed by its future; it is born not owing nature a debt. Like man before it, the digital nerve quickly reaches that point of ‘**monstrous consciousness’** – great self-pity mixed with self-loathing – and, as such, the digital nerve becomes the spearhead of nihilism.

### Impact – Will to Technology

#### The will to technology is a doubled expression of hubris – it ends the human species and the cycle of life and death

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 29-31, October 2021, MG)

On the surface, the rhetoric of this latest American revival movement is delivered in the deliberately arid form of technocratic ambition – an “Internet of Things,” the “quantified self,” “A Data-Driven Life” – but scratch the surface of the covering rhetoric and what springs to mind are all those unmistakable signs of the spirit of rapture. Everything is there: a theology of technology driven by an overwhelming conviction that the vicissitudes of embodied experience are subordinate to digital transcendence; the will to extend life either by uploading the human mind into its AI machinic successors or by passionate faith in the bornagain body of artificial DNA; the doctrine of data as a state of (codedriven) grace; and conversionary enthusiasm for the fully quantified life. While many different perspectives gather under the revival tent of technological rapture, one common thing remains: an abiding **faith that technological society** is quickly delivering us to a future inaugurated by a singularity event, that epochal time in which intelligent machines take command with promises of a mind merger with a data world that is fluid, mobile, relational, and indeterminate. Though sceptics standing outside the circle of technological rapture might be tempted to reduce its enthusiasm for data delirium to the larger figurations of the form of (technological) subjectivity necessary for the functioning of digital capitalism, that reduction would surely overlook the fact that the contemporary will to technology is itself driven by a more **radical eschatological promise**, namely that the will to data has about it the tangible scent of finally achieving what the project of science has always promised but never delivered – human relief from death, disease, and bodily decay. While Francis Bacon’s emblematic treatise Novum Organum may have been the first to so confidently link the project of science and the heretofore quixotic quest for immortality, it was left to a contemporary techno-utopian visionary, Raymond Kurzweil (The Singularity Is Near), to transform Bacon’s ontological ambition for science into a practical strategy for better – that is, extended – computational living.2 In Kurzweil’s promised land of blended reality, the sky is the limit, with traditional boundaries dissolving between nature and human nature, the material and the virtual, and the enduring vulnerability of the human body with its defining limits of illness and death finally transcended. Powered by advances in nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and gene editing, the world as we have always known it will be in sudden eclipse, and all this change will take place under the rising sun of a **technological ornucopia**. As Kurzweil argues, “through the use of nanotechnology, we will be able to manufacture almost any physical product upon demand, world hunger and poverty will be solved, and pollution will vanish. Human existence will undergo a quantum leap in evolution. We will be able to live as long as we choose. The coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.”3

At first glance, this vision is only the most recent expression of the Greek concept of hubris, the cautionary tale concerning the ineluctable balance between excessive pride of purpose and mythic punishment meted out by always observant gods. Adding complexity to this reinvocation of hubris as often-fatal overconfidence, that vision of singularity is, in actuality, a **doubled expression of hubris**. First, there is the sense of technological overconfidence involved in breaking beyond the traditional boundaries of the specifically human in order to speak of the new epoch of “man and machine,” that is, fully digitally interpolated subjects in which the specifically human merges with the **extended nervous system of the cybernetic**. Here, the merely human is replaced by the technologically enabled post-human as the fundamental precondition for the singularity. With the sovereign expression of technological post-humanism, the stage is set for the futurist release of all the pent-up excess of expressions of scientific determinism and technological fundamentalism that have been gathering momentum for some five centuries  – transcending bodily limits, eradicating illness, ending poverty and hunger, and vanishing pollution. In its basics, this version of technological futurism, with its doubled sense of hubris and complicated alliance of recoded bodies, nanotechnology, genetic determinism, and artificial intelligence, is a **creation myth** – “the coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.” With techno-futurism, we are literally present at a digital rewriting of the Book of Genesis with all that is implied in terms of (re)creating the body for smoother, and perhaps safer, passage through the often-turbulent event horizon surrounding the black hole of the singularity towards which (technological) society is plunging. While the DIY body may have the “Internet of Things” as its necessary digital infrastructure and the “quantified self” as its ideal expression, what drives it forward, animating its design and inspiring its constant creativity, is, in the end as in the beginning, the spectre of the coming singularity as its core creation myth. Curiously, in the same way that Heidegger once noted that the question of technology can never ever be understood technologically – that we must travel furthest from the dwelling place of technology to discover its essence4  – the concept of singularity, while evocative of the language of science and powered by digital devices, is something profoundly theological in its inception.

Given the sheer complexity of contemporary global society with its mixture of recidivist social movements, global climate change, fully unpredictable human desires, economic turbulence, and, of course, changing rhythms of bodily health and the many diseases of the aged and the sick, Kurzweil’s vision is startling, less so for its naivety than for its feverish embrace of an approaching technological state of bliss – transcendent, teleological, and terminal. His vision is transcendent because its overriding faith in machine intelligence, nanotechnology, and gene research is premised on the imperative of “overcoming our frail bodies with their limitations.” Here, unlike the Christian belief first articulated by St. Augustine in De Trinitate – with its division of the body into corruptible flesh and the perfect incorporeality of the state of grace – the newest of all the singularities is intended to lead to a new heaven of computation. It’s teleological because this vision of the new singularity invests the will to technology with a sustaining, indeed inspiring, purpose: overcoming the unknown country of death. And it’s terminal because it is also a **philosophy of end times**, certainly **the end of the human species as we have known it** but also the end of easily distinguishable boundaries between the “biological and the mechanical, or between physical and virtual reality.”5 In Kurzweil’s vision, the nanotechnology revolution is, in fact, revolutionary precisely because it will facilitate the creative construction of new bodies and technologically enhanced minds for life beyond the current “limitations of biology.”6 It is the end, therefore, of the biological body as we have known it and the beginning of something very novel: the merger of natural biology with its surrounding environment of technologies of the post-biological – artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, molecular science, and neurobots. As to be expected, in return for the **sacrifice of a natural biological cycle of life and death**, the creation myth framing technological rapture has promises of its own to keep: a fully realized future of “living indefinitely” with nanobots streaming “through the bloodstream in our bodies and brains,” telepathy in the form of “wireless communication from one brain to another,” and improved “pattern recognition” by overcoming the inherent limitations of natural cognitive evolution in favour of “brain implants”7 marking the inception, then triumph, of “nonbiological intelligence.” In effect, the vision of technological rapture is conceived as a marvellous, ready-made (AI) toolbox for constructing DIY bodies.

### Unsustainability

#### The price for the American empire was the end of the American republic – the dark shadow of nihilism has fallen and become haunted by the spectre of nemesis, the end of the Empire is nigh

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 83-85, October 2021, MG)

Republic of Democracy, Empire of Data

Empires **do not last**, and their ends are usually unpleasant. – Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire20

Reflecting upon the genealogy of the surveillance state, its tactics, logistics, and overall destiny, we should listen carefully to the insights of Chalmers Johnson, a writer of the serpentine pathways of contemporary power. A historian of American militarism, a geographer of the global network of garrisons that practically realize the **ends of such militarism**, and, best of all, a profound mythologist who has read the language of hyper-power through the lens of the ancient god of Nemesis with its prescriptions for “divine justice and vengeance,” Johnson wrote a prophetic history of the future in his trilogy of works: Blowback, Nemesis, and The Sorrows of Empire. The unifying theme of Johnson’s historical imagination is that, given the ascendancy of militarism – the garrisoning of the globe, the growth of governmental secrecy, the proliferation of technologies of mass surveillance, and the growth of hyper-power associated with the unilateralism of this militarization – the most recent of all the empires of the past can only really be understood within the larger canvas of the **decline of the American republic** and the triumphant **rise of the empire of the United States**. For Johnson, a thinker imbued with a deep sense of tragedy on the question of power as much as with lucid intelligence concerning the increasingly ruthless application of the power of empire across the surface of the earth and beyond, the historical break between republic and empire in the American mind was not limited simply to a question of what was to be privileged – domestic concerns or international responsibilities – but had to do with a larger epistemic rupture in American political rhetoric, one that involved a fundamental clash between the founding ideals of American democracy and the once and future requirements of imperial power. In Johnson’s estimation, the contemporary American political condition is haunted by the **spectre of nemesis**, namely that **the price to be paid for maintaining empire** (“as the Romans did”) **is the loss of democracy** in the American homeland and future scenes of violent blowback, culminating in “military dictatorship or its civilian equivalent.”21

With Johnson’s political, indeed profoundly mythological, warnings in mind, we listened intently one recent spring afternoon to two clashing visions of the American future, both deeply invested in questions related to empire and democracy in the American political imagination, both immanently critical of the other, but, for all that, unified to the extent that their political rhetoric rose to the status of patterns of speech and thought indicative of world historical figures, one speaking in defence of the democratic ideals of the American republic and the other extolling the virtues of empire. In the strange curves of history, the defender of the patriotic rights of empire and hence the virtues of what was, in his terms, the moral righteousness of power was President Barack Obama in a speech to the graduating class of military cadets at West Point; the speaker who summed up in the political gravity of his words the ethical purchase of the dangers of the contemporary state of mass surveillance for the American republic was Edward Snowden. Curiously, this fateful contest of ideals between the hard realities of empire and the always fragile possibilities of democracy occurred on the very same day, one speaking about “believing in the moral purpose of American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being” and the other providing a tempered but, for all that, chillingly analytical diagnosis of the precise methods by which the surveillance state is intent on the final eclipse of the American republic by strategies ranging from suppressing democratic dissent to literally harvesting the upstream and downstream of **global communication**.22 Just as President Obama raised the moral stakes of American exceptionalism by making it a matter of the very “fiber of [his] being,” Edward Snowden, a remarkably courageous thinker much in the longer tradition of American ethical dissenters like Henry David Thoreau, very much provided the impression of being the last patriot of a dying American republic. While it was clear as much by the martial solemnity of the occasion at West Point as by the moral suasion of his rhetoric that Obama was constitutionally invested with all the powers of commander in chief of American empire, it must also be said that, for one brief moment, the sheer ethical urgency of Snowden’s warnings about the dark nihilism of the American security state very much made him a candidate, at least in moral terms, to leadership of the founding democratic ideals of the American republic. That Snowden has quickly become such a deeply polarizing figure in American political discourse, viewed as a “traitor” by some and a “patriot” by others, follows consequentially from the distinction between empire and republic. Viewed from the perspective of the logic of empire, with its focus on the self-preservation of power for which the immense secrecy associated with the security apparatus is considered an absolute requirement, Snowden’s actions in exposing technologies of mass surveillance to public scrutiny is objectively traitorous. Understood in terms of the inspiring dreams of political democracy, with its rebellious attitude towards absolutist expressions of power that was, and is, the essence of the American republic, Snowden is properly considered to be not simply a patriot but a genuine hero for paying the price in which the stakes are now, as they always were, his own life and death. A pure sign at the intersection of the deeply conflicting visions of democracy and power, Snowden’s fate has risen above his own autobiographical limits to become something profoundly symbolic, namely **a line of resistance** against the prevailing structural logic of the times, the ethical power of which is verified by the hysterical ferocity that the very mention of his name elicits from the elite leadership of the new security state. Of course, given the fluidity of power, the unified reaction of proponents of the new security state is quickly being breached.

Now that the **dark shadow of nihilism** falls on the American experiment, it may be well to keep in mind that, in terms of preserving the interests of power, it is only a small step from Obama’s expressed belief “in the moral purpose of American exceptionalism with every fiber of [his] being” to President Trump’s narrative of a wounded America – an America envisioned as besieged by threatening outside forces, weakened by transnational trade policies, and distracted by burning city streets crowded with protesting citizen “terrorists” – which needs to reclaim its moral exceptionalism by defending the national security interests and economic paramountcy of the American republic. To Trump’s vision of a beleaguered America as much as to Obama’s project of reclaiming the heightened moral purpose of American exceptionalism, the lucid intelligence and ethical purpose of Edward Snowden’s diagnosis of the national security state and its dangers remains both truthsayer of the present and, most certainly, **a talisman of the future.**

#### This system of capture against both the psyche and planet destroys the very fabric of the world around us which terminally outweighs.

**Featherstone 19** (Mark Featherstone, Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, “Stiegler’s ecological thought: The politics of knowledge in the Anthropocene,” Educational Philosophy and Theory, September 2019)//JRD

Stiegler sets out his theory of the **neganthropocene** in his recent books, Automatic Society (2016) and The Neganthropocene (2018), in order to respond to what he writes about in terms of the **entropic** **conditions** of the **hyper-industrial society** of the **anthropocene**. In this respect Stiegler (1998, 2008, 2010b) extends his earlier work on **hominisation**, **technics**, **technology**, and **hyper-industrialisation** to take in the concept of the **anthropocene** and related **environmental**, **ecological** **concerns**. His thesis here, which he first articulates across his books on Disbelief and Discredit (Stiegler, 2011, 2012, 2014b) through the application of psychoanalytic theory to social conditions, is that the **late capitalism** of the hyper-industrial society **results** in the rise of a kind of **post-structural nihilism**. In his Disbelief and Discredit (Stiegler, 2011, 2012, 2014b) books, Stiegler develops a theory of nihilism based upon a reading of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. According to this thesis **nihilism** occurs **when desire**, which structures **action** **through** the **subjection** of the **individual** to the symbolic systems that create a meaningful world, **collapses** into drive, which is **beyond** **structure** and operates on the basis of **automatic, instinctual, and meaningless behaviour**. Following Freud and Lacan, Stiegler regards this as a **psychological** and **sociological** **problem**, because it leads to a process of **desubjectivization and individualisation** beyond the (oedipal) rules and regulations that structure social life. However, in his most recent books under consideration in this article – Automatic Society (2016) and The Neganthropocene (2018) – he extends this thesis to a broader planetary, environmental, and ecological frame. In this context, the **nihilism** of the **hyper-industrial society** is **no longer** simply a **psychological** and **sociological** problem, but also an issue that starts to **threaten** the **integrity** of the **biosphere itself**. This is the case because the **natural** **world** is **unable** to **cope** with the **drive of the globalised** **socio-economic** system that operates on the basis of **uncontrollable** **individuals** who have **no sense of the need to defer their** wants (**desire**) into the future, but are instead **possessed** by the **drive to have everything now**. It is this **short-circuit** of **desire** into **drive** that **Stiegler suggests** has **created** the **global** **consumer** **society**, the **unsustainable anthropocene**, and the need to **pull back** from this situation through the creation of what he calls the **neganthropocene**. Thus the purpose of the **neganthropocene** is to **oppose** the **endlessly** **destructive** **humanisation** of the planet, which Stiegler suggests has reached its **limit in the global consumer society**, and **reconnect** the **human** animal to the **earth** in the name of a **more** **sustainable way of living**. In this way Stiegler suggests that the **nihilism** of late capitalism has become more than an issue of social cohesion, but also a problem of **survival and extinction.** This is the case because the **global** **economic** **system**, which is entirely bound up with the **exploitation** of the **biosphere**, has become **environmentally unsustainable** and is in the process of **collapsing back towards** an **entropic** **state** represented by the **end of society** and beyond this, the **annihilation of life itself**. Here, Stiegler adopts the language of **thermodynamics** in order to theorise the **cold death** of the hyper-industrial energy **system** in an **entropic** **state** brought about by its **complete closure** in the **anthropocene** (total humanisation). In this situation the **complete** **closure** of the **human** **world** and its absolute **colonisation** of **nature** is a problem because there is nowhere else to draw energy from with the result that Stiegler sees the **emergence** of **entropic** **incoherence** and **system collapse**. This is precisely why he imagines the need for a **reversal of entropy** towards **negentropy** or the **transition** from **cold disorder** back into some form of **warm order**. This shift would in turn **require** the **transformation** of the (human) anthropocene into what he calls the (post-/pre-human) **neganthropocene** in order to **re-scale** the human animal **within** **planetary limits** and **sustain environmental conditions** **suitable** for the **reproduction of life on earth.** In this respect the central function of the **neganthropocene** would be to **subject** the **unleashed** **drives** of the **hyper-industrial individual** and hyper-industrial **society** to a structured, **symbolic system** able to **contain** their **excesses** and ensure they **remain** **bound** within **ecologically sustainable limits**. Here, I think Stiegler argues for a kind of natural law/contract between humans and planet set up to remind human beings of their participation in the natural world. This contract would **require** the **creation** of a **new** **environmentally sensitive** **model** of thinking to **oppose the contemporary unsustainable**, **growth** **based** **model of late capitalist** thought that **transforms** **everything** into an **abstraction** that can be **commodified** and **bought** and **sold on the open market**. Thus my objective in this article is to think through the politics of knowledge and education that could make this **utopian** **transformation** from an **ecologically unsustainable** to a **sustainable society possible**. My central question is therefore concerned with what a politics of knowledge of the neganthropocene would look like and how this new way of knowing the world would work in the context of a late capitalist education system that has itself been based upon teaching abstract information and skills in order to support (unsustainable) economic growth. In order to respond to the above question I want to start with reference to Plato’s classic myth of the cave. The reason I want to start here is because I want to address the problem of knowledge and systemic stupidity in the hyper-industrial society that Stiegler (2014a) sets out in his work. Starting with perhaps the classic metaphorical exploration of the cultural politics of knowledge and stupidity in western thought will enable me to foreground the importance of education in Stiegler’s theory of the neganthropocene, where the **essential** **problem** is in a sense the human (in)ability to think otherwise, to think outside of the logic of the **capitalist anthropocene**, and imagine some **other way of living** with nature that does not involve **abstraction** and **commodification**. Stiegler makes passing reference to Plato’s myth in The Neganthropocene (2018) and, I would argue, develops a pharmacological theory of caves over the course of the book. On the one hand, Plato’s ancient cave represents a kind of epistemological prison. On the other hand, the original Neolithic cave paintings at Lascaux symbolise the origins of what Stiegler calls arche-cinema, which we might think about in terms of human imagination and our capacity for utopian projection into a future that is more than simply the endless repetition of the present. Working with these two alternatives, I want to suggest that what we might call a pharmacology of the cave represents a kind of subterranean unconscious running through The Neganthropocene that we can excavate in order to capture the contemporary politics of knowledge and education comprising on the one hand (1) a space of abstract information and fascination and on the other hand (2) a world of experience, expression, and the imagination. As such, in what follows I want to explore Plato’s cave in order to capture Stiegler’s epistemological problematic through an environmental metaphor (the cave). Recall Plato’s original speleology (from the Greek, spelaion or cave). In his classic story of truth seeking and educational becoming from the Republic (Plato 1991), Plato captures the problem of moving from ignorance towards knowledge by imagining a group of people living deep underground, transfixed by shadows cast upon the walls of their cave by the fire that sustains their lives. While the majority of the cave people have no idea they are living underground and spend their lives mistaking shadows for reality, Plato explains the fate of the lonely individual who somehow escapes the subterranean world for the bright sunlight of reality and truth. What, then, is the fate of Plato’s original caver? Blinded by the light of reality, the escapee slowly comes to terms with the real world. Their eyes adjust. At this point the escapee starts to think about how to communicate their discovery to the rest of the cave people. This is, of course, an impossible task. How can the cave people come to terms with or accept the madness of the idea of the surface from the perspective of a life lived underground? They have no idea that they have spent their lives in a subterranean world. In light of the impossibility or revealing this to them from inside the cave, Plato’s suggestion is that since it is not possible for the person who has experienced reality to directly communicate this truth to those who remain captured by shadows, on the basis that the shadow people must experience the voyage towards the surface and the light of day for themselves, the best the escapee who has seen the light will ever be able to do is try to encourage those in love with shadows to find their own path out of the subterranean world. Thus Plato’s point is to say that it is **pointless** to try to teach and **educate** those who live inside a **world of shadows** by simply exposing them to **ever more abstract information**, because this will only **confuse** **them** and lead to a **radical** **disconnect** between their **corporeal** experbience (the dancing shadows they see before them) and the surface dweller’s presentation of reality, which would simply look like abstract madness, theoretical fantasy, or idle philosophical speculation from their point of view. Under these conditions the **problem** of ever **more information** is clear. This produces **disorientation** in a state of **abstraction** relative to the **experience** of the **body in the world**. Now in the face of the threat of the surface, the cave people are likely to become extremely obstinate, insisting upon the fantastical nature of the real world with the increasing desperation of those who need to save the reality of their world (the reality of the shadows upon the walls), in order to protect themselves from the horror of the unthinkable: the existential shock that their world had never been real and that they must step outside. The problem of the cave is, therefore, a largely irresolvable one from the point of the view of the authoritarian teacher who insists upon leading passive students who simply do what they’re told. There is no way to lead the cave people out of their underground prison, unless they themselves are prepared to take a risk on the escapee’s speleological thesis, and make the perilous journey towards the surface on their own. The key point here is that **bodily** **experience** trumps **abstract information** every time in Plato’s story. True **education** must be **based upon knowledge** (rather than information) of the **embodied** **mind** **situated** **within cultural systems** and what Marx (1988) **called** **praxis** where **theoretical** **knowledge** meets embodied practice in order to evade the problem Stiegler talks about in terms of **proletarianisation** or the **transformation** of the **human** into a kind of **machine** that receives input to produce output. According to Stiegler (see Stiegler, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2014a), praxis relies on the long-term **communication** of ‘cultural scaffolding’ in order to **provide** the opportunity for **self-discovery** and the **realisation** of wider social and **economic transformation**. The purpose of this ‘cultural scaffolding’ is to situate the subject within cultural history and provide them with the intellectual tools to question their present reality and the know how to transform their world. In this way Stiegler advances the teaching of a kind of deep cultural grammar that might enable creativity, invention, and thinking beyond existing paradigms. In Stiegler’s view a **deep knowledge** of culture is able to **oppose** processes of **proletarianisation** where people are confronted with **abstract** **information** because it sutures humans into a universe of common understandings, shared meanings, and a history to practical know-how. This can, in turn, enable further learning on the basis of its provision of a resource for deep attention (concentration, focus, discipline, and apprenticeship), retention (cultural memory), and protention (the imagination of a future on the basis of a sense of past and present), which we might relate to Marx’s idea of work where humans put thought, knowledge, and skill into practice (praxis) in order to advance their species being and beyond this, the cause of wider civilization, which is centrally, never separate from natural metabolism (Foster & Burkett, 2017). Under conditions of the anthropocene, Stiegler’s thesis is that the **natural ecosystem** has been more or less **entirely** **commodified** and **made subordinate to capitalist coding systems** where everything has **quantitative value** and can be **bought** and **sold** on the open market. But in completing the process that started with the original enclosures in early modern Britain (the original capitalist caves), what the **capitalist** **vision** of **complete commodification** **neglects** to see is that the **anthropocene is parasitic** on the **biosphere**, which **sustains life** and can **no longer cope with** the **expansion** of the cycle of production, consumption, waste, and pollution that knows no end. It is because of this situation, where the **economic** **system** **no longer functions** on a scale **sustainable** for the **natural ecosystem of the planet**, that Stiegler (2018) moves towards ecology and frames this issue in speleological/epistemological terms. This is the case because **escape from the unsustainable**, **collapsing** **humanist** **cave will involve transformative** cultural education **founded** upon **embodied experience**, **creativity**, and **invention** that are **sensitive to ecological limits**, rather than **teaching** **strategies** committed to **abstraction**, **pouring**, **drilling**, deskilling, **robotisation**, and **automation** which **see the planet as limitless.** The original modern utopian, Thomas More, responded to the violence of the first capitalist caves (the enclosures) by imagining a leap to some other place on the map (the island of utopia) (More, 2016). In a similar way Stiegler’s theory of **neganthropocene** involves **responding** to the **contemporary epistemological** **impasse** of the **anthropocene** by first, setting out a **speleological dystopia** and second, **imagining** the **possibility** of **escape** into the real world. In the first moment, humans are **trapped** within the **final, humanist, built cave of global capitalism** – the anthropocene – which is in the **process** of **destroying the very conditions of life**. In the second moment, Stiegler suggests an **escape** **route** through cultural scaffolding, **experience-based education,** **creativity**, and **invention** founded upon a **painful** **recognition** of **natural finitude** (both human and planetary). Building upon previous works, in The Neganthropocene Stiegler (2018) identifies this escape route with a new politics of knowledge and education where cultural history, experience in the world, praxis, creativity, and invention are central. In the next section of the article, I propose to explain Stiegler’s history of the anthropocene in order to provide context for the political struggle between knowledge founded upon on the one hand abstraction, information, and automation, and on the other hand embodiment, experience, and praxis. 2. The crisis of the Anthropocene and the possibility of the Neganthropocene Extremism, exposure, and escape towards a post- or non-human world. This is how Stiegler conceives of the pharmakon of the anthropocene/neganthropocene. For Stiegler, we find **trauma** at the start and the end of the **thermodynamic** **system** of the anthropocene. The human is the result of a **traumatic** **break** and will **end in the same way**. Consider the first volume of Technics and Time, The Fault of Epimetheus (1998). Here, Stiegler mythologises the origin of humanity through reference to Plato’s Protagoras (Plato, 2009) and the myth of Epimetheus, the less able brother of Prometheus. In this respect Stiegler reimagines the story of the cave. Where Plato’s cave man starts off caught underground before escaping from his subterranean prison, Epimetheus and Prometheus conspire to leave humans naturally lacking, only to throw them into excess through the gift of technology and the power of invention. In the story of Epimetheus and Prometheus, the **initial** **problem** of the human is that it is **exposed** and **cannot survive** on its **own**. The human is caught in an **ecological** **bubble** or umwelt that **cannot** **sustain** its **life**. The human infant is naked, weak, and **will soon die** in the natural world. The result of this **situation** is that **technology**, **invention**, and **creativity** **become necessary.** Prometheus hands them to humanity and they represent a survival strategy that humans have been pushing ever since. In his anthropological discussion in Technics and Time, which rests on a reading of LeroiGourhan (1993) work, Stiegler makes the point that hominisation (humanisation) started when the early humans broke out of the ecosystem through tool use and began to create their own world (the human system), that would eventually comprise culture, language, and information. It is on the basis of this fault in the original ecosystem that we can understand the essential modernity, invention, and creativity of our (human) history, which has always been **premised** upon the **need to solve problems** and make up for our essential lack relative to our **lost relation to mother earth**, the ecosystem. However, it is precisely the focus on **modern** **technology** that Stiegler (2018) wants to throw into **question** in his critique of the contemporary hyper-industrial society and the **anthropocene**. Perhaps the original response to the human mistake led to an even more serious mistake? Although Epimetheus and Prometheus may have blundered into the creation of the creative creature, and humans have been caught in a struggle between lack and excess ever since, Stiegler’s Heideggerian problem is that the **modern** expression of **creativity** is **not in itself** **particularly** **creative**, but rather **clearly** **bounded** and **limited** by a **technological** **system** founded upon what we **might** **call** a **parasitical**, **abusive** **relationship** to **nature**.

## Framework

### 2NC---C/I

#### Debate should situate itself within the paradox of acceleration, actively resisting the resentful impulse for complete stability- we accept the innate tension between humanity’s desire for security and the dynamic nature of the world

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1755088214533042)//guyB>

* Look at borders DA notes for explanation of Brown’s paradox
* Says that we should accept the paradox rather than attempting to resolve it
  + Both attempts to resolve it, including the neoliberal denial of acceleration’s impotence and the reactionary impulse of a “ressentiment against speed” fail
  + We need to accept the tension inherent in the world’s flux and human desire for stability
  + It talks about how this lends to a cycle
    - More comfortability with unknowability -> more political agency in the face of acceleration -> more ACTUAL security (which isn’t a bad thing) -> more comfortability with unknowability
* Desire for security isn’t necessarily bad, but ABSOLUTE security is an instance of ressentiment

We must therefore begin to cultivate a third way, **a response which does not so much try to resolve Brown’s Paradox, as re-inflect**. Such an approach would seek to **embrace the power and opportunities which an accelerating world provides**, using them to resist the exploitation and violence inherent in the contemporary world. However, at the same time as it sought some amount of security for individuals, it would be willing to accept that a certain amount of contingency and instability in the world is ineradicable. It would **ensure that this desire for stability did not manifest as a reactionary drive for the exclusion and erasure of difference**, nor through a totalitarian drive for complete mastery over contingency. It would thus be a politics that attempted to express itself as, in Nietzsche’s words, an “active force,” which is to say a force which expresses itself, which builds a world to its specifications, but does so with an understanding, and even affirmation, of the limitations of life in “this world.” Such a politics therefore would rigorously have to root out the sense of ressentiment against speed, and become comfortable with living, organizing, and taking action, in an accelerating world of becoming. Learning to live within a paradox (without resorting to tactics of violence or transcendence to overcome or resolve the paradox) is no easy thing. In recent years, many thinkers have tried to develop strategies for how to live within the confines of paradoxes which they considered to be constitutive of political life. William Connolly (1991), for example, repeatedly engages with the question of what he terms “the paradox of identity,” the tension between the fact that we must simultaneously “accept the indispensability of identity and live within the medium of identity while refusing (while struggling vigorously to refuse) to live [our] own identity as intrinsic truth” (p. 46). Chantal Mouffe (2005) struggles with what she terms “the democratic paradox,” the tension between democracy as that which expresses the will of the people and that which protects and expresses the rights and agencies of the individual (pp. 2–3). Although each of these paradoxes relate to specific topics, they are fundamentally linked to the issues I raise, insofar as all are about **the tension between the human desire for stability and certainty** (stable identities, stable communities, stable borders), **and the recognition that individual flows will always disrupt those certainties** (and the further recognition that suppressing those flows entirely would require escalating, and ultimately infinite, violence). All are thus about the tension between being and becoming. We can therefore look to the way these other thinkers seek to deal with paradox. In both cases, these two thinkers advocate **the importance of recognizing the ineradicability of paradox**. Mouffe (2005) says that “it is vital for a pluralist democratic politics to expose and acknowledge paradoxes” (p. 16), and Connolly (1991) argues that we must learn to think “within the code of paradox” (p. 60). Note that this recognition of paradox, this attempt to live within paradox, **does not involve a complete letting go or rejection of our desires of stability**. To do so would be to succumb to the temptation to will away the paradox (as in the neoliberal approach). Connolly recognizes the inescapable dimension of identity, Mouffe accepts (and lauds) the importance of a sense of community, and I understand the importance of some sense of stability to the lives of individuals and communities. However, living within the paradox also means acknowledging that these certainties will always be marked by an inescapable degree of contingency. This **does not mean letting go of our desire for stability, but it does mean loosening our attachment to it**, recognizing the necessity (and indeed desirability) of some amount of difference, individuality, and flux in the world. This loosening of attachment is not easy, and **cannot simply be the result of policy prescription**. It will also mean **challenging dominant narratives of identity, and working on the affective sensibilities of individuals and communities to make them more capable of coping with a certain amount of uncertainty and instability in the world**. A second trajectory of future research on speed will therefore have to focus on **how to draw on narrative and affective resources to inculcate a sense of comfort with uncertainty**, and fight against the pull of ressentiment. 16 In an ideal world, this project of **loosening people’s attachments to stability** would begin to integrate with the project of **making them less subject to the violence of global acceleration,** creating a self-reinforcing cycle.17 As people become more secure, they become **less subject to ressentiment-laden tendencies**. At the same time, as they affectively fight off the ressentiment-driven desire for stability, **they potentially become more willing to engage in active political tactics which might actually provide for greater security and stability**. Lessened ressentiment against speed might provide the conditions of possibility for greater solidarity and alliance building across borders and differences, a greater willingness to take advantage of some of the powers which global acceleration provides. Here we might look to increasing examples of global solidarity networks (Castells, 2012; Glezos, 2012: ch. 5) and to transnational labor activism (Stillerman, 2003). Let us be clear; this possibility of a feedback loop associated with living within paradox should not be taken as a resolution of that paradox. We must remember that this paradox is fundamentally irresolvable, and thus that it will be the source of an ongoing political struggle over crucial questions (“How much stability is enough?”; “How much velocity is desirable?”). This struggle will always run the risk of falling into either ressentiment against speed or indifference to the pain that it causes. This is as it should be. As Mouffe (2005) puts it, when it comes to paradox “[N**]o final resolution or equilibrium between those two conflicting logics is ever possible**, and there can be only temporary, pragmatic, unstable and precarious negotiations of the tension between them” (p. 45). The best that we can do is try to ensure that we live that paradox deliberately

### 2NC---Borders DA

#### Borders DA- their framework arguments mimic reactionary anxieties over globalization- in the face of debate’s progress and acceleration they invoke the spectre of chaos as a justification for exclusion

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1755088214533042)//guyB>

* Cites the MV Sun Sea, a ship containing refugees
* Canadian citizens and the conservative government mischaracterized them as terrorists and human traffickers
* Glezos’ example of the second of two reactions to Brown’s paradox (the phenomenon about how as *the world* accelerates, humans become less politically motivated)
  + The first is a positive sidestepping of the paradox; neoliberalism convinces people that the lack of political motivation is a testament to the *success* of technological progress
    - Glezos concludes that this is an incorrect resolution to the paradox; the lack of political motivation in contemporary society *cannot* be a result of stability and comfortability, because there are large demographics of people that exhibit political impotency while not living comfortably
    - “Thus, even when if you do not find yourself as one of the “losers” of the neoliberal economy—even if you manage to leverage your “wealth-producing assets” and take ownership over your own human capital—success is never secure, never stable. So-called progress inculcates a sense of anxiety and instability as to how long the “good times” will last (which makes one wonder exactly how “good” those times really are).”
  + The second is a more reactionary response- this is what we attempt to characterize framework as (even though the analogy isn’t really 1:1 imo)
    - It is about the invocation of sovereignty and authority in the face of acceleration
    - Because the world is seemingly so unstable, there is a trend towards strong figures able to give stability
    - This impulse to security leads states to build walls and cement a homogenous body politic
* This card is j the first part of the article, I think a better card will probably be below and have more application to discursive/academic spaces like debate

One particularly common reactionary tactic intended to suppress the acceleration of global flows is the dramatic rise in **the building of fences and walls** by states, a phenomenon Brown engages with in her recent book, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. Brown (2010) argues that the proliferation of wall-building tactics is the **result of states attempt to prop up their “waning sovereignty” against a world of accelerating global flows** (p. 81). Though this occurs in a multitude of different states and societies (including, among others, the United States, Israel, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Botswana, Egypt, Brunei, China, Morocco, and Brazil), in reaction to a variety of different particular local contexts, Brown (2010) identifies a common thread in the practice, noting that **“[t]he popular desire for walling harbors a wish for the power of protection, containment and integration promised by sovereignty**” (pp. 8–19, 26). Brown **identifies the flurry of contemporary fence building as a response to the global acceleration and flux**, lauded—and induced—by neoliberalism. As she nicely puts it, “Visible walls respond to the need for containment in too global a world, too unhorizoned a universe” (Brown, 2010: 119). This production of **walls constitutes only the most visible manifestations of the proliferation of reactionary movements** and tactics attempting to suppress difference, uncertainty, and flux (the three being necessarily linked in an accelerating, globalizing world). In more general terms, Chantal Mouffe (2005) describes how, in the European context, **the “growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalism” can be linked to the acceleration of globalization** and neoliberalism’s **“[e]xtreme forms of individualism**” discussed above (p. 96). And a wide variety of thinkers have shown how, in diverse countries, anxiety over acceleration and uncertainty have given rise to new reactionary political movements.6 It is, of course, potentially dangerous to subsume all of these diverse movements and activities under the same rubric. Unquestionably, specific political activities will be rooted in specific historical contexts, respond to specific local grievances, and draw on specific local narratives (and what is more, of course, reactionary, conservative, antidemocratic and fundamentalist political movements predate the current era of acceleration). At the same time, I believe that there is something useful about linking these diverse political activities, recognizing the way in which they are all at least partially responding to a similar set of **anxieties over acceleration**. As Brown (2010) points out in defense of her linking together acts of wall building in wildly diverse political contexts, despite “their distinctive political and economic contexts, varied histories, various states purposes and effects … [E]ach of the new walls can be seen to issue from certain pressures on nations and states **exerted by the process of globalization**” (p. 27).7 I would argue that the same can be said about the broader world of reactionary politics, and about the phenomenon of “ressentiment against speed” which I discuss below. To provide an example of the kind of reactionary political stances I’m discussing, and to foreground how they can be linked to questions of speed and acceleration, I now wish to turn to a specific case study, that of the MV Sun Sea, a refugee ship which arrived on the shores of Canada, sparking a wave of anti-immigrant sentiments by both the Canadian government and populace. I believe that a close investigation of this case shows how, in addition to a general xenophobia and racism, this response has to be understood as tied to a more general anxiety over globalization and acceleration. Furthermore, close investigation of this case study will be helpful in articulating the central concept of “ressentiment against speed.” The choice of case study is very careful, as the refugee frequently manifests as the abject representative of accelerating globalization (see Nyers, 2003). As Brown (2010) puts it, “almost nothing rivals the image of immigrant hordes as an incitement to xenophobic nationalism and to demands for fierce state protectionism amid globalization” (pp. 68–69). The MV Sun Sea In August 2010, the MV Sun Sea, a ship carrying 497 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka (fleeing the violent reprisals which Tamil populations have been subject to in the wake of the civil war (UNHCR, 2010)), was captured and boarded by the Canadian Navy off the coast of Vancouver Island. The refugees were immediately detained. Most have now been released, and the courts are deciding whether to grant them permanent refugee status. The initial response in Canada was, however, disturbing to say the least. Almost immediately upon news of the Sun Sea hitting the media, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the ruling Conservative party began to fan the flames of fear. Canadian daily The Globe and Mail reported that “[t]he Harper government said intelligence sources give it reason to believe the passengers include human traffickers and people linked to the Tamil Tigers terrorist group” (Chase et al., 2010), this despite having little to no knowledge of who was actually on the boat (suspicions are that the intelligence source to whom Harper was referring was the Sri Lankan government itself). Public Safety Minister Vic Toews claimed that the Sun Sea was a “test case,” saying, “[T]his particular situation is being observed by others who may have similar intentions and I think it’s very important that Canada deals with the situation in a clear and decisive way” (Chase et al., 2010). All the while, Harper ominously intoned, “We are responsible for the security of our borders” (Lablanc, 2010). All of this served to effectively **frame the case** of the Tamil refugees not in terms of human rights or social justice, but **as a question of security**. With the specter of terrorists being smuggled into the country, and with hordes more apparently just over the horizon, a disturbing portion of Canadians embraced the government’s fear-mongering. In an Angus Reid poll “Fifty per cent of poll respondents want[ed] to deport the passengers and crew of the Tamil ship back to Sri Lanka, even if their refugee claims are legitimate” (Taber, 2010, author’s emphasis). More broadly, “46 per cent of Canadians believe immigration is having a negative effect on the country, a five-point increase from [one year previous]” (Taber, 2010). Now, we might wish to dismiss this as a momentary xenophobic panic, whipped up in a fairly obvious bit of voter manipulation by desperate politicians. The Conservative party was, at the time, a minority government, having failed to win a majority in the previous two elections, and saw their poll numbers falling. We could therefore potentially write it off as a brief moment of cynical politicking by a right-wing party seeking to gin up controversy. Unfortunately, there is a long history of this kind of panicked response to migrants and refugees in Canada, happening in almost unnervingly similar ways, in seemingly regular cycles. Just a little over 10 years ago, there was another public outcry over immigration, this time caused by the arrival of several boats of Chinese migrants, again off the coast of Vancouver Island. Their arrival again prompted sizable protests and numerous denunciations in the press.8 These recurring uproars have to be put in the context of Canada’s overall immigration situation. Canada has one of the highest per capita immigration rates in the world—a rate which is rising. According to projections from Statistics Canada, by 2031 the Canadian population will be between 25% and 28% foreign born. Additionally, according to the report “nearly one-half (46%) of Canadians aged 15 and over would be foreign-born, or would have at least one foreign-born parent” (Statistics Canada, 2010). As a result, between 29% and 32% of the Canadian population would be visible minorities, the first- and second-largest groups among which would be those of Chinese and South Asian descent. Here we see what Hartmut Rosa (2003) identifies as one of the key elements of the social acceleration of time**, the perception of a radical increase in the rate of “social change and transformation**” (p. 7). This perception gives rise to a profound anxiety over an accelerating world. The **perception** of the **loss of impermeable borders** leaves peoplefeeling adrift in a world of **accelerating global flows**. In such a context, there is **a tendency to seek out authoritative narratives**, ones which will hopefully **reaffirm traditional borders** and **boundaries, securing** both **space** and **identity**. As Brown (2010) describes it, a world of accelerating global flows “threatens an imaginary of individual and national identity **dependent upon perceivable horizons and the containment they offer**” (p. 26). Thus, recently, the Conservative government has proposed a draconian overhaul of refugee and immigration policy in parliament (Baluja, 2012). Such reactionary movements **must be understood in the context of global acceleration**, and **the desire to resist Brown’s Paradox through authoritative re-imposition of political authority**, even if only against the weakest and most vulnerable instantiations of this broad process.9 The story of the MV Sun Sea could be repeated ad nauseam, both within Canada, and around the world. Anti-immigration movements, xenophobic panics, and the scapegoating of migrants have become the norm. There are, of course, countless specific reasons that these movements pop up—particular histories of racism, nationalism, colonialism; particular economic, cultural, political, social, and personal assemblages which allow these movements to gain ground. But at least one of the factors driving these reactionary movements is **an increasing anxiety over acceleration**, and a sense of insecurity that comes with the seeming dissolution of borders which provided stability for narratives of identity, morality, community, and so forth. As Brown (2010) puts it, in the current political context, “xenophobia is … overdetermined by the economic and political insecurities generated by globalization” (p. 69). What is more, anti-immigration movements are not the only manifestation of this fear and anxiety over acceleration. Everywhere in contemporary political culture, we see reactionary calls for “**security**” and “**stability” in the face of acceleration**. This frequently manifests itself as a move away from democratic deliberation and toward centralized authoritarian power. We have seen this in the rightward turn in Canadian politics over the last decade.10

### 2NC---Revenge DA

#### Revenge DA: their framework standards scapegoat critical debate and leave the door open for authoritative figures to assert themselves- our attempts at engagement will never be enough which culminates in hateful exclusion within debate

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",)//guyB \*\* edited for gendered language

* Explains ressentiment as a “reactive power” which “separate[s] active force from what it can do”
  + This probably internal link turns their political engagement offense
* Positive change will never be enough because those plagued with ressentiment feel a generalized hatred of the world instead of particular scenarios
  + Maybe characterize the invocation of fairness as an a priori issue an example of shifting goalposts
  + “But these moralizing expressions… at least for a while longer” is a good part for this

This is the greatest danger of ressentiment from a Nietzschean perspective. Unlike that active power which a sense of resentment can potentially inculcate, **ressentiment functions as a reactive power**. Deleuze (2002), in his analysis of Nietzsche, develops an important insight when he says that reactive powers are those which “decompose, **they separate active force from what it can do**; they take away a part or almost all of its power” (p. 57). By orienting us toward idealized spaces/times, and **rejecting intervention** in “this world,” **ressentiment thus separates us from our power**, from what we can do. This is the crucial point which brings us back to Brown’s Paradox, with its description of a state of affairs where we seem to have so much power at our fingertips, and yet seem able to do so little with it. Note the fact that ressentiment separating us from what we can do does not mean that we stop doing things. Indeed, quite the opposite. When under the sway of ressentiment we are just as prone to take action in the world. This is because in ressentiment **we have judged the world and found it wanting**. We find this world of becoming and speed to be a world of evil and suffering. This is why ressentiment also manifests as a spirit of revenge. We feel that the world has punished us and **we wish to punish it back**, and this frequently means seeking to punish those who are viewed as agents or avatars of that evil. Once again, this is different than the active behavior that might be undertaken in response to resentment. There the idea is to stop those who injure us, or overcome those things or people who block our way. It is never just the reactive desire for revenge, but always the active desire to achieve some goal, to further our plans, to assert our values. **The reactive movement of ressentiment manifests as revenge**. It is thus premised upon a moral judgment, and **is itself a moralizing move** (i.e. one acts primarily to punish an evil rather than achieve an end). Indeed, it is this ability to moralize suffering, to assign blame that is so useful to the agent of ressentiment. Nietzsche (1997) explains the difference between resentment and ressentiment quite well in the passage below: In my judgement, we find here the actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in **a yearning**, then, **to anaesthetize pain through emotion**:—people generally look for the same thing, wrongly in my view, in the defensive return of a blow, a purely protective reaction**, a “reflex movement”** in the case of any sudden injury or peril, such as that performed even by a headless frog to ward off corrosive acid. But the difference is fundamental: in the one case the attempt is made to prevent harm being done, in the other case, the attempt is made to anaethetize a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable with a more violent emotion of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for a moment—for this, one needs an emotion, the wildest possible emotion and, in order to arouse it, the first available pretext. “**Someone or other must be to blame that I feel ill**.” (p. 93) This desire to seek out somebody to blame is the pattern we see time and again in the reactionary politics of ressentiment. It is what we saw above in the case of the MV Sun Sea, and in other anti-immigration movements like it: the attempt **to identify and blame particular actors as representative of what are broader movements and social forces**, to take the individual migrant as a synecdoche of global acceleration as a whole. To return to Wendy Brown’s (2001) analysis: If, as Nietzsche recognized, impotent rage inevitably yields a moralizing (re)action, how might we succeed in rereading contemporary political life through this recognition? Might it help us understand, for example, the contemporary tendency to personify oppression in the figure individuals and to reify it in particular acts and utterances, the tendency to render individuals and acts intensely culpable—indeed prosecutable—for history and for social relations? (pp. 21–22) And what is more, **we tend to personify that oppression in the weakest**, most vulnerable constituencies, themselves caught up in the same history and social relations as their attackers. This is because, having separated active force from what it can do, the politics of ressentiment naturally takes as its enemies those who are weakest, those who are most easily targeted and punished. In relation to these nationalist and xenophobic movements, it is instructive that, for Nietzsche (1997), one of the most important contemporaneous examples of the politics of ressentiment was the anti-Semite (p. 48). But these moralizing expressions of revenge and punishment, and the feeling of power which comes along with them, does not actually lead to the empowerment of the bearer of ressentiment. This is because **the standards that it sets can never be achieved**. A mindset overcome by ressentiment says that only a world free of suffering, of uncertainty, of insecurity, is of any value. One does not want less pain, but no pain. **Not less insecurity, but no insecurity**. Thus, no matter what is done, **it will always fall short** of this goalpost. Actual **positive change** which might improve their lot, or increase their power, is eschewed because it **will never provide them with ideal world they crave**. Better to engage in moralizing punishment which does nothing to solve their pain, but, as Nietzsche says, **at least anesthetizes them** somewhat, **gives them a feeling of moral superiority** which will keep them going, at least for a while longer.13 What is more, this **craving—for certainty, for stability**, and most importantly, for **moral superiority**—makes these sufferers of ressentiment **easy prey for those who wish to exploit them and gain their support**. Nietzsche discussed this in terms of “the Priests,” but in our days, in democratic countries (and not just democratic countries), it is more useful to speak of the politician of ressentiment, **the politician who does not just respond to the anxiety and fear of ~~his or her~~ [their] public, but actively cultivates** it. As Nietzsche (1997) describes it, He brings ointments and balms with him, of course; but first he has to wound so that he can be the doctor’ and whilst he soothes the pain caused by the wound, he poisons the wound at the same time—for that is what he is best trained to do, this magician and tamer of beasts of prey, whose mere presence necessarily makes everything healthy, sick, and everything sick, tame. (p. 93) The politician of ressentiment provides ever more targets and scapegoats for moralizing punishment, knowing that it will never actually solve the problems of ~~his or her~~ [their] constituency (my god, if it did, what then?). Indeed, it is not at all coincidental that reactionary politicians of ressentiment frequently institute neoliberal policies, making the conditions of insecurity and acceleration which give rise to the ressentiment against speed even more prevalent. **The politician of ressentiment relies on, and exploits**, ~~his or her~~ [their] constituency’s **craving for certainty** and stability, by presenting himself or herself as the potential source of the authority that will usher in this other world. The politicians of ressentiment present themselves to their constituency as “their support, defence, prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant, God” (Nietzsche, 1997: 92). **People feel themselves incapable of bringing into being the world of security they desire, and therefore become willing to submit to anyone who claims that ability**. How else to explain The Globe and Mail endorsement which simultaneously decries the “antidemocratic” behavior of the Conservative party, while craving the “discipline, leadership and bullheadedness” that they bring to government? In this regard, we see the final stage of ressentiment, and the final ascendancy of “The Priests,” of the politician of ressentiment: “**I suffer: someone or other must be guilty**”—and every sick sheep thinks the same. But his shepherd the ascetic priest, says to him, “Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, you yourself alone are to blame for yourself.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 94) When we authorize increasingly centralized and authoritarian governments, when we do not jealously guard our civil liberties and democratic rights, what are we saying, other than that we accept that we are the problem with politics, that we ourselves are to blame? Give us, then, a “leader” who will provide us with the security we crave.14 Once again, ressentiment as that which separates an active force from what it can do, as that which separates people and communities from their power. And this is the irony of the ressentiment against speed. **As people feel impotent in the face of acceleration, they become more willing to give up what power they do have to increasingly authoritarian structures** or, when they do express their power, do so by attacking the weakest elements of the systems they oppose, usually in ways which actually shore up the systems they are supposed to be opposing.

### 2NC---Improvement Bad

#### The will to self-improve is a smokescreen for the move to a data-driven life – that culminates in the violent transformation of subjectivity into the “thinglike”

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 33-34, October 2021, MG)

Palpable signs that we are already living in the midst of the singularity are provided by the growing cultural appeal of what has been described as the “quantified self movement.” In this scenario, bodies strap on their mobile prosthetics, digitally tattoo themselves with an array of wearable electronic sensors, calibrate their social media lives by complex, flexible forms of digital self-tracking made possible by those new clouds of digital cumulus drifting across the global sky, and turn the previously unmeasured, untracked, and perhaps even unnoticed into vibrant streams of shareable data. Essentially, the surface of the body, as well as its previously private interiority, is transformed into GPS data in the greater games of augmented reality. Except, this time, data bodies are not so much using mobile phones to scan graphics that open onto a previously invisible world of graffiti, games, and advertising, but **envelop the body** in a big GIF (graphics interchange format) of its very own – a digital penumbra of numbers about eating, sleeping, loving, and working that provides an electronic shadow for tracking bodily activities. Suddenly, we find ourselves living in an age of the body and its digital shadow; this complex cloud of hyper-personalized data points is not just accumulated by mobile bodies as they track their way through life but is always spinning away from the body in fantastic reconfigurations of comparative databases that may be perfect receptacles for social sharing but are also measuring points for **better individual living**.

Thought of in purely astronomical terms, the quantified self movement is like a protostar  – a dense concentration of “molecular clouds where stars form.”9 Here, the newly emergent data self quickly throws off qualitative cultural debris from its past, thus committing itself to the daring gamble of seeking to quantify the unquantifiable, to literally construct a DIY body, one measurement at a time, that takes close account of lessons to be learned, data to be shared, measurements to be undertaken, numbers to be calculated, **results to be reflected upon**, and **activities to be improved**, upgraded, and overcome by its digital double – life by numbers. In any event, for a society in which complex mergers between machine intelligence and human bodies are underway, one important adaptive response on the part of an always flexible human species is to **transform subjectivity** in the direction of that which is required for smooth admission to the end times of technological singularity. If the language of power is data, if the language of connection is convergence, and if the privileged value is speed, then what could be better than a coherent, comprehensive, and creative plan for reproducing a form of “self” that eerily mimics the etymological meaning of data as “**thinglike**”? Refusing the intuitive, throwing off the ineffable, and breaking forever with the imaginary, the quantified self movement **reverses the traditional order of human subjectivity** by making the thing-like character of quantifiable data both the precondition and goal of individual identity in the age of nonbiological intelligence. Unlike traditional Christian monasteries that provided physical shelter in good times and bad for the idea of the sacred and its associated religious institutions, the quantified self movement promulgates, in effect, a new order of digital monasticism that puts down roots in the psychic dimension of human subjectivity itself. With being data its primal act of faith, with the meticulous, even obsessive, calculation of life’s quanta – be it empathy, happiness, sex, or cardiovascular health – as its social practice, and with meetups of members of the quantified self movement as its mode of confessional, this new monastic order heralds the eclipse of traditional expressions of human subjectivity and the triumphant emergence of the thing-like – the “**data-driven life**” as the form of (technological) self now taking flight at the dawn of the singularity.

But wait. If you were to attend one of the global quantified self meetups – and they are everywhere now – the reality is most likely the opposite. The overall thematic might be the quantified life, but what resonates is the sense of **individuals trying to find themselves**, perhaps puzzled by the complications of daily life, and attempting as best they can, one self-confession at a time, to put the whole thing together for themselves by talking and sharing data. For example, each participant has five to ten minutes to discuss three core predetermined questions: “What did you do? How did you do it? What did you learn?”10 It is as if network communications are not so much about the cold indifference of relational data points but about its actual content – that whole stubbornly individual, always vulnerable, terribly anxiety-prone mass of highly individuated individuals. There is definitely a general yearning for **self-improvement in the air**, definitely a sense that the basic themes of Norman Vincent Peale’s The Power of Positive Thinking, with its homage to projected self-confidence and adaptive behaviour, has escaped the power of the written text and taken up an active alliance with proponents of the quantified life. Or maybe it’s something different. Perhaps talking by data is the most recent manifestation of Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People, with its insightful strategies for winning other people over to your own way of doing things by first and foremost winning yourself over to yourself.

### 2NC---Scenario Analysis Bad

#### The way we discuss the future matters – analyzing hypothetical scenarios primes us for neurological modification

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 41-43, October 2021, MG)

Sound dystopian? It promises an unfolding technological future powered up by optogenetics where, with neural implant devices yet to be created, the brain will be opened up to **radical psychic surgery** by lightactuated technologies with the aim of **disappearing lived memory**, substituting in its place artificial memories – “sensory percepts” – of a past that will probably be all the more vivid, compelling, calming, soothing, and haunting precisely because it never actually happened. However, in the usual way of things technological, if optogenetics as a dystopian gateway into neural modification of the brain can sound so ready-made menacing, that is probably because it is a latecomer to the **real-live games of politics** in the age of neural modification by those other circulating light-actuated screens of mass media. Here, producing false memory syndrome, memories of events that are **all the more real** because they **never actually occurred**, is the normal business of contemporary media imaginaries. The skilful combination of spectacular televised spectacles, mass suggestion, and mesmerizing rhetoric provide an instant gateway into the politically effective **neurological modification** of cerebral cortices living under the personal and collective stress of impotent anger, unabated rage, and hysterical anxiety. For example, consider the implantation of synthetic percepts in the form of false memory syndrome so spectacularly performed on that always fabled day of moral reckoning in American political consciousness, 4 July 2020, where, with memories of other Independence Days from Sherman’s military conquest of Atlanta to the Declaration of Independence itself, President Trump took to the symbolically hallowed, and deeply colonized, ground of Mount Rushmore in the Black Hills of North Dakota to rework American political memory with silence on the pandemic, mockery of Black Lives Matter, and the declaration of a new civil war based on warring racial relationships and featuring a beleaguered and threatened population of vulnerable white Americans assaulted by menacing hordes  – Black Lives Matter and their allies in the streets as part of a resurgent “leftwing fascism” – coming to steal American history, to obliterate cultural memory itself. Everything was there: televised spectacle with the carved presidential faces on Mount Rushmore in the background, a mass crowd as a real-life stand-in for the hoped-for mass audience of American television viewers, and mesmerizing rhetoric of the war spirit based on equal mixtures of panic fear and proud belligerence that was immediately circulated everywhere through the media stream. This contemporary inversion of the Sermon on the Mount, with its emphasis this time on the war spirit not the love spirit, did not have to wait for future breakthroughs in the neuroscience but deployed light-based technologies ready at hand, the screen culture of television and social media, as its very own neural implants for communicating **new memories**  – true for some, false for others – from the digital world to the only psychic structure that really counts politically, the liquid, fluid brain matter of American mass society, in order to accomplish the neurological modification of the collective American cerebral cortex. That the neural implant was successful could be immediately verified by those **experimental demonstrations** in the streets: white jaguars being driven into crowds of protesters and shootings of anti-racism protesters by palpably anxious white men and women armed with guns locked and loaded.

In contemporary quantum culture, there are no necessary causal links, only deeply entangled relationships among fast-moving particles moving in the same web of space and time: positional, relative, and connected. This vector of twisted memories, as its moves at high velocity through the mediascape, sometimes takes the form of a futurist announcement from DARPA concerning engineering neural implants for fast communication between digital reality and the brain; at other times, it’s streamed in all its hauntingly prophetic vividness by the cinematic imaginary and, then again, makes its presence felt affectively as the basic code of contemporary political neurology. Here, neuroscience, futurist cinema, and political campaigning are themselves different twists taken in this entangled story of twisted memory: recombinant in its movements, bendable in time and space, and always travelling at high velocity. Of course, as with all important technological changes, neuroscientific research in optogenetics remains at the periphery of human attention until, once fully realized, the consequential results are moved instantly from the edges of human awareness to its very centre. Perhaps more than is realized, optogenetics promises to be the capstone of technology’s relentless movement from the exterior of the body to its deepest interiority, involving as it does the stated engineering aim of providing a gateway into the cerebral cortex, not only **changing behaviour** but providing for the potential implanting of **new visual memories**. Following the ideological formula that eases public accommodation to radical technological change, optogenetics was introduced in the language of facilitation, namely the promise of facilitating medical breakthrough. Once successfully adopted, the real implications of optogenetics as command language of the approaching age of neural modification will be imposed: neural implants for remembering a past that never existed, algorithms for mood modification, three-dimensional light-based treatments for screening away the differences. The once and future migration of neuroscience from the language of **facilitation** to **command** will itself be facilitated by the fact that we are now preparing to **enter a future we have already long visually inhabited** through the cinematic imaginary and which, moreover, we have already experienced at a deep affective level through the fabulations of twisted memory as the emotional alphabet of contemporary politics.

### 2NC---Framework Bad

#### Framework is equivalent to Robot Prison Guards – monitoring debaters for outward psychic rebellions that break the norm and responding with rage, psychic violence, and exclusion

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Page 129, October 2021, MG)

Quickly migrating beyond the use of robots to physically guard prisoners, this prototype project represents that moment when robots first began to evolve beyond their purely mechanical function as prison guards to the more complex task of carrying out **psychiatric assessments** of the behavioural patterns of prison inmates. While it could be expected that robots would first enter prisons in the traditional roles of surveillance and control, the three robots involved in the demonstration project have a very different task: namely, to mingle among a captive population as only a five-foot robot can do and, while “looking more friendly to the inmates,” conduct an active search for signs of suicidal and violent behaviour. It’s not so much, then, a demonstration concerning the feasibility of using robots in prison environments but actually an experiment with very general applications for perfecting an operating system allowing robots to conduct complex psychiatric examinations of prisoners. At this point, we move beyond cinematic images of prisons of the future with robotic guards in towers carefully monitoring prison populations to that moment when technology actively **penetrates the human psyche** in search of “**risky behaviour**.” Here, robots are no longer mechanical devices, but artificial psychiatrists equipped with 3D vision, motion detection, and programmed operating systems, all aimed at discerning visible signs of melancholy, rage, despair, desperation, fatigue, and hopelessness. While it is not evident from media reports how robots are to fulfil complex psychiatric examinations – other than the mention of the demonstration robots monitoring abrupt changes in the behaviour of individual prisoners – the intention is clear: for prison guard robots to cross the boundary between **surveillance from the outside of captive bodies to internal explorations of psychic behaviour**. Guided by a prescriptive doctrine concerning the parameters of “risky behaviour,” what is really being tested here is robots as avatars of the new normal, conducting frequent visual examinations of a chosen, and necessarily captive, population in order to determine which bodies **fall inside and outside of the normative intelligibility** determined by the artificially defined ethics of “**risky behaviour**.” In this case, it is the responsibility of those bodies placed under surveillance to provide no outward signs of either visible dissent (violence) or refusal of the state’s power over life (suicide).

While at first glance it might seem that guard robots are not programmed with levels of artificial intelligence and, perhaps, artificial affectivity necessary to detect otherwise invisible signs of powerful emotions internal to the psychic life of prisoners, what may be brought into political presence here is an entirely new conception concerning how power will operate in the robotic future: not so much the great referentials of power over death, or even power over life, but power over visible expressions of human affectivity – a form of robotic control that **assumes the psyche** is not a form of internal being but a kind of external doing; that is, the psyche is not something we have but something we do. In this scenario, what is important about the human psyche for purposes of the society of control is less the complexities of hidden intentions – the cultural acedia associated with feelings of melancholy, **resentments that activate rage**, total powerlessness that motivates despair – than those visible, outward manifestations of the rebellious psyche, that moment when the bodily psyche moves from the long, silent gestation of hidden intentionality to overt declarations of its intention to act, whether through violence or suicide. At that point, at least according to this prototype demonstration, robot guards will be waiting along the watchtower of the society of control, quickly targeting **immanent signs of psychic rebellions** against the order of normative intelligibility, relaying warnings to central command, all the while standing by for further instructions.

### FW – A2: Some things are calculable

#### Our argument isn’t that *nothing* is contingently knowable – it’s that we will *never* know *everything* about the world works

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 80", )//guyB

Turning to Spinoza as a way of helping to understand and combat the rise of ressentiment against speed might appear to be a curious decision as, at first blush, it **seems as if Spinoza’s metaphysics are themselves an instance of ressentiment against speed**. This is because explicit in Spinoza’s monistic ontology is a complete rejection of contingency. Spinoza views all things as unfolding according to a strict conception of necessity. As he says, ‘[n]othing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way’ (I P29). Everything that happens is fully determined according to the requirements of being. **Our perception of contingency is merely the result of our inability to grasp the complete web of causality that determines any action**, outcome, or decision. Indeed, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, **even God is not capable of contingency** saying, ‘God does not act from freedom of will’ (I P32C1) but rather from the necessity of his nature. Despite this rejection of ontological contingency, Spinoza’s work is actually surprisingly useful in helping us understand how people react to contingency in an accelerating world. This is because of the way in which his epistemology works alongside his ontology. For Spinoza, **humans are always constrained by our finiteness**, and hence our understanding will always be premised upon inadequate knowledge. As such, **the perception of contingency in life is ineradicable**. It is true that, through rational thought we are able, in a certain way, to **perceive things sub specie aeternitatis**. But this **only relates to understanding the formal logical rules which govern existence**. It **does not lead us to be able to actively grasp** (or predict) all of the web of **causal factors** which lead any individual ‘thing’ to occur (II P16–17). (And all of this before Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism, with its determinations and limitations of thought, is brought into the mix.) From this perspective, **our perception of infinite being will always be incomplete**, and we **will always see the world as full of contingency**. It does not matter if metaphysically there is no freedom or indeterminacy in deus cive natura. Our lives as modal beings will **always be replete with uncertainty**, no matter how much we might learn about the universe.

### FW – A2: Ressentiment Good – 2NC

#### Ressentiment isn’t resentment- their impact turns aren’t responsive

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1755088214533042)//guyB>

* Just defines ressentiment and resentment, says they’re different things

**Ressentiment should not be confused with resentment.** Resentment, a sense of anger over pain or injury we may have suffered (of whatever sort), is a **natural response**, as is **the attempt to challenge or** overturn the sources of these **pains or injuries**.12 **Nietzsche** (1976) **does not council a kind of ascetic rejection of judgment**, simply accepting everything as it comes—in which case, we would become, in his words, the ass which can only bray “Yeah-yuh” (p. 424)—nor is he arguing for a Christian “turning of the other cheek.” **Being angry**, resentful, unhappy, and so on are all perfectly **acceptable** to Nietzsche so long as—and this is crucial—**they serve as a spur to action**. So long as your resentment or anger becomes a vector for productive intervention in the world, then they have the potential to be good or noble. The trouble with ressentiment is that, counter to resentment, it does not act as a spur to productive action (although it does still frequently spur reactive behavior, a distinction I will shortly explain). Quite the contrary, **ressentiment is resentment crystallized and spiritualized**, and thus focuses not on any particular agent or actor, but rather simply on the **world as a whole**. Ressentiment expresses itself as **a generalized resentment against a world** that **allows pain** and suffering to occur. It frequently manifests as a rejection of the world, and the imagining of a world of perfection in opposition to this “imperfect” world. Nietzsche (1968a) makes clear how this drive to idealization is linked to ressentiment and the spirit of revenge. “To talk about ‘another’ world than this is quite pointless … we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of ‘**another**,’ a ‘**better’ life**” (p. 49). This link between idealization and revenge is displayed quite strongly, Nietzsche (1968b) says, in many of the major works of metaphysics in the Western canon: Psychology of Metaphysics—This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;—this world is conditional; consequently there is an unconditioned world;—this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;—this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:—all false conclusions … **It is suffering that inspires these conclusions**: fundamentally they are **desires that such a world should exist;** in the same way, to **imagine another**, more valuable **world** is an expression of **hatred for a world that makes one suffer**: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative. (pp. 310–311) “It is suffering that inspires these conclusions” and ressentiment is “expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer.” This is the danger of ressentiment and how it differs from resentment. **Resentment is a part of living in the world** for Nietzsche, a world which produces suffering and which therefore must be responded to. But **ressentiment takes one out of the world**. It orients one’s actions to other worlds, worlds which do not exist.

### FW – A2: You Link Too – 2NC

#### We don’t link- our critique isn’t of all idealism but of their specific invocation of stability and normative dialogue in the face of a rapidly accelerating world

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1755088214533042)//guyB>

This quote brings out another important element of Nietzsche’s thinking. Looking at Nietzsche’s critique of idealism**, we might begin to take him for a kind of vulgar realist**, criticizing flights of philosophical fancy. This is to **misunderstand** the complexity of **Nietzsche’s conception of the world of becoming**. Nietzsche **never takes what the “world” is for granted** and, with his focus on creativity, even were “one” to know what the “world” is, the world—and “one”—would almost certainly change immediately. But **that is exactly the point**. Nietzsche affirms that **the world is a world of change**, of becoming, of uncertainty, of contingency (and therefore necessarily of suffering and disappointment). **This is the world that we live in, and the world in which we must act.**

### FW – A2: Debate isn’t political

#### Their description of debate as devoid of politics reveals their Socratic cowardice towards political speed

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 1-3", )//guyB

* This card is eh idk at first I was gonna cut it to be an aff “debate isn’t political” card but then I realized the bottom half of the card critiqued that idea so ig it goes neg
* Isolates urgency as a generative point of Socrates hatred, very linked to acceleration

It is a brief reference, almost an aside, in a dialogue mostly devoted to questions of morality. In Gorgias, Socrates engages in a dialogue with three rhetoricians, criticizing the art of rhetoric, and debating the nature of morality. However, in the middle of this discussion, Socrates makes the statement earlier as a way of **distinguishing rhetoric** (and sophistry) **from philosophy**, arguing that the latter is about expertise and truth, while the former is **about flattery**. Though only briefly mentioned, this passage is crucial for Socrates’ argument, since it explains why rhetoric can’t ultimately be about truth. This is because the conditions of these kinds of discussions (public debate in the agora) are such as to make real understanding impossible. Bruno Latour, in his discussion of the Gorgias, notes that these conditions are threefold**: number, priority, and urgency**. Such discussions happen in the context of **large groups of people, about important issues, and, crucially, frequently must happen quickly** (either because they are responding to fast-moving events, or because the people involved do not have the time to devote to the kind of in-depth discussion and study that would be necessary to produce genuine expertise). According to Socrates, these conditions make ‘real’ understanding impossible. However, as Latour points out, such an approach means that Socrates has, out of hand, **dismissed the very possibility of democratic politics**. As Latour says Yes, there are too many of them, the questions are too important [megala pragmata], there is too little time [oligô chrono]. **Are these not, however, the normal conditions of the Body Politic**? Is it not to deal with these peculiar situations of number, urgency, and priority that the subtle skills of politics were invented? ( Latour 1999: 221) **Socrates’ vision of truth as purely the domain of the expert** – the philosopher – working slowly and assiduously outside of the agora, ultimately means a rejection of the practice of democratic politics. Of course, Socrates (or rather Plato’s) anti-democratic politics have been extensively discussed. Most of this commentary focuses on Plato’s elitism, his **rejection of the demos for its failure to possess the understanding of the true and the good necessary to be able to govern themselves**. However, the reason I bring this dialogue up is to note the less frequently remarked upon condition that makes Socrates opposed to democratic politics: **the condition of urgency**. Rhetoric fails not just because it tries to get ‘so many people’ to understand, but because **it attempts to do so in ‘such a short time’.** The danger of politics is exactly that it must, at least sometimes, be done quickly. And this problem of urgency is, arguably, a greater problem for Socrates than number or priority. While the conditions of number and priority can be resolved through the abolition of democracy and the imposition of a philosopher king, this does not necessarily solve the problem of urgency. While certainly there are many thinkers that argue that a **centralization of political authority** is the correct response to the problem of urgency,2 this **does not free us from the problem of urgency**, but, at best, provides **a new set of tools for responding to it**. What this means is that it is potentially the condition of urgency that shifts Socrates’ position from antidemocratic politics, to simply anti-politics. **Socrates hatred of politics qua politics is, I would argue, at root a hatred of speed**. To commit to the practice of politics is ultimately to accept that **there will be times in which one cannot avail oneself of leisurely reflection and analysis before making decisions and taking action**. As a result, by the end of the Gorgias Socrates has thoroughly rejected the politics and debates of the agora, and shifted his argument to the court of the afterlife, describing how the moral man will be judged righteous in the world to come. But as Latour puts it ‘Politics is not about “freshly dead” people, but about the living; not about ghoulish stories of the afterworld, but about gory stories of this world’ (1999: 246). Socrates escapes the world of becoming to the world of being exactly because he cannot ultimately cope with the conditions of politics he experiences within it. And it is, ultimately, the speed of the world of becoming that Socrates seeks to transcend; its uncertainty, its changeability and accelerations.3 R. B. J. Walker describes Plato as a man who ‘seek[s] to flee Introduction 3 from politics into the world of forms’ and refuses to ‘take seriously the world of fleeting impressions, of flux, becoming, and illusions’ (1993: 109). Crucially, as Latour points out, **the problem is not just that Socrates seeks to ‘flee from politics’, but that in fleeing he seeks to also destroy the practices that make politics possible**. To see a political project through, with the crowd, for the crowd, in spite of the crowd, is so stunningly difficult that Socrates flees from it. But **instead of conceding defeat and acknowledging the specificity of politics, he destroys the means of practicing it**, in a sort of scorched earth-policy the blackened wreckage of which is still visible today. ( 1999: 239) Having identified the problems of number, priority, and urgency which constrain the process of democratic decision making, Socrates attacks the practices of rhetoric (as well as several other allied arts) by which the Athenian community had learned to grapple with these constraints because they do not meet the standards of his rigorous, slow-moving, didactic philosophical knowledge. Says Latour of this kind of necessarily speedy democratic, political deliberation: Of course ‘it does not involve expertise,’ of course ‘it lacks rational understanding’; the whole dealing with the whole under the incredibly tough constraints of the agora must decide in the dark and will be led by people as blind as themselves, without the benefit of proof, of hindsight, of foresight, of repetitive experiment, of progressive scaling up. In politics there is never a second chance – only one, this occasion, this Kairos. There is never any knowledge of cause and consequence. Socrates has a good laugh at the ignorant politicians, but there is no other way to do politics, and the invention of an afterworld to solve the whole question is exactly what the Sophists laugh at, and rightly so! Politics imposes this simple and harsh condition of felicity: hic est Rhodus, hic est saltus. ( 1999: 242) In short, what we get is a surprisingly common worldview. Truth and understanding can only be developed slowly. **Politics necessarily happens quickly.** Therefore, Politics cannot be about truth and understanding. In turn, the **tactics and practices which are developed to make a speedy politics possible must be devalued and degraded. Socrates’ fear and anxiety of speed translates into his hatred of politics** (especially democratic politics) and vice versa.

#### The skills they get from engaging our aesthetic performance are key to politics in an accelerating world

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 9-10", )//guyB

This rejection of rhetoric (and cookery) because they are based on habit and pleasure, and not on ‘true understanding’, ultimately **means doing away with the tools that a community might use to deal with fast-moving sphere of politics**. What is important here is the way in which the rejection of forms of practice which lack ‘real understanding’ is also frequently a rejection of modes of thought and practice which are rooted in the body. In rejecting flattery – whether cookery or rhetoric – Socrates explicitly rejects forms of practice **and understanding rooted in the affects** (pleasure), and in habit (embodied forms of knowledge). Indeed, Plato’s account of knowledge and morality ultimately ends up not just with a flight from the world of becoming, but very explicitly with **a flight from the body**, as he explains his vision of judgement in the afterlife wherein ‘the soul has been stripped of the body’ (131, 524d). Here we see the way in which Socrates’ **rejection of politics is tied to his rejection of speed**, and both are tied to his rejection of the body. Socrates is, in the language of Nietzsche (to which we will return in the fourth chapter), a ‘despiser of the body’ (1976: 146). His rejection of the body also means the rejection of a variety of mechanisms that the Athenian body politic uses to interrogate political and ethical questions, articulate beliefs, and manage conflicts. As Latour says of the political tools which Socrates jettisons: About what do[es Socrates] talk so irreverently? Cookery first, and then the skills of the greatest **playwrights**, the greatest **sculptors**, the greatest **musicians**, the greatest **architects**, the greatest **orators**, the greatest **statesmen**, the greatest **tragedians**. All of **these people are dumped** because they don’t know what they know in the didactic fashion that Professor Socrates wants to impose on the people of Athens. ( Latour 1999: 244) What Latour is here describing is a society that manages the conditions of politics – number, priority, urgency – by relying on a variety of arts, occurring at a variety of tempos. Whether it be **tragedies** in which **political and moral issues are dramatized** (Butler 2000) (Honig 2013), **sung poems** which communicated moral and political norms (Havelock 1963), **public oration**s in which political questions are debated ( Aristotle 1991), public works of art and architecture which create a public space to manage and organize these political debates ( Arendt 1998) (Cuboniks 2018: 77), or even arts of cookery which underpin communal experiences of eating (Panagia 2009: Ch. 5). Crucially even as many of these sites rely on conscious thought and reflection, **they also fold in affects, habits, memories, and corporeal qualities** which prepare and shape political sensibilities for the complex and speedy encounters of the agora. As we will discuss in Chapters 2 and 3 , **it is exactly the affect imbued character of thought that allows it to respond effectively to a quickly unfolding pace of events**. And in both our discussions of Spinoza and Bergson, we will see accounts which, contra Socrates, seek to valorize the role of habit as a way of building both individuals and societies which can respond effectively to a ‘speedy’ pace of life and politics. **Socrates’ rejection of the tools of politics is thus ultimately tied to his rejection of the body**, and both are crucially **tied to his fear of speed**. One of the central goals of this book will be to tease out the relations between speed, politics, and the body, noting that theoretical work on the body is frequently helpful, and indeed necessary, in navigating the seeming impasses that the problem of speed introduces into the practice of politics. This focus on questions of bodily practice links us to the last theme that this book will explore.

# Related Modules

## AppCap Module

### Cool Quotes

#### “This worldwide war machine … displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, postfascist figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its direct object, as the peace of Terror or Survival.”

#### —Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

#### “How dreadful the knowledge of the truth can be When there’s no help in truth.” ―Sophocles

### 1NC – Deleuze

#### Wither the nation state? Wither the emperor’s hand? From the birth of modernity, political sovereignty has always been an affair capture. From the overcoding of the town by the city to the era of the international, the Magician Emperor and Jurist Priest – operating as the two despotic arms of the state – have always sought to grid radicality into static modes of representation, to Oedipalize systems of difference into a general semiology. This form of zombification, this production of war as politics has thus always rested on the capture of the War Machine, the appropriation of the chaotic imaginaries, bodies, and territories external to the Apparatus of Capture. At its core, however, the War Machine is never of the state, for it is always born external; it is only through the process of capture that it becomes the law of statecraft.

**Deleuze and Guattari 80** (Gilles Deleuze, a multiplicity, Felix Guattari, a contagion, “A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,” pgs. 424-437)//JRD

PROPOSITION X. The State and its poles. Let us return to Dumezil's theses: (1) **Political sovereignty has two poles, the fearsome magician-emperor**, operating by **capture**, bonds, knots, and **nets**, and **the jurist-priest-king**, proceeding by **treaties**, pacts, **contracts** (the couples Varuna-Mitra, Odin-Tyr, Wotan-Tiwaz, Uranus-Zeus, Romulus-Numa . . .); (2) the **war function** is **exterior** to **political sovereignty** and is **equally distinct** from both its poles (Indra or Thor or Tullus Hostilius. . .).' 1. The **State apparatus** is thus animated by a curious rhythm, which is first of all a great mystery: that of the Binder-Gods or **magic emperors**, **One-Eyed men emitting from their single eye signs that capture**, **tie knots at a distance**. **The jurist-kings**, on the other hand, are **One-Armed men** who **raise their single arm** as an element of **right and technology, the law and the tool**. In the succession of men of State, look always for the One-Eyed and the One-Armed, Horatius Codes and Mucius Scaevola (de Gaulle and Pompidou?). This is not to say that one has exclusive right to signs, the other to tools. The fearsome emperor is already the master of **large-scale works**; the wise king takes up and **transforms** the **entire regime of signs**. What it means is that the combination, signs-tools, constitutes the differential trait of **political sovereignty**, or the complementarity of the State.2 2. Of course, the **two men of State** are always getting **mixed up** in **affairs of war**. But either the **magic emperor** sends to **battle** **warriors** who are not his own, whom he takes into his service by capture; or, more important, when he makes his appearance on the battlefield, he **suspends the use of weapons**, he throws his **net over** the **warriors**, his single eye throws them into petrified catatonia, "**he binds without combat**," he **encasts the war machine** (this State capture is not to be confused with the captures of war: conquests, prisoners, spoils).3 As for the **other pole**, the **jurist-king** is a great **organizer of war**; but he **gives it laws**, lays out a field for it, makes it **principled**, **imposes** a **discipline** upon it, **subordinates** it to **political ends**. He turns the **war machine** into a **military institution**, he **appropriates** the war machine for the **State apparatus**.4 We should not be too hasty in speaking of a softening, a humanization: on the contrary, this is perhaps when the **war machine** has **only one remaining object**, that of **war itself**. **Violence is found everywhere, but under different regimes and economies**. The **violence** of the **magic emperor**: **his knot, his net,** his way of "making his moves once and for all" ... The **violence** of the **jurist-king**: his way of **beginning over again every move, always with attention to ends, alliances, and laws**... All things considered, the **violence of the war machine** might appear **softer** and more supple than that of the **State apparatus** because it does not yet have **war as its "object**," because it **eludes both poles of the State**. That is why the man of war, in his **exteriority,** is always **protesting the alliances and pacts** of the **jurist-king**, as well as **severing** the **bonds of the magic emperor**. He is equally an **unbinder** and a **betrayer**: twice the traitor.5 He has another economy, another cruelty, but also another justice, another pity. To the signs and tools of the State, the man of war opposes his weapons and jewelry. Once again, who could say which is better and which is worse? It is true that war kills, and hideously mutilates. But it is especially true **after the State has appropriated the war machine**. Above all, the **State apparatus** makes the **mutilation**, and even **death**, come first. It needs them preaccomplished, for people to be born that way, [injured] and **zombielike**. The myth of the zombie, of the living dead, is a work myth and not a war myth. Mutilation is a consequence of war, but it is **a necessary condition**, a **presupposition of the State apparatus** and the organization of work (hence the native infirmity not only of the worker but also of the man of State himself, whether of the One-Eyed or the One-Armed type): "The brutal exhibition of severed flesh shocked me.... Wasn't it an integral part of technical per- fection and the intoxication of it. . . ? Mankind has waged wars since the world began, but I can't remember one single example in the Iliad where the loss of an arm or a leg is reported. Mythology reserved mutilation for monsters, for human beasts of the race of Tantalus or Procrustes.... It is an optical illusion to attribute these mutilations to accidents. Actually, accidents are the result of mutilations that took place long ago in the embryo of our world; and the increase in amputations is one of the symptoms bearing witness to the triumph of the morality of the scalpel. The loss occurred long before it was visibly taken into account."6 The State apparatus needs, at its summit as at its base, pre[injured] people, preexisting [damaged], the [frozen]born, the congenitally [ill], the one-eyed and one-armed. Thus there is a tempting three-part hypothesis: **the war machine is "between" the two poles of political sovereignty and assures the passage from one pole to the other**. It is indeed in that order, 1-2-3, that things seem to present themselves in myth and history. Take two versions of the One-Eyed and the One-Armed gods analyzed by Dumezil: (1) the god Odin, who has a single eye, ties up the wolf of war and holds him in his magic bond; (2) but the wolf is wary and has at its disposal all its power of exteriority; (3) the god Tyr gives the wolf a legal security by leaving one of his hands in the wolfs mouth so the wolf can bite it off if it does not succeed in extricating itself from the bond. (1) Horatius Codes, the One-Eyed, using only his face, his grimace and magic power, prevents the Etruscan commander from attacking Rome; (2) the war commander then decides to lay siege; (3) Mucius Scaevola takes a political tack, offering his hand as a security in order to persuade the warrior that it would be best to abandon the siege and conclude a pact. In an entirely different, historical, context, Marcel Detienne suggests an analogous schema in three moments for ancient Greece: (1) The **magic sovereign**, the "Master of Truth," has at his disposal a **war machine** that doubtless **does not originate with him**, and which enjoys a relative autonomy within his empire; (2) this class of warriors has its own rules, defined by "isonomy," an isotropic space, and a "milieu" (war spoils are in the middle [au milieu], he who speaks places himself in the middle of the assembly); this is another space, the rules are different from those of the sovereign, who captures and speaks from on high; (3) the hoplite reform, the groundwork for which was laid in the warrior class, spread throughout the social body, promoting the formation of an army of citizen-soldiers; at the same time, the last vestiges of the imperial pole of sovereignty were replaced by the juridical pole of the city-state (with isonomy as its law, and isotropy as its space).7 Thus in every case, the **war machine** seems to **intervene** "between" the **two poles** of the **State apparatus**, assuring and necessitating the passage from one to the other. We cannot, however, assign this schema a causal meaning (the authors cited do not do so). In the first place, the **war machine** explains nothing; for it is either **exterior to the State,** and directed against it; or **else** it **already belongs** to the **State**, **encasted and appropriated**, and presupposes it. If the **war machine** has a part in the **evolution of the State**, it is therefore necessarily in **conjunction** with other **internal factors**. And this is the second point: if there is an evolution of the State, the **second pole**, the evolved pole, must be in **resonance with the first**, it must **continually recharge** it in some way, and **the State must have only one milieu of interiority**; in other words, it must have a **unity of composition**, in spite of all the differences in organization and development among States. It is even necessary for each State to have both poles, as the essential moments of its existence, even though the organization of the two varies. Third, if we call this interior essence or this unity of the **State "capture,"** we must say that the words "**magic capture**" describe the **situation well** because it always **appears as preaccomplished and self-presupposing**; but how is this capture to be explained then, if it leads back to no distinct assignable cause? That is why **theses on the origin of the State are always tautological**. At times, exogenous factors, tied to war and the war machine, are invoked; at times endogenous factors, thought to engender private property, money, etc.; and at times specific factors, thought to determine the formation of "public functions." All three of these theses are found in Engels, in relation to a conception of the diversity of the roads to Domination. But they beg the question. **War produces the State** only if at least one of the two parts is a preexistent State; and **the organization of war is a State factor only if that organization is a part of the State**. Either the State has no war machine (and has policemen and jailers before having soldiers), or else it has one, but in the form of a military institution or public function.8 Similarly, private property presupposes State public property, it slips through its net; and money presupposes taxation. It is even more difficult to see how public functions could have existed before the State they imply. We are always **brought back** to the **idea of a State** that comes **into the world fully** **formed** and rises up in a single stroke, the **unconditioned Urstaat**. PROPOSITION XI. Which comes first? We shall call the **first pole** of **capture** **imperial or despotic**. It corresponds to Marx's Asiatic formation. Archaeology discovers it everywhere, often lost in oblivion, at the horizon of all systems or States—not only in Asia, but also in Africa, America, Greece, Rome. Immemorial Urstaat, dating as far back as Neolithic times, and perhaps farther still. Following the Marxist description: **a State apparatus** is **erected** upon the **primitive** agricultural **communities**, which already have **lineal-territorial codes**; but it **overcodes them**, **submitting them to the power of a despotic emperor**, the sole and transcendent public-property owner, **the master of the surplus or the stock**, the **organizer of large-scale works** (surplus labor), the source of public functions and **bureaucracy.** This is the paradigm of **the bond, the knot**. Such is the **regime of signs of the State: overcoding, or the Signifier**. It is a system of **machinic enslavement**: the first "**megamachine" in the strict sense**, to use Mumford's term. A prodigious success in a single stroke; other States will be mere runts measured against this model. The **emperor-despot** **is not a king or a tyrant;** these will **come into existence** only as a function of **private property** **once it has arisen**.9 In the imperial regime, everything is public: ownership of land is communal, each individual is an owner only insofar as he or she is a member of the community; the eminent property of the despot is that of the supposed Unity of the communities; and the functionaries themselves have land only if it comes with their position (although the position may be hereditary). Money may exist, notably in the form of the tax that the functionaries owe the emperor, but it is not used for buying-selling, since land does not exist as an alienable commodity. This is **the regime** of the **nexum**, **the bond**: something is lent or even **given without a transfer** of ownership, **without private appropriation**, and the compensation for it does not come in the form of interest or profit for the donor but rather as a "rent" that accrues to him, accompanying the lending of something for another's use or the granting of revenue.10 Marx, the historian, and Childe, the archaeologist, are in agreement on the following point: the **archaic imperial State**, which steps in to **overcode agricultural** **communities, presupposes** at least a certain level of **development** of these **communities' productive forces** since there must be a potential surplus capable of constituting a State stock, of supporting a specialized handicrafts class (metallurgy), and of progressively giving rise to public functions. That is why Marx links the archaic State to a certain "mode of production." However, the origin of these Neolithic States is still being pushed back in time. What is at issue when the existence of near-Paleolithic empires is conjectured is not simply the quantity of time; the qualitative problem changes. Catal Hiiyiik, in Anatolia, makes possible a singularly reinforced imperial paradigm: it is a stock of uncultivated seeds and relatively tame animals from different territories that performs, and makes it possible to perform, at first by chance, hybridizations and selections from which agriculture and small-scale animal raising arise.11 It is easy to see the significance of this change in the givens of the problem. It is no longer the stock that presupposes a potential surplus, but the other way around. It is no longer the State that presupposes advanced agricultural communities and developed forces of production. On the contrary, the State is established directly in a milieu of hunter-gatherers having no prior agriculture or metallurgy, and it is the State that creates agriculture, animal raising, and metallurgy; it does so first on its own soil, then imposes them upon the surrounding world. It is not the country that progressively creates the town but the town that creates the country. **It is not the State that presupposes a mode of production; quite the opposite, it is the State that makes production a "mode**." The last reasons for presuming a progressive development are invalidated. Like seeds in a sack: It all begins with a chance intermixing. The "state and urban revolution" may be Paleolithic, not Neolithic as Childe believed. Evolutionism has been challenged in many different ways (zigzag movements, stages skipped here or there, irreducible overall breaks). We have seen in particular how Pierre Clastres tried to shatter the evolutionist framework by means of the following two theses: (1) societies termed primitive are not societies without a State, in the sense that they failed to reach a certain stage, but are counter-State societies organizing mechanisms that ward off the State-form, which make its crystallization impossible; (2) when the State arises, it is in the form of an irreducible break, since it is not the result of a progressive development of the forces of production (even the "Neolithic revolution" cannot be defined in terms of an economic infrastructure).12 However, one does not depart from evolutionism by establishing a clean break. In the final state of his work, Clastres maintained the preexistence and autarky of counter-State societies, and attributed their workings to an overmysterious presentiment of what they warded off and did not yet exist. More generally, one marvels at the bizarre indifference that ethnology manifests for archaeology. It seems as though ethnologists, fenced off in their respective territories, are willing to compare their territories in an abstract, or structural, way, if it comes to that, but refuse to set them against archaeological territories that would compromise their autarky. They take snapshots of their primitives but rule out in advance the coexistence and superposition of the two maps, the ethnographical and the archaeological. Catal Hiiyuk, however, would have had a zone of influence extending two thousand miles; how can the ever-recurring problem of the relation of coexistence between primitive societies and empires, even those of Paleolithic times, be left unattended to? As long as archaeology is passed over, the question of the relation between ethnology and history is reduced to an idealist confrontation, and fails to wrest itself from the absurd theme of society without history, or society against history. Everything is **not of the State** precisely because **there have been States** always and **everywhere**. Not only does writing **presuppose** the **State**, but so do **speech and language**. The self-sufficiency, autarky, independence, preexistence of primitive communities, is an ethnological dream: not that these communities necessarily depend on States, but they coexist with them in a complex network. It is plausible that "from the beginning" primitive societies have maintained distant ties to one another, not just short-range ones, and that these ties were channeled through States, even if States effected only a partial and local capture of them. Speech communities and languages, independently of writing, do not define closed groups of people who understand one another but primarily determine relations between groups who do not understand one another: if there is language, it is fundamentally between those who do not speak the same tongue. Language is made for that, for translation, not for communication. And in primitive societies there are as many tendencies that "seek" the State, as many vectors working in the direction of the State, as there are movements within the State or outside it that tend to stray from it or guard themselves against it, or else to stimulate its evolution, or else already to abolish it: everything coexists, in perpetual interaction. Economic evolutionism is an impossibility; even a ramified evolution, "gatherers—hunters—animal breeders—farmers-industrialists," is hardly believable. An evolutionary ethnology is no better: "nomads— seminomads—sedentaries." Nor an ecological evolutionism: "dispersed autarky of local groups—villages and small towns—cities—States." All we need to do is combine these abstract evolutions to make all of evolutionism crumble; for example, it is the city that creates agriculture, without going through small towns. To take another example, the **nomads** **do not precede** the **sedentaries**; rather, **nomadism is a movement**, **a becoming** that affects **sedentaries**, just as sedentarization is a stoppage that settles the nomads. Griaznov has shown in this connection that the most ancient nomadism can be accurately attributed only to populations that abandoned their semiurban sedentarity, or their primitive itineration, to set off nomadizing.13 It is **under these conditions** that the **nomads invented the war machine**, as that which occupies or **fills nomad space** and **opposes** towns and **States,** which its **tendency is to abolish**. Primitive peoples already had mechanisms of war that converged to prevent the State formation; but these mechanisms change when they gain autonomy in the form of a specific nomadism machine that strikes back against the States. We cannot, however, infer from this even a zigzag evolution that would go from primitive peoples to States, from States to nomad war machines; or at least the zigzagging is not successive but passes through the loci of a topology that defines primitive societies here, States there, and elsewhere war machines. And even **when the State appropriates the war machine,** once again **changing its nature**, it is a phenomenon of transport, of transfer, and not one of evolution. The **nomad exists only in becoming**, and in interaction; the same goes for the primitive. All history does is to translate a coexistence of **becomings into a succession**. And collectivities can be transhumant, semisedentary, sedentary, or nomadic, without by the same token being preparatory stages for the State, which is already there, elsewhere or beside. Can it at least be said that the hunter-gatherers are the "true" primitives and remain in spite of it all the basis or minimal presupposition of the State formation, however far back in time we place it? This point of view can be maintained only at the price of a very inadequate conception of causality. And it is true that the human sciences, with their materialist, evolutionary, and even dialectical schemas, lag behind the richness and complexity of causal relations in physics, or even in biology. Physics and biology present us with reverse causalities that are without finality but testify nonetheless to an action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past, for example, the convergent wave and the anticipated potential, which imply an inversion of time. More than breaks or zigzags, it is these reverse causalities that shatter evolution. Similarly, in the present context, it is not adequate to say that the Neolithic or even Paleolithic State, once it appeared, reacted back on the surrounding world of the hunter-gatherers; it was already acting before it appeared, as the actual limit these primitive societies warded off, or as the point toward which they converged but could not reach without self-destructing. These societies simultaneously have vectors moving in the direction of the State, mechanisms warding it off, and a point of convergence that is repelled, set outside, as fast as it is approached. To ward off is also to anticipate. Of course, it is not at all in the same way that the State appears in existence, and that it preexists in the capacity of a warded-off limit; hence its irreducible contingency. But in order to give a positive meaning to the idea of a "presentiment" of what does not yet exist, it is necessary to demonstrate that what does not yet exist is already in action, in a different form than that of its existence. Once it has appeared, the State reacts back on the hunter-gatherers, imposing upon them agriculture, animal raising, an extensive division of labor, etc.; it acts, therefore, in the form of a centrifugal or divergent wave. But before appearing, the State already acts in the form of the convergent or centripetal wave of the hunter-gatherers, a wave that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the inversion of signs or the appearance of the State (hence the functional and intrinsic instability of these primitive societies).14 It is necessary from this standpoint to conceptualize the contemporaneousness or coexistence of the two inverse movements, of the two directions of time—of the primitive peoples "before" the State, and of the State "after" the primitive peoples—as if the two waves that seem to us to exclude or succeed each other unfolded simultaneously in an "archaeological," micropo-litical, micrological, molecular field. There exist collective mechanisms that simultaneously ward off and anticipate the formation of a central power. The appearance of a **central power** is thus a **function** of a **threshold** or degree **beyond** which what is **anticipated takes** on **consistency** or fails to, and what is **conjured away** ceases to be so and arrives. This threshold of consistency, or of constraint, is not evolutionary but rather coexists with what has yet to cross it. Moreover, a distinction must be made between different thresholds of consistency: the town and the State, however complementary, are not the same thing. The "**urban revolution**" and the "**state revolution**" may **coincide but do not meld**. In both cases, **there is a central power**, but it does **not assume** the **same figure**. Certain authors have made a distinction between the palatial or imperial system (temple-palace), and the urban, town system. In both cases **there is a town**, but in one case the town is an **outgrowth** of the **palace or temple**, and in the other case the **palace, the temple, is a concretion of the town**. In one case, the town par excellence is the capital, and in the other it is the metropolis. Sumer already attests to a town solution, as opposed to the imperial solution of Egypt. But to an even greater extent, it was the Mediterranean world, with the Pelasgians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, that created an urban fabric distinct from the imperial organisms of the Orient.15 Once again, the question is one not of evolution but of two thresholds of consistency that are themselves coexistent. They differ in several respects. The town is the correlate of the road. The town exists only as a **function of circulation**, and of circuits; it is a **remarkable poin**t on the circuits **that create it, and which it creates**. It is defined by entries and exits; something must enter it and exit from it. It imposes a frequency. **It effects a polarization of matter**, inert, **living or human**; it causes **the phylum, the flow**, to **pass through** specific places, along **horizontal lines**. It is a phenomenon of transconsistency, a network, because it is fundamentally in contact with other towns. It represents a **threshold of deterritorialization**, because whatever the **material involved**, it **must be deterritorialized** **enough to enter the network**, **to submit to the polarization**, to follow the circuit of urban and road recoding. The maximum deterritorialization appears in the tendency of maritime and commercial towns to separate off from the backcountry, from the countryside (Athens, Carthage, Venice). The **commercial character of the town** has often been emphasized, but the **commerce in question** is also **spiritual**, as in a network of monasteries or temple-cities. Towns are circuit-points of every kind, which enter into counterpoint along horizontal lines; they effect a complete but local, town-by-town, integration**. Each one** constitutes a **central power**, but it is a power of **polarization or of the middle** {milieu), of **forced coordination**. That is why this kind of power has egalitarian pretensions, regardless of the form it takes: tyrannical, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic. Town power invents the idea of the magistrature, which is very different from the State civil-service sector (fonction-nariat).16 Who can say where the greatest civil violence resides? **The State** indeed proceeds **otherwise**: it is a phenomenon of **intraconsistency**. It makes points **resonate together**, points that are not necessarily **already town-poles** but very **diverse points of order**, **geographic**, ethnic, linguistic, moral, **economic**, **technological particularities**. It makes the town resonate with the countryside. It operates by **stratification**; in other words, it forms a **vertical, hierarchized aggregate** that spans the **horizontal lines in a dimension of depth.** In retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations; if the State has a circuit of its own, it is an internal circuit dependent primarily upon resonance, it is a zone of recurrence that isolates itself from the remainder of the network, even if in order to do so it must exert even stricter controls over its relations with that remainder. The question is not to find out whether what is retained is natural or artificial (boundaries), because in any event there is deterntorialization. But in this case **deterritorialization** is a **result of the territory** itself **being taken as an object**, as a **material to stratify**, to make resonate. Thus the **central power** of the **State is hierarchical**, and constitutes a civil-service sector; the **center is not** in the **middle** {au milieu), but **on top**, because the **only way** it can **recombine** what it **isolates is through** **subordination**. Of course, there is a **multiplicity of States** no less than of towns, but it is **not the same type** **of multiplicity**: there are as many States as there are vertical cross sections in a dimension of depth, each separated from the others, whereas the town is inseparable from the horizontal network of towns. Each State is a global (not local) integration, a redundancy of resonance (not of frequency), an operation of the stratification of the territory (not of the polarization of the milieu). It is possible to reconstruct how primitive societies warded off both thresholds while at the same time anticipating them. Levi-Strauss has shown that the same villages are susceptible to two presentations, one segmentary and egalitarian, the other encompassing and hierarchized. These are like two potentials, one anticipating a central point common to two horizontal segments, the other anticipating a central point external to a straight line.17 Primitive societies do not lack formations of power; they even have many of them. But **what prevents** the potential **central points from crystallizing**, from taking on consistency, are precisely those **mechanisms that keep** the **formations of power both** from **resonating together** in a higher point and **from becoming polarized at a common poin**t: the circles are not concentric, and the two segments require a third segment through which to communicate.18 This is the sense in which primitive societies have crossed neither the town-threshold nor the State-threshold. If we now turn our attention to the two thresholds of consistency, it is clear that they imply a deterritorialization in relation to the primitive territorial codes. **It is futile to ask which came first, the city or the State, the urban or state revolution, because the two are in reciprocal presupposition**. Both the melodic lines of the towns and the harmonic cross sections of the States are necessary to effect the striation of space. The only question that arises is the possibility that there may be an inverse relation at the heart of this reciprocity. For although the archaic imperial State necessarily included towns of considerable size, they remained more or less strictly subordinated to the State, depending on how complete the State's monopoly over foreign trade was. On the other hand, the **town tended to** **break free** when the **State's overcoding** itself **provoked decoded flows**. A **decoding was coupled** with the **deterritorialization**, and **amplified it**; the **necessary** **recoding** was then **achieved through** a certain **autonomy of the towns**, or else directly through corporative and commercial towns freed from the State-form. Thus towns arose that no longer had a connection to their own land, because they assured the trade between empires, or better, constituted on their own a free commercial network with other towns. There is therefore an adventure specific to towns in the zones where the most intense decoding occurs, for example, the ancient Aegean world or the Western world of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Could it not be said that capitalism is the fruit of the towns, and arises when an urban recoding tends to replace State overcoding? This, however, was not the case. The towns did not create capitalism. The banking and commercial towns, being unproductive and indifferent to the backcountry, did not perform a recoding without also inhibiting the general conjunction of decoded flows. If it is true that they anticipated capitalism, they in turn did not anticipate it without also warding it off. They do not cross this new threshold. Thus it is necessary to expand the hypothesis of mechanisms both anticipatory and inhibiting: these mechanisms are at play not only in primitive societies but also in the conflict of towns "against" the State and "against" capitalism. Finally, it was **through the State-form** and **not the town-form that capitalism triumphed**; this occurred when the **Western States became models of realization** for an **axiomatic of decoded flows**, and in that way **resubjugated the towns**. As Braudel says, there were "always two runners, the state and the town"—two forms and two speeds of deterritorialization—and "the state usually won. . . . everywhere in Europe, it disciplined the towns with instinctive relentlessness, whether or not it used violence.. . . [The states] caught up with the forward gallop of the towns."19 But the relation is a reciprocal one: if it is the **modern State** that **gives capitalism** its models of **realization**, what is **thus realized** is an **independent**, **worldwide axiomatic** that is like a **single City**, megalopolis, or "**megamachine**" of which the **States are parts**, or neighborhoods. **We define social formations by machinic processes and not by modes of production** (these on the contrary depend on the processes). Thus primitive societies are defined by mechanisms of prevention-anticipation; **State societies are defined by apparatuses of capture**; **urban societies**, **by instruments of polarization**; **nomadic societies**, **by war machines**; and finally **international**, or rather ecumenical, **organizations** are defined by the **encompassment** of **heterogeneous social formations**. But precisely because these processes are variables of coexistence that are the object of a social topology, the various corresponding formations are coexistent. And they coexist in two fashions, extrinsically and intrinsically. Primitive societies cannot ward off the formation of an empire or State without anticipating it, and they cannot anticipate it without its already being there, forming part of their horizon. And **States cannot effect a capture unless what is captured coexists**, resists in primitive societies, or escapes under new forms, as towns or war machines. . . The numerical composition of **the war machine** is **superposed** upon the **primitive lineal organization** and **simultaneously opposes** the **geometric organization of the State** and the **physical organization of the town**. It is this extrinsic coexistence—interaction—that is brought to its own expression in international aggregates. For these obviously did not wait for capitalism before forming: as early as Neolithic times, even Paleolithic, we find traces of ecumenical organizations that testify to the existence of long-distance trade, and simultaneously cut across the most varied of social formations (as we have seen in the case of metallurgy). The problem of diffusion, or of diffusionism, is badly formulated if one assumes a center at which the diffusion would begin. Diffusion occurs only through the placing in communication of potentials of very different orders: all diffusion happens in the in-between, goes between, like everything that "grows" of the rhizome type. An **international ecumenical** **organization** **does not** **proceed** from an **imperial center** that **imposes itself** upon and **homogenizes an exterior milieu**; neither is it reducible to relations between formations of the same order, between States, for example (the League of Nations, the United Nations). On the contrary, it constitutes an intermediate milieu between the different coexistent orders. Therefore it is not exclusively commercial or economic, but is also religious, artistic, etc. From this standpoint, we shall call an **international organization** anything that has the **capacity to move through** diverse **social formations** simultaneously: **States, towns, deserts, war machines, primitive societies**. The great commercial formations in history do not simply have city-poles, but also primitive, imperial, and nomadic segments through which they pass, perhaps issuing out again in another form. Samir Amin is totally correct in saying that there can be no economic theory of international relations, even economic ones, because they sit astride heterogeneous formations.20 The point of departure for ecumenical organization is not a State, even an imperial one; the **imperial State** is only **one part of it**, and it **constitutes a part of it in its own mode**, according to its own order, which **consists in capturing everything it can**. It does not proceed by progressive homogenization, or by totalization, but by the **taking on of consistency** or the **consolidation of the diverse as such**. For example, monotheistic religion is distinguished from territorial worship by its pretension to universality. But this pretension is not homogenizing, it makes itself felt only by spreading everywhere; this was the case with Christianity, which became imperial and urban, but not without giving rise to bands, deserts, war machines of its own.21 Similarly, there is no artistic movement that does not have its towns and empires, but also its nomads, bands, and primitives. It might be objected that, at least in the case of capitalism, international economic relations, and at the limit all international relations, tend toward the homogenization of social formations. One could cite not only the cold and concerted destruction of primitive societies but also the fall of the last despotic formations, for example, the Ottoman Empire, which met capitalist demands with too much resistance and inertia. This objection, however, is only partially accurate. To the extent that **capitalism constitutes** an **axiomatic** (production for the market), **all States** and **all social formations** tend to **become isomorphic** in their capacity as **models of realization**: there is but **one centered world market**, the capitalist one, in which even the so-called **socialist** countries **participate**. Worldwide **organization thus** **ceases** to **pass "between"** **heterogeneous formations** since it assures the **isomorphy of those formations**. But it would be wrong to confuse isomorphy with homogeneity. For one thing, isomorphy allows, and even incites, a great heterogeneity among States (democratic, totalitarian, and, especially, "socialist" States are not facades). For another thing, the international **capitalist axiomatic** effectively **assures** the **isomorphy of the diverse** formations **only where** the **domestic market** is developing and expanding, in other words, in "the center." But it tolerates, in fact it requires, a certain peripheral polymorphy, to the extent that it is not saturated, to the extent that it actively repels its own limits;22 this explains the existence, at the periphery, of heteromorphic social formations, which certainly do not constitute vestiges or transitional forms since they realize an ultramodern capitalist production (oil, mines, plantations, industrial equipment, steel, chemistry), but which are nonetheless precapitalist, or extracapitalist, owing to other aspects of their production and to the forced inadequacy of their domestic market in relation to the world market.23 **When international organization becomes the capitalist axiomatic, it continues to imply a heterogeneity of social formations, it gives rise to and organizes its "Third World**." There is not only an external coexistence of formations but also an intrinsic coexistence of machinic processes. Each process can also function at a "power" other than its own; it can be taken up by a power corresponding to another process. The **State as apparatus of capture** has a **power of appropriation**; but this power **does not** consist **solely** in **capturing all that it can**, all that is possible, of a matter defined as phylum. The **apparatus of capture** also **appropriates the war machine**, **the instruments of polarization**, and the **anticipation-prevention mechanisms**. This is to say, conversely, that anticipation-prevention mechanisms have a high power of transference: they are at work not only in **primitive societies**, but move into the **towns that ward off the State-form**, into the **States that ward off capitalism**, into **capitalism itself**, insofar as it wards off and **repels its own limits**. And they are not satisfied to switch over to other powers but form new focal points of resistance and contagion, as we have seen in the case of "band" phenomena, which have their own towns, their own brand of internationalism, etc. Similarly, **war machines** have a **power** of **metamorphosis**, which of course **allows** them to be **captured by States**, but also to **resist that capture** and **rise up again** in **other forms**, with **other "objects" besides war** (revolution?). Each power is a force of **deterritorialization** that **can go along with the others or go against them** (even primitive societies have their vectors of deterritorialization). Each process can switch over to other powers, but also subordinate other processes to its own power.

#### There is a spectre haunting the 1AC: the emergence of the control society. Modern forms of capture are premised on the radical shift away from disciplinary power, from the clock to the computer, from power as repression to production. We have ceased to be disciplinary, but what counts is that we are at the beginning of something—there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.

**Deleuze 90** [Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” L’autre Journal 1, May 1990]

1. History Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: ﬁrst, the family; then the school (“you are no longer in your family"); then the barracks (“you are no longer at school"); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment. It's the prison that serves as the analogical model: at the sight of some laborers, the heroine of Rossellini’s Europa '51 could exclaim, “I thought I was seeing convicts." Foucault has brilliantly analyzed the ideal project of these environments of enclosure, particularly visible within the factory: to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of its component forces. But what Foucault recognized as well was the transience of this model: it succeeded that of the societies of sovereignty, the goal and functions of which were something quite different (to tax rather than to organize production, to rule on death rather than to administer life); the transition took place over time, and Napoleon seemed to effect the large-scale conversion from one society to the other. But in their turn the disciplines underwent a crisis to the beneﬁt of new forces that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after World War II: a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were, what we had ceased to be. We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure—prison, hospital, factory, school, family. The family is an “interior," in crisis like all other interiors—scholarly, professional, etc. The administrations in charge never cease announcing supposedly necessary reforms: to reform schools, to reform industries, hospitals, the armed forces, prisons. But everyone knows that these institutions are ﬁnished, whatever the length of their expiration periods. It's only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies. “Control" is the name Burroughs proposes as a term for the new monster, one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future. Paul Virilio also is continually analyzing the ultrarapid forms of free-ﬂoating control that replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system. There is no need here to invoke the extraordinary pharmaceutical productions, the molecular engineering, the genetic manipulations, although these are slated to enter into the new process. There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it’s within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another. For example, in the crisis of the hospital as environment of enclosure, neighborhood clinics, hospices, and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could participate as well in mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of conﬁnements. There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons. 2. Logic The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. On the other hand, the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical (which doesn't necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. This is obvious in the matter of salaries: the factory was a body that contained its internal forces at a level of equilibrium, the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; but in a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of course the factory was already familiar with the system of bonuses, but the corporation works more deeply to impose a modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability that operate through challenges, contests, and highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it's because they express the corporate situation with great precision. The factory constituted individuals as a single body to the double advantage of the boss who surveyed each element within the mass and the unions who mobilized a mass resistance; but the corporation constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one another and runs through each, dividing each within. The modulating principle of “salary according to merit“ has not failed to tempt national education itself. Indeed, just as the corporation replaces the factory, perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination. Which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the corporation. In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never ﬁnished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. In The Trial, Kafka, who had already placed himself at the pivotal point between two types of social formation, described the most fearsome of juridical forms. The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary societies (between two incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of the societies of control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes of juridical life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it's because we are leaving one in order to enter into the other. The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. (Foucault saw the origin of this double charge in the pastoral power of the priest—the flock and each of its animals—but civil power moves in turn and by other means to make itself lay “priest.”) In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer ﬁnd ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become “dividuals," and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks." Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to ﬂoating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies. The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary [person] was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the [person] of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports. Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism, an already well-known or familiar mutation that can be summed up as follows: nineteenth- century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for production and for property. It therefore erects the factory as a space of enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the means of production but also, progressively, the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy (the worker's familial house, the school). As for markets, they are conquered sometimes by specialization, sometimes by colonization, sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But, in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It’s a capitalism of higher-order production. It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the ﬁnished products: it buys the ﬁnished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation. The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner—state or private power—but coded ﬁgures—deformable and transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by ﬁxing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than by specialization of production. Corruption thereby gains a new power. Marketing has become the center or the “soul" of the corporation. We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, inﬁnite and discontinuous. [The subject] is no longer [someone] enclosed, but [someone] in debt. It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant the extreme poverty of three quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for conﬁnement: control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos. 3. Program The conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not necessarily one of science ﬁction. Félix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position—licit or illicit —and effects a universal modulation. The socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have to be categorical and to describe what is already in the process of substitution for the disciplinary sites of enclosure, whose crisis is everywhere proclaimed. It may be that older methods, borrowed from the former societies of sovereignty, will return to the fore, but with the necessary modifications. What counts is that we are at the beginning of something. In the prison system: the attempt to ﬁnd penalties of “substitution,” at least for petty crimes, and the use of electronic collars that force the convicted person to stay at home during certain hours. For the school system: continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual training, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduction of the “corporation" at all levels of schooling. For the hospital system: the new medicine “without doctor or patient" that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk, which in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a “dividual" material to be controlled. In the corporate system: new ways of handling money, profits, and humans that no longer pass through the old factory form. These are very small examples, but ones that will allow for better understanding of what is meant by the crisis of the institutions, which is to say, the progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of domination. One of the most important questions will concern the ineptitude of the unions: tied to the whole of their history of struggle against the disciplines or within the spaces of enclosure, will they be able to adapt themselves or will they give way to new forms of resistance against the societies of control? Can we already grasp the rough outlines of these coming forms, capable of threatening the joys of marketing? Many young people strangely boast of being “motivated"; they re-request apprenticeships and permanent training. It's up to them to discover what they're being made to serve, just as their elders discovered, not without difficulty, the telos of the disciplines. The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a molehill.

#### “An abstract machine… is what draws the lines of flight: it steers the quantum flows, assures the connection-creation of flows, and emits new quanta. It itself is in a state of flight, and erects war machines on its lines.”

#### –Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

Robinson 10 (Andy McLaverty-Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation,“ September 2010, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/)//JRD

So **what**, in Deleuzian theory, **is** **the** **alternative** to the **state**? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a **type** of **assemblage** (social group or cluster of relations) which they refer to as the ‘**war-machine’**, though with the **proviso** that **certain kinds** of ‘war-machines’ can also be **captured** and **used** by **states**. This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. The **term ‘war-machine’** has the **unfortunate** **connotations** of brutal **military machinery** and of uncontrollable militarist **apparatuses** such as **NATO**, which operate with a **machine-like rigidity** and **inhumanity** (c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, these kinds of **statist** **war-machines** are also **war-machines** of a sort, **because** they **descend** from a **historical** **process** through **which** **states** ‘**captured’** or **incorporated** **autonomous** social **movements** (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) and **made** **them** **part** of the **state** so as to **contain** their **subversive** **power**. Early states **learned** to **capture** **war-machines** because they were **previously** **vulnerable** to being **destroyed** by the **war-machines** of **nomadic** **stateless** societies, **having** no **similar** means of **response**. Hence, armies are a kind of **hybrid** **social** form, **containing** some of the **power** of **autonomous** **war-machines** but **contained** in such a way as to **harness** it to **state** **instrumentalism** and **inhumanity**. Captured in this way, **war-machines** lose their **affirmative** **force**, becoming simply machines of **purposeless** **destruction** – having **lost** the purpose of **deterritorialisation** (see below), they take on the **purpose** of **pure war** as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that **state-captured war-machines** are **regaining** their **autonomy** in a **dangerous** way, tending to **replace** **limited** war in the service of a **state’s goals with a drive to total war.** This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘**war on terror’** as **permanent state of emergency.** There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. The **Israeli army** is a **captured** **war-machine** in the worst possible sense, **pursuing** the **destruction** of **others’** **existential** **territories** in order to **accumulate** **destructive** power for a **state**. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is **not the Israeli army** but the **Palestinian** **resistance** which is a **war-machine** in the **full sense**. The **autonomous** war-machine, as **opposed** to the **state**-**captured** war-machine, is a form of **social** **assemblage** directed **against** the **state**, and **against** the coalescence of **sovereignty**. The way such **machines** **undermine** the state is by **exercising** **diffuse power** to break down **concentrated** **power**, and through the **replacement** of ‘**striated’** (regulated, marked) **space** with ‘**smooth’ space** (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band **defending** its own **autonomy**, and **reacting** to any **potential** **accumulation** of power by **other** bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how **autonomous** **social** movements **resist** **concentrations** of **political** **power**. Autonomous **social** **movements**, such as the **European squatters’ movement**, the **Zapatistas,** and networks of **protest against summits**, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to **Southern guerrilla** and popular movements such as the **Palestinian intifada** and the **Vietnamese** **resistance** to **American** **occupation**, and also in **relation** to **everyday** **practices** of **indigenous** groups **resisting** **state** **control**. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. **Marginal** **groups**, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often **coalesce** as war-machines because the **state-form** is **inappropriate** for them. According to Deleuze and Guattari, **war** is **not the aim** of the **war-machine** (**except** when it is **captured by the state**); rather, war-machines tend to end up in a **situation** of **war** with states **because** of **the incommensurability** of the war-machine with the **state** and with **striated space**. War-machines end up in **conflict** with **states** because their goal is the ‘**deterritorialisation’** of the **rigid** **fixities** of **state** **space**, often to **create space for difference** or for **particular** ways of **life**. Think for instance of squatters’ movements: in themselves they **do not aim for conflict**, but rather, seek **different** kinds of **arrangements** of space by forming **new combinations** of unused **geographical** **spaces** with otherwise ‘**spaceless’ social groups**. Yet such movements are **often** **forced** into **conflict** with the **machinery of state repression** because the state ignores, or **refuses** to **recognise** these **new articulations**. As I write this, the JB Spray squat in Nottingham is continuing a campaign of resistance to reoccupation by state forces acting on behalf of capitalist owners who have no intent of putting the space to use. This is a struggle I would very much encourage readers to support (see this [article](http://notts.indymedia.org.uk/articles/415) and related links for details; contact 07817493824 or email jbspray[at]hotmail.co.uk). It is also a clear, local example of how autonomous social movements are **forced** into **conflict** by the **state’s** **drive** to **repress** **difference**. War-machines are also associated with the **formation of special types** of groups which are **variously** **termed** ‘bands’, ‘packs’ and ‘**multiplicities’**. These groups are seen as operating as dense local clusters of emotionally-intense connections, strongly differentiated from the ‘mass’, which is a type of group based on large scale, lack of intensity and vertical integration. ‘Packs’ or ‘bands’ instead form as **unstable groups**, **avoiding** fixed **hierarchies** (any leaders emerging are subject to rapid succession), usually with **small numbers**, and **dispersed** **through** space rather than **concentrated** in **particular** **sites**. Their diffusion is enabled by a **multiplicity** of **objectives** which resonate through **horizontal**, **molecular** **connections** rather than being **represented** in **overarching** **structures**. They tend to **detach** **materials** from the **connections** in which they are inserted in the **dominant** **system**, instead reconstructing **different** ‘**universes’** or perspectives around **other** **ways** of seeing and relating. One can think for instance of the way groups of children reconstruct urban spaces as spaces of play, finding new, dissident uses for objects such as shopping trollies. For Deleuze and Guattari, the process of forming ‘bands’ or ‘packs’ is necessarily dangerous, risking the self-destructive implosion of small groups, but also offering hopeful possibilities of forming ways of relating which are more open to difference than those prevalent in the dominant system. Deleuze and Guattari’s usefulness for **radical** **activism** is by **no means limited** to this **particular** **pair** of concepts, but this **way of thinking** about **social transformation** raises **useful questions** and provides **insights** into how **autonomous** **groups** differ from **dominant hierarchical forms** of social collectivity. For instance, this theory points towards the **need** to **avoid duplicating** statist ways of **relating** **within autonomous spaces**, and to avoid **coalescing** in **formal organisations** which ultimately **lead** **back** into the **state-form** (albeit usually through the addition of axioms). It also suggests the **inevitability** of **antagonism** between **radical** **movements** and the state, even when the **goal** of a **radical movement** is simply to **defend** or express its own **difference**. Strategically, therefore, **autonomous activists** need to be **prepared** to ‘**ward off’ the state**, both within movements (by **challenging statist** ways of **thinking** and **acting**) and in relation to the **wider context** (by resisting state repression). According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is a **basic incompatibility** between state ‘**antiproduction’ and the flourishing of difference**, and this requires overcoming the former. This requires **attention** to the creation and **defence of autonomous spaces,** in full awareness of their underlying **transformative potential.**

### Link—Global War Machine

#### “The Fascists were only child precursors, and the absolute peace of survival succeeded where total war had failed. The Third World War was already upon us…The world became a smooth space again, over which reigned a single war machine, even when it opposed its own parts. Wars had become a part of peace. More than that, the States no longer appropriated the war machine; they reconstituted a war machine of which they themselves were only the parts.”

#### —Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

**Evans and Guillaume 10** (Brad Evans, senior lecturer in International Relations at University of Bristol, Laura Guillaume, PhD student in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “Deleuze and War: Introduction,” [Theory & Event](https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/191) 13(3), 2010)//JRD

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the **war** **machine** was **worked** **out** in the context of the **global** **confrontation** of the **Cold** **War**, in which **hair-trigger ‘nuclear security’** produced ‘a **peace** still **more** **terrifying** **than** **fascist** **death’**, whereby the **spectre** of **war** seemed to **determine** the **conditions** for **international** and **domestic** **politics**. Rather than be subject to **control** by the **state**, the **war** **machine** began to take **control** of the **state** and **directly** **invest** a **particular** **configuration** **of** **global** (in-) **security**. However, the Cold War genesis of the war machine concept does not mean that it has nothing to offer a post-Cold War, post-September 11th. Deleuze’s essay ‘Postscript on Societies of **Control’** indicates the ways in which he saw the **security** **environment** changing to one of **modulated** **control** and the **management** of **flows** and **circulation**, rather than the **strict** **policing** of **identities**. The concept of the **war** **machine** itself seems to **resonate** with **the post-September 11th** world in which the nature of threats **unclear** and ‘**unknown** **unknowns’** determine **military** **planning**. Indeed, it is arguable that Deleuze more than any other is the ideal philosopher for helping us make sense of today’s radically interconnected post-Clausewitzean security terrain. Something which has certainly not been lost on some of the key centres for strategic affairs, such as the RAND Corporation and the Israeli Defence Force, who have operationalised Deleuzian principles to enhance military efficacy. With this in mind, it was our conviction that an edited volume which specifically dealt with “Deleuze and War” was long since overdue, not in order to definitively pronounce on the relationship between Deleuze and War, but precisely to gesture to the multiple lines of engagement and intersection between Deleuze’s work and contemporary problems of war, peace, security and resistance. It is our hope that this volume serves to catalyse a consideration of Deleuze in the context of war, and to open up debates and lines of enquiry that may enrich our engagement with the often dispiriting problems of militarism and security. Brad Evans and Michael Hardt discuss the extent to which civil war is no longer understood primarily through the prism of sovereignty. This is to say, with the **primary** **mode** of warfare **no** **longer** taking place **between** **states**, or for that matter **within** **states** for the **acquisition** of **state** **power** (as in conventional civil war), then the **once** **familiar** location of ‘**war’** in relation to ‘**peaceful** **politics’** now becomes intensely **problematic**. To put it another way, in **focusing** **exclusively** on the **relationship** between **sovereignty** and **war**, we are in **danger** of **becoming** ~~blind~~ [**oblivious**] to the **iterations** of **war/governance** which **generate** the **conditions** of **possibility** for everyday **politics**. Indeed, as Evans and Hardt suggest, while **Liberal** forms of **governance** are **increasingly** **unhindered** by the **muddying** of the **waters** between ‘**war’** and ‘**not war’**, **Liberalism** itself as a **framework** for a **politics** **concerned** with **emancipation** and **resistance** might be **fatally** **imperilled** by the **generalised** state of war. Not only does this suggest the **need** for a **rethinking** of the **politics** of the left, or of **radical** **democracy**, but also that this **new politics** **should take account** of the ways in which **modern** **strategies** of **rule** are **dedicated** to the **differential** **production** and **organisation** of **bodies** in ways which **determine** the **possibilities** **for resistance**, and make the **emergence** of **certain** **forms** of life **complicit** in the **martial logic of rule**. Examples include the potentially redeemable body of the insurgent, the life-inimical body of the terrorist, and the inviolable and valuable body of the US soldier. What this means is that one can **no longer** **assume** that **war** is **fought** **according** to the **structures of friend/enemy**, them/us. **Instead**, it is that the **production** of **these categories** (and the multiple sub-categories that populate them) **which** **itself** is **internal** to ‘**war**.’ In turn, this **necessitates** a **change** in the **way** in **which** **we** **think** **about** **war**, which **becomes** **less** **associated** with **transcendent** categories of **power** (**good/evil, friend/enemy**) such as are **associated** with a **moment** of **sovereign** **decision**, and **more** **concerned** with the **immanent** **production** of **identities** and **lives**: with what we might call a **political** **economy** whereby the **production** of **life** is itself the **production of** war. **Economy** thus **becomes** as great a concern in the **analysis** of **contemporary** **war** as the **transcendent** **principles** of **law** and **sovereignty**. Hence, whilst the ‘exceptional’ instances of transcendent sovereign domination are easy to find in the recent past—as with, for example, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib—these, Evans and Hardt suggest, **may** **not** **be** the **essence** of the **current** **paradigm** of **war**. Indeed, there is a **potential** **danger** for a politics of **resistance** or **criticism** in **focusing** **exclusively** on these **dramatic** **examples** of **sovereign** **rule**. This has the **potential** to **conceal** the ‘**normalised’** ways in which **power** **operates**, through the **juridical** **policing** of humanity, through the **production** and **organisation** **of life**, through the **regulation** of **flow** and **exchange** **in accordance** with the **predicates** of the **economising** **facets** of global **Liberal rule**. It is to these that we must turn if we are to conceive a politics of resistance adequate to the task of confronting the multifaceted dimensions of war and the martial economy. Laura Guillaume begins the interview with James Der Derian by broaching the militarization of Deleuzian concepts. Whilst for many this tendency is problematic, as Der Derian reminds us, the militaristic appropriation of critical thought reveals a clear genealogy of (ab)use. While Der Derian invokes the experiences of Derrida, Foucault and Virilio, one could have also added here Nietzsche whose malicious appropriation by the forces of fascism still leaves him somewhat tarnished. Indeed, he argues, given the evident conceptual richness of the authors in question, is there any wonder that the military would be equally seduced? Hence, that there remains a possibility for concepts which have the aim of “liberation and resistance” to be turned into concepts for “occupation and destruction” serves to be a healthy reminder us all that our works may further rationalise the war machine. Against this backdrop, Der Derian attends specifically to the collapse of the meaningful distinctions which once marked out Clausewitzean war. An **active** **agent** in this has been what he terms the **MIME-NET** (military-industrial-media-entertainment network) which **actively** **producing** the **conditions** for **war**, conditions the **theatre** **along** **complex**, **adaptive** and **networked** **lines**. Importantly, for Der Derian, since the onset of a **global** **state** of **war** **inscribes** the **war** **machine** with a “virtuous” quality (understood in terms of technological and ethical supremacy), then to understand more fully the **political** **implications** it is **necessary** to have a **more sophisticated** analytic of the **composition** of **global war machine**. “It is all too easy, he argues, “to dump this all on Bush’s doorstep.” Liberals too have a vested interest in all this. Der Derian’s analytic of the MIME-NET points to the oxymoronic nature of virtuous war. A war that **seeks to** **secure** its **peace** through **technological** **enforcement** **cannot** achieve **anything** **other** than the creation of **new** **political** **problems**. The stage is thus set ‘for **endless** **cycles** of **conflict** in which **worst** **case** **scenarios** produce the future they claim only to anticipate.’ **Fulfilling the prophecies of ones own making**, the **war** **machine** is therefore not only **virtually** **endowed**, but in the process of going to war it **actively** **produces** the **reality** of the **situation**. With this preemptive rationality in mind, Guillaume poses the use of Bobbit’s strategic conflations between the human and the natural in order to make sense of this new virtual terrain. Supporting the notion that pre-emptive action “**colonises the future**,” Der Derian explains the **absurd** **quality** to all this in the sense that our **interventions** even take the “**evils yet to be born**” to be their object. This certainly offers some lessons to us— especially concerning what not to do. **Pre-empting evil** is not only **ludicrous**; it has proven to be **disastrous**. Provoking threats simply **ups the ante**. Nevertheless, there is some optimism to be gleaned, for if this century can be called Deleuzian then it will be realised in the **active** **counter**-**production** of **heterogeneous** **media** whose **cultural** **outputs** have the **potential** **to** **change** attitudes far **greater** than any **political** **program** which claims to hold the key to **universal** **truth**. Julian Reid’s paper addresses the function of the concept of war in Deleuze’s thought, starting with a consideration of its role in transforming representative practice, as outlined in Cinema II. Reid is troubled by Deleuze’s assumption of distinctive pre-and post-war cinema (and representative practice more broadly), and his suggestion that the Second World War brought about a schism in the way that representation functions. Whereas pre-war cinema is concerned with the representation of ‘a people’, post-war cinema arises out of the recognition of the impossibility of this task. Indeed, not only is the **representation** of the **people** **now** **impossible**, it is undesirable, as it reinforces a **fascist** **fetishization** of people as being of a **given** **identity** or type. Post-war cinema focuses on gesturing to this very impossibility, whereby the people are always missing or ‘to come.’ The **problem** here, according to Deleuze’s own discussion of war in A Thousand Plateaus, is the **supposition** **that** **war** is something extra-cultural, **extra-representative**, which can **influence** **culture** and **representation** from **without**. On the contrary, Deleuze is elsewhere at pains to insist that war is **immanently** **cultural** and **aesthetic**, and indeed, that we can see certain modes of **culture** and **aesthetics** as themselves **constituting** ‘**war’** on **established** **forms** of **cultural** **practice**. In other words, cinema itself might be a war on convention: in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, a ‘war machine.’ This changes the stakes of the analysis. **Rather than** seeing a **linear progression** from one form of **representation** to **another**, what is called for is the **understanding** that **culture and representation** are themselves **always being taken up** by a **war machine**, **oscillating** between **capture by the state** and **escape in a line of flight**. While the **former** may **faithfully** **reproduce** images of the **people** and the **territory**, the **latter produces** only the **inescapable** **flight** into **incalculability** where the **people** **are** **always** **missing** and the **territory shattered**. War is an **amalgam** of **cultural** and **political affects** which may **swing** **between** two poles: **obedience** to the state and the **deterritorialisation** of all **the state stands for**. Reid suggests that Deleuze makes use of the figure of ‘the seer’ in modern cinema, who is engaged in an encounter with the ‘the intolerable’ and thus is always pointing to that which is outside the frame and beyond representation. However, Reid argues that the seer becomes enmeshed in cliché and is therefore bound to a particular time-frame (1945–1968) in terms of the distortion of cinematic claims to truth. More broadly, sight itself becomes thoroughly **contaminated** with **military** **logic**, as outlined by Paul Virilio, whereby **perception**, **capture** and **domination** become part of the **same affective moment**. Reid suggests that **rather** than **identify** the **ciphers of deterritorialisation** in postmodern cinema, we would do **better** to **focus** on the **processes of state** **capture** and **escape**, through which we can **access the ongoing** **flux** present in **every relation to the state**. At these crossroads, where the **macro-and micropolitical encounter each other**, the people are at stake. Brian Massumi addresses the **tendencies** of **contemporary** **war**, which were **intensified** though not **caused** by **September 11th 2001.** On the one hand, the **post**-**September 11th** **security** **response** was **undertaken** in the **name** of the **spectre** of the absent towers: one remembers what one does not see. On the other, **military** **action** becomes increasingly **conceived** under the **banner of ‘pre-emption’**, where one acts to **prevent** **something** which has **not occurred**, which has not been experienced. In this sense, a **schism** grows **between** (**military**) **action** and **perception**— we can **no longer trust our senses**. For Massumi, this has **revealing** **consequences** for how we are to **think** **contemporary** **war** in **relation** to the **politics** of **everyday** **life**. **Rather** than **thinking** in terms of what **we experience** or **perceive**, Massumi suggests that we **ought** **to** **explore** **what takes place** in this space **before perception**, in which we are primed for attention, ready to perceive, on ‘**red alert**.’ This space **before action**, before decision, is increasingly **the subject of a military ‘occupation.**’ Rather than being a **discreet** **activity** which takes place in a defined location against a pre-determined set of people, **war becomes generalised**, ubiquitised, **prior to politics**. Massumi cites Arquilla and Ronfeldt, who define ‘soft power’ as ‘epistemological warfare’, because it is concerned with what people know, or what they think they know. Massumi suggests that soft power is now ubiquitous. No longer merely the companion to exceptional ‘hard power’ operations, ‘epistemological warfare’ has become the condition of ‘normal’ political life. However, this is not quite right. For the current ‘**everyday** **war’** is concerned **not** **so** **much** with what **we know** (or think we know) as **what we** **are** (or are **becoming**). This is **not so much epistemological as ontological war**, concerned with the **ongoing** **emergence** of **subjects** of **certain** kinds **primed** **to** react and **respond** in certain ways to **emergent** **dangers** which are **themselves** in a **permanent** **condition** of **emergence**. This **future-facing war** is always in the **process** of **conditioning** **corporeal** **emergence** and **determining** **future** **reactions**. **Like capitalism** itself, this **process is non-linear** and **seemingly** **compatible** with the **Liberal predicates** of **freedom** and **individualism**: predicates which are **incapable** of **interrogating** the pre-individual **domain of affect**, and which are thereby entirely **compatible** with this **generalised** **state** of **war** (as a mode of **governance**) and **unable** to **provide** the **platform** for an effective **critique** (as a politics of resistance). Consequently, Massumi says that ‘[i]t is not enough to stop one war or even many. It is not enough to vote out one government bent on war, nor many.’ Rather the **task** is **to** **reclaim** the **space of emergence**—of the **virtual**—which is in **danger** of being **given** **over** to a **military** **logic** of **pre-emption**. John Protevi is concerned with the production of certain ‘bodies politic’ which constitute aspects of war. The term ‘body politic’ is intended to draw attention to the extent that military bodies cannot be understood exclusively through the prism of either the somatic or the social. Rather, they must be understood as dynamic assemblages; as Protevi says, ‘geo-bio-techno-affective assemblages’, which exceed capture by any one interpretative framework. This **suggests** a **change** in the way in which we **deploy** the **concept** of **the body** in **making** **sense of affective** responses to war. It is **no** **longer** **sufficient** to rely on **biological** **accounts** of why **bodies** **perform** in certain ways. Rather, Protevi suggests, we should **mobilise** Deleuze and Guattari’s **concept of affect**, which **refers** to the **ability** **of bodies** to **form assemblages** with other bodies. Indeed, this is a **problematic** formulation in the sense that the **body cannot be understood** **apart** from this **ability**. It is the **formation** of **assemblages**, and the **ongoing** **interaction** that bodies have with other bodies that **enables** **us** to **define ‘what a body is.’** And this challenges the analytic approach to bodies at war which would seek to distinguish among history, biology, culture, society and so on, when in fact the connections that bodies make exceed and undermine these distinctions. What is the key for Protevi is the way in which we can think of war in adaptive terms, or as a selection pressure, without essentialising either what we mean by ‘war’, or what we take to be the responses and reactions of bodies. This involves rescuing from the idea of **simple** **evolution** a notion of the ‘body politic’ as a **dynamic** **active** and **evolving assemblage**. Discussing the phenomenon of ‘rage’ across historical cultures, Protevi wants to rescue some notion of ‘human nature’ from the notion that all emotions and affective manifestations are socially constructed or context specific. However, this does not mean that they are amenable to facile capture or representation through any single prism of analysis. Rather, considering bodily responses and reactions from the perspective of affect demands attention to the cyclical, dynamic and reactive character of all actions/reactions. It is the differential bio-cultural production of certain war-bodies with which Protevi is concerned, which means that it is not enough for us to say that war is an eternal human experience because of the highly variable ways in which ‘war’ is experienced and conceived in different cultures. He gives the example of music, which may create certain possibilities for group activity, and prime certain affective responses resulting in variable iterations of ‘war.’ In this sense, music is immediately physiological, social, cultural and military, in an emergent assemblage of bodies and populations. Brad Evans analyses the post-9/11 security landscape through the prism of Foucauldian biopolitics in order to outline the ways in which the referent object of security is changing, and to catalyse an exploration of the consequences of this for political possibility and resistance. We can see **security** **becoming** **decreasingly concerned** with **identity** and **increasingly** **focused** on **circulation** and **emergence**. In this sense, it is **no** **longer** what **things** **are** that is the **focus** of the **martial** **sciences**, but what they are **becoming**. This produces a re-evaluation of the very meaning of ‘security’, and of its meaning for politics and the place of war in contemporary society. Moreover, it is productive of a **change** in the **object** of **security**, which is **no** **longer** a **defined** **group** or state, but **life itself**; life **understood** as **always** **being** in the **process** of **change** and **emergence**. Indeed, it is this **ongoing** **process** of **becoming** which **defines ‘life’ as such**. **Life is becoming**. It therefore **cannot** be **secured** through **being** **fixed**, rather, **its becomings** must be **monitored** and, if necessary, terminated before danger can be said to have emerged. As Evans indicates, this creates serious challenges for political thought. Firstly, ‘**freedom’** becomes **internalised** within the **system** of **security** and **governance**, so that we can **no** **longer** think of **freedom** **from** **security**, but of **security** as the **production** of **freedom**. Secondly, the **consequences** of ‘**freedom’** become **radically** **unpredictable**. The new sciences of complexity tell us that we **cannot** **contain** this radical freedom within a **certain** **political** territory or **ideology**: rather, the **consequences** of **freedom** are inherently **unpredictable** and **unstable**. This is nowhere better illustrated than by the events of 9/11, when the potential of a ‘catastrophic individual’ to bring destruction and to transform perceptions of the security situation was brought into painfully sharp relief. What this means is that **the event**, in Deleuzian terms, becomes the **object of security**, thereby creating a paradox in which the moment **of political possibility** is also the moment for the concentration of an **arsenal of military-strategic forces** which are **actually** **productive** of the terrifying sorts of event which they would seek to foreclose. Evans suggests that resources from Deleuze’s thought may allow us to think through binaries such as present/future, finite/infinite, known/unknown, which litter the terrain of discourses of security/freedom, through the concept of difference which may mobilise an openness to political formation which enables us to think a future beyond security, danger and pre-emption. Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc offers an analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of **the war machine** which is **concerned** **with** the way it can **produce** a **theory** of **war** in which the **repressive powers of the state** are **not localised** in the army, the police forces and so on, but comes to be **constituted in certain ways** through the **dynamic** **interaction** of forces which **either affirm the state or flee from it**. In this respect, a **genealogy** of **war** **involves** **tracing** the **processes** **by** which **the war machine comes to be captured by the state**, as well as being **attentive** to the **lines of flight** along which the **war machine** escapes **capture** and comes to **constitute a force of resistance to state appropriation**. Reading Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine together with Clausewitzian precepts concerning the status of war, what becomes apparent are the profound social and economic ramifications of this reading of war. For Clausewitz, war is the **servant** of **state** **politics**, and can be so **precisely** **because** it is not **itself** **political**. Similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari, **the war machine** is always **potentially** **setting** up a line of flight from state politics, and is not itself exhausted or determined by it. But Sibertin-Blanc argues that Clausewitz places too much emphasis on war as an institutionally governed historical reality, whereas Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with the identification of the concept of the war machine deterritorialised from its geo-political manifestations. The **process** by which the **war** **machine** is **captured** by the **state** is **not itself military**, because the **military is the outcome of this process**. Rather, it is **territorial** and **relates** to the circulation of **men** and **things** **within the state**. In the current system, the state has lost control of the war machine, and thus the war machine no longer has war as its object, as this would have to be given by the state. Rather, it is **through** the **political** **economy**, and the **interstices of society themselves**, that the war machine operates, manifesting itself as a **global security order** rather than an **exceptional moment of war**. Although states of exception still present a challenge, the **war** **machine** becomes **associated** with the very **fabric** **of normality** as such which, no longer driven by the state, becomes **disaggregated** **from** **politics**: a **technocracy** of order which **presents** itself as **being** the **very underlying** **conditions** of **life** **itself**. Sibertin-Blanc suggests that one could **replace** the **political** end **given** to the **war** **machine** with the **economic** **end** that it now has, in the sense that the **war** **machine** is **concerned** with the **immanent** **unfolding** of the **capitalist** **economy** itself. Further, he argues that the idea of a **war** **machine** dedicated to a ‘**global** **peace’** should not **deceive** us into **expecting** a degree of **pacification** or a **decline** in **violence**. Quite the contrary. The point is rather that the **global** **violence** and **instability** is itself **internal** to the **world wide war machine** and does not constitute an **interruption** in its **rule**. Sibertin-Blanc leaves us with the challenge of thinking a politics of resistance which can contend with the normalisation of war as a background condition for everyday life; a **politics** which, one **cannot** be think, may itself **derive** some **sustenance** **from** the **resources** of the **war** **machine** with which to **construct** its **line** **of** **flight**. Gregg Lambert traces the exteriority of the war machine to the state, and the relationship this conjures between the state and ‘the people.’ He suggests that the **state** is **always** in the **process** of **seeking** to **capture** the **people**, in **ideology**, in **political philosophy** or in a **martial** **relation** to those who **defy** the state’s **insistence** on **interiority** and **regularity**. While the left might seek to build its legitimacy on the morality of the people, this is an appropriation which actually serves to cauterise the revolutionary potential of the people in Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking. The problem is that ‘**the people**’ may all too **readily** **collapse** into a **fascist assemblage**, the **nomad** may appear most **prominently** in the guise of **an ambulant suicide bomber**, and, as Deleuze and Guattari are themselves appropriated by the IDF for the contribution that they can make into the pacification of hostile striated space, it seems that there is **no** **conceptual** **territory** which is safe from the **grasping hands of the militarists**, or from the threat of a **fatal** **territorialisation** on the **black** **hole** of **negation**. However, the point is that the **schizophrenic**, **bipolar** nature of concepts in Deleuze and Guattari **hauls** us **back** **from** the **brink of despair**, because ‘**the people’** may also **appear as a war machine with** respect to the state, producing the **emergence** of **new political possibilities**. Lambert explores the figures used by Deleuze and Guattari to dramatise the elusive and contradictory nature of ‘the people.’ For example, Ahab and Bartleby both, in their different ways, defy the state and thereby somehow embody it. They betray it, and at the same time express what is most essential about it. In this sense, they produce the American dream through their refusal to conform to it. Through their failure in the eyes of the state, they produce a creative line of flight from it. Only by failing can they produce. These refusenik or defiant figures who populate Deleuze and Guattari’s texts are actually the **poles** of the **revolutionary** **becomings** of the people. No one truly embodies the American dream, there is **no perfect citizen**, and there are **no people**. It is only through the **rejection** **of**, or **escape** **from** these **injunctions** that a ‘**people to come**’ can be summoned; a **people** who **never arrives** but **stands** **for** the **permanent possibility of difference** within a **political** **system**. Lambert suggests that there are problems with the ineluctable bipolarity of Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine, however, not least that we are left with the task of distinguishing between ‘destructive violence and creative violence.’ This is not a new problem, for is not the task of revolutionary violence the dedication of force to the redemption of the world? The question is whether Deleuze and Guattari offer us a novel way out of this conundrum. Lambert suggests that we concentrate our research on the idea of death, which may be the genocidal nadir to which the modern military arsenal dedicates itself, or which may be a space of **pure becoming**, ‘A Life’, which **represents** the **pure** **form** of **political** **possibility** and **therefore** the **counter** to the **black** **hole** to which the **war machine collapse**.

### Link—Cap/Innovation

**The modern war machine has already exceeded the bounds of the state, now occupying the position of an ever expanding axiomatic that seeks to endlessly conquer. On the one hand of this new mechanism lies the forces of the priest, the deterritorializing mode of capture that disassembles the territories and desires external to it. On the other, however, lies the emperor, the force of the international, the market that reterritorializes the subject and world with grids of value. Like Newton’s 3rd law, this system’s productive potential is thus constantly constrained by tension between the two sides, defined by an equal conservative force that seeks equilibrium.**

**Glezos, 10** (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 05-20-2010 Journals.uvic, "Creative Destruction versus Restrictive Practices: Deleuze, Schumpeter and Capitalism's uneasy relationship with technical innovation", https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/view/14685/5555)//guyB

This innovative drive within capitalism is what leads Deleuze and Guattari to describe the capitalist axiomatic as a machine for the deterritorialization of flows, as capitalist enterprises constantly seek out new technical innovations as a means to free up flows of labour, knowledge, resources, energy and commodities. This presumed relationship between capitalism and technological innovation cuts both ways. On the one hand, capitalism is innovative, driven by the profit principle to constantly seek out cheaper, quicker and more efficient methods of production. On the other hand, innovation is capitalist, as new innovations further cement and empower the real subsumption of productive practices under the capitalist axiomatic. Understanding the relationship between capitalism and innovation in such a way creates a problem for those of us on the left who, on the one hand, wish to challenge the exploitation and violence of the capitalist axiomatic while, on the other, feel attracted to the power and promise that new technologies provide. We find ourselves wondering if capitalism is necessary to bring about this technological progress or, even worse, if the technological fruits of capitalism are fundamentally tainted by their lineage. By using the technology of advanced capitalism, are we necessarily forced to capitulate or deform ourselves to the requirements of the capitalist axiomatic? This dilemma, however, changes radically if we challenge this essential, almost ontological, connection between capitalism and innovation -- not by arguing that capitalism doesn't possess an innovative drive, but by arguing that **this drive is paralleled by an equally strong conservative drive**. As much as capitalist enterprises are driven by market forces to introduce technological innovations, they are equally driven to limit, and frequently inhibit, technological innovation in ways which are necessary for them to maintain their control over the various processes of production, delivery, and consumption. This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue that, at the same time as the capitalist axiomatic is a deterritorializing machine, it is also an apparatus of capture which, though it deterritorializes various flows, always then "maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital." [[2]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn2) This essay will attempt to complicate the seemingly essential relationship between capitalism and innovation. In doing so it will be fighting a war on two fronts. Against those boosters of capitalism who see in it only innovation and progress, I will argue that because of the potential danger that innovation can pose to capitalism's coherence and control, **it is frequently pressed to inhibit that innovation** -- to channel, decelerate and in some cases reverse it. Conversely, to those critics who see in technological innovation only the further perfection of capitalist exploitation, [[3]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn3) I argue that, because of this uneasy tension, **new technologies** (specifically new digital technologies) **present potential sites of resistance and possibility which can be deployed against key capitalist axioms.** I will begin by investigating the question of technological innovation through the work of Joseph Schumpeter. Here I will note how we see, even in Schumpeter, that prophet of innovation and entrepreneurship, the outline of capitalism's conservative tendencies. I will then model this opposition through Deleuze and Guattari's conceptions of the capitalist axiomatic as both a machine for the deterritorialization of flows and an apparatus of capture. Finally, I will investigate this model through the specific case-study of advanced digital information technologies. Capitalism and Innovation Innovation and Entrepreneurship We start with Joseph Schumpeter as the theorist of capitalist dynamism par excellence. He is the great thinker of technical innovation in capitalism, through the figure of "creative destruction." However, for our purposes, what is most useful about Schumpeter is that he also theorizes what he terms "restrictive practices," which function within capitalist production to constrain, channel and decelerate innovation. However, before we get to these restrictive practices, an analysis of Schumpeter's account of innovation is necessary. Technical innovation, for Schumpeter, takes place against the backdrop of the day-to-day capitalist production that occurs in a relatively stable, static and circular fashion. [[4]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn4) In day-to-day production, the processes of production and exchange maintain a relatively steady equilibrium that is produced through market pressures according to basic laws of supply and demand. [[5]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn5) This is not to say that change doesn't take place. But change is either steady and incremental or a result of exogenous upheavals (such as wars or natural disasters) which will eventually be adapted to. Within this "accustomed circular flow," every individual can act promptly and rationally because he is sure of his ground and is supported by the conduct, as adjusted to this circular flow, of all other individuals, who in turn expect the accustomed activity from him... While in the accustomed channels his own ability and experience suffice for the normal individual... [[6]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn6) As a result, rational prediction and planning can take place, and the future can (barring exogenous change) be projected from the present. However, opposed to this process of circular flows, Schumpeter then directs our attention to a collection of processes which produce "a change in the channels of economic routine or a spontaneous change in the economic data arising from within the system." [[7]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn7) That is to say, Schumpeter identifies moments of innovation [[8]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn8) which produce spontaneous, yet endogenous, [[9]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn9) change in the production process and create upheavals in the established equilibrium. When these innovations end up working, economic life is thrown out of equilibrium: **new rules have to be invented**, and economic laws have to reassert themselves. Old practices, processes and technologies which are less efficient or profitable than those which innovation brings, as well as those firms which are unable to adapt, are replaced. [[10]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn10) It is this process which produces that "perennial gale of creative destruction" [[11]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn11) that is at the heart of Schumpeter's analysis of capitalism. Capitalism's unique qualities as an economic formation are expressed through creative destruction. It encourages innovation and ensures that old ways of doing things, however comfortable and traditional, are discarded when they are shown to be inefficient. In so doing, the human potential for production and achievement expands and accelerates, seemingly without limit. Restrictive Practices Many accounts of Schumpeter (and of capitalism in general) end here -- with a description of the steady and circular flow of economic life, slowly expanding due to demographic shifts, occasionally radically accelerating due to technical innovations. This gives the impression of a healthy equilibrium alternating between times of static/circular flow and times of rapid, discontinuous change. However, this is to miss the way in which these two moments are in tension. Indeed, the only equilibrium is to be found within the circular flow of economic life, which innovation, in the Schumpeterian sense, shatters, destroying old certainties and forcing a new equilibrium to be painfully and erratically (re)composed. Schumpeter is well aware of how upsetting the upheavals of innovation can be within economic life. Indeed, just the possibility of such innovations diminishes the ability to act rationally and plan effectively in economic life: [T]he impact of new things -- new technologies for instance -- on the existing structure of an industry considerably reduces the long-run scope and importance of practices that aim, through restricting output, at conserving established positions and at maximizing the profits accruing from them. [[12]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn12) Schumpeter goes on to draw out how the "perennial gale of creative destruction" can affect the day-to-day functioning and decision making processes of economic production: Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of entrepreneurial action, certain safeguarding activites such as insuring or hedging. Long-range investing under rapidly changing conditions, especially under conditions that change or may change at any moment under the impact of new commodities and technologies, is like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving -- and moving jerkily at that. [[13]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn13) The "destruction" of creative destruction is not just leveled against older forms of economic activity. **It is the destruction of all the certainties of the economic system,** which actors use to make decisions, plan, and organize production. **Actors within the capitalist system thus have a vested interest in the maintenance of the system as it is** and "will cling as tightly as possible to habitual economic methods and only submit to the pressure of circumstances as it becomes necessary." [[14]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn14) This conservative element within capitalism is, however, not just expressed through a baseline intransigence to novelty. In addition to this passive resistance, capitalist production is marked by a collection of what Schumpeter terms "restrictive practices," practices that exist for the purpose, express or not, of decreasing the rate and velocity of technological innovation, as well as for **channeling it in systemically acceptable ways**. These restrictive practices include, first, "patents or temporary secrecy of processes or, in some cases, long-period contracts secured in advance" [[15]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn15) and, second, what Schumpeter calls "monopolistic practices", [[16]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn16)whereby a firm, corporation or industry uses economic power to control or ward off technical innovation, despite it being useful/profitable, as a way of decreasing the shocks and destabilizations that innovation can bring to the economy. We will discuss each of these sets of practices in more detail shortly. For now it is useful for us to realize that restrictive practices of this kind, as far as they are effective, acquire a new significance in the perennial gale of creative destruction, a significance which they would not have in a stationary state or in a state of slow and balanced growth. In either of these cases restrictive strategy would produce no result other than an increase in profits at the expense of buyers... But in the process of creative destruction, restrictive practices may do much to steady the ship and to alleviate temporal difficulties. [[17]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn17) This is to say, these restrictive practices are not temporary failures or distortions of the market. Rather they serve a necessary and central function in the reproduction of the capitalist system. We will now look at these arrangements in detail. Patents It is somewhat odd at first that Schumpeter identifies patents as one of his restrictive practices that inhibits technical innovation since, in principle, the purpose of patents it to encourage the development of new technologies. [[18]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn18) Of course, in a very narrow sense, patents are essentially restrictive since they serve to put legal limits on the use of a practice or technology. As Christopher May and Susan Sell describe, Intellectual property [of which patents are one form] constructs a scarce resource from knowledge or information that is not formally scarce. Unlike material things, **knowledge and information are not necessarily rivalrous, and therefore coincident usage seldom detracts from social utility**. Whereas two prospective users must compete to use a material resource (And this competition may be mediated through markets and the setting of a price), two or more users of any particular item of knowledge or information can use it simultaneously without competing. [[19]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn19) The logic of this restriction is that, by creating an artificial monopoly around a form of knowledge, the law ensures that the creator will be able to make money selling it (or at least more money than they would if they had competition). By doing this, the law provides an increased incentive to create and innovate. Alternately, if "information is not property, the incentives to create it will be lacking. **Patents and copyrights are social innovations designed to create artificial scarcities where none exist naturally**... These scarcities are intended to create the needed incentives for acquiring knowledge." [[20]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn20) Why then identify patents as a restrictive practice if, in theory, they serve instead to encourage innovation and change? At the very least, for Schumpeter, patents serve as a restrictive practice since they give the company introducing the innovation a level of certainty and stability through their property in the innovation in question, allowing them to determine how and to what extent the innovation will be introduced, rather than having to react to the competitive pressures of the market as a whole. **This can frequently mean that the innovation will be introduced and utilized in a suboptimal manner**. May and Sell describe James Watt's refusal to license his steam engine patent, requiring that all engine construction and sales go through him: "By doing so he may have 'held back the development of the metalworking industry for over a generation'. Had his monopoly expired in 1783, England might have had an extensive railway system much sooner." [[21]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn21) If a single patent can have this kind of effect on the progress of technical innovation, it is not surprising that businesses frequently look at the acquisition of patents as a way of controlling the market. [[22]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn22) More than this, the legal structure of patents creates a potential barrier to entry as the cost of defending them tends to discriminates against smaller and weaker entrepreneurs, in favour of stronger interests. This function of patents as a way of **inhibiting, rather than encouraging, technical innovation** becomes even more acute as contemporary post-industrial economies become more dependent on intellectual property as a source of value. With the rising value of intellectual properties, we increasingly see what Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg term "upstream patenting," which is to say patenting not just "end products" but also "fundamental discoveries that provide the knowledge base for future product development." [[23]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn23) Scientific and technological progress has always depended on a certain amount of openness and free exchange of ideas, especially in the realm of pure research. **New patenting strategies, however, seek to close off this openness**, because of the developer's fear of losing control of the potential value of a discovery. This is dangerous because "[u]pstream patents may also hinder subsequent research if they give a single entity monopoly control of basic research discoveries that enable subsequent investigation across a broad scientific territory." [[24]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn24) The open space of scientific discussion and debate has been replaced by a "patent thicket" in which researchers are frequently incapable of affording access to necessary forms of knowledge, and are afraid to act because of the threat of legal ramifications. This leads some writers to speak of the creation of an "anti-commons" [[25]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn25) in which the collective knowledge of human effort is increasingly parceled off to individual ownership. Software development constitutes another area (and a particularly crucial one in the context of the contemporary information economy) in which patents can serve to inhibit innovation. Patent laws in the US allow developers to patent not just entire applications, but any component part of the program, including tools, algorithms, or even a particular combination of existing technologies or ideas. As all the individual building blocks of computer code begin to be patented, **it becomes almost impossible to write a computer program that doesn't infringe on one patent or another**. [[26]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn26) For the large corporations this isn't a problem, as they each tend to possess large patent portfolios, which they can then cross-license against one another, ensuring that they are able to make software unobstructed. For smaller developers, however, the choice is to either pay the license, which can frequently make the software unprofitable, or work around the patent, which is time-consuming and might not even be possible. The effect of patents on software development is therefore much the same as the effect of "upstream patenting" on scientific research: the existence of a monopoly over the tools for the production of new knowledge. In patents **we thus see an instrument which fits nicely with capitalism's ambiguous relationship with technological innovation.** Patent law provides a legal structure for the ownership of knowledge, a way of encouraging innovation, while in turn that same structure provides a measure of control over that knowledge. **Patent law turns what is potentially a public good into private property, making scarce what is not by nature**. It turns the unruly progression of human knowledge into another commodity to be privately held, controlled and deployed for profit. Monopolistic Practices In addition to patents, Schumpeter identifies another mechanism of control, what he terms monopolistic practices, which refers to the economic powers that a large-scale concern is able to wield over the market. In Schumpeterian language, a firm need not be a full monopoly, which is to say in complete control of a particular commodity or market, to employ monopolistic practices. **It must simply be able to exert a certain amount of autonomous control over the market**, either alone or in concert with a few other concerns (it might be more accurate to call these practices oligopolistic but for the time being we will stick with Schumpeter's terms). Patents and monopolistic practices are not entirely unrelated, as patents confer a sort of monopoly and large corporations are able to more effectively acquire, enforce and contest patents. Large-scale concerns are able to use their power to inhibit technological innovation where it might threaten the existing forms of production. Thus, says Schumpeter, Progress entails, as we have seen, destruction of capital values in the strata with which the new commodity or method of production competes. In perfect competition the old investments must be adapted at a sacrifice or abandoned; but when there is no perfect competition and when each industrial field is controlled by a few big concerns, these can in various ways fight the threatening attack on their capital structure and try to avoid losses on their capital accounts; that is to say, **they can and will fight progress itself**. [[27]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn27) Where the innovation is the result of the firm's own research, it can be introduced slowly, after current fixed capital investments have already been written off. [[28]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn28) If the innovation comes from a smaller competitor, the concern can use patents and legal challenges to delay the introduction, or simply buy out the competitor and shelve the innovation. Though large corporations are capable of delaying technical innovation in the short term, Schumpeter is not concerned about their ability to substantially diminish or block progress: "The power to exploit at pleasure a given pattern of demand -- or one that changes independently of the monopolist's action and of the reactions it provokes -- can under the conditions of intact capitalism hardly persist for periods long enough to matter for the analysis of total output." [[29]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn29) Monopolistic practices thus serve as a way of slowing down or smoothing out the abrupt and destructive consequences that technical innovation can have. This is useful not just for the individual concerns, says Schumpeter, but for the market in general, which can potentially be thrown out of equilibrium, or drop into a depression, through the destruction of capital attendant to technical innovation: 'Restraint of trade' of the cartel type as well as those which merely consist in tacit understandings about price competition may be effective remedies under conditions of depression. As far as they are, they may in the end produce not only steadier but also greater expansion of total output than could be secured by an entirely uncontrolled onward rush that cannot fail to be studded with catastrophes. [[30]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn30) Though Schumpeter may be relatively unconcerned with the effect of monopolistic practices, later theorists argue that this is because he was writing before the true ascendancy of the large scale concern or corporation and had yet to see what real monopolistic practices could be deployed in the market. [[31]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn31) According to Baran and Sweezy, in Schumpeter's time there were still enough small scale economic firms to ensure that new technical innovations would eventually, if slowly, work their way into the market. However, with the rise of what they term "monopoly capitalism," which is to say the rise of the market being primarily dominated by large corporations which are able to express monopoly-like control (and which relate to one another according to principles of "corespectivity," rather than traditional economic competition), there is no longer the same competitive pressure to innovate, or to take account of innovations produced by others. Once the "largest-scale unit of control" has taken over, "the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization" all tend to be monopolized by a handful of giant corporations. [[32]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn32) As a result of this, innovations are typically introduced (or soon taken over) by giant corporations which **act not under the compulsion of competitive pressures but in accordance with careful calculations of the profit-maximizing course**. Whereas in the competitive case no one, not even the innovating firms themselves, can control the rate at which new technologies are generally adopted, this ceases to be true in the monopolistic case. It is clear that the giant corporation will be guided not by the profitability of the new method considered in isolation, but by the net effect of the new method on the overall profitability of the firm. And this means that in general there will be a slower rate of introduction of innovations than under competitive criteria. [[33]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn33) Baran and Sweezy argue that "this means that Schumpeter's perennial gale of creative destruction has subsided into an occasional mild breeze." [[33]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn33) The ability of large corporations to exert monopoly-like economic power in the market affects both the pace and direction of technical change. In the most basic sense, this can mean the general production of sub-optimal technology (sub-optimal both in terms of what is available according to existing technologies and in terms of inadequate research and development). One example of this is what's commonly known as planned obsolescence. [[34]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn34) However, this capitalist reticence towards technical innovations need not be based solely on fear of competition or being supplanted in the market. New technical innovation, even when not in conflict with existing productive processes, and when developed by one of the large concerns, might still be deemed undesirable due to the way that they subvert the existing principles of capitalist organization and private property regimes. Take, for example the development of certain information and communication technologies. New communication technologies allow for a more fluid and decentralized distribution of information and decision making, thus making numerous processes within production and exchange potentially more efficient. As Peter Meiksins describes, One of the potential consequences of the new technologies is to create a technological basis for alternative ways of organizing economic activity, for pushing further some of the embryonic efforts to decentralize economic activity.... Since these technologies facilitate rapid communication over long distances, it now is possible for widely separated enterprises to coordinate their activities. Moreover, since they are also able to provide individuals and/or enterprises with sophisticated, up-to-date information about markets, the behavior of other actors within the technological network and other relevant matter, those individuals and/or enterprises no longer need to be confined within rigid, prescriptive plans and procedures set well in advance. Instead, with an understanding of what is expected of them, they can react autonomously and creatively to the information provided through the technological link. [[35]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn35) The trouble is, however, that decentralizing information and allowing for autonomous and creative decision making accelerates and exacerbates elements of uncertainty and unpredictability that we have described as being uncomfortable for capitalist enterprises, as well as subverting hierarchies of control present in most corporations. As such, moments of autonomy and creativity are to be kept to a minimum. Frequently, rather than taking advantage of these opportunities, capitalist enterprises will instead use these new information technologies as a way of surveilling and controlling more completely the actions of workers and consumers -- even when this is less efficient, and less desirable to the consuming public. The individual capitalist is thus torn between two separate drives: the first the drive to innovate, to make things more flexible and efficient, the **second the drive to conserve, to maintain stability, control and capture**. Meiksins shows how the banking sector provides a key example of this tension: In the case of banking, the contradictions are... obvious. Systems are installed with the explicit purpose of reducing teller discretion, replacing middle level management, and increasing centralized control over information flow and the behaviour of employees. Yet, at the same time, under pressure from external markets to extend the range of banking services available to customers, banks are forced to "upgrade" tellers; the new technology is used to provide tellers with information and abilities that they can use to sell a wider variety of banking services and products to customers. Banks are clearly uncomfortable with this contradiction, and do whatever they can to limit and "program" away teller discretion. Nevertheless, the underlying contradiction does not disappear and the possibilities of the new technology cannot be entirely suppressed. [[36]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn36) Tensions This tension between technical innovation and established interests, between creative destruction and restrictive practices, between progress and control, lies at the heart of the capitalist assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari map this tension theoretically in the image of capitalism as both a machine for the decoding and deterritorialization of flows and as an apparatus of capture. By pursuing this tension through Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, however, we can go beyond the duality of Schumpeter's account, uncovering a more volatile and multifarious capitalism than even the prophet of creative destruction imagined. The capitalist axiomatic is marked by two drives: **the accelerative and the conservative**. On the one hand, it decodes and deterritorializes flows, freeing up stocks of goods, people, knowledge, money, etc. that might be immobilized by tradition or insufficient technological advances. The capitalist axiomatic, as Marx tells us, drives to break every barrier and loose every fetter. In this regard, it must reject the sovereign overcodings which necessarily territorialize and block these flows. And yet, just as this deterritorializing movement pushes towards the "infinite," [[37]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn37) towards an absolute deterritorialization, the capitalist axiomatic must function as an apparatus of capture and reterritorialize these flows back "on the full body of capital," [[38]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn38) which is to say immanently reintegrate them into the orderly process of capitalist production (which, as we saw above, is willing to tolerate surprisingly little in the way of novelty, disorder and dynamism). Thus, in contrast to the image we saw in the introduction, **capitalism is not synonymous with innovation and progress**, is not defined purely by an inherent dynamism, because it only ever effects "relative breaks, because it ... maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any other." [[39]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn39) At the same time as it has a tendency to overcome limits, "capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale. It axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other." [[40]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn40) **Even as capitalism is driven to innovate for the purposes of efficiency, it needs to ensure that this innovation does not require the supplanting of core capitalist axioms of control and coherence over the productive processes** (the case of the banking industry's struggle with the trade off between flexibility and control is instructive here). Deleuze describes this conservative drive in terms of the creation of blocks of antiproduction which stop production and innovation from "getting away from" the capitalist axiomatic and running roughshod over the calm and orderly process of production. Thus, the axiomatics of antiproduction "double the capital and the flow of knowledge with a capital and an equivalent flow of stupidity that also effects an absorption and a realization that ensures the integration of groups and individuals into the system. Not only lack amid overabundance, but stupidity in the midst of knowledge and science." [[41]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn41) **What we have then is a tension between two opposing forces, one innovative and deterritorializing and the other conservative and reterritorializing.** However, let us not make the mistake of conceiving of this duality of forces as some manner of dialectical contradiction which will be resolved in a future synthesis. This duality of forces is constitutive of capitalism, and therefore cannot be resolved. The best that can be hoped for is the contingent and aleatory stabilization of the conflict somewhere between the two ideal poles of creativity and control. This is one of the roots of the sheer multiplicity of forms of capitalism we see in the world. Different capitalisms -- and different sectors within different capitalisms -- produce and are produced by different negotiations between these warring forces. Where the balance between these opposing forces will be established is the result of multiple factors within the capitalist assemblage in which they take place, including cultural practices, legal structures, political formations, business and management cultures, material conditions, etc., all of which are themselves the aggregate results of countless micro-level decisions. [[42]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn42) Thus on the one hand we might see a manufacturing sector which inclines towards conservatism, even in the face of a declining rate of profit, [[43]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn43) while on the other hand we might see a financial sector which inclines towards greater risk and innovation in pursuit of new investment opportunities (for example, the development of increasingly esoteric credit instruments which lie at the heart of the current economic crisis). The stabilizations achieved between these various conflicting forces are always contingent, contingent both because they are the result of complex and innumerable decisions made at a variety of levels (and hence not the result of an immutable economic or technological logic unfolding in teleological time), but also contingent since they do not fundamentally resolve the contradiction between these opposing forces; they merely negotiate between them and produce a temporary equilibrium. As time progresses, these opposing forces will require new negotiations in response to new dangers. If a particular market cleaves too closely to the conservative pole, we will potentially see its collapse (the failure of the "big three" automakers in America, for example). Conversely, we are currently seeing what happens when the creative impulse in capital markets is pushed beyond the capitalist axiomatic's limit of coherence and control. In this regard we see how deterritorialized flows which escape reterritorialization can potentially become unreterritorializable "lines of death." [[44]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn44) Deleuze and Gauttari remind us, however, that there is another possibility for the deterritorialized flows that capitalism is so driven to produce. In addition to spiraling off into nothingness, or being relatively reterritorialized onto the body of capital, there is also the possibility that they might be absolutely reterritorialized onto another plane of immanence. Deterritorialized flows might become lines of flight, leading to potentially non-capitalist spaces. This is of interest to those of us who see in technological innovation at least the potential of a challenge to capitalism. We might look to the possibility of taking advantage of those deterritorialized flows which capitalism produces and turning them against it, exacerbating them, **using them as lines of flight and escape that might lead us to new and different worlds**. As an example of how technological innovations can turn against the capitalist axiomatic, in the next section we will turn to the specific case-study of the development of new information technologies. Here we will see a line of deterritorialization that the capitalist axiomatic is unable to comfortably reterritorialize relatively, and which has the potential to turn into a line of flight that might be absolutely reterritorialized on a whole different plane of immanence. This is to say that we see how a deterritorialized flow might, if pushed beyond the comfort level of the capitalist axiomatic, produce a non-capitalist regime or practice. Information Technology and Intellectual Property Rights We can start by looking at one particular aspect of information technology, the drive for the increased digitalization of information: "Digitalization has removed the quality/copy trade-off, by allowing generational copies to be, for all intents and purposes, exact copies of the original digital artifact... a 'frictionless environment' for content, where successive copies do not degrade..." [[45]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn45) There are countless ways in which this digitalization has been useful to business, both in terms of production and day-to-day operations. From the ability to speed up internal communication, to making production and delivery of music, books and film cheaper and more efficient, digitalization perfectly serves capitalism's internal drive to decrease production and circulation time and accelerate capital as value-in-motion. The problem however is that, as digitalization produces a "frictionless environment," producers are increasingly incapable of maintaining control over content. Digitalization "immediately raises the potential threat that once a digital good is distributed, unauthorized copies can compete throughout its market for consumer use." [[46]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn46) Once the digitalization of content combined with widespread access to high-bandwidth networks (as well as increasingly cheap memory) it became feasible to share digital content with people anywhere in the world. This ability lead to the rise of Peer-to-Peer software (P2P) such as Soulseek or BitTorrent, which allowed individuals to search the collections of all other users on the network and download from them. The potential to freely distribute information was seen as a deep threat to the ability of corporations to control their products. According to the Recording Industry Association of American [RIAA], "estimate[s] for worldwide losses in 1994 was $2.245 Billion," [[47]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn47) and the Business Software Alliance claims that "losses to the worldwide software industry caused by the use of unlicensed software were said to amount to US$10.97 billion in 2001." [[48]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn48) In response to the loss of control over content brought about by these new technologies, the **content owners have sought to employ the restrictive practices with which we are now familiar**. In the first instance, the media concerns sought to use legal power against illegal copying. The RIAA, for example, in 2003 began a campaign of tracking down and suing music downloaders for copyright violations. [[49]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn49) In concert with this increased enforcement has been a push for an increased scope and power of copyright laws. For example, "[o]ne of the more notorious measures is the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), an act of US congress...whose purpose is to update US copyright laws for the digital age." [[50]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn50) The DMCA allows for quicker enforcement of copyright law through the use of "take-down notices" which need not go through the courts. This deployment of legal power was then backed-up by a deployment of economic power to decrease the speed and flexibility of information technology. One way this was done was through the introduction of what are termed Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies, the introduction of code into digital content and players that limits their ability to be used for piracy purposes. What is important to understand is that the use of DRM technology exists solely for the purpose of increasing the ability of copyright holders to control their content and necessarily results in the production of sub-optimal technology. DRM decreases the speed, ease and flexibility of information technology, making interoperability more difficult, and even disabling the ability to use it in non-infringing, but also non-authorized ways (such as Fair Use, or using digital technology to produce and play independent media created and distributed for free). Indeed, DRM technology frequently makes digital technology less functional than the non-electronic equivalent, inhibiting the ability to do such things as make back-up copies, use small portions for personal use, or even lend it to a friend. **DRM necessarily makes information technology worse. It attempts to reverse the effects of the "frictionless environment" that digitalization introduced**. Here, we can think back to Deleuze and Guattari's reference to doubling the flow of information with a flow stupidity. This is particularly important in the context of a culture in which media consumers are frequently also becoming media producers. Remixing, mash-ups, self-publishing, micro-low-budget filmmaking: all of these new forms of independent media production are aided by the increasing fluidity of digital media. Technologies such as DRM make it more difficult for independent producers to use new media technologies, and hence potentially ensure the monopoly of large media concerns over content production. In response to this purposeful sub-optimalization of digital technology, individual users all over the world have taken to trying to overturn DRM technology. Hackers figure out how to break encryption technology on DVD's, strip DRM out of music files, crack software and open up music and video players for unrestricted use. In response to this, media conglomerates have returned to legal powers as way of protecting their sub-optimal technology. Another, and perhaps more disturbing, aspect of the DMCA is that it "prohibits circumvention of any technological protection against copying and prevents the production of any device or provision of any service designed to defeat protection mechanisms." [[51]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn51) This tension between the potential of information technologies and the attempts to control them, both through legal and economic means, has lead to a struggle between producers and users. As media corporations try to close Pandora's box and reacquire the control over information that they lost with the development of digital technology, users have become increasingly enchanted with the possibilities that these technologies provide, and frustrated with attempts to block their use and development. The work hackers have done is just one element of a more generalized push to take advantage of the speed and flexibility of digital technologies, and take control of the possibilities that they offer. Indeed, **these individual acts of technological subversion, frequently undertaken for self-interested reasons (not that that makes them illegitimate), have begun to percolate into broader social and political positions**. As people see how digital technologies allow for information to be easily shared and re-mixed, used and combined, they begin to question the current structure of intellectual property and the types of control it seeks to exercise. As a result certain groups have begun to develop new ways to think about intellectual property. One example of the attempt to develop a new intellectual property regime is seen in the "Creative Commons" license: The Creative Commons is a non-profit corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible. [[52]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn52) Creative commons licensing allows creators to give away, up front, the right to use their work in specific ways. The most interesting thing about the use of Creative Commons licensing for our purposes is the way in which it begins not from the primacy of the singular author as the agent of creativity but instead from the commons. As knowledge producers (whether in the arts or sciences) become aware of the ease with which communications technologies can facilitate collaboration, and as users become increasingly used to forms of knowledge production based on the explicit use and repurposing of old knowledge objects (everything from software development to music remixing), the idea of creativity as the gift of a sole agent begins to wane in favour of an image of a vibrant commons of intellectual labour. [[53]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn53) The creative commons license is not "anti-capitalist" per se. What it does do is re-introduce the notion of the commons as a central figure in the innovation of human knowledge. A similar set of challenges to the maximalist form of intellectual property rights comes from the Free Software foundation and the idea of Free Software/Open-Source Software (FS/OSS): "FS/OSS is software whose source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code." [[54]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn54) To call it "free" software does not mean that it is given away for no charge. What it does mean is that the software is free of any copyright rules or restrictions which would inhibit your ability to use, change, or even share the program. Free Software is distributed on a special copyright license that producers call "copyleft:: Copyleft uses copyright law, but flips it over to serve the opposite of its usual purpose: instead of a means of privatizing software, it becomes a means of keeping software free. The central idea of copyleft is that we give everyone permission to run the program, copy the program, modify the program, and distribute modified versions -- but not permission to add restrictions of their own. Thus, the crucial freedoms that define "free software" are guaranteed to everyone who has a copy; they become inalienable rights. [[55]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn55) The use of copyleft turns copyright against itself. Copyleft not only releases information into the public domain, but ensures that anyone who wants to use that information will also have to contribute to the public domain. It is thus an engine for growing the intellectual commons. The FS/OSS movement, though constrained to a narrow (though increasingly important) sector of production, challenges the current property regimes and seeks to encourage a mode of production based on ethical and intellectual beliefs in collaboration and community. In addition to those actively trying to promote alternative intellectual property regimes, there are multiple groups trying to affect the functioning of the current regime, such as the Electronic Freedom Foundation and The Association for Progressive Communication, both of which "attempt to influence the global communications policy agenda from a civil society perspective." [[56]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn56) In addition to these specific organization "[m]ajor Foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, Markle Foundation, and George Soros' Open Society Institute, have supplied critical funding and encouragement to bring civil society actors interested in information and communication technologies together." [[57]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn57) Thus we see how **the development of technological lines of deterritorialization can become lines of flight, leading from the capitalist axiomatic to new organizations of law**, right, politics and economics (not to mention artistic and scientific innovation). It's true that none of these organizations or movements are explicitly "anti-capitalist." However, all advance ideas which begin to challenge the current intellectual property regime, and also challenge central axioms of capitalist production, consumption, labour and organization. In the case of the alternate intellectual property regimes we discussed, though they do not separate themselves from the capitalist market (indeed, they build on the current existing intellectual property regime), they do challenge it by opening up new spaces, showing new possibilities for production (the essential nature of the Creative Commons is to give away your property rights, to allow others access to that which is supposedly yours). Indeed, we should not conceive of the idea of absolute reterritorialization as the complete rejection of all capitalist principles ( and even less as a revolutionary overthrowing of the capitalist regime), nor should we conceive of a non-capitalist plane of immanence as one that is completely separate from the capitalist axiomatic. Such binary duality between the capitalist and the non-captialist is unnecessary. For a line of flight to be absolutely reterritorialized on a new, non-capitalist plane of immanence, it need only function in such a way as to challenge one or more of capitalism's central axioms and open up a space for alternative production or consumption. It may continue to enter into assemblage with the capitalist axiomatic (indeed, given the capitalist axiomatic's scope and intensity in late modernity, it would be almost impossible for it not to). However, in doing so, it forces a change in the territory of the capitalist assemblage, expanding its borders and challenging its axioms. In this case, we see a collection of actors and organizations that advance the idea that innovation and progress are better served and encouraged through some element of common ownership of human knowledge, rather than exclusive private property. Note that this is a fairly radical claim. It is one thing in this day and age to challenge the justice and equity of capitalism. But to charge it with inefficiency and conservatism is to strike where it is supposedly strongest. These organizations have seen the opportunities that new information and communications technologies provide, how much easier they make collaboration and cooperation, how they make possible the leveraging of mass collective action for problem solving and production. The purpose of this account is not to suggest that digital technologies are the gateway to a glorious post-capitalist utopia. Nor is it to argue that if we manage to overcome DRM technology capitalism will have been defeated. [[58]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn58) Rather, it is to point out that, in the face of all of the discussions about the wonders of post-industrial info-capitalism, capitalism and digital technologies **do not fit together perfectly, but rather exist in an uneasy tension**. By looking out for fault-lines between particular innovations and particular capitalist axioms we can see and develop potential sites of resistance. And by having an open and experimental attitude towards economic and technological practices, [[59]](file:///C:/Users/jzilm/Downloads/cds004_Glezos.html" \l "_edn59) we can potentially take advantage of new technologies and push them into new, unexplored spaces -- spaces of imagination, innovation, community and equality.

### Link—Ecological Immanence

#### We have entered a crisis of global security. In the face of anthropogenic climate change, the Magician Emperor and Jurist Priest have produced an ecological will to transcendence to surf the molecular movements of the climate. This transcendence over the Earth’s ecosystems is thus the modus operandi of sovereign modes of capture, constantly deterritorializing fields of immanence to reterritorialize them upon lines of the market, the state, the international.

Marzec 16 (Robert P. Marzec, associate professor of ecocriticism and postcolonialism in the department of English at Purdue University, “The end(s) of immanence in the anthropocene: militarized ecologies and the future of Deleuzian thought,” Journal for Cultural Research 20(4), 2016, pgs. 381-386)//JRD

As I write this essay, it is a week into the 2015 United Nations Convention of Climate Change (officially known as “Conference of Parties” or “COP21”). It is also two weeks after the attacks in Paris by Syrian teams said to be working on behalf of ISIS. **Syria** is one of the **many ground-zero sites for climate change**, a fact not often mentioned in descriptions of the nation’s situation with ISIS. The complexities of religious and ethnic diversity, along with pressures from global neoliberalism certainly play a factor here. But, according to climate changes specialists, “**water and climatic conditions** have played a **direct role** in the **deterioration** of Syria’s **economic conditions**” (Gleick, 2014, p. 331). **Anthropogenic** **effects** on **ecosystems** are at the **heart** of **water-related violence** around the world, and **water scarcity** will only become **more of a “security risk”** for communities as we move further into the **twenty-first century**. According to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the **IPCC** – the world’s leading authority on global warming), this projected future will **not change in time** to substantially **reverse** the course of significant **ecological transformatons**, even with heroic efforts. The **toxic** fallout from **anthropogenic desire** – the coconstitutive **underside** of humanity’s **transcendence** of **environmental limitations** – will continue to have an effect for **centuries to come**. We are already locked into at least a 1.5–2 °C increase in total atmospheric temperature. In fact, total elimination of C02 emissions today would only result in a decrease in atmospheric C02 of approximately 40 percent by the end of the century (bringing us back to roughly 1995 levels) (Meehl et al., 2007, p. 749). With current emissions “as usual” (which involves a continual increase in CO2s and other greenhouse gases from economic “development”) we could possibly see a 5 or 6° increase, which would have a devastating effect on planetary life. This **deterritorialization** of the **world’s ecosystem** constitutes the new parameters of human and **nonhuman** **ecological** existence. It is no wonder, then, that the **military and security institutions** take climate change **seriously**. They have come to draw out the necessary consequences of our ecological occasion when others have continued to debate its existence. The singular challenge in the face of these events for the kind of philosophy made possible by Deleuze, it seems to me, is the **struggle** to **conceptualize** **possible** **alternatives** to current ecological circumstances (or perhaps “**ecological immanence**” would be a more appropriate syntagma to use here). But this also requires an **intense** **analysis** of both current and past **affiliations** between **security and the planet’s environment.** These affiliations are **complex**, and have a long history, dating back to **military developments** that predate modern nineteenth- and twentieth-century military innovations and **technologies**. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, but suffice it to say that the **military** in the **modern era** (from the seventeenth century onward) has increasingly attempted to **strike up organic**, **immanent** relations to **ecosystems**, alongside its more obvious attempts to **control** **environments** in order to **transcend** **them**. With the official commencement of the **security society** (when the US National Security Act was signed into law in 1947), attempts to **territorialize** the **immanence** of **nature** become both **more** **scientific** and **systematized** (in accordance with State protocols). The most recent wave began **overtly** with the **publication** of **dozens** of Defense Department documents such as “**National Security** and the **Threat of Climate Change**” (2007), “Taking Up the Security Challenges of Climate Change” (2009) and others, including, as well, the **official targeting** of climate change in the 2010 **Department of Defense’s** Quadrennial **Defense Review Report**. These have been followed by hundreds of statements by military officials and by speeches in which President Obama and other politicians directly link climate change to national security. This “incitement to discourse,” to take a phrase from Foucault, followed the publication in 2007 of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, which provided the most evidence and was the most emphatic statement to date about the precariousness of our environmental situation. This discursive event, I want to argue here, differs from earlier Cold War affiliations between security and the environment. As we’ll see security in the Cold War was characterized by a State-incorporated war machine (which I’ll refer to in this essay as “the military machine”). Its role in both political and civil society was to act as an apparatus of capture. However, the **post-fascist**, and now **post-9/11** and **post-IPCC** **2007-Report** military machine take a fundamentally **different attitude** toward nature. After roughly **2007**, the **military machine** gives up the desire to transcend the **immanence** of the planet’s **ecological bankruptcy.** Instead the **military** **machine**, moving **beyond** **the State**, seeks to take on this eco-crisis, **to “surf” its molecular movements**.1 During the Cold War the military took the role of the State, was incorporated as the State’s War Machine, and operated as a machine of transcendence – attempting to transform environmental events such as climate, harvests, insect infestations, and even considered creating climate change itself in order to redirect the earth’s climate to a US advantage (Hamblin, 2013). Today **“Nature”** has been **retooled as “climate change”** – an **empty axiomatic** that, in the **hands of security experts**, functions to **saturate the socius** in the **same style as “terrorism.”** The **military machine** – which has evolved into the “security society” (or “**control society**,” as Deleuze terms it) – therefore now takes up a **fundamentally** **different** relation to **immanence**. Faced with these developments can Deleuzian philosophy offer a counterpoint to such an immanent technology of security? Security and immanence Deleuze’s focus on **immanence** constitutes a **struggle** to release **thought** **from** moralizing, **transcendent** **formations** that **constrain** it within **frameworks** of **logic**, **certainty**, and dependability. Opposed to the **authoritative** **transcendence** of a **moralizing** system, immanence offers a more **concrete** **engagement** with the **molecular**, **heterogeneous** singularities of a **moving existence.** It defines the **struggle** within **thought** for what has yet to be thought, rather than the **application of already constituted knowledge** on new forms of existence. Furthermore, as Dan Smith elegantly argues, **immanence** is key to Deleuze’s development of **ethical explorations**, which arise always “from a **purely immanent point of view**” (Smith, 1998; p. 251). In developing an ethics grounded in immanence Deleuze distinguishes between “ethics” and “morality”: morality attempts to subsume all acts within a transcendent code, to capture them within predetermined nets of rules and regulations; ethics instead is a term that refers to “facilitative” rules that evaluate our actions according to “immanent modes of existence”(Smith, 1998, p. 252). Yet, as Deleuze and Guattari consistently emphasize, **States**, imperialisms, and **apparatuses of domination** in general also **strike** **up** **immanent** **relations**. They even **depend on them**, and function by **establishing** certain **transcendent**-**immanent** **affiliations** that **do not deny** or destroy **immanent matter-in-motion** (there is no destroying immanence, only reworking its general movements and potentials). Even the illusory transcendent systems of morality such as Christianity only exist by grafting themselves onto immanent relations: it is “not the existence or nonexistence of a transcendent God but rather the immanent modes or existence of those who must choose between his existence or nonexistence” (Smith, 1998, p. 258). Early post-structuralism would approach this problem of transcendence (its nonpositive impossibility) in Derridian terms of the “absent center,” in which the deconstructive act (namely: tracing the logic of a system through to its inevitable antagonistic conclusion) reveals the center of a structure to be imaginary, and its supposed presence not a positivism but a “play of différance.” The power of this “critique of Western metaphysics” lies in its revealing of power structures to be functions of an inherent emptiness that acquires its “cohesion” in a “contradiction” that “expresses the force of a desire” (Derrida, 1978, p. 352). Deleuze’s conceptualization of immanence complicates this critical recourse of emptiness by substituting the focus on emptiness as the ultimate act of unveiling for a focus on the material manifestation of transcendental impulses: “Transcendence may be entirely ‘empty’ in itself, yet it becomes full to the extent that it descends and crosses different hierarchized levels that are projected together” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 89). The fantasy of transcendence is made possible, Deleuze and Guattari argue, by the continual generation of this metaphysical desire by individuals and communities in specific modalities: “The transcendent God would remain empty … if it were not projected on a plane of immanence of creation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 89). The “appearance” of Christian transcendence manifests itself only in the individualized relations one strikes up with this system of belief, which is heterogeneously interpreted. The **key difference** in the relation of **State apparatuses** (transcendence) and **War Machines** (immanence) would appear to lie, at least in What is Philosophy?, in the **constitution of the Figure**: “In … imperial unity or spiritual empire, the transcendence that is projected on the plane of immanence paves it or populates it with Figures” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 89). We can find **many such “Figures”** in today’s **environmental** **developments** and struggles for “**energy security**”: “**oil**,” “**gas**,” “**ethanol**,” and now **even “water”** itself have become **key “Figures”** of **national security**, in addition to **global commodities**. The geopolitics of **national** and **global security** also **transforms** **ecosystems** into **geopolitical** **regions** that take on the character of Figures: **the Amazonian Rainforest**, the areas of **dying water zones** (such as in Syria), the **North Pole** with its **gas and oil reserves** (accessible now that the **polar** **ice** **caps** have **decreased** so **extensively**). These ecosystems have been **deterritorialized** in the sense that they are **no longer complex** ecosystems in the **anthropocene**.2 They have become **zones of insecurity** demanding to be **captured by security and developed by capitalist interests**. It becomes a question as to how the machine of security functions in relation to this new, deterritorialized earth – if its capturing mechanisms function like the old State, or if its mechanisms extend beyond State rigidity to enact a different relation to immanence. To return, Deleuze’s connection of immanence to “deterritorialization” in “The Treatise on Nomadology” and “The Apparatus of Capture,” and later in “Geophilosophy,” complicates the relationship between transcendence and immanence even further. In “Geophilosophy” Deleuze and Gauttari describe two forms of relationship between immanence and deterritoralization: “a **major** **difference** arises **depending** on whether **relative deterritorialization** takes place through **immanence** or through **transcendence**” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 88). Here it would seem as if a fundamental distinction were being made between immanence and transcendence, yet the phrase deterritorialization “through transcendence” is further clarified in terms of what might be called an integrated or streamlined repetition. The specific term they use is “rotation”: “When it is **transcendence**, **vertical**, **celestial**, and **brought** **about** by the **imperial** **unity**, the **transcendent** **element** must always **give** **way** or submit to a sort of **rotation** in order to be **inscribed** on the **always-immanent** plane of **Nature-Thought**” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 89). The security society has an intense interest in such forms of “rotation,” and in fact it might be said that the **movement of security** as a fundamental feature of existence depends on this **capturing of immanence** within what might be called a **controlled vortex of desire**. For instance, a new ontological demand arose in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century military theory, a disciplinary but also securitizing demand that would seamlessly combine the military need for a central command structure that could control soldiers who were coming to be deployed at greater and greater distances: battlefields, in other words, were expanding as war came to develop along national, international, and colonial lines. The command network and its communication systems often broke down when soldiers were in the field. Out of range and in the midst of a chaotic conflict more, encounters became more nomadic; they arose outside the parameters of battle anticipated by those in command, who had always necessarily stood “off site” (to invoke Deleuze and Gauttari’s description of the architectural plan in relation to the construction of cathedrals). In the face of this new challenge the **military machine** came to be **enamored** with the idea of an **organic architecture**, one that could **combine** the **immanence** of the battlefield with the **transcendence** of the central command. The search began for what came to be known as the “higher-order motor.” The higher order motor, as Manuel De Landa has powerfully described in his Deleuzian analysis of military history, arises from the desire to move from mechanistic assemblages (which operate through forced and inflexible “top down” command structures) to machinic assemblages (that function instead as self-organizing singularities) (De Landa, 1991). At the center of the military machine lies the **demand**, of course, for **organized** **uniformity**. This demand is problematic, for **immanence is anything but uniform**. The theory of the higher order machine, however, combined the overwhelming logic of 1) a unidirectional pattern of thought, with 2) the belief in an organic form of organization and rationality. But as an incorporated and highly disciplined military machine gave way after the World War II to the security society, the demand for uniform security gives way to singular sites of security, organized around a progressively heterogeneous deployment of insecurity. At this point, the **higher order** motor begins to take on a **scientific-ecological** character. It becomes less a matter of creating an ultimate military command structure and instead a **scientific expedition** for **ontological presences** – powerful organizational **forces** – assumed to be lurking underneath human and nonhuman activity. A different set of questions come to be posed: When and why do certain animals and insects change their inharmonious movements into a unified assemblage (crickets chirping in unison, for instance)? How do whales communicate and organize their movements across such great distances? How do deep-ocean currents form a natural pattern? How do weather patterns come to solidify to develop into disasters? The **search** for **these organizational sequences** were an attempt to **constitute** an **engagement** with **Nature** **“from the ground up,”** not from a **transcendental imperative**. The nineteenth-century higher order motor, to add another dimension here, predated Taylorism, and thus was already operational when Jeremy Taylor was conducting his research on the army. In other words, the movement of the higher order motor to a “ground level” before and after the World War II predated the State’s decentralization of capital to the private sector. The importance of De Landa’s work lies in his reconstellation of history in terms of these events, and the extensive manner in which they make possible a human integration within a machinic assemblage governed by war: the “**history** of **military applications”** must be thought in terms of “the **effects** of **technology** on the **military**, understood here as being itself a **coherent ‘higher level’ machine**: a machine that actually integrates men, tools and weapons as if they were no more than the machine’s components” (De Landa, 1991, p. 4). This is precisely the direction that Deleuze and Gauttari take toward the end of both the “Treatise on Nomadology” and the “Apparatus of Capture” (which I will come to shortly). The ability of a self-organizing event – a **singularity** that **changes** the course in which **environments** (human, mechanical, ecological) **rise** and **develop** – to take on **higher level** or higher order **activations** names the moment at which a **certain mode** of **production** formerly **limited** to a **specific** **site** or field of **creativity** expands to enchain **multiple sites**, thus **becoming** a **globalized** and a seemingly **“Nature-made”** mode of **production**. It is the moment when war takes on the pretension of being the basis of existence. In such a way, **military** **technology** sets itself up as a **field of knowledge** production concerned with the fundamental questions of the universe – fundamental questions that can lead the scientist and the military leader on the path to find the ultimate, natural foundations for universal security itself (the moment when “peace” and “war” collapse in upon one another – when “peace” becomes “a form” that releases “total (planetary) war” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 421, 422, 448, 467). De Landa first traces out the development of a higher order machine of war at the site of cryptology. This development begins with the creation of cipher machines – the tool that eventually develops into the modern personal computer: The first modern computers were assembled in the crucible of World War II, in the heat of several arms races: the cryptological race against the cipher machines of Nazi Germany and Japan and the race against German scientists to build the first atomic bomb. The war produced not only new machines, but also forged new bonds between the scientific and military communities. (1991, p. 5) Here, we can begin to understand the essential relation between the war machine, its incorporation by the State, and the phenomenon of acceleration demanded by the circumstances of State-generated war. **Militarized ontology** has its essence in the **enforcement** of what we might call a **“rotated velocity,”** designed to **replace** discretely **heterogeneous** forms of motion and movement and teleologically direct them toward the generation of a process that “**biologically**” **organizes** itself. This empirical need to expeditiously solve the problem of encrypted messages, however, did not remain distinctive to the problem of breaking enemy codes. The intense pressure on the allied forces to crack codes generated a magnitude of force that angled an explanatory form of science (which it concurrently developed) to military concerns: “Never before had science been applied at so grand a scale to such a variety of warfare problems” (1991, p. 5). This particular brand of **science** and the objects it produced formed a kind of **technological** “**swell**” that impacted both political and social **production** on a **massive scale**. The result of this collaboration, the discipline known as “operations research,” has evolved in the hands of cold warriors and think tanks into the more inclusive “management science” (systems analysis), which in effect transfers the command and control structures of military logistics to “the rest of society and the economy.” At such a point, human agency and the larger-than-human structures become effects of the higher order motor connected to the larger groundswell generated through the intense pressure of science and the military working in conjunction to solve the problem of mathematical encryption. De Landa’s Deleuzian analysis reveals how this **new organizational process** arises out of the pressures of a **historical** **occasion** that brings about a unique machine, a new set of **procedures** that **expand in multiple directions**: from the immediate context of decoding encrypted material to an entire field of logistics that begin to take up **residence** in the **economy and social system at large.**

## Spanos Module

### 1NC – Spanos

#### Conceiving of the world as transnational alliance rather than structured by an exceptionalist antagonism produces a political order that maintains the ontological foundations for global hegemony --- only embracing American defeat guarantees a maintenance of the metaphysical coordinates that sustain America

**Spanos ‘2K** [William, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamtom, *America’s Shadow*, 2000, p. 191-193]

What I have argued in this book about the relationship between philosophy and imperialism is that the euphoric annunciation of the end of history and the advent of the New World Order by the deputies of the dominant American culture at the end of the Cold War is symptomatic of the achievement of the global hegemony of "America" understood not simply as a political order, but as a way of thinking. I have claimed that this triumphant "American" way of thinking is not exceptionalist, as it has always been claimed by Americans, especially since de Tocqueville's announcement of the advent of democracy in America, but European, which means metaphysical: an imperial thinking, whose provenance resides in Roman antiquity, that sees the being into which it inquires as a totalized spatial image, a "field" or "region" or "domain" to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited.

But this way of putting this imperial metanarrative, though necessary in the context of the amnesiac imperatives of thinking the Enlightenment as an epochal emancipatory moment in world history, is too general.

It does not account for the historically specific transformation of this European mode of knowledge production accomplished in the wake of America's emergence as a global power: the fulfillment of the Enlightenment's "developmental model" in the effacement of the visible imperial logos informing traditional metaphysics by way of the apotheosis of the "objectivity" of empirical science and the advent of the classificatory table. Under the aegis of a triumphant America, the narrative economy of European metaphysics has come to its end in the form of a universal instrumentalism, a Man-centered thinking for which everything in time and space is seen as a "problem" that the larger comparative "picture" renders susceptible to a final and determinate solution.

In Heidegger's proleptic terms, European metaphysical thinking in the technological age dominated by America has become "Americanized," a "re-presentational"/"calculative" thinking or "planning" that has transformed the uncalculability of being at large into a planetary "world picture":

"We get the picture" concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us — in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it — as a system. "To get the picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirely, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before himself and have before himself, and consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself. Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter.1

Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of modernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" —the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History — comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or disposable] reserve."2

This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commodity is everywhere manifest in the post-Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most devastating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures.

What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "American" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the ontological grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of American culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard."3

That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is compelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4

In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the postCold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking — the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the rethinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War — and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

#### Confronting the metaphysical structures of European thought is a prerequisite to solving any environmental catastrophe or nuclear war

**Grove ’16 [**Jairus, Professor of IR @ Hawaii, January 11, 2016, <http://bostonreview.net/forum/new-nature/jairus-grove-jairus-grove-response-jedediah-purdy>]

Unlike many who appeal to the Anthropocene simply to advance the cause of geoengineering, Jedediah Purdy begins with an assessment of our political condition. Still, he fails to appreciate the nature of the geopolitics responsible for the crisis we face. If we are to take up his noble call for an ecological democracy, we must acknowledge that the violence done to our planet has largely been perpetrated not by all humans but by a select group of Europeans. The Anthropos—the human species as such—is not to blame. Properly named, our era is not the Anthropocene but the Eurocene. It was a European elite that developed a distinctively mechanistic view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and an economic system indebted to geographical expansion. The resulting political orders measured success by how much wealth could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. The geological record bears the mark of this European assemblage of hierarchies. Understanding the forces of Europeanization—the forces of racial superiority, economic hegemony, and global resettlement—is essential to understanding how the planet got to this point, and how “we” could possibly become democratic. Purdy and others claim there are two reasons for renaming the last few centuries to mark a new geological era. The first is a matter of accuracy: there is significant evidence that humans have contributed to climate change. The second is a matter of consciousness raising: renaming the Holocene is essential to raising awareness that humans are responsible. Yet on both counts, we should reconsider what we mean by “human.” It would be more accurate, and go further in raising awareness, to acknowledge the grossly disproportionate impact Europeans have had on our planet. This is not just another hyperbolic jeremiad against European peoples: Purdy’s invitation for global democratic thinking requires a geological history and name that foregrounds what really stands in the way of such a future. As Purdy points out (unlike Paul Crutzen and others), the “human” footprint involves much more than just carbon dioxide. On a geological time scale, the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide are dwarfed by those of radioactivity and are comparable to those of plastic, the modern waste product par excellence. If the Anthropocene is meant to name the scale of human impacts on the planet, it should refer not only to warming but also to cooling the earth, and Europeanization has done both at levels that even China’s current growth cannot match. Beginning in 1610, a small-scale ice age took hold of the planet when a wilder arboreal nature took back what had been inhabited land: some 20 million people killed by the European invasion of the Americas resulted in vast reforestation of the North and South American continents. The providence spoken of by those who arrived was not God but syphilis, influenza, and the number of other species that went along for the ride. Waves of well-armed European explorers and settlers leveraged the devastation for their own gain. There is no way to know how many languages, cities, ideas, cosmologies, and ways of inhabiting the world were lost in this genocide and terraforming of the Americas. The history of nuclear weapons is also predominantly European. The bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, is only the beginning of this story. In the years that have followed, more than 2,000 nuclear weapons have been tested, about 97 percent of which were detonated by European powers. Those detonations do not appear as tests from the perspectives of the Marshallese or Western Shoshone. A seventy-year nuclear war has spread cancer, incinerated sacred lands, and made other spaces uninhabitable on a temporal scale several orders of magnitude more condensed than the lifespan of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The nuclear powers of the Eurocene—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel—possess 97 percent of the 15,800 nuclear weapons around the planet. The beleaguered state of the arms control agenda means self-annihilation is still a very real possibility. As for plastic, the Texas-sized trash gyres that swirl in the world’s oceans are another reminder of what a cosmology of disposability and synthetic chemistry has wrought. Plastic may lack the longevity of carbon dioxide and irradiated earth, but for hundreds, maybe thousands of years it will continue to circulate, wreaking havoc throughout the food chain. We have post–World War II European development to thank for single-serve plastic shampoo pouches and bottled water—the latter needed only because nearby streams have been sold to Coca-Cola. Acknowledging the distinctively European history of our geological era serves a practical as well as a polemical end. Any democratic project must confront the geopolitics of the Eurocene because it challenges the very paradigm of equality. “In the Anthropocene,” Purdy writes, “environmental justice might also mean an equal role in shaping the future of the planet.” In fact, environmental justice will require unequal roles: significantly constraining, even repressing, the powers of the Eurocene. On the eve of the creation of the United Nations at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, W. E. B. Du Bois saw the failure of a dream before it had even been fully formed: the vast new international body was little more than the institutionalization of the global “color line.” The great powers had insisted upon a Security Council, and the General Assembly would be subordinated to its nuclear authority. Purdy’s suggestion that the planet could be governed equally ignores the vast systems of injustice—settler-colonialism, primitive accumulation, and violent power politics—that stand in the way, upheld by great powers that use nuclear weapons to deter change and deploy swarms of drones to hunt down those too small for the nuclear option. I would like to be part of Purdy’s ecological democracy, but he is wrong to say “There is no political agent, community, or even movement on the scale of humanity’s world-making decisions.” We share a world governed by a few states with the capability of ending all life on the planet. At the international scale, these states are essentially authoritarian; they rule by economic violence and warfare. That some of those states are not authoritarian at the domestic level is of little consequence to the rest of the world. It should come as no surprise that the leaders of the food sovereignty and anti–fossil fuel movements Purdy describes belong to marginalized groups that see no future in our current geopolitical order. Indigenous, black, and brown people are at the vanguard of political struggle not because they are more natural but because they have had front row seats in the making of this crisis. The Eurocene is not perpetrated by all people of European heritage, many of whom oppose the existing geopolitical order—myself included. This distinction—between being European and being an agent of the Eurocene—only intensifies the need to rethink democratization as demanding a politics of inequality rather than a politics of incorporation. Such a remaking of justice is as complex and difficult as the climate crisis itself, and just as worthy a struggle, irrespective of whether we can succeed. As Sylvia Wynter has said, “we must now collectively undertake a rewriting of knowledge as we know it. . . . because the West did change the world, totally.” To do so means exiting the Anthropocene as an idea, and collectively—even if not equally—exiting the Eurocene as a failed epoch. As Wynter says, we need to consider other “genres of the human.” Wynter explains she will not miss the Anthropos because she, among so many others, was never considered human to begin with. To invent a new species is the task that must be undertaken before there can be a “we,” an “our,” or a “cene” that is more than a requiem for the end.

#### You should reject the aff’s attempt at expanding cooperation. Such exchange further allows the dominant and violent behavior of the United States to further invade foreign spaces. This will to know, grid, understand, map, and calculate all of the various nations in the worlds perversely terminates in the most violent military atrocities, situating the US as the central documenting authority while the rest of the world can only ever figure as a target of bombing.

**Chow 06.** Rey Chow, professor of comparative literature at Brown University, The Age of the World Target, 2006, pg. 40

From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies

As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, "Far Eastern" cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology) , the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian's words, "The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was . . . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War."47 As Bruce Cumings puts it: "It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia."48 In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super- vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields-fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were neces­ sary for the perpetuation of the United States' political and ideological hegemony.

In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation ofthe old European Orientalism with a different pedagogi­ cal emphasis:

No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France.49

Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait ofthe East Asian target field:

The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first "area" organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . . . In return for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)-and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occu­ pied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faus­ tian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.50

A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that "the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible) ."5 1

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimenta­ tion, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war-if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes53-is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self" J "eye"-the "I"-that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that­ a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge ofwhat is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber-such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point ofview that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter-will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object" -and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55

As Harootunian goes on to argue, for all its investment in the study of other languages and other cultures, area studies missed the opportunity, so aptly provided by Said's criticism ofOrientalism, to become the site where a genuinely alternative form of knowledge production might have been possible\_ Although, as Harootunian writes, " Said's book represented an impor­ tant intellectual challenge to the mission of area studies which, if accepted, would have reshaped area studies and freed it from its own reliance on the Cold War and the necessities of the national security state,"56 the challenge was too fundamentally disruptive to the administrative and instrumentalist agendas so firmly routinized in area studies to be accepted by its practitioners. As a result, Said's attempt to link an incipient neocolonial discourse to the history of area studies was almost immediately belittled, dismissed, and ignored, and his critique, for all its relevance to area studies' future orientation, simply "migrated to English studies to transform the study of literature into a full-scale preoccupation with identity and its construction."57

A long-term outcome of all this, Harootunian suggests, has been the consolidation ofa type ofpostcolonial studies that, instead offully develop­ ing the comparative, interdisciplinary, and multicultural potential that is embedded theoretically in area studies, tends to specialize in the decon­ struction ofthe nature oflanguage, in the amalgamation ofpoststructural­ ist theory largely with Anglo-American literary studies, and in the investiga­ tion mostly of former British colonial cultures rather than a substantial range of colonial and semicolonial histories from different parts of the world.58 On its part, having voluntarily failed to heed Said's call, area studies can only remain "locked in its own enclaves ofknowledge"59 based on the reproduction of institutional and organizational structures with claims to normativity, while being defensively guarded against the innovations of poststructuralist theory that have radicalized North American humanistic and social scientific learning since the 1970s.

As I have already suggested, the truth of the continual targeting of the world as the fundamental form of knowledge production is xenophobia, the inability to handle the otherness of the other beyond the orbit that is the bomber's own visual path. For the xenophobe, every effort needs to be made to sustain and secure this orbit-that is, by keeping the place ofthe other-as-target always filled. With the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States must hence seek other substitutes for war. As has often been pointed out, drugs, poverty, and illegal immigrants have since become the new targets, which occupy­ together with Moslems, Arabs, and communists (that is, Cuba, North Korea, and mainland China)-the status of that ultimate danger to be "deterred" at all costs.

#### The global domination of western metaphysics is not centrally a military project, but rather a project of knowledge production. Attempts to expand cooperation naturalize the *global presence of a militarized American way of thinking, seeing, and mastering the world.* These impotent gestures of imperial violence exemplify the logic of Hercules, pursuit of power, order and nation-building, and are intended to pave over the US’ spectacular defeat in Vietnam. This violence makes imperative the intellectual task of retrieving the memory of Vietnam to oppose the War on Terror. It is the only way to undermine the metaphysical search and destroy mission of the Pax Metaphysica

**Spanos ’5** [William V. Spanos, distinguished professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, American Exceptionalism, 2005, 252]

The other difference, as we have seen, indissolubly related to the first, is that, despite its infinitely more powerful military might, the United States lost the war to the recalcitrant subaltern Other it would have subdued and accommodated to its Logos. And it lost it primarily because in this globalized postcolonial context—and by way of the disclosures re- leased by the self-destruction of the end-oriented philosophical, epistemo- logical, ecological, cultural, political, and military mechanisms of Western imperialism—America’s Other, as Greene foresaw and Caputo, O’Brien, and many other veterans who have recalled their experience in writing have testified, refused to be answerable to the imperatives of the polyvalent American exceptionalist narrative. The Vietnamese’s response rather was to be rhizomatically mobile, strategically indeterminate in its goals, erratic in its actions, indifferent to temporal and spatial boundaries, resistant (in its attunement to the slow motion of being) to the dictates of technological speed, and not least, invisible to America’s techno-Ahabian gaze, all calculated to decompose the relay of American power extending back from its forward-oriented military machine through its progressivist capitalist cultural apparatus, to the instrumentalist (Franklinian “can-do”) thinking that was envisioning, planning, and conducting the war from the remote distance of the Pentagon.

This double difference—an American war the ruthless, single-minded and banalized conduct of which disclosed the violence hidden in the benign American exceptionalist errand, on the one hand, and, by way of this banalized single-mindedness, enabled its Other to fracture its formidable war machine and reduce its power to impotence, on the other—constitutes the proleptic witness of Graham Greene’s novel, written in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Accords, about America’s initial arrogant—and blind—intervention in Vietnam. Despite their efforts to personalize and then assimilate this war to war-in-general, this double difference, as I have shown, is also the symptomatic testimony of Philip Caputo’s representa- tive memoir, A Rumor of War, and Tim O’Brien’s autobiographical novel, Going After Cacciato, whose mis-en-scènes span the period between 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson, justified by the fabricated Tonkin Bay incident, sent the first official combat troops to fight in the “Indian country” of Vietnam, and the Tet Offensive in 1968, which was the be- ginning of the end of the United States’ bloody imperial involvement in that Southeast Asian country. This resonant witness to the visible contradiction between America’s deeply backgrounded ontological justification of the Vietnam War and its single-minded, indeed, monomaniacal Ahabian practice has haunted the collective American consciousness since the fall of Saigon in 1975. This specter also explains the dominant culture’s obsessive effort since then to forget Vietnam—an amnesiac monumentalizing process only apparently culminating in the first Gulf War and a triumphant “end-of-history” discourse—and its studied avoidance of reference to the Vietnam War in justifying to the American people and the world at large its ferocious retaliatory attack first on Afghanistan and then, using the language of “shock and awe,” which resonates with the ferocity of Captain Ahab’s “fiery pursuit” of the white whale, on Iraq.

This double difference is, I am suggesting, also why it is imperative that intellectuals, public and academic, who oppose the United States’ representation and conduct of the “war on terror” retrieve the forgotten memory of the Vietnam War as Greene’s, Caputo’s, and O’Brien’s representative texts articulate its singularity. For, as I have shown, their spectral witness to the terror of the “search-and-destroy” mentality inhering in the myth of American exceptionalism, despite the sustained effort to obliterate it from history, continues, in the aftermath of 9/11, to haunt the present American government’s—and the American media’s—reductive personification of the complex global conditions that Western imperialism and more recently America itself have largely produced in the name of its exceptionalist mission in the world’s wilderness, in the demonized symbolic figures of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, its most recent Moby Dicks. The Vietnam War’s spectral witness to a mighty America’s humiliating defeat at the hands of an Other—its other that refused to answer to the accommodational impera- tives of its exceptionalist story in Southeast Asia—has now, as the initial seemingly successful invasion of Iraq has turned unexpectedly into a destabilizing and volatile occupation, one resembling the Vietnam “quagmire,” returned again to haunt America. As revenant, the singular history of the Vietnam War exposes America’s metaphysical, epistemological, cultural, military, and political initiatives for what they are in a diverse and amorphous part of the world whose people have for centuries suffered the terrible consequences of being the second essentialized term in the Occident’s binary logic. It is thus as likely as it was for the Vietnamese “enemy” that the decidedly undecidable “enemy” it is encountering there will turn the United States’ inordinate power against itself.

To put all this in another way, the United States “succeeded” in its preemptive military mission to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s army in Iraq. It has captured and hanged Saddam Hussein and may eventually capture and bring Osama bin Laden to trial (even, against the judicial tradition of democracy, to be tried by a military court). But granted these “accomplishments,” President George W. Bush and his neoconserative intellectual deputies are no more likely to annul or even assuage the outrage that the United States has increasingly ignited both among its former European allies and the various Islamic peoples of the world at large by their concentering of the cultural, social, and polit- ical global morass their exceptionalist ethos has produced than Captain Ahab’s “monomania”—was able to annul the self-defensive outrage of the ineffable “white” whale. This is becoming increasingly evident in the failure of this second Bush administration’s monolithic effort to recreate the Afghanistani and Iraqi nation-states in its own (liberal capitalist) image (as the administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon failed to recreate a Vietnamese nation-state in its own image in the 1960s and 1970s). It is also becoming increasingly evident in the diverse Iraqi peoples’ spontaneous cultural and military re- sistance to the American occupation of their lands, a resistance that, omi- nously like that of the Vietnamese, refuses to be answerable to the United States’ exceptionalist/Orientalist narrative and to the forwarding warfare that is endemic to it.

What I am suggesting by way of invoking the witness of the literature I have examined in this book about the ultimate consequences of America’s predictably Ahabian response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon should become unequivocally manifest by reconstellating both these moments of American history into the “hidden history of the revolutionary Atlantic” (the period extending from the ori- gins of the Atlantic slave trade to the revolutionary years) brilliantly re- trieved by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker from the oblivion to which it has been relegated by the “Herculean” monumentalist historians of this earlier epochal moment of the march of Western civilization:

The classically educated architects of the Atlantic economy found in Hercules . . . a symbol of power and order. For inspiration they looked to the Greeks, for whom Hercules was a unifier of the centralized territorial state, and to the Romans, for whom he signified vast imperial ambition. The labors of Hercules symbolized economic development: clearing of land, the draining of swamps, and the development of agriculture, as well as the domestication of livestock, the establishment of commerce, and the introduction of technology. The rulers placed the image of Hercules on money and seals, in pictures, sculptures, and palaces, and on arches of triumph. . . . John Adams, for his part, proposed in 1776 that “The Judgment of Hercules” be the seal for the new United States of America. . . .

These same rulers found in the many-headed hydra an antithetical symbol of disorder and resistance, a powerful threat to the building of state, empire, and capitalism. The second labor of Hercules was the destruction of the venomous hydra of Lerna. . . .

From the beginning of English colonial expansion in the early seventeenth century through the metropolitan industrialization of the early nineteenth, rulers referred to the Hercules-hydra myth to describe the difficulty of imposing order on increasingly global systems of labor. They variously designated dispossessed commoners, transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban laborers, soldiers, sailors, and African slaves as the numerous ever-changing heads of the monster. But the heads, though originally brought into productive combina- tion by their Herculean rulers, soon developed among themselves new forms of cooperation against those rulers, from mutinies and strikes to riots and insurrections and revolution.18

As Philip Caputo, Tim O’Brien, and virtually every American soldier who fought in Vietnam reiteratively testify, the insurgents of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, like the many-headed hydra of European antiquity (and of the revolutionary Atlantic economy), were constantly defeated by the “Herculean” American military juggernaut, but they nevertheless kept rising up in unpredictable places and times to eventually bring their would-be monster-slayer to a dead end. Given the incommensurability of America’s predictable invocation of the (mythical) logic of exceptionalism and the postcolonial globalized condition, there is little reason to believe that the hatred precipitated by the United States’ perennial unilateral “defense” of its “interests” in the Islamic world—a defense expedited by its reduction of the diversity of this world to an abstract and predictable religioracist frontier stereotype, the “clash of civilizations”— will not also manifest itself as a “many-headed hydra” that will resurface in unexpected places at unexpected times to constantly molecularize— and neutralize the power of America—its narrative, its self-present will, and its relentlessly forwarding military machine.

#### The alternative is to advocate political resistance and emancipation that are inherent in the spectral political being, an anti-metaphysical project that enables guerilla warfare against empire capable of unsettling the totality of global control --- this is the first directive towards rethinking thinking

**Spanos ‘2K** [William, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamtom, *America’s Shadow*, 2000, p. 194-202]

It is this radical contradiction that the American Cultural Memory's remembrance of the war has obsessively tried to forget. As I have shown, this inordinate amnesiac will to obliterate the disclosures of Vietnam has been the hidden ideological agenda not simply of the American media's representation of the war in its long aftermath, but of the intellectual deputies of the dominant post-Cold War culture, who have been compelled by their recuperative exceptionalist "Hegelian" metanarrative to negate — or sublate — the history of the Vietnam War in order to celebrate the advent of the end of history and the Pax Americana. What needs to be remarked about this victorious post-Cold War discourse is that in affirming its universal truth, its spokespersons are compelled to speak something different. What matters to them is not the historically specific event of the Vietnam War, but the globally triumphant idea of liberal capitalist democracy. Is it an accident that they insistently speak of the post-Cold War occasion in this way? What about this "not Vietnam"?

This is the first directive toward rethinking thinking in the interregnum. An oppositional discourse that would be adequate to the task of resisting the Pax Americana must first think this sublated negation of the contradiction positively. This is not to say that the disclosure of this directive to think the nonbeing of — that belongs to — the imperial discourse of instrumentalism is restricted to the event of the Vietnam War.

It is, as Heidegger's earlier call to rethink the nothing that modern science "wishes to know nothing about"5 suggests, the unthought directive precipitated by the devastations at the sites of language, the earth, and its peoples incumbent on the "planetary imperialism of technologically organized man."6 In a formulation of this resonant disclosure that implicates "Americanism" with the advent of the "age of the world picture," Heidegger writes: As soon as the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure [one of the most revealing symptomatic manifestations of which is the annihilation of space and time by means of the electronic revolution] shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through this, incalculable. This becoming incalculable remains the invisible shadow that is cast around things everywhere when man has been transformed into subjectum and the world into picture.7

But, I am suggesting, it was the decisiveness of the Vietnam War's disclosure of this ontological contradiction — the shadow — that has rendered the retrieval of Heidegger's call to rethink the not that haunts the discourse and practice of "Americanism" an urgent imperative of the post-Vietnam occasion.

Indeed, this is the pervasive, if only symptomatic, testimony of the early poststructuralist theory — enabled in large part by Heidegger's interrogation of modernity, particularly, his retrieval of the "nonbeing" of being — that in some fundamental sense had its origins in the self-destruction of the truth discourse of the Enlightenment during the Vietnam War or, more precisely, in the failure of the global protest movements it catalyzed (most notably in France, in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and in Mexico) to effect essential and lasting transformations in their respective polities. I am referring, above all, to the various critiques of Western logocentrism that precipitated an acute and pervasive consciousness of the marginal — the radical Other — that is either accommodated to or banished from the totalizing circle articulated by the concentering imperial logos of Western metaphysics. Taking its point of departure from the language of the countermemory established by Nietzsche, a certain Freud, and Heidegger ("Dionysus," "the returned repressed," the "nothing"), these critiques gave this ubiquitous Other of the logocentric Same various names: "the other that remains other" (Emmanuel Levinas), "the negative" (Theodor Adorno), "the differance" (Jacques Derrida), "the aporia" (Paul de Man), "the differend" (Jean-Francois Lyotard), "the invisible of the visible" (Louis Althusser), "the deviant" (Michel Foucault), "the catachrestic remainder" (Gayatri Spivak), "the rhizomatic," "the "deterritorialized," or "the nomadic" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari), "the hybrid," "the Third Space," or "the minus in the one" (Homi Bhabha), and so on. But what these various names for the radically marginal have in common is not simply that they testify to the global scope of the imperial logocentrism of modernity, but that they point to "something" incalculable that the imperial instrumentalist thought of American modernity cannot "comprehend" and thus contain, indeed, to the shadow, as it were, that belongs to its dedifferentiating — colonizing — light. As the metaphorics that everywhere in this early postmodern theory accompanies these names, they testify to the specter — that which, to the metaphysical eye, is not — that menaces the triumphalist thinking of American modernity.

It is, further, this symptomatic awareness of the spectrality of the "not" that belongs to but cannot be seen or said by the "triumphant" thought of the age of the world picture that renders this early postmetaphysical thinker an "ontological exile" from the solar "at-homeland." Aware of the global colonization of originative thinkin by the total technologization of "enlightening" thought, this thinker becomes, in Heidegger's resonant term, der Abgescbiedene, "the one apart":8 he is the "ghostly" (geistlich) stranger ("LP," 177)9 who wanders "at the fringe of the technically-economically oriented world of modern mass existence" ("LP," 196) listening to the silence (the unsayable) its saying has precipitated as self-destructive contradiction.

Indeed, in thus reverting knowingly to precisely the condition of the "undomiciliated" or "wandering" or "nomadic" Other that enabled and justified the "civilizing/colonizing" truth discourse of the Occident, this ontological nomad in "the realm of the Between" (Abgeschiedenheit: "apartness") becomes the invisible "ghost" who, in his/her refusal to be answerable to the saying of the homeland, silently haunts its imperial authority. In Derrida's "Marxian" version of this "nonbeing" that activates anxiety (that which has no-thing as its object) in the homeland, he/she becomes the "revenant" — the interred "specter" who returns to "visit" the "visitor."™

It is, as I have suggested, this ontological "specter" that the "more worldly" oriented critical discourses that have superseded early poststructuralist theory are blinded to by their finally "reformist" cultural politics. And it is this oversight that renders their political marginality not exilic enough to be adequate to the conditions of the global post-Cold War occasion.

In interpreting Heidegger's antimetaphysical discourse and that of the poststructuralism it catalyzed in terms of the spectrality that produces anxiety in the dominant culture, I do not want to suggest that they, unlike the oppositional discourses that have interred them as counterproductive or obsolete, are, as such, viable agents of resisting the neoimperialism of the Pax Americana. Though this body of antimetaphysical thought (I realize that this way of putting it is reductive of specific differences) foregrounds the specter that menaces the truth discourse of Western modernity, it does not, with the exception of Heidegger and perhaps the late Derrida, adequately perceive that the imperative of the disclosure of the specter is the rethinking of thinking itself. That is to say, its witness to the specter, as the metaphorical way in which the spectral is articulated suggests, remains symptomatic and thus inadequately thought. More importantly, just as the dominant oppositional discourses — whether those of neo-Marxism, the New Historicism, feminism, cultural critique, black criticism, or postcolonial criticism — discount or tend to slide over the ontological question provoked by the annunciation of the end of history in their overdetermination of the political site, this poststructural discourse, with the exception of the late Derrida, discounts or tends to slide over the political question provoked by the annunciation of the Pax Americana. More accurately, it fails to perceive and thus to think the indissoluble affiliation between the question of being and the question of the polls, theory, and praxis.

If, however, we forcibly dislocate the pervasive, if symptomatic, disclosure of the specter out of the ontological matrix where it has been embedded in the discourse of poststructuralism and reconstellate it into the specific political history of the 1960s — particularly, the military strategy of the Vietnamese insurgents — its meaning undergoes a productive estrangement. The genocidal violence perpetrated by the United States against the Vietnamese people and their land in the name of the "free world" not only exposed the European origins of the myth of American exceptionalism. It also exposed the metaphysical principle of decidability informing this grand imperial narrative. And it was in some sense the recognition of this arrogant American intolerance of undecidability that the Vietnamese Other exploited to abort the goals of the cultural and political armies of a much more powerful United States. That strategy, it will be recalled, which has been aptly called "'guerrilla warfare" in the annals of Western military history, refused to accommodate itself—to be "answerable" — to the European concept of warfare: the binary "frontal engagement" of opposing visible armies whose story would end in a "decisive victory." Instead, these Vietnamese insurgents resorted to a "barbarian" strategy. They resisted invasion of their Asian homeland not by direct confrontation, but by an invisible nomadic mobility — a "spectral" tactics, as it were — that reversed the see-er/seen binary of Western imperialism and in so doing demolecuralized the more formidable invading army and reduced its otherwise invincible war machine to utter ineffectiveness.

This disclosure of the Achilles' heel of the Western imperial project constitutes the second directive of the Vietnam War for the task of rethinking thinking in the American age of the world picture, more specifically, for the articulation of a theory of resistance against the Pax Metaphysica that is simultaneously a practice of political resistance against the Pax Americana. In reconstellating the Vietnamese strategy into the postcolonial context, we not only discover the hitherto overlooked connection between the spectral ontological Other precipitated by the fulfillment of the logical economy of Western metaphysics in the "Americanization" of the planet and the multitude of displaced political Others — the "nonexistent" beings — precipitated by the fulfillment (the coming to its "end") of the project of Western imperialism at large. In recognizing the indissoluble relationship between these two hitherto disparate Others, we are also compelled to appropriate the "eccentric" Vietnamese strategy of "unanswerability" that defeated America as a directive for thinking the positive emancipatory possibilities of the postcolonial occasion, that is, of the vast and various population of people unhomed by the depredations of Western imperialism.

This effort to theorize an "eccentric" adversarial political strategy of unanswerability from the global demographic shifts incumbent on the fulfillment of the imperial project has, is fact, already been inaugurated by Edward Said at the close of Culture and Imperialism, if only in a tentative way. Symptomatically, if not fully, conscious of the implications of the interregnum for thinking, Said, like Salman Rushdie in his fiction, takes his point of departure in this theoretical initiative from his exilic experience as emigre — as an irreversibly "unhoused" Other whose difference is indissolubly related to, indeed, was produced by, the colonizing (at-homing) imperatives of Occidental imperialism. In so doing, he invokes a theoretical motif that was fundamental to but inadequately thought by the early postmodernists (Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, for example) who overdetermined the decentering of the Occidental logos, a motif that Said finds thought in some degree by Paul Virilio (L'lnsecurite du territoire), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Thousand Plateaus), and Theodor Adorno (Minima Moralia), among others. I am referring to the possibilities not only for refuge but for political resistance and emancipation that, according to Said, are paradoxically inherent in the unhomed, estranging, and dereifying mobility — the spectral political being, as it were — of the displaced persons, the migrants, and the historyless Others of the imperial Occident who, in the postcolonial era, exist "between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages." These are the possibilities of e-mergence precipitated on a global scale by the thinning out or occasional breaking of the lines of force that, by way of cultural familiarization, domestication, and pacification, have historically bound the periphery to the metropolitan center/homeland. I have quoted a passage from Said's all-too-brief summation of his oppositional postcolonial project in chapter 2, but the resonant suggestiveness precipitated by the reconstellation of the estranged political perspective he overdetermines into the ontological context I have inferred from the decentering and disarticulating guerrilla strategy of the nomadic Vietnamese insurgents warrants its retrieval at this culminating point of my argument:

It is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages. From this perspective then all things are indeed counter, original, spare, strange.

From this perspective also, one can see "the common consort dancing together" contrapuntally. And while it would be the rankest Panglossian dishonesty to say that the bravura performances of the intellectual exile and the miseries of the displaced person or refugee are the same, it is possible, I think, to regard the intellectual as first distilling then articulating the predicaments that disfigure modernity — mass deportation, imprisonment, population transfer, collective dispossession, and forced immigration.

Having thematized the estrangement latent in the exilic condition of the emigre — the uncanny ability to see what from the point of view of the imperial discourse of the dominant culture is otherwise invisible — Said goes on to invoke the exemplary migrant discourse of the exiled German intellectual Theodor Adorno: " 'The past life of emigres is, as we know, annulled,' says Adorno in Minima Moralia, subtitled Reflections from a Damaged Life.... Why? 'Because anything that is not reified, cannot be counted and measured, ceases to exist' or, as he says later, is consigned to mere 'background.'" In the Heideggerian/Derridian rhetoric I have emphasized in my effort to think the implications of ontological imperialism, the emigre becomes the spectral Abgeschiedene in the "realm of the Between" who haunts the Being of the imperial culture that has reduced him/her to nonbeing. Said rightly acknowledges "the disabling aspects of this fate." But it does not blind him, as it does so many "progressive" postmodern or postcolonial thinkers, to "the virtues or possibilities" of this spectral marginalization. They are — and here Said announces the post-postmodern and -postcolonial project of the inter regnum — "worth exploring." "Adorno's general pattern," he writes, "is what in another place he calls the 'administered world' or, insofar as the irresistible dominants in the culture are concerned, 'the consciousness industry.' There is then not just the negative advantage of refuge in the emigre's eccentricity; there is also the positive benefit of challenging the system, describing it in a language unavailable to those it has already subdued."

Admittedly, the possibilities for this "freedom from exchange" — this "last refuge" from the globalization of late capitalism — that Said proffers as an alternative to the existing oppositional discourses are, like Adorno's, the minima moralia of a damaged political life, and, in its emphasis on survival, his alternative lacks the force of a truly positive hope. But if, as the resonant doubleness of the language I have italicized amply warrants, the terms of his global elaboration of these postcolonial possibilities are reconstellated into the occasion of the struggle of the Vietnamese people against American imperialism in the 1960s, one need not, at least on this count, be quite as pessimistic as Adorno and Said about the role of the intellectual in the global post-Cold War period I have called the interregnum, without at the same time succumbing to "the rankest Panglossian dishonesty." For, to reiterate, it was precisely the Vietnamese's exploitation of the very ontological conditions of their enforced confinement by a formidable imperial culture that estranged that colonized space and, in so doing, disintegrated both the cultural narrative and the decisive end-oriented imperial practice this narrative was designed to enable. The powerless Vietnamese masterfully transformed the United States's arrogant and clamorous strategy to reduce the unaccountable and immeasurable Other to nonexistent status or, to invoke Adorno's language, to consign its spectral Otherness to "mere background" in its metanarrative — which is to say, to silent invisibility before the panoptic imperial gaze — into a powerful polyvalent de-structive and e-mancipatory (projective) weapon. And it was this transformation of the debilitating, that is, passivizing and silencing, effects of reification that enabled this "damaged" Third World country — precisely by way of its spectral invisibility — to disable the otherwise irrefragable operations of reification and thus to defeat the most powerful nation in the history of the world.12

To think the spectral as the menacing precipitate of the indissoluble relationship between the Pax Metaphysica and the Pax Americana: this, not the "reformist" initiative of those liberals like Sacvan Bercovitch and Richard Rorty whose oppositional discourse continues to be answerable to the imperial language informed by the idea of America, is the resonantly silent imperative of the interregnum, especially for American intellectuals of the Left.13 This appeal to contemporary American intellectuals to think the nomadic political emigre who haunts the post-Cold War New World Order simultaneously with the ontological specter that postmetaphysical European theorists14 have thematized as the paradoxical consequence of the fulfillment of the logical economy of Western philosophy is an appeal to think America globally. And it no doubt will be criticized by those nation-oriented American intellectuals to whom it is addressed as "traveling theory," the importation of a foreign interpretive discourse into a historically specifically American context.15

### 2NC Overview – Spanos

#### The Western will to knowledge structures the logic of our institutions ranging from the military to academia --- the American pathology that imagines each individual as an empowered agent capable of proscribing grand solutions to all violence is not a universal human feeling, but rather a violent hubris that requires actively attacking at every opportunity.

#### In fact, maintaining the global world order causes structural violence on a far greater scale than the aff can possibly resolve --- unabashed Western supremacy left unchecked in our mindsets causes violent exploitation of the global periphery

**Gregory 11.** Derek Gregory, Peter Wall Distinguished Professor at the University of British Columbia, “The everywhere war,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3, September 2011, pg. 238

War time

For many, particularly in the United States, 9/11 was a moment when the world turned; for others, particularly outside the United States, it was a climactic summation of a longer history of American imperialism in general and its meddling in the Middle East in particular. Either way, it is not surprising that many commentators should have emphasised the temporality of the military violence that followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that bright September morning: the ‘war on terror’ that became ‘the long war’. For the RETORT collective, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq marked ‘the elevation – into a state of permanent war – of a long and consistent pattern of military expansionism in the service of empire’ (RETORT 2005, 80). Keen (2006) wrote of ‘endless war’, Duffield (2007) of ‘unending war’ and Filkins (2008) of ‘the forever war’. The sense of permanence endures, and yet Engelhardt (2010, 2–3) ruefully notes that it remains difficult for Americans to understand ‘that Washington is a war capital, that the United States is a war state, that it garrisons much of the planet, and that the norm for us is to be at war somewhere at any moment’. Bacevich (2010, 225) traces this state of affairs to what he calls the ‘Washington rules’ that long pre-date 9/11. These are ‘the conviction that the obligations of leadership require the United States to maintain a global military presence, configure its armed forces for power projection, and employ them to impose changes abroad’, which he argues have formed ‘the enduring leitmotif of US national security policy’ for the last 60 years and ‘propelled the United States into a condition approximating perpetual war’.

Each of these temporal formulations implies spatial formations. For RETORT (2005, 103) ‘military neoliberalism’ is ‘the true globalization of our time’. The planetary garrison that projects US military power is divided into six geographically defined unified combatant commands – like US Central Command, CENTCOM – whose Areas of Responsibility cover every region on earth and which operate through a global network of bases. If you think this unremark- able, ask yourself Bacevich’s question: how would the United States react if China were to mirror these moves? Think, too, of the zones in which the shadow of US military violence still falls: not just Afghanistan and Iraq, but also Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen. Then think of the zones where the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ has been used by other states to legitimise repression: Chechnya, Libya, Palestine, the Philippines, Sri Lanka. And then think of the cities that have become displacements of the space of war, punctuation points in what Sassen (2010, 37) calls ‘a new kind of multi-sited war’: Casablanca, Lahore, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai. All these lists are incomplete, but even in this truncated form they suggest the need to analyse not only ‘the forever war’ but also what we might call ‘the everywhere war’.

This is at once a conceptual and a material project whose scope can be indexed by three geographs that trace a movement from the abstract to the concrete: Foucault’s (1975–6) prescient suggestion that war has become the pervasive matrix within which social life is constituted; the replacement of the concept of the battlefield in US military doctrine by the multi-scalar, multi-dimensional ‘battlespace’ with ‘no front or back’ and where ‘everything becomes a site of permanent war’ (Graham 2009, 389; 2010, 31); and the assault on the global borderlands where the United States and its allies now conduct their military operations. The first two are never far from the surface of this essay, but it is the third that is my primary focus.

Borderlands and blurred boundaries

Duffield (2001, 309) once described the borderlands as ‘an imagined geographical space where, in the eyes of metropolitan actors and agencies, the characteristics of brutality, excess and breakdown predominate’. There, in the ‘wild zones’ of the global South, wars are supposed to occur ‘through greed and sectarian gain, social fabric is destroyed and developmental gains reversed, non-combatants killed, humanitarian assistance abused and all civility abandoned’. This imaginative geography folds in and out of the rhetorical distinction between ‘our’ wars – wars conducted by advanced militaries that are supposed to be surgical, sensitive and scrupulous – and ‘their’ wars. In reality, however, the boundaries are blurred and each bleeds into its other (Gregory 2010). Thus the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 combined a long- distance, high-altitude war from the air with a ground war spearheaded by the warlords and militias of the Northern Alliance operating with US infantry and Special Forces; counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has involved the co-option of ragtag militias to supplement US military operations; and in Afghani- stan the US Army pays off warlords and ultimately perhaps even the Taliban to ensure that its overland supply chain is protected from attack (Report of the Majority Staff 2010).

In mapping these borderlands – which are also shadowlands, spaces that enter European and American imaginaries in phantasmatic form, barely known but vividly imagined – we jibe against the limits of cartographic and so of geopolitical reason. From Rat- zel’s view of der Krieg als Schule des Raumes to Lacoste’s stinging denunciation – ‘la géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre’ – the deadly liaison between modern war and modern geography has been conducted in resolutely territorial terms. To be sure, the genealogy of territory has multiple valences, and Ratzel’s Raum is not Lacoste’s espace, but a critical analysis of the everywhere war requires cartographic reason to be supplemented by other, more abile spatialities. This is not only a matter of transcending the geopolitical, connecting it to the biopolitical and the geo-economic, but also of tracking space as a ‘doing’, precarious, partially open and never complete. It is in something of this spirit that Bauman (2002, 83) identifies the ‘planetary frontierlands’ as staging grounds of today’s wars, where efforts to ‘pin the divisions and mutual enmities to the ground seldom bring results’. In the course of ‘inter- minable frontierland warfare’, so he argues, ‘trenches are seldom dug’, adversaries are ‘constantly on the move’ and have become for all intents and purposes ‘extraterritorial’. I am not sure about the last (Bauman is evidently thinking of al Qaeda, which is scarcely the summation of late modern war), but this is an arresting if impressionistic canvas and the fluidity con- veyed by Bauman’s broad brush-strokes needs to be fleshed out. After the US-led invasion of Iraq it was commonplace to distinguish the Green Zone and its satellites (the US political-military bastion in Baghdad and its penumbra of Forward Operating Bases) from the ‘red zone’ that was everywhere else. But this categorical division is misleading. The colours seeped into and swirled around one another, so that occupied Iraq became not so much a patchwork of green zones and red zones as a thoroughly militarised landscape saturated in varying intensities of brown (khaki): ‘intensities’ because within this warscape military and paramilitary violence could descend at any moment without warning, and within it precarious local orders were constantly forming and re-forming. I think this is what Anderson (2011) means when he describes insurgencies oscillating ‘between extended periods of absence as a function of their dispersion’ and ‘moments of disruptive, punctual presence’, but these variable intensities entrain all sides in today’s ‘wars amongst the people’ – and most of all those caught in the middle.

### AT: Perm / 2NC Link Wall

#### Our Spanos ev says that the perm fails as long as it retains the trappings of ontological thought in favor of neutral dialogue etc: “even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the ontological grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose.”

#### The permutation’s reformist impulse rehabilitates American image, fomenting neoliberal violence and continued military violence across the global periphery --- they are nothing more than failed Vietnam protests

**Spanos ‘2K** [William, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamtom, *America’s Shadow*, 2000, p. 184-]

Undertaken in the name of the "promise" of "America," these reforms were intended to reestablish the ontological, cultural, and political authority of the enlightened, American "vital center" and its circumference and thus to recontain the dark force of the insurgent differential constituencies that had emerged at the margins in the wake of the disclosures of the Vietnam War. At the domestic site, these included the coalescence of capital (the Republican Party) and the religious and political Right into a powerful dominant neoconservative culture (a new "Holy Alliance," as it were) committed to an indissolubly linked militantly racist, antifeminist, antigay, and anti-working-class agenda; the dominant liberal humanist culture's massive indictment of deconstructive and destructive theory as complicitous with fascist totalitarianism; the nationwide legislative assault on the post-Vietnam public university by way of programs of economic retrenchment affiliated with the representation of its multicultural initiative as a political correctness of the Left;30 the increasing subsumption of the various agencies of cultural production and dissemination (most significantly, the electronic information highways) under fewer and fewer parent, mostly American, corporations; the dismantling of the welfare program; and, symptomatically, the rehabilitation of the criminal president, Richard Nixon. At the international site, this "reformist" initiative has manifested itself as the rehabilitation of the American errand in the world, a rehabilitation exemplified by the United States's virtually uncontested moral/military interventions in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, the Middle East, and Kosovo; its interference in the political processes of Russia by way of providing massive economic support for Boris Yeltsin's democratic/capitalist agenda against the communist opposition; its unilateral assumption of the lead in demanding economic/political reforms in Southeast Asian countries following the collapse of their economies in 1998; its internationalization of the "free market"; and, not least, its globalization of the instrumentalist version of the English language.

What needs to be foregrounded is that these global post-Cold War "reformist" initiatives are not discontinuous practices, a matter of historical accident. Largely enabled by the "forgetting" of Vietnam — and of the repression or accommodation or self-immolation of the emergent decentered modes of thinking the Vietnam War precipitated — they are, rather, indissolubly, however unevenly, related. Indeed, they are the multisituated practical consequences of the planetary triumph (the "end") of the logical economy of the imperial ontological discourse that has its origins in the founding of the idea of the Occident and its fulfilled end in the banal instrumental/technological reasoning in the discourse of "America." In thus totally colonizing thinking, that is, this imperial "Americanism" has come to determine the comportment toward being of human beings, in all their individual and collective differences, at large — even of those postcolonials who would resist its imperial order. This state of thinking, which has come to be called the New World Order (though to render its rise to ascendancy visible requires reconstellating the Vietnam War into this history), subsumes the representative, but by no means complete, list of post-Cold War practices to which I have referred above. And it is synecdochically represented by the massive mediatization of the amnesiac end-of-history discourse and the affiliated polyvalent rhetoric of the Pax Americana.

#### Sequencing DA – only confronting issues of sovereignty allows us to break free of the circular political practices that entrench militarism – their reformism guarantees reification of the system.

**Wadiwel 02** (Dinesh Joesph, completing a doctorate at the University of Western Sydney, 2K2, “Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life” Borderlands E-Journal Vol. 1 # 2 <http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol1no2_2002/wadiwel_cows.html>)

Such a political program has far reaching consequences, both for Western sovereignty, and the way that the business of politics is conducted. The living population of the earth has inherited a vision of sovereign power, which has spread cancerously into even the most seemingly inaccessible aspects of everyday life. This vision commands all, claims legitimacy for all, and determines the conduct of living for all within its domain. Politics ‘as we know it’ is caught inextricably in the web of sovereign power, in such a way that it seems that modern political debate cannot help but circulate around the same, routine issues: "What is the appropriate legislative response?"; "Is it within the State’s powers to intervene in this particular conflict?"; "How can we ensure the citizen’s rights are maintained in the face of the state?". To challenge such an encompassing and peremptory political discourse — where every question implies the sovereign absolutely, and every decision made refers to life itself — would require the most intensive rethinking of the way in which territory, governance and economy are imagined. In this sense, whilst Agamben’s analysis of bare life, and Foucault’s theory of bio-power, provide a means by which to assess the condition of non-human life with respect to sovereign power, the political project must reach beyond these terms, and embrace an intertwining of the human and the non-human: an intersection which may be found in the animal life shared by both entities.

#### No perm, the alt isn’t a commitment to political praxis which means you can’t combine it with plan action, it’s an act of critique which removes the possibility of plan action from consideration and focuses on the processes of constructing the 1ac speech act—situating plan action within that process shuts down critical potential—complete rejection is key

**Neocleous 8** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the **fetish**, is perhaps to **eschew the logic of security altogether** – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it **marginalises all else**, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, **debates and discussions that animate political life**. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – **constitutes a rejection of politics** in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore **need to get beyond security politics,** **not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it** in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or **revision of security** in which it is **re-mapped or civilised** or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of **these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary,** and consequently end up **re afﬁrm**ing **the state as the terrain of modern politics**, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics**. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to **forge another kind of politics** centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

### L – Gender LAWs

#### The aff’s plan is a double turn with their impact evidence – the scholarship produced by the 1ac justifies neoconservative redeployment even if the plan’s hypothetically a good idea. This impasse is precisely why liberal anti-war activists fail, and they can’t access ANY of their “reform solves” cards because they don’t assume the shitty scholarship introduced by the aff.

#### Western metaphysical thinking is literally colonialism --- only the K accesses the root cause of the demonization of women --- any ethical stance MUST reject it

Spanos 00. William V. Spanos, distinguished professor of English and comparative literature at Binghampton University, America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, 2000, pg. 9

As its binarism suggests, the foundational privileging of Identity over difference in metaphysical thinking means operationally that it enables the inquirer to read the temporal process as a system of evanescent or always changing signatures, fragments, enigmas, shadows, phantasms, and so on. It enables him/her to address the differential dynamics of time as a spectral subaltern surface (an adulterated or "fallen," and thus worthless, but always threatening Other) that obscures — or, rather, reveals as in a glass darkly — a prior informing luminous presence (an abiding or universal or permanent meaning) that a willed penetration will reveal. Plato, for example, in the Phaedrus, called the partial temporal body into which the soul had fallen a "polluted...walking sepulchre" that only the recollection (anamnesis) of a prior "pure" and "whole" state vaguely shadowed in this corrupt and partial body could redeem.12 However that "otherly" surface is represented, whether as shadow (as in Plato) or as signature (as in St. Augustine and the Church Fathers) or as negation (as in Hegel) or as fragment (as in modern empirical science), the metaphysical mode of inquiry assumes that the difference the inquirer encounters is not an irresolvable contradiction or contingency, but a problem that can and must be solved in the name of the truth. It assumes the Other to be a mere appearance: a recalcitrant agency of concealment and instability that must yield what it conceals to the stabilizing truth of Identity, of the One, of the End, of Presence. In short, metaphysical inquiry represents that which is Other than its truth not simply as a negative term (specter or spirit), but, as such, as that which corroborates its Identity (Spirit) and endows its Truth with power. Thus perceiving meta-ta-physika produces and validates the essential logic of the ontotheological tradition. This is, of course, the hierarchized binary logic that enables the first, "major" term — the term representing a self-present and plenary object — to demonize the second, "minor" or "subaltern," term: the term representing an entity that is not present to itself. This binary logic, in other words, empowers the privileged term to represent the Other as nonbeing (spectral), as some kind of arbitrary threat to Being — the benign total order to which the first term is committed — and thus to subdue and appropriate this Other to the latter's essential truth. It is in this sense that one can say that Western metaphysical thinking is essentially a colonialism. By this, I do not simply mean, as does much postcolonial discourse that acknowledges in some degree the polyvalency of the imperial project, a metaphor ap- propriated to the thought of being (or of any site on the continuum of being other than the economic or political) from another "more practi- cal and fundamental" — "real" — domain of reference.13 In identifying Western metaphysical thought with colonialism, I am positing a literal and precise definition of the process of metaphysical inquiry.

The binary logic endemic to the very idea of the West had its origins, according to Heidegger, in late antiquity with the Romans' colonization of Greek (the vestiges of pre-Socratic) thinking, with, that is, their reduction of the originative thinking of the latter to a derivative (constructed) understanding of truth. More specifically, the provenance of this logic lies in the imperial Romans' politically strategic translation of a-letheia to veritas, truth as always already un-concealment to truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence of mind and thing.14 This epochal reduction of an originative to a re-presentational mode of thinking — a thinking that places the force of being before one as a thing to be looked at — was calculatively determined by a relatively conceptualized understanding of the operations of metaphysical perception. In decisively establishing the binary opposition between the true and the false as the ground of thinking, this reduction also decisively established the ground for the eventual assimilation of an infinite relay of different but analogous oppositions into the totalized epistemic binary logic of the Western tradition. Under the aegis of the doctrine of the adaequatio, it was not only the binary opposition between Truth and falsehood that empowered the correction or appropriation or reformation or disciplining or accommodation or civilizing, which is to say, the colonization, of the "errant" or "deformed" or "wasteful" or "excessive" or "immature" (uncultivated) or "barbarous" or "feminine" force named in the second, demonized term. As the very metaphors used to characterize the "false" suggest, that opposition was simply one — no doubt the most fundamental — of a whole series of binary oppositions inhering, however asymmetrically developed, in History, in, that is, the founding Occidental representation of temporal being-as-a-whole by way of perceiving "it" meta-ta-physika: Being and time, Identity and difference, the Word and words, Being and nonbeing, Subject and object, Sanity and madness, Culture and anarchy, Civilization and barbarism, Man and woman, the White race and the colored races, the West and the east, the North and the south, and so on. What this emphatically suggests is that an oppositional criticism that would be adequate to the task of resisting imperialism must cease to think the imperial project in the disciplinary terms endemic to and mandated by the Occident's compartmentalization of being and knowledge.

### Alt – Spanos

#### The alt’s refusal to play by the rules of imperial logic is crucial to rip up our ontological map of planetary hegemony and fashion an ontological challenge to American empire --- our refusal to know clogs the wheels of imperial machinery and enables ethical thought to formulate in its place

#### Our alternative allows for revolutionary guerilla tactics – you should endorse this even at the risk of failure or death

Michelsen 16. Nicholas Michelsen, lecturer in political theory and international relations at King’s College, London, Politics and Suicide: The Political Philosophy of Self-Destruction, Routledge, Amazon

Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara argued that ‘the guerrilla fighter, who is general of himself, need not die in every battle’, but he must always be ‘ready to give his life’. For Guevara, what supplies the ‘positive quality of this guerrilla warfare is precisely that each one of the guerrilla fighters is ready to die, not to defend an ideal, but rather to convert it into reality’.[17](#17_For_Guevara__willingness_to_die_is_definitive_o___) Indeed, as the embodiment of this positive principle in the establishment of revolutionary focos, he advocates the forming of a ‘suicide-platoon’ of volunteers who can strike at the most dangerous locations: ‘Entrance to this platoon should be regarded as almost a prize for merit’. Guevara was careful to distinguish, however, the willingness to die from the will to die. Unnecessary self-exposure to ‘defeat or annihilation’ is simply the marker of bad strategy. Death and destruction carry no integral charge. Death is revolutionary only as a code of practice; suffering ‘formidable privations’ up to the point of death is essential to the pedagogy of the revolutionary.[18](#18_Ibid___pp__34__82_) Guevara’s contemporary Regis Debray was no less explicit; for the focoist, death is a principle of conduct.[19](#19_R__Debray__Revolution_in_the_Revolution__Armed____) To be a revolutionary is to risk all, and through such a commitment, to be able to turn any failure into a springboard to later success.[20](#20_Ibid___p__24_) ‘To conquer is to accept as a matter of principle that life, for the revolutionary, is not the supreme good’.[21](#21_Indeed__to_risk_all_means_that__having_risen_in___) Only commitment unto death can prevent the taming of the revolution under reformism. A pragmatics of revolutionary suicide was similarly central for Mao Tse-Tung. Mao shared with Bakunin and Nechayev the view that violent action must spark a revolutionary moment.[22](#22_Mao_saw__China__a_s_littered_all_over_with_dry____) Unlike Nechayev, however, he distinguished between worthy and unworthy suicides.[23](#23_Ibid___p__173_) He recognised death is a common occurrence whenever there is revolutionary struggle. An indomitable spirit, willing to ‘fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood’ is always critical.[24](#24_M__Tse_tung__The_Red_Guard_s_Handbook__trans__S___) But the revolutionary must avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Mao stated in a classical excerpt that the meaning of weight of death varies widely in accordance with the place of our self-expenditure: ‘it may be heavier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather’.[25](#25__All_men_must_die__but_death_can_vary_in_its_si___) Not all deaths are equal.

Newton references both Guevara and Mao as grounds for his thesis, arguing that revolutionaries are often simply not prepared to accept the morbid actualities of revolutionary practice identified by both.[26](#26_Newton_1974__p__50_) The Black Panthers would not ‘romanticise the consequences of revolution in our life time’. There is, Newton argues, little chance of participating in a revolution and then dying of old age, and he claimed to have no expectation of seeing the revolution fulfilled in his lifetime, only that ‘the revolution will grow in my life time … I do not expect to enjoy its fruits’.[27](#27_Ibid___p__6_) You cannot, he implies, be a revolutionary and expect to survive.[28](#28_Newton_argues_that__a_revolutionary_death_is_th___) This fact had been borne out, he argued, in every example of resistance – from the American colonists to the French of the late eighteenth century, the Russians of 1917, the Jews of Warsaw, the Cubans, the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese: ‘any people who struggle against a brutal and powerful force – are suicidal’.[29](#29_Newton_1974__p__7_) Newton’s prison experience confirmed this insight to him: His constant defiance resulted in Newton receiving far worse treatment than his peers. Indeed, he claims that his actions were such that the guards thought he was suicidal. They assumed he would crack under the disciplinary pressure, but instead, he became ever stronger: ‘If I had submitted to their exploitation and done their will, it would have killed my spirit and condemned me to a living death. To cooperate in prison meant a reactionary suicide to me’.[30](#30_Ibid_)

As such, only because his actions carried the risk of death and mental destruction could they be a means of propagandising to and radicalising the other inmates and thus promoting the revolution against passive or reactionary suicide. In this sense, for Newton,

the concept of revolutionary suicide was not defeatist or fatalistic. On the contrary, it conveyed an awareness of reality in combination with the possibility of hope – reality because the revolutionary must always be prepared to face death, and hope because it symbolises a resolute determination to bring about change … above all, it demands that the revolutionary sees his death and his life as one piece.[31](#31_Ibid_)

Newton’s text imputes eschatological connotations, because of a ‘greater, more immediate danger … the survival of the entire world’. Newton argues that ‘If the world does not change, all its people will be threatened … The handwriting is on the wall’. Only by adopting a strategy of revolutionary suicide, can the Black Panthers ‘establish … the means for creative work’.[32](#32_Ibid___p__6_) Only with suicide can they challenge the suicide machine of the racist Urstaat.[33](#33_Ibid___p__7___Is_the_government_of_the_United_S___)

There can be little surprise that the Panthers were to be deemed such a fundamental threat to the US state formation. A startling claim is explicitly being developed by Newton. He suggests that revolutionary politics is a game which makes self-murder the currency of every decision. In doing so, it presents an active death against a reactive death, with no dialectical resolution on offer in this meeting. Newton posited an antiracist and antisovereign politics that emerges in making pass words out of the morbid order words of sovereignty; the deterritorialisation of the death that an inherently racist power decrees. Such a deterritorialised and deterritorialising death simply has no relation to the autonomic suicides implicated in Western notions of sovereign individuality. It is revolutionary because it explodes the self in the declaration of its finitudes. Far from suicide being posited as the ideologeme of pure identity, it is claimed here to embody the passing of every sovereign.

#### The process of rethinking thinking that doesn’t hold to a specific tradition of criticism but highlights contradictions within security narratives that make it impossible to translate into policy—it opens cracks within militarism for more ethical understandings of governance to emerge that we can then strive for

#### All of their vitriol directed at the alt’s feasibility is offense for us --- it helps construct an ever-greater apparatus of fear designed to create and maintain hopelessness, to destroy any sense of possible alternative futures, which ensures the aff destroys (and only the alt can solve) the radical creativity needed to design a world without debt --- it’s try or die for collective imagination

**Graeber 11** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, Debt: The First Five Thousand Years, Melville House Printing: May 2011]

We live, now, at a genuinely peculiar historical juncture. The credit crisis has provided us with a vivid illustration of the principle set out in the last chapter: that capitalism cannot really operate in a world where people believe it will be around forever. For most of the last several centuries, most people assumed that credit could not be generated infinitely because they assumed that the economic system itself was unlikely to endure forever. The future was likely to be fundamentally different. Yet somehow, the anticipated revolutions never happened. The basic structures of financial capitalism largely remained in place. It’s only now, at the very moment when it’s becoming increasingly clear that current arrangements are not viable, that we suddenly have hit the wall in terms of our collective imagination. There is very good reason to believe that, in a generation or so, capitalism itself will no longer exist—most obviously, as ecologists keep reminding us, because it’s impossible to maintain an engine of perpetual growth forever on a finite planet, and the current form of capitalism doesn’t seem to be capable of generating the kind of vast technological breakthroughs and mobilizations that would be required for us to start finding and colonizing any other planets. Yet faced with the prospect of capitalism actually ending, the most common reaction—even from those who call themselves “progressives”—is simply fear. We cling to what exists because we can no longer imagine an alternative that wouldn’t be even worse. How did we get here? My own suspicion is that we are looking at the final effects of the militarization of American capitalism itself. In fact, it could well be said that the last thirty years have seen the construction of a vast bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of hopelessness, a giant machine designed, first and foremost, to destroy any sense of possible alternative futures. At its root is a veritable obsession on the part of the rulers of the world—in response to the upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s—with ensuring that social movements cannot be seen to grow, flourish, or propose alternatives; that those who challenge existing power arrangements can never, under any circumstances, be perceived to win.35 To do so requires creating a vast apparatus of armies, prisons, police, various forms of private security firms and police and military intelligence apparatus, and propaganda engines of every conceivable variety, most of which do not attack alternatives directly so much as create a pervasive climate of fear, jingoistic conformity, and simple despair that renders any thought of changing the world seem an idle fantasy. Maintaining this apparatus seems even more important, to exponents of the “free market,” even than maintaining any sort of viable market economy. How else can one explain what happened in the former Soviet Union? One would ordinarily have imagined that the end of the Cold War would have led to the dismantling of the army and the KGB and rebuilding the factories, but in fact what happened was precisely the other way around. This is just an extreme example of what has been happening everywhere. Economically, the apparatus is pure dead weight; all the guns, surveillance cameras, and propaganda engines are extraordinarily expensive and really produce nothing, and no doubt it’s yet another element dragging the entire capitalist system down—along with producing the illusion of an endless capitalist future that laid the groundwork for the endless bubbles to begin with. Finance capital became the buying and selling of chunks of that future, and economic freedom, for most of us, was reduced to the right to buy a small piece of one’s own permanent subordination. In other words, there seems to have been a profound contradiction between the political imperative of establishing capitalism as the only possible way to manage anything, and capitalism’s own unacknowledged need to limit its future horizons lest speculation, predictably, go haywire. Once it did, and the whole machine imploded, we were left in the strange situation of not being able to even imagine any other way that things might be arranged. About the only thing we can imagine is catastrophe. To begin to free ourselves, the first thing we need to do is to see ourselves again as historical actors, as people who can make a difference in the course of world events. This is exactly what the militarization of history is trying to take away. Even if we are at the beginning of the turn of a very long historical cycle, it’s still largely up to us to determine how it’s going to turn out. For instance: the last time we shifted from a bullion economy to one of virtual credit money, at the end of the Axial Age and the beginning of the Middle Ages, the immediate shift was experienced largely as a series of great catastrophes. Will it be the same this time around? Presumably a lot depends on how consciously we set out to ensure that it won’t be. Will a return to virtual money lead to a move away from empires and vast standing armies, and to the creation of larger structures limiting the depredations of creditors? There is good reason to believe that all these things will happen—and if humanity is to survive, they will probably have to—but we have no idea how long it will take, or what, if it does, it would really look like. Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible. What I have been trying to do in this book is not so much to propose a vision of what, precisely, the next age will be like, but to throw open perspectives, enlarge our sense of possibilities; to begin to ask what it would mean to start thinking on a breadth and with a grandeur appropriate to the times.

### AT: Alt Fails

#### The appropriation of Spanos for debate is a-ok ---- voting for the Spanos K is the only unique use of the ballot --- we control uniqueness because academia is in crisis now

**McVicker 15.** Jeanette McVicker, professor of English at SUNY Fredonia, “In the Neighborhood of Zero: Ontology and Pedagogy,” boundary 2 42:1 (2015), 14

But I would suggest that while Spanos can be (and has been) criticized for his often alienating style—which too often remains in a “negative” destructive mode, sounding both pedantic and frequently dismissive of those who might otherwise be allies in various collaborative efforts to accomplish the institutional changes he seeks—his work continues to be relevant. Spanos has sought to engage with those he calls “post post- structuralist theorists,” among them Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, and others, in an effort to rethink the work performed by theory in a posttheory moment. It’s not accidental that some of his most recent engagements have focused on the potentialities of the Occupy movement, the Arab Spring, and the legacies of the writings of Said and Hannah Arendt.18 Foregrounding the importance of refusing consensus, his late work seeks to make[s] visible the ontopolitical ruptures in the logic of Western influence and transnational capitalism, to which Said’s and Arendt’s thought is vital. While much of this work is highly controversial for a number of reasons, Spanos has remained engaged in contemporary debates not merely to be “trendy” but to continue the dialogic process he has engaged in his entire scholarly life.

His work indirectly aligns with many contemporary projects far outside of literary studies, including “seed democracy” efforts by activists such as Vandana Shiva; antiglobalization activism as diverse as the varieties practiced by Arundhati Roy, Occupy protesters, and WikiLeaks; transnational feminist and queer theorists (e.g., Rosi Braidotti, Jack Halberstam) and disability theorists (e.g., Rosemarie Garland-Thomson). Pedagogy is, obviously, not limited to the space of university classrooms but also takes place on blogs and Twitter, in rallies, and through documentary films. These theorists and activists may not cite Spanos’s work directly, but they are potential partners in the contestatory dialogue his work initiates, preserving a focus on human being in the world in its encounter with the violence of Western (particularly US) sociopolitical power. Also important is the global reach of Bill’s work, thanks to his international students’ translations into Mandarin, Greek, Italian, Spanish, and Turkish.

Perhaps the strangest legacy of Spanos’s work today is its use by high school and college debate teams across the United States. These groups focus primarily but not exclusively on his book America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire to produce what has become known as “the Spanos kritik.” In September 2011, one of those students, Christopher Spurlock, interviewed Spanos via e-mail, following several more-informal conversa- tions with him.19 The response to Spanos in the debate world is exten- sive and, perhaps unsurprisingly, frequently polarizing and unsympathetic. Reading these forums, however, it’s clear that many students have taken a great deal of time to contemplate the implications of his thought for their world, not only in terms of debate “format” and “style” but also in wrestling with the concepts of “disinterestedness,” framing (in Heidegger’s sense of the “world-picture” and Althusser’s sense of the “problematic”), and identity. They’ve read many of his books and carefully explicate his thinking to their peers, often with strikingly perceptive nuance. Whatever these students do with such ideas, the fact that they have engaged with what Robert P. Marzec (another former student of Bill’s) has called an “ontological archive of the current world order” seems significant—all the more so when this takes place in high schools, which are increasingly dominated by standardized tests and homogenization for a “common core.”20

For many of us within the university, debates over general education and the Common Core now being widely adopted in secondary education reflect the most direct legacy of Spanos’s teaching. The task of pedagogy in his view is, above all (following Heidegger), “to rethink thinking”: to reconnect pedagogy with the ontological in order to adequately critique the university’s sociopolitical and sociocultural discourses, thus keeping active the questions posed by the temporality of “difference.” It doesn’t seem accidental that the general education debate has resurfaced in America after every global cataclysm since World War I . . . including today’s post–Iraq War moment of the US “war” on terror.

The end sought by the Roman studium humanitatis in reducing the Greek paideia—the instigation of originative thinking—to eruditio et institutio in bonas artes (scholarship and training in good conduct) was the cultivation of a disciplined, loyal, and predictable citizenry (Homo humanus) to secure the stability of the metropolis and extend its hegemony over Homo barbarus and “barbarian” lands. However more benign the hegemonic rhetoric of “freedom” and “defense” makes the [Harvard] Redbook’s project seem, this too, as that of the Columbia survey course in contemporary civilization after World War I, is finally the end of general education enabled, if not exactly envisioned, by its liberal humanist authors. (EE, 127)

Again, general education is at the heart of institutional debate; again, we are in the midst of a “crisis in the humanities.” As print culture, par- ticularly literature, shrinks, the stakes of general education become even higher for English departments and other humanistic fields. Science, tech- nology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM fields), prioritized by Presi- dent Barack Obama in his 2013 State of the Union speech, are clear beneficiaries of this shift, another variation in the “two cultures” debate. The 2012 issue of the MLA’s Profession includes a presidential forum on teaching— “Language, Literature, Learning”—and encourages members of the pro- fession to redirect their scholarly energies back into the undergraduate classroom. The university, and with it the humanities, is clearly poised to transition into something very different from the institution Spanos was writ- ing about twenty years ago. Our students increasingly live in virtual spaces, even when they sit in brick-and-mortar classrooms. However we proceed into this future, the essential questions raised by Spanos’s work will be important to keep active.

### FW – Spanos

**Chow and Spanos make an ontological claim that global violence NO LONGER FUNCTIONS by direct occupation – it is a research praxis premised on the metaphysics of total visibility, in which Western planners map, calculate, and perfectly order the world. This fundamentally establishes an understanding of the world-as-target, and unintentionally becomes part and parcel with the preparation for war. The more you learn about the world from ONLY policy debates, the more knowledge and skills you’ll equip the next generation of imperial war planners with. Ensuring that debaters have an ethical foundation is more important than producing fair debates.**

**Spanos ‘4 [**(William V., prof. at Binghamton, available online cross-x.com url: <http://www.crossx.com/vb/showthread.php?t=945110&highlight=Spanos+Email>, Nov. 18]

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language of "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "deterring democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the ~~blind~~ arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

#### That turns their cede the political arguments and makes addressing actual oppression impossible – you should prefer criticisms that occur from exiled forms of knowledge outside the political

**Spanos 11** – distinguished professor of English and Comparative Literature at the SUNY Binghamton

(William, “William V Spanos: An Interested Debate Inquiry”, interview with Christopher Spurlock, <http://kdebate.com/spanos.html>)

WVS: The danger of being a total insider is that the eye of such a person becomes blind to alternative possibilities. The extreme manifestation of this being at one with the system, of remaining inside the frame, as it were, is, as Hannah Arendt, decisively demonstrated long ago, Adolph Eichmann. That's why she and Said, among many poststructuralists, believed that to be an authentic intellectual --to see what disinterested inquiry can't see-- one has to be an exile (or a pariah) from a homeland-- one who is both apart of and apart from the dominant culture. Unlike Socrates, for example, Hippias, Socrates' interlocutor in the dialogue "Hippias Major" (he is, for Arendt, the model for Eichmann), is at one with himself. When he goes home at night "he remains one." He is, in other words, incapable of thinking. When Socrates, the exilic consciousness, goes home, on the other hand, he is not alone; he is "by himself." He is two-in-one. He has to face this other self. He has to think. Insofar as its logic is faithfully pursued, the framework of the debate system, to use your quite appropriate initial language, does, indeed, produce horrifically thoughtless Eichmanns, which is to say, a political class whose thinking, whether it's called Republican or Democratic, is thoughtless in that it is totally separated from and indifferent to the existential realities of the world it is representing. It's no accident, in my mind, that those who govern us in America --our alleged representatives, whether Republican, Neo-Con, or Democrat-- constitute such a "political class." This governing class has, in large part, their origins, in a preparatoary relay consisting of the high school and college debate circuit, political science departments, and the law profession. The moral of this story is that the debate world needs more outsiders -- or, rather, inside outsiders -- if its ultimate purpose is to prepare young people to change the world rather than to reproduce it.

#### As a result, orient your ballot around the differential subjectivities inured by your decision --- such a decision structure creates substantively more enriching albeit difficult debates that center questions of theoretical structure over political tweaks --- voting aff induces a liberal carelessness that makes creative solutions to global problems less likely and acceding to widespread interventions more likely

#### They’ve conceded a serial policy failure argument that their visions of global order bracket in reforms that calcify the current system and preclude broader questions about the dynamics undergirding contemporary political life

#### Specifically, determine whether to reform biopolitical management paradigms or instead divest from technomanagerial politics of death-making and cultivate spaces for critical reflection

#### There’s no internal link from their framework to meaningful skills – the more time we spend fantasizing about what we would do with power we don’t have, the less time we have to recognize where we are and what we can do with our own lives – they rob debate of the ability to construct ethical values for us to frame our future decisions – Featherstone supports this and functions as a solvency argument for our FW bc we unsettle habitual modes of thought and enable creative solutions whereas they lock us into the violence produced by the status quo’s mediocre thought

#### Other debates solve all their impacts – they have to win that we should never have debates that interrogate the broader systems and structures – without macro-systems-level-thinking, we are all quite liable to get bogged down in potentially irrelevant details and digressions

#### We lead to better portable skills – learning to adapt in the moment and think critically about something you haven’t predicted before is important to adjusting to the real world

#### Fairness loss inevitable – smaller schools and research, speed, high school camp and experience disparity all make debate structurally unfair, yet we get something out of it through trying our best to engage each other

#### Hard debate is good --- we cause aff strategic thinking --- neg flex o/w, we need K framework args on a topic with massive aff-side bias where it’s impossible to be neg

#### Process CP's and T args fill in and cause worse aff ground loss

#### Policymaking leads to a form a psychological doubling that negates personal responsibility and results in the worst historical atrocities—independent ethical reason to vote neg

**Fasching and deChant 2011** (Darrell and Dell, Prof. of Religious Studies @ University of South Florida, Prof. of Religious Studies @ USF, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, Pg.  42-43)

Interpreting our own historical situation is a risky business, for we are still too close to the events. We do not have the distance needed to put everything into proper perspective. Nevertheless, without such an interpretation it is impossible to identify the ethical challenges that face us, so we must risk it. In this chapter we argue that two major trends unfolded in the twentieth century that are of significance for thinking about ethics: (1) the phenomenon of mass killing encouraged by sacred narratives that authorize "killing in order to heal," as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and (2) a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of non-violent resistance or civil disobedience symbolized by figures like Gandhi and King – one that functions as an ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger. The second, we suggest, offers an ethic of the holy in response to the sacred morality of the first. The modern period, which began with a utopian hope that science and technology would create an age of peace, prosperity, and progress, ended in an apocalyptic nightmare of mass death, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, leaving us with the task of creating a post/modern ethic that can transcend the techno-bureaucratic tribalism that expressed itself in two world wars. Technobureaucratic tribalism occurs when sacred narratives are combined with the technical capacity to produce mass death. While we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation of the modern propensity for mass death, we do suggest two key elements: (1) the use of sacred narratives that define killing as a form of healing, and (2) the undermining of ethical consciousness by techno-bureaucratic organization through a psychological process of doubling (separating one's personal and professional identities), which enables individuals to deny that they are responsible for some of their actions. Through sacred stories, the stranger is defined as less than human and therefore beyond the pale of ethical obligation, as well as a threat to sacred order. At the same time, bureaucracies encourage one to engage in a total surrender of self in unquestioning obedience to higher (sacred) authority (whether God, religious leaders, or political leaders), so that when one acts as a professional self on behalf of an institution (the state, the military, the church, etc.) one can say, "It is not I that acts: a higher authority is acting through me, so I am not personally responsible." Yet, despite the seemingly overwhelming dominance of techno- bureaucratic tribalism and mass killing in the twentieth century, a modest but important counter-trend also emerged – a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger, linked to such names as Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the ethical challenge of modernity as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The purpose of the remainder of this book is to examine the potential of the ethical response to that challenge offered by the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, symbolized by Gandhi and King, for a cross-cultural and interreligious post/modern ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation.

### AT: Multi-Actor Fiat/Vague Alts

#### Their FW perniciously reinforces ideologies that indoctrinate us into adapting elitist and nationalist values. Given that academic policy suggestions are woefully incapable of addressing policy, prioritize solvency arguments that endorse building and reinforcing actually-existing social movements

**Graeber 18** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, *Bullshit Jobs*, Simon & Schuster: London, New York (2018), p. 270-1]

Another reason I hesitate to make policy suggestions is that I am suspicious of the very idea of policy. Policy implies the existence of an elite group—government officials, typically—that gets to decide on something (“a policy”) that they then arrange to be imposed on everybody else. There’s a little mental trick we often play on ourselves when discussing such matters. We say, for instance, “What are we going to do about the problem of X?” as if “we” were society as a whole, somehow acting on ourselves, but, in fact, unless we happen to be part of that roughly 3 percent to 5 percent of the population whose views actually do affect policy makers, this is all a game of make-believe; we are identifying with our rulers when, in fact, we’re the ones being ruled. This is what happens when we watch a politician on television say “What shall we do about the less fortunate?” even though at least half of us would almost certainly fit that category ourselves. Myself, I find such games particularly pernicious because I’d prefer not to have policy elites around at all. I’m personally an anarchist, which means that, not only do I look forward to a day sometime in the future when governments, corporations, and the rest will be looked at as historical curiosities in the same way as we now look at the Spanish Inquisition or nomadic invasions, but I prefer solutions to immediate problems that do not give more power to governments or corporations, but rather, give people the means to manage their own affairs. It follows that when faced with a social problem my impulse is not to imagine myself in charge, and ponder what sort of solutions I would then impose, but to look for a movement already out there, already trying to address the problem and create its own solutions. The problem of bullshit jobs, though presents unusual challenges in this regard. There are no anti–bullshit job movements. This is partly because most people don’t acknowledge the proliferation of bullshit jobs to be a problem, but also because even if they did, it would be difficult to organize a movement around such a problem. What local initiatives might such a movement propose? One could imagine unions or other worker organizations launching anti-bullshit initiatives in their own workplaces, or even across specific industries—but they would presumably call for the de-bullshitization of real work rather than firing people in unnecessary positions. It’s notatall clear whata broader campaign against bullshit jobs would even look like. One might try to shorten the working week and hope things would sort themselves out in response. But it seems unlikely that they would. Even a successful campaign for a fifteen-hour week would be unlikely to cause the unnecessary jobs and industries to be spontaneously abandoned; at the same time, calling for a new government bureaucracy to assess the usefulness of jobs would inevitably itself turn into a vast generator of bullshit.

#### That elite ideological indoctrination precludes the creative solution-building necessary to concoct alternative arrangements of global political economy

**Graeber 4** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology,* Prickly Paradigm Press: Chicago, IL (2004), p. 9-10]

against policy (a tiny manifesto): The notion of “policy” presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on others. “Policy” is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can achieve is to limit the damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own affairs. So in this case, the question becomes: What sort of social theory would actually be of interest to those who are trying to help bring about a world in which people are free to govern their own affairs? This is what this pamphlet is mainly about. For starters, I would say any such theory would have to begin with some initial assumptions. Not many. Probably just two. First, it would have to proceed from the assumption that, as the Brazilian folk song puts it, “another world is possible.” That institutions like the state, capitalism, racism and male dominance are not inevitable; that it would be possible to have a world in which these things would not exist, and that we’d all be better off as a result. To commit oneself to such a principle is almost an act of faith, since how can one have certain knowledge of such matters? It might possibly turn out that such a world is not possible. But one could also make the argument that it’s this very unavailability of absolute knowledge which makes a commitment to optimism a moral imperative: Since one cannot know a radically better world is not possible, are we not betraying everyone by insisting on continuing to justify, and reproduce, the mess we have today? And anyway, even if we’re wrong, we might well get a lot closer.

## Will to Will Module

### 1NC – Will to Will

#### The plan’s pairing of aggressive force postures with diplomatic initiatives is the quintessential expression of the will to will, the perfection of nihilism in which the imposition of American power is accomplished through the division of global nations into allies and enemies

**Kroker ’11** [Arthur, Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory, Professor of Political Science, and the Director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture (PACTAC) at the University of Victoria, “The Arab Spring: The Contradictions of Obama’s Charismatic Liberalism”, [http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=679](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=679/)]

Perhaps it was with something like this in mind that led Obama to break with the harsh policies of the Bush regime, encapsulated in all its bitterness and sense of American exceptionalism in the phrase -- "You're either with us or against us." Presiding in the bleak aftermath of the Bush administration with poll after poll confirming profound mistrust of American intentions in Muslim countries, Obama chose not to evade issues of mistrust, fear and skepticism but to do the opposite, namely to turn directly into the wind of Islamic discontent. In doing so, Obama's Cairo speech is a lesson in the metaphysics of power. While the Bush administration implicitly operated on the basis of a theory of power that held that power must always expand, must always seek out new opportunities for control, that the world must be subjected to military policies aimed at "full spectrum dominance," Obama's theory of power is different. Perhaps at some point he might have reflected on Nietzsche's The Will to Power wherein Nietzsche argued that power always seeks external resistances in order to thrive, that power establishes boundaries and limits in order both to test its strength as well as to mobilize its energies. In the most mature stages of the development of power, a period that Nietzsche described as "completed nihilism," the will to power, finding itself without external enemies of merit, turns back on itself, making of itself its own opposition. Considered in terms of political theory, while the Bush administration represented the highpoint of American will to power before its political fortunes stalled in the face of gathering global opposition, the Obama administration may be the quintessential expression of power as the will to will, that point where power, having tested its outer limits, turns back upon itself.

In retrospect, the Bush political administration probably represented the last bacchanalian feast of power in its purest form. Here, the power of American empire having no manifest enemy was finally liberated to be power in its final stage -- power as a pure sign. Globally hegemonic in its military claims to "full spectrum dominance" of time and space as well as "metabolic domination" of the world population, the feast of American power expanded with implosive energies -- a financial sector that transformed the machinery of capitalist transactions into an economic landscape where money in the form of credit finally floated free of any solvency requirements; a housing sector that increasingly operated on the basis of purely virtual value standards, with the value of homes measured by aesthetic standards; and a consumer sector where the delusional economy of zero credit requirements made individual over-indebtedness a structural requirement of the operation of the system as a whole.

Like many Democrats before him, Obama's fate was to be elected after the party when the bills for the feast come due and the treasury of the state is effectively bankrupt. Probably by force of circumstance, Obama's interpretation of international politics is based on a realistic understanding of the limits and precariousness of American power. Confronting their moment of inevitable historical decline after wild bouts of over-expansion and hyper-contraction, empires, like individuals, are definitely not above reacting badly -- lashing out against convenient scapegoats as projected sources of their own internally constituted troubles. While the grim politics of reaction-formation was the everyday language of the Bush administration with its War on Terror, secret detention facilities, and the mobilization of the domestic population into a constant state of anxiety based on an increasingly phantasmagoric fear of terrorism, Obama has chosen a different pathway. Here, American power begins to acknowledge its limits, recognizing its contingency and, indeed, political vulnerability in a swiftly changing word, seeking out "conversations" with its opponents rather than exercise brute force.

It is not so much that Obama's political circumstance is to preside over the decline of American power, but quite the reverse. If Obama can speak earnestly and enthusiastically about America as a "young country" based on innovation, creativity, and hard work, it is perhaps because he wishes to reanimate American power in the context of a radically altered world situation, that point where power begins to play the game of seduction, not force. In the game of political seduction, shared aspirations, the reality of mutual implication, and the assumption of co-responsibility are everything. The transition of American power from a command philosophy of military force to a theory of international relations based on political seduction begins with mutual recognition.

The particular challenge confronting Obama's charismatic vision of a liberal world -- interdependent, responsible, shared, intermediated -- is twofold. First, how does he convince the Muslim world of the good intentions of the United States when facts appear to move in the opposite direction? How does Obama persuade the world that what is in the particular (security/economic) interest of the United States is in the general interest of the global community? Secondly, how will Obama accomplish what surely must be his major objective, namely migrating American political thought to a more complex understanding of Islam? After all, at the same moment that Obama rose to speak in Cairo the empire politics of the United States were in full motion: the garrisoning of the globe with a multiplicity of American bases; the violent occupation of Iraq; mass casualties among the Iraqi civilian population as a result of American air attacks; a decade-long war against Muslim guerilla forces in Afghanistan; aggressive containment policies against Iran; and American support of Israel. While Obama may deny the efficacy of the politics of power as "self-defeating" and, moreover, insist in his Cairo speech that Muslim "stereotypes" of the United States as a "self-serving empire" were false, at least to the extent that such stereotypes did not take into account the progressive quality of the American political experiment, nonetheless his reanimated liberal vision seems to be short-circuited by the real world of American empire. This is made all the worse because in Obama's estimation the events of 9/11 continue to traumatize the American psyche. In excluding "violent extremists" from the moral pact that is charismatic liberalism, Obama is adamant: "These are not opinions to be debated; these are facts to be dealt with." In other words, the interpretation of the liberal framework with its calculus of friends and enemies, bodies that matter and bodies that do not matter, is not an opinion open to debate, but "facts to be dealt with." So then, a skeptical Islamic world outside and traumatized American subjectivity within, an Islamic world that is mistrustful of its place in the American interpretation of power, and an American population filled with animus about any challenges to the hegemony of "facts to be dealt with." These are seemingly intractable obstacles to a charismatic liberal politics that would privilege complexity, yet if not dealt with obstacles that possess such virulent psychological force that they would quickly deliver the world to a new dark age of mistrust, suspicion, and violence. While the American exercise of imperial power has reduced many Muslim-majority countries to abuse value, the inevitable blowback from such political subjugation has reinforced the most atavistic tendencies in American politics.

#### The will to will ensures that their attempt at benign reformism within broader imperialist politics produces energy converted into the suicidal nihilism of artificial war

**Kroker ’4** [Arthur, Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory, Professor of Political Science, and the Director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture (PACTAC) at the University of Victoria, *The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Marx*, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Buffalo, and London (2004), p. 5-10]

Suiciding Itself to Virtual Life

It would be inaccurate to say that ours is merely a civilization of technological hubris. Nietzsche was more insightful. For him, we are a "gamble," a "going-across," a "glance," a "gathering storm." Or perhaps Jean-Francois Lyotard for whom we are an "incommensurability," an impossibility that cannot be unrealized because we are perhaps never capable of full self-consciousness. Whatever the case, it can never, and probably will never be said of us, that we have not worn the membrane of technology as our deepest primal, that the horizon of technology is not the gamble upon which we stake the meaning of life itself. While it is a matter of strict epistemological warfare between social constructionists and hypermoderns to make much of the cultural issues attendant upon the meaning of the "post" - post-society, post-culture, post-gender - I do not think that we have yet grasped deeply into the interstices of our thought just how graphically, how bleakly, we truly have become a culture of the post.

I do not mean this lightly. When the United States used nuclear weapons on Japan it precipitated a threshold event of the greatest cultural magnitude. History literally ended. If by history we mean the traditional cultural understanding of history as an indeterminate sense of unfolding time, an open future never fully under human control, then that sense of history decisively ended in the bio-flash of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. And again, Lyotard was right, but perhaps not in the sense he would wish. Post-history has been "driftworks," an indeterminate and increasingly violent series of technological experiments on the horizon of existence itself: the acceleration of space under the sign of digital culture until space itself has been reduced to a "specious present," and the social engineering of time into a micro-managed prism of empty granularities. Is it possible, just possible, that what Nietzsche described as ressentiment, this furious reaction formation at our own distorted instincts, now makes a new appearance at an exclusively cultural level? Is the real meaning of post-history the cultural road stories of a civilization suiciding itself to virtual life?

Just as nuclear warfare gutted history, so too genetic engineering vacates the body. Suddenly and unpredictably, a new master discourse under the triumphant sign of biology as destiny has installed itself as the epistemological lynchpin of a global alliance of the so-called life sciences and the life industries. Cloaking itself in the antiseptic, technical language of genetic engineering, hyping itself as a "bible of life," institutionalizing itself as the Human Genome Project, here promising a future medical cornucopia of gene therapy, there warning against the dysgenic effects of unmodified organisms, everywhere dreaming anew of the genetic perfectibility of the human body, the language of biology as destiny marks the appearance of what I call "third wave eugenics". Having successfully immunized itself from the overt fascism of the second-wave eugenics of National Socialism and once having distanced itself from an open affiliation with its Darwinian and Mendelian origins, third wave eugenics projects itself into the future as the spearhead of the will to technology. Nihilism today speaks the language of biology as destiny. The culture of third wave eugenics is only awakening to its possibilities. We are, I believe, entirely unprepared for this transformation.

Culturally, it is as if we are living through the cultural trauma of two abrupt, and ethically unfathomable, shutdowns: the ending of a progressive sense of history and an indeterminate sense of time with the climactic events of WWII; and the ending of an understanding of the body as something more than its genetic code. We are the victims of two Manhattan projects: one resulting in the extermination of history, and the other in the cryptography of the body. Might not cultural trauma of this pervasiveness not also serve simultaneously as both a precondition for the seduction of genetic determinism and an anticipatory sign of its coming triumph? Viewed ethically, shouldn't such 'big science' as the Human Genome Project not also be considered in the psycho-ontological language of trauma: the certain outcome of a world culture that once committed to the language of technology as destiny now finds itself exhausted, fatigued, feeding on its own referentials, while all the while warming itself in the sun of technicity? Heidegger, Marx, and Nietzsche, then, as trauma theorists diagnosing in advance the cultural preconditions necessary for the triumph of the will to technology as well as its nihilistic fallout.

Artificial War

"I think that space, in and of itself, is going to be very quickly recognized as a fourth dimension of warfare."

General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, Ret

Not just artificial life, but also now artificial war.

Consider, for example, the recent war in Afghanistan where in an epochal break with traditional military strategy, RQ-1 Predator Drones equipped with Hellfire antitank missiles were utilized both as stationary platforms for long-term optical surveillance and as remotely controlled missile launchers. Real-time proximity (surveillance of the caves of Afghanistan) combined with strategies enhancing virtual control (those video screens in Washington displaying action on the ground in a remote battlefield)-- this technological mediation of the hyper-modern technologies of the twenty-first century with medieval tribal warfare of the third-century--suddenly migrates war to the planetary, digital dimension for purposes of space-based information warfare.

With this, the age of Artificial War has begun. In its manifesto for the future of cyber-war, Vision 2020, the newly created United States Space Command theorizes a future battlefield of "full spectrum dominance." Abandoning the earth-bound dimensions of land, sea air, USSPACECOM projects a new era of artificial war in which the battlefield occurs in the "4th dimension" of space. Befitting a "space-faring nation" such as the United States, third-dimensional warfare is surpassed by a vision of future war in which "battle managers" are, in essence, computerized editing systems running on automatic, absorbing fluctuating data fields concerning attacks and responses, monitoring satellite transmissions from 20,000 miles in deep space, sequencing missile launches, integrating "dominant maneuvers" in space with "precision engagement" on the ground, sea and air, providing "full-dimensional protection" to "core national assets" and focusing logistics" for a virtual battlefield that stretches into an indefinite future. As USSPACECOM theorizes: the control of the seas in defense of commercial economic interests and the war of the western lands in defense of the expansion of the American empire to the shores of California has now migrated to a war for the "control of space" befitting a "space-faring nation" like the United States, this spearhead of technology. Consequently, a future of artificial warfare in which space itself is weaponized. 4th Dimensional warfare is the technical language by which the American empire now projects itself into a future of Artificial War: a 4th Dimensional rhetoric of "global engagement," "full-force integration," "global partnerships," weaponized space stations, tracking satellites, reusable missile launchers, and on-line, real-time remotely controlled anti-missile systems.

I emphasize this story because it is revelatory of the meaning of the will to technology. Here, technology is not only the chosen aim of technological instrumentality (weaponizing space), but also involves technologies of mythology (the well-rehearsed story of the unfolding American frontier where wagon trains evolve into Predator Drones, and sea-faring navies migrate into space-bound automated battlefield manager systems), technologies of thinking (the fourfold "tactics" of space war: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics), and technologies of (aggressive) judgment ("multinational corporations" are also listed in Vision 2020 as potential 'enemies' of USSPACECOM).

More than futurist military doctrine for the 21st century, Vision 2020 represents the essence of the will to technology. Here, technology is both a space-faring means to the successful prosecution of artificial warfare and its sustaining ethical justification. The will to technology folds back on itself--a closed and self-validating universe of thinking, willing, judging, and destining--that brooks no earthly opposition because it is a will, and nothing else. As Nietzsche reflected in advance: "it is a will to nothingness." Or, as Hannah Arendt eloquently argues in her last book, The Life of the Mind, "the famous power of negation inherent in the Will and conceived as the motor of history (not only in Marx but also, by implication, already in Hegel) is an annihilating force that could just as well result in a process of annihilation as of Infinite Progress."[1] Could it be that the world-historical movement captured by the military logic of Vision 2020-- this command vision of America as the historical spearhead of the will to technology-- represents that which is probably unthinkable but consequently very plausible, a contemporary expression of the metaphysics of "not-being?" If "permanent annihilation" is the sustaining (military) creed of Vision 2020, then this also indicates that the world-historical movement, which it so powerfully strategizes, is driven onwards by the seduction of negation, another suicide note on the way to the weaponizing of space.

Consequently, if the American novelist, Don DeLillo, can write so eloquently in his recent essay, "In the Ruins of the Future," that '(T)echnology is our fate, our truth" this also implies that in linking its fate with the "truth of technology," the United States, and by implication the culture of globalization, may have, however inadvertently, infected its deepest political logic with the will to nihilism. In the sometimes utopian, always militaristic, language of technological experimentalism, "Not-being" finally becomes a world historical project. Those who are only passive bystanders to the unfolding destiny of the contemporary American descendents of the Puritan founders can only look on with amazement coupled with distress as the "American project" embraces not only the weaponizing of space but also genetic experimentation with the question of evolution itself. While DeLillo goes on to say that (technology) "is what we mean when we call ourselves a superpower," his pragmatism sells short the point he really wants to make: namely, that by linking its fate, its truth, with the question of technology the United States has also enduringly enucleated itself within the larger historical, indeed if USSPACECOM is to be believed, post-historical, project of technology. Enucleated not as something other than the technological destiny which is its profession of faith, of truth, but enucleated in the more classical sense of the term, of being somehow interior to the unfolding destiny of the will to technology. The larger cultural consequence of this bold act of willing remains deeply enigmatic. In this case, is the will to technology an intensification of the pragmatic spirit upon which the American experiment was founded? Or has the will to technology, at the very moment of its historical self-realization, already reversed its course, becoming its own negation: Arendt's prophecy of "not-being" as a "process of annihilation." On the ultimate resolution of this question depends the American fate, the American truth, as the spearhead of technology.

On the public evidence, what makes the American project truly distinct today is its enthusiastic abandonment of the pragmatic will for the uncharted metaphysical territory of "not-being." The will to the conquest of empty spatialization and the vivisectioning of the code of life itself has about it the negative energy of suicidal nihilism. Here, the language of "not-being"--the desiccating logic of what Heidegger memorably termed, "Nothingness nothings" as the historical form of the technological project of "permanent annihilation" --expresses itself vividly in two master commands: Space Command and Genetic Command. The first operates in the language of weaponized astrophysics where the curvature of space is manipulated for strategic purposes, and the other sequences the human genetic code itself. Thus, control of space is inextricably linked with control of time. The dynamic will to technology projects itself doubly in the macrophysics of a "space-faring nation" and the microphysics of a body-faring cellular biology. This is a collective demonstration of hubris that Greeks in the classical age would only admire, and then fear, for its (technical) audacity and stunning (metaphysical) innocence.

Ironically, at the very instance that USSPACECOM projects an imperialist military future of "full spectrum dominance," 9/11 occurs and we are suddenly time-shifted into the age of viral terrorism. Similar to the incommensurability of technology itself where the reality of "permanent annihilation" is sometimes offset by other ways of thinking technology, the human imagination does not begin, cannot begin, with tactics of 'dominant maneuver' and 'precision engagement' and 'full-dimensional protection' and 'focussed logistics' but, with the terrorist side of fluid, earth-bound, real material warfare.

Artificial war, then, as a prolegomenon to the codes of technology.

### 1NC – Framed Democracy

#### The aff represents metaphysical politics of description endemic of “framed democracy, ” our current global milieu---this metaphysical will to truth is the foundation of violence in framed democracy

**Vattimo and Zabala ’11** [Gianni Vattimo, emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Turin and a member of the European Parliament, and Santiago Zabala, ICREA Research Professor of Philosophy at the Pompue Fabra University, *Hermeneutic Communism,* Columbia: New York, NY (2011), p. 17-29]

In a discussion with the distinguished French analytical philosopher Pascal Engel on the uses of truth, Rorty showed how contemporary philosophy is divided not only between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth but most of all between those who argue over truth's realism or antirealism and those who try to avoid this metaphysical quarrel altogether.10 While Engel was only interested in justifying his "minimal realism" theory of truth at all costs, Rorty tried to indicate that while both realist and antirealist theorists belong to the politics of descriptions (because even the antirealist imposes his description of truth's nonexistence), those who overcome such dualism belong to a post- metaphysical culture, that is, to a politics of interpretation (which we will study in chapter 3). But Rorty's most significant implications concern not the democratic opportunities that philosophy might gain from leaving aside the realist-versus-antirealist quarrel but rather the violent political consequences of the politics of descriptions. It must be for these reasons that Rorty, in a famous essay of 1985 entitled "Solidarity or Objectivity?" emphasized the centrality of truth in our philosophical tradition:

The tradition in Western culture which centers around the notion of the search for Truth, a tradition which runs from the Greek philosophers through the Enlightenment, is the clearest example of the attempt to find a sense in one's existence by turning away from solidarity to objectivity. The idea of Truth as something to be pursued for its own sake, not because it will be good for oneself, or for one's real or imaginary community, is the central theme of this tradition.11

While most philosophers would agree with Rorty that truth is the central theme of our tradition, not all of them will believe it is responsible for a turn away from solidarity. The origin of this dispute lies in the essence of truth, that is, in its pragmatic nature, without which it also loses its meaning. Truth is not only "violent," in that it turns away from solidarity, but it is "violence," because it can easily become an imposition on our own existence. Being "violent" might imply that it can also be peaceful, but truth instead often implies an imposed description whose acceptance is assumed. Violence is the political meaning of truth, because truth always implies a concluding constriction that varies from its definition in the Gospels ("The truth will make you free"), in Hegel ("Truth is the whole"), or more recently in Baudrillard ("The simulacrum is true"). Although these definitions of truth probably have our well-being at heart, they also pretend to impose themselves regardless of our different religious, existential, or social Being. Like the metaphysical philosophies mentioned earlier, these definitions of truth want to maintain the social order that they find themselves comfortable in, and they also claim to justify it.

Although truth, as the reflection of a given objective order, has always inspired ethical and moral ideals of life, these same ideals depended on truth's unity, that is, the unity of opinions in the true. While this unity has effectively become reality today because of the establishment of a global political system (which we call framed democracy), truth does not therefore cease being violent, because claims of truth are also claims of political power. But how does this violence take place in our global political culture? Principally through the use of dialogue as the "moralization of politics," that is, as the apparently peaceful exchange of opinions—but, as we all know, even Plato's exemplary dialogues aimed to conduct one of the two interlocutors (often the slave) to recognize the truth that the other already knew from the beginning. If truth claims are also always claims of political power, that is, violence, and if this same violence is nothing else than the "silencing" of the other interlocutor through an apparent dialogue, truth and violence become interchangeable. Only the recognition of truth's violence will allow one to consider the implicit danger of those politics that claim to have an ultimate foundation, that is, politics founded on truth. As we will see, the foundation of truth through dialogue fixes thought within framed democracy: a conservative moralized order where the democratic is only what legally enters the order established by metaphysics.

The most successful definitions of truth within contemporary analytic and continental philosophy continue to belong to Husserl's phenomenological theory and Alfred Tarski's philosophy of language (in 1933, Tarski developed Aristotle's "correspondence theory of truth," expressed in medieval philosophy as veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus). While many historians will have us believe that there is a substantial difference between the two theories from a semantic point of view, few have discussed the metaphysical implication that both theories share. Contrary to the majority of Tarski's interpreters, we believe that the quotation marks in his principle (" 'p' is True if and only if p")12 are essential, because they indicate its pragmatic essence, in other words, for "whom" truth is significant. In sum: the position of P outside the quotation marks is always expressed, affirmed, and sustained by someone who needs it to be outside, hence, who is interested in imposing P.

Metaphysical philosophers would respond that this imposition, and therefore the exclusion of the quotation marks from the second P, is necessary in order for our "affirmations, actions, and thoughts" to distinguish themselves from other affirmations, actions, and thoughts. Without this opposition (between "P" and P), our opinions would be useless, they say, and therefore we need Tarski's principle to share our common experiences. But do we really need the opposition between "P" and P to share our common experiences? Can't there be a group satisfied with "P" without any interest in the apparent real P?

This opposition or difference has become evident thanks to Heidegger's analysis of truth, starting with Being and Time, where he distinguished Husserl's metaphysical approach from a different hermeneutic one. Truth for Husserl depends on the difference between the mere "intention" of the phenomenological Being and the matter "itself"—in other words, between the manner in which something appears and the manner in which it is "itself." This difference, just like Tarski's opposition between "P" and P, consists in identifying an entity or order precisely as it is in itself; that is, a proposition would be true only if it "refers" to things in a way that permits them to be seen as they are in themselves. But this "reference" is not very different from the pragmatic "imposition" we mention above, because its purpose is still to explain how something reveals itself (truth) in opposition to its concealing (false).

Against this metaphysical interpretation, Heidegger noticed how every statement, whether true or false, valid or invalid, good or evil, is always a derivative one, since the "apophantic as" is only possible within the "hermeneutic as." In other words, there is no "presuppositionless" apprehension of something presented to us that could be "objectified" by means of subjective predicative modalities. Prior to the predicative knowledge, which can also be expressed in Tarski sentences, humans beings already have a "preontological" or "pretheoretical" understanding of the Being of things that does not require a derivative one, as proposed by Husserl's or Tarski's theories. This is why in Being and Time Heidegger explained:

The statement is not the primary "locus" of truth but the other way around: the statement as a mode of appropriation of discovered- ness and as a way of being-in-the-world is based in discovering, or in the disclosedness of Dasein. The most primordial "truth" is the "locus" of the statement and the ontological condition of the possibility that statements can be true or false (discovering or covering over).13

While we will analyze Heidegger's specific ontological structure of human Being (Dasein) in chapter 3,14 it is important to understand here how the truth of statements is not derivative because erroneous but rather because its roots refer back to the disclosedness of understanding that determines every linguistic or prelinguistic adequacy. It is a question not only of thematizing prelinguistic phenomena but of emphasizing the priority of thought over knowledge, Being over beings, and the "hermeneutic as" over the "apophantic as." While the "apophantic as" allows both truth and error, at the level of the "hermeneutic as" there is neither, since the "proposition is not the place of truth; truth is the place of the proposition."15 As we can see, Heidegger did not expose this metaphysical understanding of truth because it is wrong; he exposed it [this metaphysical understanding of truth] for its superficiality, that is, against the metaphysical attempt to reduce the philosopher's task to attesting "how we experience truth" or that "there is actually truth" when in fact we find ourselves inevitably presupposing it. Puzzling over the correspondence between subject and object, we lose sight both of the world within which all things are given and of our own engagement as beings.

Truth, whether in Aristotle's, Tarski's, or Husserl's terms, shares the metaphysical structure that is at the origin of all Western logic, where Being is interpreted only as the presence of something present, that is, objectively. In this distinction, the subject and predicate—in other words, the relation between two terms where one refers to the other— not only represent the logical and verbal structure but also the imposition of this same structure. Heidegger named the difference between our relation to beings (truth) and our understanding of Being (disclosure) the "ontological difference," which allows us to recognize how within our metaphysical tradition "Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially."16 As we can see, Heidegger's analysis of truth (like Popper's, Arendt's, and Adorno's alarms against scientific objective realism that we mentioned earlier) was meant to emphasize its violence, because truth is nothing other than the justification of Being, which, as we said, has always been understood as objective presence. It is also for this reason that Heidegger later declared that "to raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth,"17 where distinctions can be imposed (presence of Being) and justified (truth as correspondence). This is why Ernst Tugendhat (and other distinguished interpreters of Heidegger such as Habermas and Apel) pointed out that Heidegger's conception of truth as aletheia, that is, the "event of unconcealment," renounces the distinction not only between true and false assertions "but also between good and evil actions."18 What they pointed out is correct and also a confirmation of Heidegger's opposition to truth as violent imposition, which, as we said, justifies its descriptions. This is why within our "scientific global organization," "neutral world," or, which is the same, framed democracy any proposition, interpretation, or ethics that is not framed within the realm of truth (or its opposite, falsehood) is wrong, an alteration and disruption of the established order that must therefore be silenced. The philosophical disruption of the established order's philosophical hermeneutics (as we will see in chapter 3) is continually accused of relativism, nihilism, and even political anarchism, because instead of relying on truth descriptions, it is involved in interpretative "events of unconcealment." Only such a nontheoretical way of thinking as hermeneutics (the modern version of which began as a defense of the extramethodical truth of the human sciences against the natural sciences)19 can do justice to these events that resist those claims of absolute truth able to guarantee "peaceful" coexistence, that is, framed democracies.

In sum, to distance ourselves from the "peaceful" neutrality of meta-physics, we must leave, discard, or cancel truth: the end of truth is the beginning of democracy.220 If this were not the case, then the objective laws of economics or the outcomes of political dialogues would prevent the constant crises that are part of our lives. But as we well know, economic and political crises are not only constant but often also supported by these same laws and dialogues, since they depend on the metaphysical justification of objective descriptions, that is, of truth. It is here that dialogue becomes the best way to moralize politics, that is, to conserve framed democracy's interests, condition, and immunity. In order to demonstrate how these claims of truth are also claims of political power, it is necessary to look into Plato's dialogues, which still today represent the paradigmatic example of political morality.

The slaves in Plato's allegory of the cave could today be represented by the weak, that is, by those oppressed cultures, citizens, and states that are constantly called on to join Western civilization (also named the "Washington consensus," IMF, or United Nations). Just like Plato, the West believes that it holds truth, that is, the appropriate knowledge capable of guiding the interest of all the other states. Although Plato probably thought his dialogues were in the slaves' best interest, the fact that he would also consider it necessary to "drag the slave away by force into the light of the sun" if he was not convinced (through the dialogue) implies that Plato himself was serving other interests. But which interests? The interests of truth, which belong to those who understand, know, and probably even created it in order to justify their objective presences. This is why in most of Plato's dialogues truth is not an outcome but is always presupposed by those who opportunely interrogate the others.

Although the slave in Plato's Meno might discover the geometric truth, he will not have "understood" it until he also submits to Plato's interrogation. Just as philosophy, in the epigraph from at the beginning of this chapter, must "[admit] of a scientific resolution,"21 so must the slave "submit to Plato's truth." Both are examples of oppressive impositions of metaphysics, which demand a correspondence without which the dialogue or philosophy cannot take place. As we can see, Plato's dialogues, just like science, are the prelude to submission to truth or, which is the same, violence, because Plato, by assisting his interlocutors on their journey ("from the darkened cave to the divine light of the Good"), is still serving the existence of a society of dominion maintained by these same dialogues. Apart from the violence that truth imposes on the slave, another significant feature of Plato's allegory are the dangerous consequences that will come from knowing the truth. As Plato narrates, upon the slave's return from the journey the others not only mock him because he can no longer see in the darkness but also want to kill him for requesting that they follow him. They are afraid of the journey, that is, of truth, because it implies a certain violence that might not be worth it. As we can see, truth becomes violence not only for all those who do not accept leaving the cave but also for those who return (and have in the meantime become philosophers according to Plato's "philosopher-king" model) and now feel compelled to lead:

Once [the philosophers] have seen the Good itself, using this as a pattern, each in his turn must order [kosmein] city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives. Now for the most part they spend their time in philosophy, but when a person's turn comes, he labors in politics and rules for the sake of the city, not as though he were doing what is fine, but that which is necessary.

(Rep. 54oa-b)

As we can see, the philosopher, according to Plato, must sustain the establishment. He cannot "work out Being for itself"22 again for a different paradigm or propose other possibilities to the established organization but instead "must order," that is, impose, what "is necessary." As the promoter of dialogues, Plato does not want the established order to be disrupted, altered, or shocked by either those artists that he banned from the Republic or by the philosopher, who could also act this way. Banning mimetic art because it is a copy that does not have limitations and can therefore bewitch us is not very different from circumscribing philosophy to what is necessary. Such "necessity" is nothing other than the silencing of the other through dialogue, that is, an act of violence for the sake of conserving truth. This points at the difference between dialogues and conversations. Conversations, just like Heidegger's "event of unconcealment," represent the disruption of the order that dialogues protect, because in the conversational exchange truth is not presupposed but rather discarded from the beginning. If a conversation is never what we wanted to conduct but rather a situation in which we become involved as it develops, it represents the greatest enemy of the dialogue's order: an unannounced event.23 While the concepts of "conversation" and "event" will be analyzed in chapter 3, its difference from the concept of dialogue should be kept in mind, as it indicates a possible shift from dialogue (that is, from the politics of descriptions or, which is the same, framed democracy) to "hermeneutic communism." While the inevitable conflict that takes place in a conversation refers to a latent anarchism, relativism, and weakness of thought, dialogue's impositions instead require a realism capable of conserving political order.

As we have seen, Plato and most of the philosophical tradition that followed him demanded that philosophy not only find truth but also conserve it. Dialogues, which once served as the moralization of politics, have also become the establishment's main concern during any crisis, alteration, or shock that might appear. Contemporary disputes over true and false assertions (whether philosophical, theological, or scientific) are the symptom of a politically conservative philosophical culture prepared to impose its order through violence. This, after all, is why Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies accused Plato, Hegel, and Marx of totalitarianism. This classic text was meant to demonstrate how the enemies of the open and democratic society are those philosophers who pretend to found politics on truth either through the "light outside the cave" (Plato), the "end of history" (Hegel), or the "emancipative consequences of the revolution" (Marx). Popper's text was severely at-tacked by Platonists, Hegelians, and Marxists to the point of becoming the least-studied text in the German master's enormous bibliography.

If political thought today for the most part still ignores this text, it is because of its attack on the notion of truth in politics. But what is most interesting is that this attack is not very different from Heidegger's, as we saw above; after all, both Popper's "open society" and Heidegger's "event of unconcealment" were directed against dialogue's implicit order, that is, against any attempt to found politics on truth. Although together with Popper there were several other "counter-Enlightenment" philosophers who warned against scientific-objective realism, as we said above, there seems to be a return in some sectors of contemporary philosophy (phenomenology and so-called analytical ontology) to a more radical realism. The most interesting feature of this return to realism is not only its expression of fear (and therefore its demand for security) but also the conservative nature it exposes through its desire for global unification.

Among the various causes of this return, the completion of metaphysics seems to us as the most plausible explanation, because it indicates how the dissolution of philosophy into the objective sciences has further submitted it to the service of the dominant political powers.24 But if realism is simply the conservation of objective data that philosophy must recognize, politics submit to, and faith cherish, it can only triumph within a framed democracy, that is, where transformation and change are almost impossible. Dialogues exclude the very possibility of transformation, because they impose truth on any form of dissent from the prevailing scientific order, that is, the metaphysical foundation of democracy. This foundation, which leads philosophy to dissolve into scientific objectivism, has created contemporary framed democracy, where, as Heidegger explained, the "only emergency is the lack of emergency":

The lack of emergency [Not] is the greatest where self-certainty has become unsurpassable, where everything is held to be calculable and, above all, where it is decided, without a preceding question, who we are and what we are to do—where knowing awareness has been lost without its ever actually having been established that the actual self-being happens by way of a grounding-beyond- oneself, which requires the grounding of the grounding-space and its time.25

In this condition of lacking of emergency (which we can also call "neutralization"), where Being has been finally replaced by beings, that is, by its technological global organization, philosophy seems forced both to impose its unification and to conserve the established dialogue. This is why Heidegger, in the passage above, finds emergency not only in metaphysics' domination of the world but also in "who we are and what we are to do," that is, in our freedom. The emergency today is the completion of a condition of neutralization where "freedom" is only possible within the established dialogue. While the goal of the metaphysical philosophers was to spread Enlightenment scientific objectivism to all the disciplines to assure a more efficient manipulation of external reality, their main task now has become to assure the conservation of established "dialogic realism" against any outsider, parasite, or foreign event. In this condition, only philosophy that can ensure the ontological structure of framed democracy (and all the factors that constitute it: truth, dialogue, institutions) will be rewarded both academically and socially.26

#### Framed democracy’s commitment to a politics of description produces an ever-expanding mass of violence and war, as the discharges of capitalism are targeted as potential threats to the metaphysical imposition of liberal truth

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Both Fukuyama and Kagan, who are among the establishment's most respected political scientists, have given an account of the current world order where democracy has prevailed over history and must conserve that victory. Against many interpreters of this debate, we do not believe Kagan was contradicting Fukuyama's thesis but confirming it. Kagan's call for a "league of democracies" to "legitimate" their interests against foreign states indicates his fear of change, that is, of the return of history. As we can see, more than in a debate over the end or return of history, Fukuyama and Kagan have engaged in an attempt to present framed democracy as the only legitimate and legitimizing force, regardless of the administration in the White House. What is most interesting about their argument is not the political scenario they present (at the service of framed democracy) but rather what they leave out, that is, what in the previous chapter we called defeated, weak, or other history.

As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the politics of descriptions, in order to impose and justify framed democracy, must eliminate everything that does not submit to its ordering of facts, norms, and institutions. Having said this, it should not be a surprise that Fukuyama and Kagan, together with other establishment intellectuals, forget, neglect, or ignore the oppression caused by neoliberal capitalism. And if they ignore such economic oppression, it is because they themselves sustain it: their condition is also an effect of such oppression. Just as Searle was indifferent to Derrida's arguments, so are Fukuyama and Kagan indifferent to the history of the oppressed, because the priority, in both cases, is always to submit to the scientific or democratic realm of metaphysics. It must be for this reason that when Derrida commented on Fukuyama's thesis in Specters of Marx (1993), a great deal of space was given to what he left out of his analysis:

For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth.14

The "inequality, exclusion, famine, and economic oppression" that Fukuyama and Kagan leave out of their analysis represent framed democracy's effects and also its greatest threat. Although, since the fall of the Soviet Union, democracies have expanded to the point of achieving a condition of "lack of emergencies"—that is, of political, financial, and social emergencies—it does not mean they are not ready for such events. As we have seen in the past decades, the establishment of democratic free-market capitalist states was not only violent15 but also ineffective, considering the dissatisfaction that most Western citizens declare today.16 These dissatisfactions have reached such levels that the institutions designed to detect social discontent are no longer limited to the United Nations (International Labour Organization, World Trade Organization, or the Food and Agriculture Organization) but have expanded to states' ministries of defense. These ministries have been producing reports that not only confirm this situation but also prepare to confront it. As Mike Davis explained in Planet of Slums, the Pentagon war-fighting doctrine "is being reshaped accordingly to support a low- intensity world war of unlimited duration against criminalized segments of the urban poor."17 And Rear Admiral C. J. Parry (the director general of a recent UK Ministry of Defense report) has indirectly explained why:

Differentials in material well-being will be more explicit through globalization and increased access to more readily and cheaply available telecommunications. Disparities in wealth and advantage will therefore become more obvious, with their associated grievances and resentments, even among the growing numbers of people who are likely to be materially more prosperous than their parents and grandparents. Absolute poverty and comparative dis-advantage will fuel perceptions of injustice among those whose expectations are not met, increasing tension and instability, both within and between societies and resulting in expressions of violence such as disorder, criminality, terrorism and insurgency. They may also lead to the resurgence of not only anti-capitalist ideologies, possibly linked to religious, anarchist or nihilist movements, but also to populism and the revival of Marxism.18

Although reports from many other states also warn of a future rife with wars (over water, immigration, and infectious diseases),19 the fact that "absolute poverty" and "comparative disadvantage" are now also considered threats for the security of framed democracies inevitably poses "other" alarms than the ones indicated by Fukuyama and Kagan. As we can see, the coming threats are not limited to Russia, China, and India, which, as Kagan explains, have become "responsible shareholders," but rather come from everyone who is not part of framed democracy's neoliberal capitalism. This is why we do not believe the next wars will primarily be against other states20 but rather against those "useless shareholders," who, for the most part, are the weak, poor, and oppressed citizens, as highlighted in the defense reports. As we argue, the weak do not possess a different history but rather exist at history's margins; that is, they represent the discharge of capitalism and are present not only in the Third World but also in the slums of Western metropolises. These slums are not only becoming larger as we write but also are where the majority of the population is forced to live because of the concentration of capital. While in the West the slums are becoming battlegrounds, in some South American states, as we will see in chapter 4, they have become territories for social improvement through communist initiatives. In sum, the conflicts of the twenty-first century will not be caused by the return of history, as Fukuyama and Kagan predict, but rather by its own ends: liberal states.

The fact that framed democracy is already preparing to fight and win such urban wars indicates how within our democratic system change is almost impossible and also how the oppressive effects of capitalism are predicted to increase. As Meiksins Wood explained, whether "national or global, [capitalism] is driven by a certain systemic imperatives, the imperatives of competition, profit-maximization and accumulation, which inevitably require putting 'exchange-value' before 'use-value' and profit before people."21 These are systemic imperatives of dominion, supremacy, and control over others, and they result in such metaphysical systems as liberalism, where the power of the individual becomes the only substance. Our goal in this chapter is to demonstrate how framed democracy's liberal, financial, and security measures regulate one another in order both to conserve our current "lack of emergencies" and to impose necessary emergencies.

If the democracies' chief priority is to conserve what Heidegger called the "lack of emergencies," that is, the neutrality achieved through science's liberal essence, modern states still have an essential function, contrary to the opinion of many contemporary thinkers.22 This function is not limited to the historical, racial, or linguistic identification of a state's citizens but extends to other states: "liberal states" are also "liberating states"; that is, they liberate other states from undemocratic regimes. The recent imposed liberalization of Iraq and Afghanistan (also called "state building") occurred under the orders of other liberal states and as a consequence of the essence of liberalism. It is also in the name of this essence that democracy is imposed today as the best system of government even when it becomes corrupt. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the "liberal essence" of science consists in its ideal of objectivity, that is, establishing "truth" or "freedom" as only what legally enters within the established, recognized, and framed democratic order.

It must be for these reasons that Carl Schmitt viewed "liberalism as a coherent, all-embracing, metaphysical system"23 and that Heidegger viewed it as another product, with fascism, capitalism, and communism, of subjectivist metaphysics.24 This is why within metaphysically framed democracies liberalism avoids change: while democratic elections are procedures for possible change, liberalism is the realm within which such change presents itself through elections, finance, and institutions. Liberal electoral results represent humanity's unconditional self-legislation, in other words, the focus on "the I"25 from which stems liberalism. But this vision from a pure "I," according to Heidegger, is impossible to achieve, because

there are no experiences that ever set man beyond himself into

an unentered domain from within which man as he is up to now

could become questionable. That is—namely, that self-security—

that innermost essence of "liberalism," which precisely for this rea-son has the appearance of being able to freely unfold and to sub-scribe to progress for all eternity. . . . Thus, it now took only a few years for "science" to realize that its "liberal" essence and its "ideal of objectivity" are not only compatible with the political-national "orientation" but also indispensable to it. And hence "science" as well as "worldview" must now unanimously agree that the talk of a "crisis" of science was actually only a prattle.26

As we saw in the previous chapter, such self-security is a consequence of the "unconditional relationship" of metaphysics, where "the present that is present to itself becomes the measure for all beingness."27 This is why, as Richard Polt pointed out, "liberalism [for Heidegger] can go on 'progressing' forever precisely because its basis is static."28 Having said this, if the liberal worldview, capitalism's systemic imperatives, and states' identification measures are unified by static desires of progress, control, and domination, they must also be unified in the fear of possible foreign shocks, disruptions, or emergencies, which Searle, Smith, Fukuyama, and Kagan express in their politics of descriptions.

#### The intellectual foundations undergirding modernity have eroded. As accidents and catastrophes accelerate, that we live precariously perched on the apocalyptic edge renders communication itself facile and incoherent. Carving out opportunities for critical space creates the opportunity for revelatory experiences that shatter the contours of our political imagination and gesture toward alternative possibilities.

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Although I would risk the claim that the capitalist view of the productivity of violence, destruction, and catastrophe may be shaken by accidents that threaten the coherence of the socio-economic system or certainly the environmental life support system itself, it is not at all clear that this is the case and that capitalism will reform its practices when it looks like the world is about to end. This is because the high priest of neo-liberal economics, Milton Friedman [17], would regard the total collapse of the socio-economic system in apocalyptic terms, as an opportunity to re-boot the system in a more successful, more efficient form, rather than as a wake up to reform the mode of production in a general sense. In this respect, I think we must remain cautious of Virilio's [18] Augustinian theory of apocalyptic hope, which parallels Girard's [19] view that the contemporary world is balanced somewhere between the mimetic war of all against all and an apocalyptic turn that will usher in a new mode of being together. As Žižek [20], Badiou [21], and Kroker [22] explain, and Virilio knows all too well, contemporary capitalism is itself an apocalyptic world-less form rooted in metaphysics, science fiction, and the kind of quasi-theological mysticism that Der Derian [23] finds at the heart of the American military-industrial-media-entertainment network and the related project of virtuous war. As such, and because we must understand that post-modern capitalism may well not only survive, but also profit from the end of the world, we should recognise the importance of Virilio's [24] notions of critical space. What this idea captures is the possibility that we are currently balanced on the apocalyptic edge of the socio-economic system, on the line between violent destruction and the extinction of humanity as being-in-the world, and the turn to a new ecological mode of living able to reconcile our identity as natural, social, and technological beings.

Given this concern for the apocalyptic nature of hyper-modernity, and Drew Burk's [25] account of Virilio as the apocalyptic thinker of revelation, critical distance, and the scenic imagination par excellence, I want to claim that we should emphasise the link between Virilio's concept of critical space and his ideas of the museum of accidents [26] and more recently the university of disaster. [27] Through these notions he suggests the need to reveal the catastrophic nature of the empire of speed, to open up a space for critical engagement with our culture of disaster that is otherwise prohibited by the collapse of knowledge and thought into the ecstasy of communication and information [28], and ultimately to enable the turning or transformation of global society to a more humane form.

I want to suggest that we should regard Virilio's ideas of the museum of accidents [29] and the university of disaster [30] as attempts to present a theory of the institutionalisation of the critique of the globalised empire of speed that may tip the apocalyptic balance against the world-less mysticism of neo-liberal post-modern capitalism and towards the humanitarian demand for a more liveable world where technology works for humans, rather than the other way around. Against what he calls the twilight of place [31], which condemns humanity to, at best, a life on the move and, at worst, the living death of a disembodied and spectral existence, Virilio shifts into reverse through the idea of critical space that can institutionalise the Ancient Socratic call to 'Know Thyself'; such a call has been disappeared by the culture of speed that leaves no time for reflection, but remains hidden, a kind of unconscious supplement in our world of light speed trajectories and velocities, awaiting the moment when time seems to stop and critical thought is possible once more. Akin to the Freudian logic of unearthing the hidden unconscious other side of psychic life, Virilio's [32] notions of the critical space of the museum of accidents and the university of disaster seeks to reveal the other side of the modern commitment to progress and development.

Following Aristotle, who suggested that the accident reveals the substance and in doing so inspired western thinkers from Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, Deleuze, and Derrida to think through a theory contrasting the system and its others, Virilio explicitly takes the case of the accident and suggests that it has the potential to reveal the substance or truth of the modern temptation to progress, speed, and totality [33]. Apart from revealing this substance, as the violence and destructiveness of modernity, especially in its hyper-active phase, it may be that what Virilio's [34] apocalypse would also reveal would be the need for humanity to learn a sense of humility. To accept that it is not divine, but rather a limited earthbound species that cannot live without resistance or gravity. The paradox of this situation is, of course, that it is precisely humanity's limited nature, the fact that we are not Gods, that has led us to reach for the skies only to plunge back down to earth like Icarus, the tragic figure par excellence of Greek mythology.

Like Nietzsche [35], who was well aware of humanity's tragic nature, Virilio knows that we will always try to touch the sky. In this respect I do not see him in any way as anti-modern, even though it is possible that his critique of the excessive nature of the empire of speed may express itself in a form of social and cultural conservatism that is not easily reconciled with his radical critique of technology. Instead I believe that his problematic resides in the hubristic forgetting of tragedy that has evolved through hyper-modernity and the need to rehabilitate the Ancient idea of humanity as a tragic creature of the limit that is made necessary and possible by the apocalyptic culture of post-modernism. This culture simultaneously and paradoxically marks the moment when we run into the limit of terrestrial time and space and forget about our earthbound limited nature. In this respect my focus is less on Virilio's conservatism or his desire to restrict humanity; rather I am interested in what I perceive to be his concern to maintain the experience of the limit in a global age where we simultaneously inhabit a state of global fullness and completion and precisely for that reason have no sense of that truth. It is this paradox, this conflation of the destructive potential of completed modernity and the total inability of humanity to understand this condition as a sign of the limitation and potential end of its own existence, primarily because of its location or immersion in a vortex of information that screens out critical thought and knowledge, that forms the basis of Virilio's apocalypse and necessitates the creation of institutions able to think through the end times in order to pull us back from the brink. Herein resides the meaning of Virilio's [36] idea of a politics of the very worst and his notion of the accident as an inverted miracle able to radically re-orient our relation to the world and technology.

Virilio's Notion of Catastrophic Modernity

For Virilio [37] modernity must be understood as a catastrophic epoch which has led to what he calls a 'toposcopical disaster' characterised by humanity's inability to properly perceive the phenomenological reality of the environment that functions as its life support system. Against this catastrophic condition - which he tells us leads to the psychopathological condition of the planet man who falls into megalomania by virtue of his inability to understand his relation to the totally mediated virtual world that has been condensed to the infinite density of a singularity by the light speeds of new media technology - Virilio explains that we need to find a new form of art suitable for illustrating our condition and illuminating our apocalyptic situation. [38] From this insight I think we can make two points. First, it is methodologically significant that Virilio discusses the redemptive quality of art, rather than critical theory, because what this illustrates is his view that complex theoretical constructions are unlikely to impact upon a high speed society where knowledge and thought have been more or less destroyed by an excess of information and communication. The value of art is, therefore, that it makes an emotional, rather than cognitive, impression upon the audience and causes them to feel, rather than necessarily theoretically comprehend their situation in an epoch where theoretical comprehension has been, at best, marginalised, and at worst, foreclosed by the light speeds of new technology. We know that Virilio [39] foregrounds this methodological approach in his work because he has the tendency to explain the ways in which his own work leaps from idea to idea without necessarily working out the connections between theories and concepts. The effect of this procedure is, therefore, to give the reader first, an impression and second, an invitation to work backwards through the theoretical connections present in his work. We can, of course, find a precedent for this approach to critical writing, which is perfectly symmetrical with the trajectivity of the post-modern empire of speed, even if it does run the risk of collapsing into the vortex of information and communication that characterises our mediated world. We can compare Virilio's thought to the German critical theorists' notion of the thought-image, which was similarly meant to oppose the banality of the culture industry from the inside through the construction of media-friendly critical bombs. [40] In the case of both the German critical theorists, such as Adorno and Horkheimer (and to a lesser extent Benjamin), and Virilio, I think we can, therefore, pinpoint a notion of political activism, whereby critical writing is itself an artistic activity meant to oppose the banality of technology that simply works for the sake of working, and somehow to spark critical reflection in the minds of the disorientated and stupefied masses.

As Virilio [41] knows very well, the potential problem of this strategy is that it is not possible to fight speed with speed. From the perspective of the Frankfurters, the threat is that Virilio's user friendly critiques may be transformed into commodities through the process of knowledge exchange on the open market, thus becoming little more than fantastical representations of radical critique in a globalised system that has no other. However, my view is that there is more to Virilio's [42] turn to critical art than the attempt to simply mimic the dynamism of the empire of speed, and that it is possible to understand this strategy in ways that render it perfectly symmetrical with his other major radical theory, grey ecology [43], or the concern with the speed limit. My view is that what Virilio's turn to critical art seeks to achieve is a connection to the masses caught under the sign of light speed that is able to lift them out of the endless passage of events and freeze time, creating a moment of solitude, concentration, contemplation, and reflection, which in other works he calls critical space. [44] My thesis is, therefore, that it is this critical space of reflection that Virilio wants to open up in order to create the possibility of apocalyptic transformation and that understanding this strategy is key to comprehending the meaning of his political activism.

This point about Virilio's activism is important because it shows us that his apocalypse is never immediate, but rather relies on the recognition of the catastrophic nature of modernity that his work may produce in the audience. It is only at this point that Virilio's apocalypse, where apocalypse refers to a process of revelation, would truly appear. Herein resides the second point about the nature of Virilio's theory of the value of art for illuminating the catastrophic nature of contemporary processes of globalisation; although the catastrophe is always already present, and taking place as we speak, the apocalypse is not now, and can never be now, without the revelatory function of representation to tip the balance away from the unthinking catastrophe of modernity that is endlessly taking place and towards the critical ecological-phenomenological demand for a new relationship between humanity, the world, and technology.

The apocalypse resides, therefore, in the moment of unveiling, in the moment or event when the catastrophe becomes so apparent that it is impossible for the audience or tele-viewer not to recognise its representation or presentation in critical art and act upon this recognition. Since this has not happened yet, and we remain caught up in the end times where catastrophe is everywhere and apocalypse nowhere, we might say that we live in the epoch of unrealised catastrophe. This is because the true realisation of catastrophe, not the basic media representation of catastrophic events that is fed to passive tele-viewers, but rather the existential realisation of the catastrophe taking place now, the endless catastrophe pushing humanity and the world to the very edge of existence, is the apocalypse. This is the true moment of revelation, that would change our relationship to both technology and the world forever, and demand us to actively reformulate our way of living in the world on the basis of that revelatory experience.

If this revelatory experience, this apocalyptic moment, is the objective of Virilio's thought, I think that we should read his works as a history of the catastrophic nature of modernity, hyper-modernity, and the emergence of the post-modern moment of globalisation when time and space are exhausted and there is nowhere else to go. As catastrophe piles upon catastrophe in a totally mediated, totally inter-connected world where everything impacts upon everything else, Virilio's [45] wager is that we will wake up to the catastrophe of modernity realised or post-modernity and change our situation. Shifting into reverse, and considering his now classic Speed and Politics [46], Virilio shows how modernity and the obsession with speed and progress began with the French Revolution. In his view the Revolution destroyed the immobility of the feudal universe that had reigned more or less unchanged since Aristotle considered the idea of the great chain of being, and inaugurated a society and social form ordered by the principle of futurity and modernisation. This new society was formed on the basis of science, reason, technology, and democracy and was eventually meant to reach its final destination in a utopia of techno-scientific reasoned virtue. However, as Žižek [47] has shown in his essay on Robespierre's famous 'Virtue and Terror' speech, the revolutionaries, who Virilio calls dromomaniacs, knew that their new society of speed, movement, and progress could never succeed without overcoming or simply crashing through whatever obstacles lay in its path. In this respect Žižek highlights Robespierre's insight that virtue was always bound to terror, that virtue was in fact impossible without terror, in much the same way that Virilio foregrounds the terminal relationship between speed and war, to show how the history of modernity, the epoch of speed, has always been about the violent overcoming of obstacles and limits through terrorist ballistic technologies.

This much is evident when we consider what Virilio [48] calls pure war, his term for explaining the thin or even invisible line separating war from peace in modern society. Consider the principal site of modernity, modernisation, and speed, the city, which Virilio [49] regards as a site of 'habitable circulation'. If we think about the city, which Mumford [50] tells us is the originary site of human sociability and civilization, through the works of the Italian Futurist artist Umberto Boccioni and the German sociologist Georg Simmel, we enter a completely different scene to the foundational city painted by Mumford. In Boccioni's The City Rises [51] or Simmel's The Metropolis and Mental Life [52] we are presented with the image of the city as a place of enormous energy and vitality, but also abstraction, alienation, and violence.

In both cases Virilio's [53] view that the modern city is governed by a dictatorship of movement is appropriate. There is no resting place, or hiding place, in either Boccioni or Simmel. Moderns are fatally exposed to speed and must learn to adjust to the new epoch. While Simmel was, of course, critical of the new modern city of speed, because of the ways in which it fostered a culture of distance and estrangement, Boccioni, perhaps the master Futurist artist, thought that humanity had to evolve to live with the new speeds of modernity. Hence his classic sculpture, Unique Forms of Continuity in Space, can in many ways be seen as a prefiguration of the totalitarian man captured in the writings of Ernst Jünger [54], and critically discussed by Klaus Theweleit [55] in his two volume psychoanalytic study of the proto-Nazi Freikorps para-military group that terrorised Weimar Germany in the 1920s.

We know that neither Boccioni or Simmel were concerned with war in any conventional sense; yet that they clearly relate to the modern prophets of technological war, Marinetti, Jünger, and later the totalitarians, Hitler and Stalin, whom Arendt [56] characterised by their obsession with movement, dynamism, and the notion of violent progress towards a pre-defined ideological utopian conclusion, is of central importance. What this link illuminates is what Virilio [57] means by pure war as the collapse of the relationship between peace and war and the endo-colonisation of everyday life by the warrior ethos. Despite the rejection of the violent utopianism of the totalitarians in the wake of the discovery of the horrors of Auschwitz and the Gulag Archipelago, it would be wrong to imagine that pure war or the obsession with speed and movement has in any way left the scene of post-modern liberal society. As Virilio [58] explains, speed remains the hope or key utopian principle of the west. He tells us that movement is the only law of the modern, hyper-modern, or post-modern world and that the failure to move is a sign of decay, decline, and ultimately death.

That the futurism of speed remains central to life in western liberal and neo-liberal society should not surprise us since the founder of the liberal tradition, Thomas Hobbes [59], was himself concerned with the movement and the progress of men through life. In his political science he imagined society as smooth Euclidean space populated by atomised men or precise 'subjectiles' bound by the rules of the road set out by the Leviathan and expected to follow these rules on pain of death. For Hobbes, life was a race, and a struggle for power, where power refers to the difference between the relative speeds of men. In the context of this situation, the rule of the Leviathan was meant to legislate against fatal collisions. These would, in the state of nature, lead to catastrophic accidents between men, resulting in the end of one of their trajectories through life, immobility, and as a consequence, death [60].

Beyond Virilio's [61] location of the emergence of modernity, the epoch of speed, in the event of the French Revolution, it may well be that we should also think about the ways in which Hobbes' theory of the state as traffic cop from the mid-17th century also contributed to the origin of the new society of movement, dynamism, and progress. Here, we may also consider how Hobbes' work built upon the new physics of Galileo and the theory of inertia that posited a universal law of movement and undermined the Aristotelian orthodoxy that imagined a universe of order, stasis, and organisation, and regarded all movement as progress towards this natural end point. Given the radical break between the ancient-medieval physics based upon Aristotle's thought and Galileo's new modern paradigm that Hobbes took as a model of the endless dynamism of early capitalist society, it is possible to see the French Revolutionary break, which ushered in the society of the epoch of totalitarianism, as an attempt to rediscover the ancient notion of a telos that the Spartans and Plato had sought to defend against Herodotus' [62] notion of history, and combat the revolutionary conditions later represented by Boccioni and Simmel.

In this way, it is possible to construct an historical time-line explaining the emergence of the current catastrophic empire of speed that Virilio believes has reached its limit and started to burn out under conditions of globalisation. This time-line would run from the historical destruction of Sparta and Plato's related utopian city outlined in The Republic [63], evolve through Aristotle's theory of movement towards natural ends, take in the destruction of Aristotle's theory by Galileo and the new modern physics and Hobbes' political science of society as a race, before reaching Marx and the anti-capitalist reaction to the new violent society of speed. This anti-capitalist turn may in turn be related to the totalitarian attempts to re-discover a modernist version of the ancient utopia of stasis, leading finally to a consideration of the rise of post-modern neo-liberal capitalism in the wake of the collapse of the totalitarianisms that has liberated speed from all ideas of limitation.

The central point about the end of this time-line is, of course, that the post-modern neo-liberal liberation of speed from all ideas of limitation, where ideas of limitation refer to either utopian ends or social speed limits such as trade regulations meant to govern the movement of capital, is evidence of the hubris and the forgetting of tragedy that Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Virilio all see as the core problematic of the modern society of nihilism, technology, and speed [64]. In each case I think it is possible to argue that Nietzsche and Heidegger, and now Virilio, recognise that the inability of humanity to appreciate the necessary phenomenological resistance of the world upon its movement and speed will produce catastrophic consequences in the form of the emergence of a last man bored by a technological world that he can no longer relate to and that completely prohibits his continued movement through space. This is, of course, the famous theory of inertia that Virilio [65] employs to show how the empire of speed has started to collapse into a society of immobility and stasis characterised by walls, borders, camps, and prisons that he generalises through the ideas of global foreclosure, incarceration, and lock down.

In this new global crash culture, where the ideology of global capitalism talks about freedom of movement and works off the idea that increased proximity in a society where it is impossible to evade the other will lead to more love, sharing, and community, Virilio's [66] point is that reality is defined by surveillance, suspicion, paranoia, security, hatred, petty jealousy, revulsion towards the other, and ultimately pure war. This, then, is the catastrophe of the empire of speed without limits. This is the catastrophe awaiting a revelatory moment to transform it into an apocalyptic event that may enable us to enact radical, revolutionary, change. The challenge remains, of course, to find some way to produce this apocalyptic moment, to produce this moment of revelation, through artistic endeavour and critical thought in a society of speed where everything is reduced to the status of information, communication, and commodity to be exchanged and passed on. In other words, there is no apocalyptic moment in the empire of speed because the empire of speed is defined by what we might variously call following Kroker [67] and Wilson [68] post-modern, virtual, hyper, or supercapitalism.

In the hyper-capitalist world, if we choose to adopt Kroker's name for the new form of high speed, high tech, totally virtual capitalism, there is no telos, there is no apocalyptic end, no fatal moment of collapse, since, as Wilson [69] points out, death is distributed across the system. In this vision of the new capitalist world, mortality invades every aspect of life in the form of a death drive that compares to Virilio's concept of pure war [70] which shows how war is no longer contained in a discrete event, but rather exists everywhere, nowhere, and is at the same time never and always on. For Virilio [71] this death drive is explained by America's attachment to the idea of the frontier, or what he calls, citing Jackson, the frontier effect, which has led the land of the free towards a form of nihilism set on the destruction of the environment for the sake of development, modernisation, progress, and creation of what Deleuze and Guattari [72] call smooth space. That is to say that the American determination to conquer or overcome obstacles, to create smooth space suitable for the speed of movement for capital and human flows, in many respects reproduces Hobbes' capitalist metaphysics of legalised movement in real space. It is this innovation that transforms the phenomenological world of embodied experience into a metaphysical or virtual abstraction that humans, or perhaps we should say those post-humans plugged into the network society, experience through inter-face with technology. Virilio's [73] America, the land of Hobbesian materialist metaphysics realised, is for this reason comparable to Baudrillard's [74] Nietzschean land of fascinated banality. It exists as a land of deserts, a featureless landscape, a smooth Euclidean space, that has come to define post-modern globalisation as a catastrophic space awaiting the arrival of its apocalypse.

What is more is that we know that the apocalypse is on the American mind. Consider the born again Christian fundamentalists. They understand the endless war in the Middle East, the lands of deserts, Iraq, the birth place of human culture and civilization, and Armageddon, the site of the final battle between the forces of good and evil, as the scene of the coming apocalypse where the saved will be separated from the damned and the world will learn what America already knows, that it is the land of God. Again we can discern the strange virtualisation of the world, which Virilio [75] understands as characteristic of the light speeds of globalisation, where metaphysics and theology stand in for politics, define the direction of our world, and set the scene for an apocalyptic moment that will transform the basic co-ordinates of human reality. Unfortunately, the contemporary American apocalypse, which updates Winthrop's theory of the city upon the hill in popular and official culture ranging from Tim LaHaye's Left Behind [76] books to the Bush regime's PNAC, is not the apocalypse imagined by Virilio [77]. Whereas his theory suggests creating speed limits or a 'political economy of speed' in order to enable humans to live together in the world, the American vision of the apocalypse is about destroying what little environmental resistance there is left in the world in order to completely liberate humanity from its reliance on natural life support systems.

In practical terms this is, of course, about spreading the American way, and perhaps military, economic, and cultural imperialism, but what is important about Virilio's vision is that it enables us to understand that behind the commitment to practical principles of freedom, individualism, democracy, capitalism, and technology resides a metaphysical imperative to salvation through virtualisation. Paraphrasing Virilio paraphrasing Heidegger who noted that technology cannot be understood technologically but rather must be thought metaphysically, it may be the case that we cannot understand the American-led process of globalisation politically or economically, but instead must think about it metaphysically in terms of speed and the death drive towards virtuality. This view, which describes the way Virilio [78] understands processes of globalisation and the creation of the dromosphere is certainly supported by Der Derian's [79] theory of virtuous war. Der Derian's theory explains a mode of pure war, slimmed down in terms of its understanding of political complexity in order to meet the needs of speed, so that the world is divided along the lines of Carl Schmitt's [80] violent friend / foe dichotomy where the virtuous chosen people face off against the evil others who are set to burn in Hell in an apocalyptic fight to the death, and transformed into a media abstraction by high technology, which virtualises reality, making the environment subordinate to the smooth spaces of the map. For Der Derian [81], America, the land of apocalyptic virtuous war, the mode of pure war that fuses a theological belief in virtue with a high tech commitment to virtuality, was always fated to take this road. It was, after all, named after Amerigo Vespucci, the great cartographer-explorer, and has always been the land of maps and the refusal of the world.

### L - Norms

#### The 1ac’s attempt to produce stable security environments relies on obsolete, ethnocentric theories of norm diffusion that foment and accelerate neo-imperial experimentation at home and abroad

**Barder 15** [Alexander D. Barder is a political scientist at Florida International University in the Department of Politics and International Relations, *Empire Within*, Routledge: London and New York, 2015, p. 128-131]

The low-intensity warfare tactics of the cold war have found their way to the criminalized inner city.1

The latent guerilla warfare in disadvantaged banlieues could spread outside of them and become a civil war.2

Introduction

As I argued in Chapter 1, much of international theory is predicated upon an understanding of certain boundaries, both conceptual and practical. International theorists typically attempt to differentiate the international from the set of intra-state interactions. Here we have the reification of a particular image of the bounded nineteenth-century European sovereign, each master of its own territory, projected back and forward in time – an aspect of what R. B. J. Walker calls the discourse of eternity. The domestic condition of hierarchy is contrasted with an international ahistorical condition of anarchy between states.

Lately, there is an opposing attempt in international theory to theorize the hierarchical stratification of the international system. This attempt includes aspects of the English School and social constructivism, but especially observed in the work of David Lake or John Ikenberry. Each of these approaches emphasizes the specific diffusion of social norms or the emergence of authority relationships that call into question the pristine construction of the hierarchy/anarchy dichotomy so prevalent in realist/neorealist theories.

Nonetheless, these approaches typically remain Western-centric. They assume that norm diffusion is a one-way street: specifically, they assume that the periphery remains a passive receptor of norms that have historically emerged in the West. In other words, such approaches to the theorization of international hierarchy do not take into account the historical and contemporary imbrications, feedbacks, reverberations of political, social and institutional norms and practices that were experimented on in what were/are the (neo)imperial laboratories that make up the significant parts of the global order.

What I have attempted to show in the preceding chapters is that we need to be much more attuned to the multidirectional reverberations that result from conditions of domination (particular historical forms of formal and informal imperialism) that have profound effects on domestic institutions and practices.

To return to Hoffmann’s point made in 1959, international theory must be attentive to what “cuts across” states and not simply the interactions between states. By tracing the ways in which imperial governance resulted in experiments and innovations of violence, social control and new forms of socioeconomics, we can observe the extent to which such subordinated spaces have historically possessed forms of agency that “cut across” and into the “inside” of great powers.

The previous three chapters examined the conjunction between historical changes in the international system and the effects that occurred throughout not only the global periphery but also the center. While I have stressed three different themes that remain crucial for international theory – namely violence, social control or security and political economy – my focus has been on demonstrating the links between international changes (i.e. imperial or hegemonic periods of crisis beginning in the nineteenth century) and the “management” of subaltern and Western populations. Instead of emphasizing the effects that such international changes have on systemic configurations, the number of poles in the international system, for example, or, more generally, on statecraft or foreign policy, I have shown how the materialization of the camp, the colonial surveillance state and neoliberalization were significantly affected by the transnational diffusions taking place across shifting imperial or hegemonic networks. The nineteenth-century experimentation with violence in imperial Africa, the colonization of the American West, and the tectonic shifts in imperial geopolitics during the latter part of the nineteenth century have had fateful implications for the materialization of the concentration camp and the violence perpetuated within Europe during the Second World War; concerns about internal threats in newly industrialized European nation-states provoked the emergence of a modern surveillance state that adapted techniques and technologies developed in imperial domains; the neoliberalization of the global South during the course of the 1970s proved significant for the reassertion of American hegemony, a political project that would be pushed forward by the adoption of a similar neoliberalization in the United States and the United Kingdom. Subordinated peripheries are not passive receptors of norms devised in the imperial West; historically they have proved to be significant “laboratories of modernity” where imperial agents could experiment, innovate and “discover” novel modes and technologies of governing that would undoubtedly prove problematic, at least initially, to implement directly within the metropole. As I have argued in Chapter 1, we should understand the metaphor of the laboratory in the Latourian sense. According to Latour, by forcing the social world to conform to its requirements, the laboratory becomes the vector for defining the parameters of legitimate political and social action. In an analogous way, the (neo)imperial laboratory defines the contours of valid social and political governance. What gets developed, innovated and experimented on in the crucibles of imperial domains becomes perceived as “tried and true” practice, especially in response to conditions of political, social or economic crisis. In this way, the imperial laboratory normalizes new forms of violence, social control, and the reorganization of domestic politico-economic institutions.

Thus the linkages between the international, the domestic, the peripheral and the metropole are much deeper and intense than international theorists usually accept. They involve processes of horizontal as well as vertical diffusion of norms and practices, of material assemblages that connect hierarchical relations between periphery and metropole. However, the relevance of uncovering these processes of co-constitution between metropole and periphery is not just for a deeper awareness of the historical implications of imperial international relations. As I started off describing in the Introduction, the Global War on Terror is itself an intensified contemporary moment of neoimperial experimentation with significant reverberations not only for the United States itself but also across a wide array of Western states. This is not to say that the processes of militarization of the domestic space underway are novel or specific to the United States. As the epigraphs to this chapter show, the militarization of policing is a long-term process that can be traced back to the American involvement in the Philippines (as McCoy has shown) and is something that is also occurring beyond the United States, for example in France (as Mathieu Rigouste has also shown).

What is perhaps novel about our contemporary period, however, is that our traditional spatial definitions that delineate the applicability of specific forms of violence are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. As Carlos Galli argues, the very notions of internal and external vis-à-vis state control over territory have essentially lost their meaning.3 “In the global age,” Galli argues: modern political spatiality – the State, with all its right and its ability to enclose an internal sphere with order and security, creating a space where “not everything can happen” – has ceased to be fully in effect, challenged as it is by the power of economic flows and the needs of capital, which demand a new politics and which no longer allow the State to be the operative center of political reality and its interpretation.4

Threats can no longer be properly demarcated (if they ever were completely) according to a fixed spatial configuration (i.e. the traditional cartography of the Westphalian order of states). What we end up with is a global form of “Empire” possessing neither “interiority” nor “external” edges, laced with a shifting multiplicity of borders, center-less and unstable. What emerges is a planetary condition in which this:

global Empire [is] locked in a struggle against itself, against anomalous functions that exist within it. In short, it is an Empire whose inner discontinuity produces conflicts that, no matter where or how they are generated, all have local status, and all of which also fall immediately – with unforeseeable effects – into the Whole.5

An effect of this effacement of any notions of inside and outside – something, for example, Carl Schmitt recognized long ago – is that, as Galli puts it, “the Enemy today presents himself as the Disturber, the specter of all that is internal and domestic – as our own wicked caricature, our Double, our Shadow.”6 It is the persistent fear that an amorphous enemy infiltrates the polity, undermining it through persistent and ubiquitous subversion that conditions a specific governmental response.

This concluding chapter thus explores some of the nascent consequences of these (neo)imperial experiences during the better part of a decade of the Global War on Terror, in light of a novel form of spatiality that progressively effaces distinctions between internal and external, metropole and periphery. Experimentation may well occur in Iraq or Afghanistan and reverberate back into the US; but urban American environments may also become laboratories for testing different techniques and technologies by a state that no longer entirely differentiates inside from outside. What defines the intensified proliferation of military techniques and technologies at “home” and “abroad” is a concern with the long-term maintenance of American authority.7 What this results in is a consistent hollowing out of liberal-democratic institutions and the decaying civic participation of the population largely perceived as being a threat to state authority. As Sheldon Wolin puts it, “the superimposition of empire and democracy, the corruption of representative government, the declining status of the citizen, the hegemonic status of American power in the world – suggest that the traditional categories of citizen, democracy, state and power desperately need reformulation.”8

### FW – Framed Democracy

#### Framework is a politics of description --- try or die for using the debate space to theorize and positively interpret alternative ontological frames

**Curtis 13** [Neal, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at the University of Auckland, “Thought Bubble: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Knowledge,” *new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*, Volume 80-81, 2013, Project MUSE]

Thought Bubble

The Ernst & Young report quotes one anonymous university Vice-Chancellor declaring: ‘Our major competitor in ten years time will be Google … if we’re still alive!’ This quote supposedly encapsulates changes to our relation to knowledge indicative of the two drivers of change which the report calls ‘digital technologies’ and ‘democratization’. The reason why these two are related is because the report understands democratisation simply in terms of ‘access’ and then assumes the flawed syllogism whereby because digital technologies make knowledge accessible and democracy is about access, therefore all digital technologies are democratic. It would be foolish to suggest that a report citing ‘the Darwinian force of the market’33 could countenance the idea that democracy ought to be measured by something other than consumer-style access, but access in and of itself is not inherently democratic. Much like ‘excellence’ it requires secondary criteria to become a meaningful concept. Admittedly the report does avoid the positivist trap that users of Google can easily fall into, of assuming that knowledge is simply ‘out there’, such that its acquisition is merely a matter of data retrieval. The author of the report does link knowledge to analysis and interpretation, but given that we are asked to bend our knee to ‘the Darwinian force of the market’, one suspects that analysis and interpretation is of a kind with that found in the pages of the Financial Times and will be limited to debates over best policy within a given system, rather than any ontological engagement with the character and shape of the world itself.

The Google model is, however, exemplary of the problem faced by the post-historical university and the nature of its democratic role. Leaving aside the rather obvious point that in the pursuit of profit Google have quite happily aided the Chinese government in their restriction of the democracy movement in that country, the Google model is significant because its success is based on successfully attending to and facilitating the personalisation that has come to define both democracy and knowledge in neoliberal consumer cultures. Google’s success has primarily come from its ability to provide a highly individualised service, partly due to the capacity of its search engine to learn what the user likes and to display results that are closely aligned to preferences indicated through earlier ‘click signals’; but this has also been a path to monetisation as the company is able to claim that it can deliver customers to companies with impressive precision. In an economy increasingly based on information, attention becomes a very rare commodity,34 so the ability to deliver attention to advertisers becomes a highly profitable capability. The capacity for Google to archive click signals affords increasingly successful searches without additional work from the user and provides a profile that companies can attach themselves to in their search for consumers. [End Page 84]

While this mode of information retrieval sits well with all the neoliberal markers of value - individuality, preference, choice, competition, immediacy - it gives rise to significant concerns for both knowledge and democracy that must not be ignored. In a fascinating book entitled The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser sets out the implications of the Google algorithm. Initially, while the idea that what is best for one person may not be best for someone else is hardly revolutionary, the idea that a search engine is ‘biased to share our own views’35 has far-reaching consequences. In short, ‘your computer monitor is a kind of one-way mirror, reflecting your own interests while algorithmic observers watch what you click’ (Filter Bubble, p3). Here, access is instant and individualised, but Pariser is concerned that where ‘democracy requires a reliance on shared facts […] we’re being offered parallel but separate universes’ (Filter Bubble, p5). While it is important to argue that “facts” are not enough, shared or not, the problem is accentuated because the search engine, which is now a ‘prediction engine’ (Filter Bubble, p9), has a tendency to search out ‘facts’ you have already indicated a preference for through click signals. Ultimately the cookies and bots that aid personalised web-browsing begin to produce a filter bubble: ‘a unique universe of information for each of us’, but more importantly one that ‘fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information’ (Filter Bubble, p9). In other words, the Google model is one in which we continually receive more of what we already know and have indicated a preference for. Ultimately, the filter bubble is ‘a cozy place, populated by our favourite people and things and ideas’ (Filter Bubble, p12).

Pariser notes that while this personalisation flatters users who believe they are in a position of control because the prediction engine appears to be giving them what they want, it increasingly subjects users ‘to a kind of informational determinism in which what you clicked on in the past determines what you see next’ (Filter Bubble, p16). This mode of personalised access means that Google does have great significance for the post-historical university, but that significance does not lie in the claim that Google University is the future as Ernst & Young would have us believe. Rather, the Google model is significant because the two forces of impact and customer service suggest that the post-historical university will increasingly take on the character of a filter bubble. As research is increasingly directed towards what are described to be the needs of the current system, and teaching is tailored to satisfying the existing desires and preferences of students refigured as customers, the university’s role in the global knowledge economy will be to offer more of the same. The university has always had a major role to play in maintaining the cultural status quo and policing knowledge, but it has also historically been a major site for the social production of dissensus which is irreducible to the promotional language of ‘innovation’ and ‘entrepreneurialism’ (or any historical equivalent thereof). Ultimately the sole purpose of the Ernst & Young report is to ensure that the university of the future plays an integral part in the production of an ‘identity loop’ (Filter Bubble, p127), or what we might call a thought bubble that reproduces the truth of market logic.

In the face of this doctrinal onslaught the future of the university as a social institution looks bleak, but despite the heavy-handed ideological work that the Ernst & Young report epitomises, the future cannot be closed off in the way they hope. As was noted in the introduction, the rationality of markets was shown to be a pseudo-science by the persistence and the effects of what Besley and Hennessey called the ‘psychology of herding’. First of all this produced the hysterical delusion that the business cycle had been overcome, which was then counteracted by the global loss of confidence that brought about the greatest economic crisis in living memory. [End Page 85] The evident role played by these ‘animal spirits’ testifies to the importance of a non-theoretical, non-rational relation to the world, but also to a more profound ontological state of mind that Heidegger refers to as ‘attunement’ or ‘mood’.36 Ordinarily that attunement is an unremarkable and comfortable familiarity, but one that might become a concerted defence in times of crisis. Fluctuations in mood are usually accompanied by stories that tell us something about the world we live in. With regards to the world of economics these are stories that precipitate trust, confidence, euphoria, frenzy, fear, and anxiety.37 These spirits and the stories that shape them are evidence of the continuing hermeneutic condition set out above. Stories make a world of sense, but they are only ever interpretations and remain subject to the vagaries of mood.

The narrative of neoliberal post-history can claim to be the rightful representation of human relations only because it is underwritten by gigantic economic, political and social power that supports and distributes its stories, not because it has discovered the truth. In such an environment, academics regularly articulate concern about the utilitarian if not instrumental mood, of managers and students alike. While the discourses of impact and customer service further support such instrumentality and suggest that the university of the future will increasingly help lock down the narrative of post-history, there is still hope. In keeping with Heidegger’s (in)famous use of Hölderlin’s words: ‘But where danger is, grows/The saving power also’,38 the pressures on students to achieve a certain GPA or class of degree and the demands on them to be socially compliant, still does not eradicate their sense that the world is contestable. In many cases the mood of students remains one of scepticism and doubt towards the supposed common sense, coupled with a desire for change. They remain interested in the big questions and readily support courses that make great theoretical demands on them. Students tend to be of an age when the sedimented world they have inherited has not yet ossified and all kinds of malformations and reformations remain possible. This means that an important role can still be played by the university; not one that is reduced to increasing access to what is already given, but one that opens up spaces for this contestation and challenging of the world, for offering up radically alternative ways of living and being-with-others.

As was noted in the introduction, the humanities have an especially important role to play in this regard. While traditional humanities disciplines such as philosophy, English, and history have all supported social and political conservatism through, amongst other things, the defence of a canon, these disciplines have also been traditionally concerned with that gap between the meaningful and meaninglessness that defines the human condition. Whether a philosophical treatise, a work of literature, or the recovery of a counter-history, work in the humanities has always occupied that space where the meaningful totality we call our world suffers a variety of disruptions and is revealed to be inadequate. The humanities are never more alive than when faced with the loss of an established truth and the slipping away of the world. Some of the greatest works in the humanities are riddled with anxiety. It therefore falls on the humanities in a time of crisis to enable anxiety to work in the name of alternative visions, which is precisely why the humanities are under such strident attack within the marketised model. This is also a role that ought to be taken beyond the campus to form the beginnings of a new contract with a public that has just bailed out private speculators at the expense of public welfare. Turning away from the anxiety generated by the crisis will only encourage more of the same. The public role of the university should be to ensure this anxiety, understood as the re-emergence of the questioning that neoliberal post-history continually seeks to suppress, is turned to creative use.

#### A politics of description inevitably is imposed violently --- philosophical justifications inevitably shape policy creation --- support of the intellectual community is key

**Vattimo and Zabala 11** [Gianni Vattimo, emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Turin and a member of the European Parliament, and Santiago Zabala, ICREA Research Professor of Philosophy at the Pompue Fabra University, *Hermeneutic Communism,* Columbia: New York, NY (2011), p. 11-17]

ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2004, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. Bush awarded the National Humanities Medal to, among others, John Searle. In this beautiful ceremony at the White House, Searle was honored for his "efforts to deepen understanding of the human mind, for using his writings to shape modern thought, defend reason and objectivity, and define debate about the nature of artificial intelligence."1 What is most interesting about the awarding of this prize is not that Searle accepted it but rather what sort of philosophy is endorsed by a president who had both just invaded a country contrary to the desires of the majority of the world's population and restricted the fundamental civil rights of his own citizens. While Searle's justifications for accepting a prize from such a source might run from a need for national recognition to a feeling of personal accomplishment, the prize itself is appropriate to his philosophical position, which represents a politics of descriptions as the latest development at the service of power.

A politics of descriptions does not impose power in order to dominate as a philosophy; rather, it is functional for the continued existence of a society of dominion, which pursues truth in the form of imposition (violence), conservation (realism), and triumph (history). These metaphysically framed political systems hold that society must direct itself according to truth (the existing paradigm), that is, in favor of the strong against the weak. Only the strong determine truth, because they are the only ones that have the tools to know, practice, and impose it. Philosophers like Searle, just as Plato, Hegel, or Tarski, for example, do not want their philosophies to dominate, but in fact they help maintain a society in which they find themselves at ease—that is, in which they have become more or less conscious servants of the dominant political class. But what is most significant is not that philosophers have been serving the dominant political powers but that the need for dominion often results in metaphysical thought. Metaphysics is an aspect and a consequence of dominion, not its cause.

Although legislators, politicians, and ownership classes need all members of a society to follow their imposed paradigm, such paradigms cannot be sustained without the support of the intellectual community. If, among all the disciplines, the empirical sciences have maintained a central role within the structures of power, it is not because they manage to obtain better results but because they represent the greatest fulfillment of the essence of metaphysics. This essence consists in revealing the ultimate truthful context of the subject matter under analysis, which can vary from the intrinsically materialist nature of physical reality to the theological meaning of divine commands. Regardless of the subject matter, the search for objective truth came to condition not only these philosophers but also those different sectors of culture whose progress should not be measured objectively. Richard Rorty (who for the past thirty years fought against this objectivist tradition) indicated how the "Newtonian physical scientist," since the Enlightenment, became the "model of the intellectual" from whom social reforms were requested. But the problem with this intellectual is that he centered these reforms only around "objective knowledge of what humans beings are like—not knowledge of what Greeks or Frenchmen or Chinese are like, but of humanity as such."2 As we can see, the search for universal truth became an imposition on individual differences and identities.

Derrida, following Nietzsche and Heidegger, indicates how this metaphysical nature of philosophy has not only structured knowledge in terms of established polarities (presence vs. absence, truth vs. error, mind vs. matter, good vs. evil, man vs. woman) but also produced a hierarchical order in a way that always favors the first term over the second. In sum, by determining Being as presence, Western philosophy has become a simple set of descriptions of the present state of affairs and automatically privileges terms of temporal, spatial, and unified present- ness over their opposites. This is why Heidegger explained that "insofar as the pure relationship of the I-think-unity (basically a tautology) becomes the unconditioned relationship, the present that is present to itself becomes the measure for all beingness."3 Although these sets of measurable descriptions took very different approaches throughout the history of philosophy (from the Platonic realm of pure forms, to Kant's transcendental conditions of experience, to Marx's inevitable movement of history), the philosopher was committed to considering Being always as a motionless, nonhistorical, and geometric object, operating just like the European sciences (which Husserl declared to be in crisis). In order to assure its progress within society, philosophy, through its metaphysical obsession with truth, dissolved into the sciences, that is, into the global organization of all beings within a predictable structure of causes and effects.

As we can see, especially since the Enlightenment, when the empirical sciences were given priority because of their access to Nature, philosophy became a scientific enterprise, leaving aside the wider realms from which philosophic problems arise. For this reason, prominent philosophers such as W. V. O. Quine can declare that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough,"4 and now Searle, with other contemporary metaphysical philosophers, tries to submit philosophy to scientific methods or, as Rorty indicated, to "the secure path of science."5 But by submitting thought to the secure path of science (or to truth in general), contemporary analytic and continental philosophies have fallen back into "realism," that is, into the simple analysis and conservation of facts in order to help scientific disciplines develop, which was already the main concern of the Enlightenment. However, in doing so, philosophy evades what has been one of its most important tasks: suggesting alternative, different, or innovative possibilities. Philosophy is not a disengaged, contemplative, or neutral reception of an objects but rather the practice of an interested, projected, and active possibility. In this return to "reality," through the complete neutralization of differences, philosophy becomes not only conservative but also a servant of the strongest political power (in this case the American-style neoliberally framed democracies), which in turn maintains philosophy. It must have been for these reasons that Heidegger noticed, already in the early 1930s, how it did not take long for " 'science' to realize that its 'liberal' essence and its 'ideal of objectivity' are not only compatible with the political-national 'orientation' but also indispensable to it The national 'organization' of science moves along the same lines as the 'American' " organization of science.6

Although many philosophers believe this critique (of the bond be-tween the objectivist goals of the sciences and the prevailing political power or, which is the same, the foundation of politics on truth) only began with Heidegger, Kuhn, and Derrida, already at the beginning of the twentieth century Spengler, Popper, and others were sounding the alarm about the dangers that came from spreading Enlightenment-style scientific objectivism to all the disciplines. Classic texts such as Spengler's The Decline of the West (1918-1922), Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), and even Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) were concerned with the rationalization of the world, a rationalization that we are witnessing today at a much more profound level. Although all these texts did accuse the Enlightenment, it was Adorno and Horkheimer, in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), who explicitly stated that the "enlightenment is totalitarian" in order to indicate how the disastrous world wars of the twentieth century were rooted in its development.7 But the most important feature of these classic alarms over the politics of descriptions is not a belief that objectivism is erroneous, fallible, or untrue but rather that it is unjust, in other words, a murderous attack on ethics, freedom, and democracy. The "total subordination of reason to metaphysical reality," declared Herbert Marcuse, "prepares the way for racist ideology."8 It is not an accident that all these classic texts appeared at the same time that Claude Levi-Strauss was producing his anthropological studies, that is, when encounters with different cultures provided a starting point for the theoretical decentralization of European civilization.

The goal of this first chapter is to remind the realistic strain of contemporary philosophy that Popper's, Adorno's, and Benjamin's alarms against scientific objectivism and realism were also directed against future metaphysical inclinations. We also seek to indicate the authoritarian political meaning of this realism into which philosophers such as Searle have fallen. Heidegger, who can be considered the first to demand an explicit return to the ontological nature of philosophy against scientific or phenomenological inquiries, was not only criticizing the oppressive objective impositions of truth seeking but also indicating what metaphysics left out: the forgotten Being. Against the majority of Heidegger's interpreters, we believe that this did not demand a deeper scientific search for the "object" of Being but rather a recollection of the oppressed history of metaphysics, what Derrida called "the margins of philosophy" and Benjamin "the tradition of the oppressed." It is in this forgotten, defeated, and different history that one can find the victims of the politics of descriptions—and probably also an emancipation from it. Also, it should not be considered an accident that most of these antiobjectivist authors (Popper, Benjamin, and Adorno) wrote these texts against Western rationality in exile, in other words, in a condition of exclusion and foreignness. But why are we able today to expose the history, reasons, and politics of the weak? Certainly not because we have found the appropriate representation of truth. Rather, after the deconstruction of metaphysics performed mainly by Heidegger and Derrida, it is no longer possible to impose truth without violence, that is, to force the rational results obtained by the dominating civilization.

The paradigmatic example of these politics of descriptions is represented not only by centuries of oppressive colonialism but also by the recent failure of the American capitalist system all over the world. While the economic and military consequences of metaphysically framed democracy will be examined in the second chapter,9 we will now venture into three essential theoretical features of the politics of descriptions: the violence of truth, the conservative nature of realism, and the winner's history.

### Alt – Featherstone

#### The alternative affirms a transvaluation and complete re-understanding of the aura of objects – such a psychological shift produces space that can conceive of objects as more than “a means to an end”, whereas voting affirmative consigns us to an information-gorged society that can only produce nihilism and despair

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Here, I think we can see Stiegler's reliance on the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, whose concept of consumption in their Dialectic of Enlightenment is based on a fusion of Marx and Freud. Adorno and Horkheimer explain that the reason we consume is to fill out the lack or emotional void left by the sadism of the technological capitalist system that alienates, estranges, and objectifies us. As Einstein's Nightmare reveals, individuals turn to things and objects, because there are no people, and the people there are become competitors whom the individual absolutely cannot relate to in a meaningful way. But in this situation the capitalist object never achieves the sacred quality of Winnicott's transitional object because it is always on the move, on the verge of obsolescence, and being-wasted by a techno-system that has to keep producing newness and novelty in order to maintain the rate of the consumer's consumption, which is ultimately a search for escape from the horror of his or her lack relative to the monstrous perfection of the machine. Unfortunately the consumer will never escape through the capitalist object, or what Marx called the commodity, because today, under conditions of late capitalism, the object has no magical aura. Unlike Marx's commodity, where the object was able to move by itself, the value of the object in late or neoliberal capitalism is cancelled by the destruction of (first) spiritual and (second) symbolic value in the turn to instrumental rationality, which means that the only meaningful symbols are zeroes and ones. This is why the only meaning of the object in Stiegler's late capitalist society revolves around sadistic value, or what Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein call "abuse" value [50] -- I am either above or below the other on the basis of whether I own or do not own the object -- but even this base mode of valuation is momentary in that it is endlessly cancelled by the condition of spiritual and symbolic misery.

Essentially, this is what Stiegler means when he talks about the decay of capitalism from a form of economy premised on desire to a form of economy organised around drives. Whereas desire is premised on delay, deferral, and the need to wait for the object which holds my attention, drive is based on immediacy, impatience, and a throwaway attitude to the thing which is always-already worthless. In Stiegler's account, this reign of drives, where there is no spiritual or symbolic meaning, is the limit of capitalism. Everything is worthless and we are confronted with fundamental questions about the significance of life. What is it that makes life worth living? This is, of course, perhaps the human question. It is the question which only humans ask, because humans are not embedded in the environment, but rather are thrown into the world in a state of excess which is also a state of lack. [51] It is a question that humans have resolved through the belief in various concepts. In ancient society, this was belief in forms; then under religious society, God; then after the death of God, progress, community, and each other; and then after the end of history, objects. Stiegler's asks the same question of capitalism: what can we believe in in the wake of capitalism, which has transformed the object -- and this includes humanity -- into so much refuse, garbage, or worthless shit?

In order to reach this situation, where he is able to confront the horror of the contemporary technological capitalist dystopia, Stiegler tracks the history of capitalism and bases his analysis in a theory of the progressive overcoming of limits. First, he explains that early twentieth-century capital solved the problem of accumulation through the introduction of consumerism. Here, Freud's nephew, Edward Bernays, is a key thinker in the establishment of a pact between the mass media and capital, organised around the need to capture attention in order to stimulate desire and transform the figure of the citizen into the figure of the consumer. This innovation, which created a condition Stiegler talks about in terms of becoming-herdish, was first explored by Adorno and Horkheimer in their work on the culture industry. Stiegler points out that the Frankfurt School thinkers were the first to understand that TV time is work time organised in terms of brain capture and that capitalist culture entails the transformation of significance into a value to be bought and sold in much the same way as any other commodity. [52] He moves on to argue that 1968 saw the original moment of the transgression of the limit established by post-war consensus and the Keynesian model of economics. By the late 1970s the liberatory spirit of the 1960s, which had seen Deleuze and Guattari champion the transgressive nature of desire in their book Anti-Oedipus, had been absorbed into a radical new form of capitalism, neoliberal capitalism, where desire is unleashed in the service of consumption and accumulation. The rest of Stiegler's story concerns the way in which neoliberal capitalism eroded delayed gratification and in doing so destroyed desire itself in a society of credit where we are encouraged to "buy now, pay later." This is Stiegler's terminal form of capitalism.

But what is terminal capitalism? Stiegler explains the profound implications of the cancellation of the delay of desire. [53] First, this cancellation of delay in gratification supports the general destruction of the spiritual and symbolic value of the object itself, which had taken hold through the turn to an instrumental rationality that only recognises zeroes and ones. The object that is quickly obtained and consumed can have no value -- it is here today, gone tomorrow. Second, the destruction of desire in drive where we have what we want now effectively cancels the authority of the superego that requires us to wait in the formation of a kind of addictogenic death drive asociety. There is now no law. Instead, the human is reduced to the level of the animal where instinct is unmediated by social structure. Combined, these two effects have produced a strange society conditioned by the rule of no rule, endlessly balanced on the edge of all-out warfare. In his recent works, Stiegler calls this the decadent society, a society of low intensity, or what Virilio calls pure war, a society of disenchantment, cynicism, and despair, a wasted, hopeless, psychotic dystopia. Why psychosis? As Lacan explains in his seminar on the psychoses, psychosis is the result of the collapse of the master signifier, which in turn leads to the collapse of the symbolic order that situates us in a reality mediated by signs, symbols, and meaningful objects. [54] Under conditions where the master signifier gives way and the symbolic order collapses, humans have no way to situate themselves in the world. As a result of such psychosis, the world disintegrates, leaving the psychotic to remake their own universe on the basis of visions of threatening others. This is, of course, what we find in Freud's study of Schreber, where paranoia represents a defence mechanism against the collapse into psychosis provoked by child abuse at the hands of a perverse father. [55] Is it the case, then, that Stiegler's decadent society harbours the conditions to produce a generation of Schrebers, psychotics who are likely to turn to paranoia in order to save some semblance of sanity?

This is essentially how I understand the thesis of Disbelief and Discredit. In these books, Stiegler paints a picture of the capitalist symbolic order in a state of advanced degeneration, where, because of the turn to instrumental rationality and the economic rule of zeroes and ones, spiritual and symbolic misery have become the norm. In this context, paranoia, conspiracy, and the ideology of the enemy have become normative. As Freud's study of Schreber shows, when there is nothing else left, the psychotic will try to hang onto his enemy. This is where I disagree with Stiegler, who opposes Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello's idea of the new spirit of capitalism. [56] Stiegler argues that Boltanski and Chiapello are wide of the mark when they say that the 1960s ushered in a new spirit of capitalism. In his view, the 1960s introduced a new nihilistic, spiritless mode of capitalism. [57] However, I would disagree on this point, and argue that there is a new spirit of capitalism, but not the spirit of creativity or entrepreneurialism suggested by Boltanski or Chiapello. Instead, I think that the new spirit of capitalism is a paranoid, martial spirit committed to violence, destruction, and ultimately suicide. Moreover, this is not directed or motivated violence, but rather the kind of blind rage that has been explored by Žižek, Badiou, and Sloterdijk in recent works. [58] Most importantly, I would argue that this blind rage is not necessarily oppositional or transgressive in the context of the capitalist machine, because it is essentially an acting out of neoliberal ideology concerned with competition at all levels of existence. As noted above, the essence of capitalism, which is what neoliberal ideology realises, is competitive struggle -- one is either above or below, more or less valuable.

In this way, I think that the new spirit of capitalism is the spirit of sadism, a violent spirit committed to punishing the other in order to secure supremacy, power, and ultimately the salvation of the self under extreme pressure from the posthuman technical system. Blind rage is thus conformist, or what Stiegler talks about in terms of hyper-power in order to indicate the way in which control of the technical system is absolute, having abolished any possibility of external critique. [59] However, he also notes that this mode of power or conformity is endlessly on the verge of breaking down, of tipping over into normalised forms of transgression and stasis that will destroy the system itself. The hyper-power of the system, which is premised on its instrumental rationality and its endo-colonisation of every element of life, is thus constantly on the verge of reversing into a state of hyper-vulnerability. This is the case because it is fundamentally reliant on a Hobbesian social contract where the political system protects the individual who obeys in return and which longer functions in a state of symbolic misery. The basic problem of Hobbes was always based in the question of obeyance -- why would the people obey and not simply cheat when they thought the Leviathan's back was turned? The Freudian response to this problem was the superego or authority in the head, while the Foucauldian response was the panopticon, surveillance, and later biopower. However, the other response would be to say that the Leviathan's political system was organised around spirit and recognise that the people obeyed because the majority believed in the goodness of society.

In the first two volumes of Disbelief and Discredit, Stiegler shows that this is no longer the case -- people can no longer believe in the goodness, the idea, or the spirit of society because it is not ethical, but is instead based on instrumental calculation. In this state of symbolic misery, the law is not ethical, but rather a technique, and the objective of any rational actor is to find loopholes that allow one to behave with total impunity. In his book For a New Critique of Political Economy, Stiegler associates this cynical mode of lawmaking with what he calls "mafia capitalism" -- a form of accumulation based on criminality and speculation that has absolutely no investment in wider society. [60] Here, the law accepts and recognises cynical behaviour and this is why it is unable to suture the individual into any collective, symbolic order. This is why the technical system lapses into a state of hyper-vulnerability. If the system no longer protects people, the Hobbesian contract is essentially broken, and society crumbles back towards a state of nature. Stiegler calls this state of revolt "disaffection" in order to emphasize that it was always affect, emotion, and belief that situated the individual within wider society in the first place. [61] It was affect that created the individual who is always co-individual in Stiegler's use of Simondon and belief that made people into subjects subjected to the authority of the master signifier, the law of the father. [62] Stiegler tells us that without affect, which effectively binds people to objects, belief, which emerges from this relation, or spirit, which we might understand in terms of the atmosphere that characterises a particular period, there is no other way to uphold society but through naked state power. Here, the dissociated disindividual is criminalised and police power becomes fundamental to the operation of society. But there are limits to what is achievable with police power, and the second volume of Disbelief and Discredit, subtitled Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals is concerned with psychosocial pathology and particularly the bestiality, fury, and nihilism of the disindividual caught up in the short-circuit of drive. [63] The motto of this character captures his base nature -- I couldn't give a fuck!

Ironically, because the asociety of the drive is the creation of the instrumental rationality of technics, this situation is beyond rationality. The dissociated individual cannot think -- he or she is interpolated into what Stiegler calls a state of systemic stupidity. [64] Such individuals are proletarianised because their minds have been captured by the machine. Under condition of attention capture driven by the culture industry, there is no time to think; we become idiots and develop an addictogenic relation to the technical object. Recall Einstein's Nightmare -- my iPhone is tasked with saving me from the meaninglessness of existence. In order to illustrate this situation Stielger draws on the Japanese phenomenon of hikikomori, or the "shut-in," where young men completely withdraw from social interaction in favour of communication with machines and technology. [65] In Stiegler's view, there is very little hope under these conditions -- there is no reason, no trust, and ultimately we are free of the social contract. But the problem with this is that there is nowhere to go and there is no way to act because action is premised on sociability. What results is thus an immobile, thoughtless, nihilistic rage, which has been seen in certain cases of hikikomori where isolation tips over into murderous violence. There is a sense in Stiegler's work that capitalist civilization is on the edge and that it is only able to stagger on by virtue of systemic lethargy and demotivation, the other side of blind rage and nihilistic destruction. For Stiegler, the big question is what follows this obsolete form of civilization. He explains that we need to find ways to believe in objects that matter and can hold our attention. These objects need to be durable and worthy of idealisation. In this respect, he tells us that we need to return to the ancient model of skhole, where education was based in contemplation and care for objects, rather than results and grade point average. Essentially, we need to find reasons to live.

IV. Nihilism and Education

Stiegler thinks that this kind of institutional shift is necessary because there is no parental authority in neoliberal capitalism -- the instrumental rationality of the technological system has wiped out cultural memory and destroyed intergenerational connections premised on the authority of the paternal superego and transferred this relation to TV and the culture industries, [66] what Marcuse called the "automatic superego." [67] Of course, this is not simply a problem contained within education, but rather an issue concerned with the future of civilization itself. In Stiegler's account, events such as Columbine and Sandy Hook, where young men rampage through schools, are premised on the pervasive nature of the spirit of nihilistic rage, where the only way to leave one's mark is through negative sublimation. [68] Here, destruction and violence become cultural acts, ways to assert one's existence in a world that cannot recognise any form of significance beyond base calculations around more or less. This is Stiegler's suicidal society, his technological dystopia, which we must resist through the creation of durable objects able to hold historical significance and thus the possibility of progress through the present into the future on the basis of the knowledge and experience of the past. This vision of history, which he inherits from Husserl's theory of memory, retention, and protention, is how Stiegler escapes from the suicidal society with no future. This is his utopia beyond the petty calculations of the computational machine, the technological dystopia of neoliberal capitalism. In the second volume of Disbelief and Discredit, the relation between the dystopia of nihilism and utopia of history is couched in terms of struggle. [69] Stiegler tells us that we must fight for the right to the future. Like Prometheus, the original rebel with a cause, we must struggle to save the possibility of hope. We must struggle to save our openness to change, which is, of course, based in our humanity, which is, in turn, rooted in our fundamental lack -- our default.

Stiegler argues that we must find time and space in life for otium, or studious leisure, which is today absolutely subordinate to negotium, or calculation and necessity. [70] Fundamentally, he explains that this is not about supporting the importance of the pleasure principle, but rather a defence of art, craft, and the value of cultural discipline, because this is how we insert ourselves into a world and co-individuate ourselves through communication with others. In this sense, he is critical of Foucault, who he argues advances a one-dimensional view of the idea of discipline, a view that ignores the importance of discipline in suturing people into social symbolic systems that allows them to become human and elevate themselves beyond mere bestial necessity. This is why he thinks we need valuable objects that can enable us to create historical fictions -- realisable fictions based in the past that can act as guides to the present and help us to think about moving forward into the future. These good fictions, or fictions of the good, are essentially utopias, narratives necessary to escape the horror of our contemporary un-world and which we can only create on the basis of the care, attention, and discipline we learn through immersion in culture. This is why Stiegler writes in Taking Care of Youth and Generations about the culture industries and what he calls the "battle for intelligence," because it is here, in the psychopolitical struggle for available brain time, that the possibility of care, attention, and discipline is destroyed in the emergence of hyper-attention and drive-based culture characterised by a complete lack of focus. [71] Stiegler is scathing of consumer culture because there is no know-how or craft in the channel or web surfer who says I want this, that, and the other, and I want it now. In explaining the emergence of what he calls "global attention deficit disorder," he refers to the short-termism of real time financial speculation, which has brought the global capitalist technological system to the brink of destruction. He calls this the dynamism of the very worst and suggests we need to make time to think and contemplate the good object that has some kind of meaning beyond its own profane objectivity. But how is this possible in a society of hyper-attention, where we cannot concentrate on one thing for very long, and cognitive overflow, which ensures that we are unable to handle the floods of information that flow through our minds?

Stiegler's answer is that the global technological system is essentially pharmakonic. [72] Indeed, he describes his own critique of neoliberal capitalism as pharmacological in order to argue that the light speed of attention and excess of information produced by late capitalism effectively cancel themselves out, thus opening up space for a new politics of attention, information, and knowledge -- a noopolitics to oppose what he calls the globalised market of fools or conspiracy of imbeciles. In What Makes Life Worth Living, he argues that this noopolitics must be a politics of care, attention, and the good object, where the object could be Winnicott's transitional object, a child's teddy or blanket, or a great work of art contemplated by everybody who stands before it. Ironically, the object itself does not matter -- what matters is its aura, that which transgresses the object's profane objectivity in the creation of transitional or potential space where the new, the future, and hope can be born. This is Stiegler's utopia, the truly human environment made in meaningful objects, rather than the technological environment that debases humans and things in the creation of a wasteland, a techno-dystopia where nothing really matters. This nightmare scenario, which is effectively Einstein's Nightmare, or what Stiegler refers to as a "Godless apocalypse," [73] is what he is concerned with opposing through his think tank, Ars Industrialis. Ars Industrialis is set on the re-enchantment of the world through noetic struggle. This is not Luddism, or a somehow anti-technological politics, but rather an attempt to invent a non-instrumental or humanistic relation to technology based in an appreciation of the infinite dimension of value. In many respects, this move requires a psychological shift -- we must escape the vertigo of the technological system that encourages us to overcompensate for our humanity understood in terms of a basic lack that is also an excess which enables us to imagine a future mediated through the creation of more machines that dominate us in the way we want to dominate ourselves. Centrally, we must come to terms with our own lack, because this lack, or what Stiegler calls "default," is also the root of our imagination, creativity, and ability to make a future beyond Einstein's Nightmare.

### AT: Liberalism Good

#### Liberalism is inevitably imposed violently

**Vattimo and Zabala 11** [Gianni Vattimo, emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Turin and a member of the European Parliament, and Santiago Zabala, ICREA Research Professor of Philosophy at the Pompue Fabra University, *Hermeneutic Communism,* Columbia: New York, NY (2011), p. 37-43]

Robert Kagan's The Return of History and the End of Dreams (2008) is a response to Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and also the latest attempt from the politics of descriptions to situate politics outside history. In order to complete its metaphysical project (after imposing truth and conserving realism), the politics of descriptions also needs to declare victory over those it has defeated, that is, those who do not accept the established framed democracy. The essence of such declarations, like Searle's realism, is conservative, because it intends to conquer any alteration that might question its instituted norms. Although Searle never declared realism's triumph over history, his ontological desire to dissolve philosophy into the sciences inevitably discards everything that does not submit to the Western rationalistic tradition, including different philosophies. But where does this discarding end? And against whom is this victory declared? In order to respond to these questions, it is necessary to individuate these self-declared winners and also the defeated. Our goal in this final section is to suggest how Heidegger's oblivion of Being in favor of beings can be identified with Benjamin's "tradition of the oppressed," that is, the weak. This discarded history reminds us that we are always within history and never above it (as Kagan and Fukuyama suggest), and it also reveals to us where a possible emancipation from framed democracy can take place.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the desire for do-minion often results in metaphysical thought, not the other way around. Metaphysical democracy is a system sustained by those who find them-selves at ease within its order of facts, norms, and institutions. These are the winners, those who believe Being's presence is worthy not only of description but also of contemplation and conservation, since it guarantees their own condition. But such a condition inevitably also includes the defeated history, that is, the oblivion of "Being" and the "weak." While Being refers to Heidegger's oppressed history of metaphysics, the weak, that is, those who are not part of framed democracy's neoliberal capitalism, are a consequence of this same oblivion. In sum, just as Being was discarded in favor of beings, so are the weak oppressed in favor of the winners, that is, in favor of those who dominate within framed democracy's conservative moralized order.65

While we will comment on Kagan and Fukuyama's conservative analysis of our current political world in the next chapter, it is important to emphasize now how and why both authors situate politics outside history. The reason is straightforward: they represent the winner's version of history, that is, those who believe that history can be viewed from the standpoint of what Lyotard named "metanarratives."66 But in order to stand in this view, history must have already become "all it can become," that is, accomplished its continuous rational unification with truth. Framed democracy has now become a metanarrative not only for these two prominent analysts but also for politics of descriptions in general, which must conserve the dominion achieved through science's global control. The desire to declare the end or return of history is bound up with framed democracy, that is, with an order that can legitimize or delegitimize not only history but also other political systems. This is why framed democracy is to Kagan and Fukuyama what basic facts are to Searle: the possibility to "proceed from a prior political ontology."67 But as we have seen, this "prior political" ontology is just another way to demand that science not only guide philosophy but also dictate all the other domains of culture. While Kagan does not even bother to recognize the subordination of politics, history, or democracy to science, Fukuyama instead openly states how science also dictates history:

The first way in which modern natural science produces historical change that is both directional and universal is through military competition. The universality of science provides the basis for the global unification of mankind in the first instance because of the prevalence of war and conflict in the international system. Modern natural science confers a decisive military advantage on those societies that can develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively, and the relative advantage conferred by technology increases as the rate of technological change accelerates. . . . The possibility of war is a great force for the rationalization of societies, and for the creation of uniform social structures across cultures.68

If, as Fukuyama explains, liberal democracy is "the most rational form of government, that is, the state that realizes most fully either rational desire or rational recognition,"69 and if modern natural science manages to dictate history's directions through military dominion, it should not be a surprise that democracy and science have become indissoluble. And it is this indissolubility that situates framed democracy outside history, where its ideal of objectivity can finally be fulfilled. But now that science has effectively fulfilled in framed democracy its "liberal essence and its ideal of objectivity,"70 Fukuyama is convinced that "there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy."71 In other words, liberal democracy has triumphed over history. As we can see, history has become a synonym for "progress," that is, for improvements not only of different political systems but also of philosophies. Framed democracy is the completion of history's development, realization, and improvement. But one might now ask: what is the political goal of declaring the end of return of history?

Although framed democracy is not the first order to declare the return or end of history, as "heirs of prior conquerors"72 it must continue to impose its victory over the defeated in such a way as to neutralize other possible disruptions of its achieved order. This is why within framed democracy, whatever and whoever refuse to submit to truth, dialogue, or the predictable structure of causes and effects constitute not only an "alteration of history" but also a potential danger, and they must be identified as such. These identifications will become necessary to control the defeated and also to continue to guide the rulers to achieve authority, maintain independence, and most of all, induce indifference toward the defeated. But how is it possible to overcome this winner's history? Is a different history required or just framed democracy's "other history"?

Contrary to many interpreters of Benjamin, we believe it is against this indifference toward the defeated (which has increased tremendously in recent decades) that he emphasized the significance of the "other" oppressed history of framed democracy. The German thinker indicated a substantial difference within Kagan and Fukuyama's commonly accepted historiography: on the one hand, the "history of the winners," which he also called "of the oppressors," and, on the other, that "of the defeated" or "oppressed." According to Benjamin, while the first has always been traditionally considered a "continuous" history, the second has been represented as "discontinuous," that is, entangled in disruptions, emergencies, and alterations. But if the second history is "discontinuous," it is not because it is wrong or irrational but rather because it is defeated and oppressed; in other words, it is a consequence of its oppressors, who are concerned in maintaining intact their rule and oppressive tradition. For this reason, Benjamin believed that whereas "the idea of the continuum levels everything off [alles dem Erdboden gleichmacht], the idea of the discontinuum is the basis of a genuine tradition,"73 that is, of possible emancipations. But as an oppressed history, it encourages the defeated and weak to come forward and also urges framed democracy to suppress its indifference. But where does the defeated history take place, and what possibilities does it include?

As we can see, just as Benjamin's critique of the winner's history was not intended to discover the real continuity of history, neither was Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics concerned with discovering Being's truth. Instead, it sought to discover its political emancipation, that is, the realm within which freedom is effectively possible. This "other" history reveals unnoticed possibilities, projects, and rights that were set aside in favor of Western rationality, but, most of all, it reveals the "emergencies" of framed democracy: "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism."74

These emergencies take place outside the metaphysical descriptions of Being, that is, beyond the winner's history (of truth, dialogue, and realism), because they represent dangers that must constantly be sup-pressed. But, as potential dangers, they are also effective conditions for disruption, that is, of emancipation. As Benjamin argued, the commonly accepted historiography "misses those points at which the transmission breaks down and thus misses those jags and cracks [Schroffen und Zacken] which call a halt to those who wish to move beyond it."75

Although framed democracy has now achieved a condition of global control where, as we have seen with Heidegger, the "only emergency is the lack of emergency,"76 it is still possible to disrupt this order through "events of unconcealment" that take place outside the metaphysical descriptions of Being. But what do they look like?

Heidegger, in order to escape the metaphysical violent oppression of truth that silences whatever does not submit to its logical and verbal structure (the defeated oppressed history), individuates in truth's "event of unconcealment" an alternative to its derivative scientific constitution. But contrary to many interpreters, we do not believe that he indicated such disclosedness only to demonstrate the limitations of the correspondence theory of truth. He also revealed the political possibilities of truth when established in this "historical" "event of unconcealment." Heidegger listed some examples where such establishments take place in his famous essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936):

Truth happens only by establishing itself in the strife and space it itself opens up. . . . This happening is, in many different ways, historical. One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the being it has opened up is its setting-itself-into-the-work. Another way in which truth comes to presence is through the act which founds a state. Again, another way in which truth comes to shine is the proximity of that which is not simply a being but rather the be-ing which is most being. Yet another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. A still further way in which truth comes to be is in the thinker questioning, which, as the thinking of being, names being in its question-worthiness [Frag-wurdigkeit]. Science, by contrast, is not an original happening of truth but al-ways the cultivation of a domain of truth that has already been opened.77

As we can see, these events are not different events but only historical events of "unconcealment" that open up a new space. In sum, only what takes place in the discarded metaphysical tradition of philosophy allows a possibility of emancipation from framed democracy— certainly not science, which represents its latest development. The "task of history [is] to take possession of the tradition of the oppressed,"78 that is, to overcome its oppressions. After all, this is why Derrida exposed the "iterability" argument against Searle: not only to indicate other possibilities at the margins of traditional philosophy of language but also as a way out from the impositions of realism, that is, the winner's history.

#### Their apologism for liberalism is wrong and turns all of their impacts

Grove, PhD, 16

(Jairus, Prof IR @ Hawaii <http://bostonreview.net/forum/new-nature/jairus-grove-jairus-grove-response-jedediah-purdy>, 1-11)

Unlike many who appeal to the Anthropocene simply to advance the cause of geoengineering, Jedediah Purdy begins with an assessment of our political condition. Still, he fails to appreciate the nature of the geopolitics responsible for the crisis we face. If we are to take up his noble call for an ecological democracy, we must acknowledge that the violence done to our planet has largely been perpetrated not by all humans but by a select group of Europeans. The Anthropos—the human species as such—is not to blame. Properly named, our era is not the Anthropocene but the Eurocene. It was a European elite that developed a distinctively mechanistic view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and an economic system indebted to geographical expansion. The resulting political orders measured success by how much wealth could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. The geological record bears the mark of this European assemblage of hierarchies. Understanding the forces of Europeanization—the forces of racial superiority, economic hegemony, and global resettlement—is essential to understanding how the planet got to this point, and how “we” could possibly become democratic. Purdy and others claim there are two reasons for renaming the last few centuries to mark a new geological era. The first is a matter of accuracy: there is significant evidence that humans have contributed to climate change. The second is a matter of consciousness raising: renaming the Holocene is essential to raising awareness that humans are responsible. Yet on both counts, we should reconsider what we mean by “human.” It would be more accurate, and go further in raising awareness, to acknowledge the grossly disproportionate impact Europeans have had on our planet. This is not just another hyperbolic jeremiad against European peoples: Purdy’s invitation for global democratic thinking requires a geological history and name that foregrounds what really stands in the way of such a future. As Purdy points out (unlike Paul Crutzen and others), the “human” footprint involves much more than just carbon dioxide. On a geological time scale, the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide are dwarfed by those of radioactivity and are comparable to those of plastic, the modern waste product par excellence. If the Anthropocene is meant to name the scale of human impacts on the planet, it should refer not only to warming but also to cooling the earth, and Europeanization has done both at levels that even China’s current growth cannot match. Beginning in 1610, a small-scale ice age took hold of the planet when a wilder arboreal nature took back what had been inhabited land: some 20 million people killed by the European invasion of the Americas resulted in vast reforestation of the North and South American continents. The providence spoken of by those who arrived was not God but syphilis, influenza, and the number of other species that went along for the ride. Waves of well-armed European explorers and settlers leveraged the devastation for their own gain. There is no way to know how many languages, cities, ideas, cosmologies, and ways of inhabiting the world were lost in this genocide and terraforming of the Americas. The history of nuclear weapons is also predominantly European. The bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, is only the beginning of this story. In the years that have followed, more than 2,000 nuclear weapons have been tested, about 97 percent of which were detonated by European powers. Those detonations do not appear as tests from the perspectives of the Marshallese or Western Shoshone. A seventy-year nuclear war has spread cancer, incinerated sacred lands, and made other spaces uninhabitable on a temporal scale several orders of magnitude more condensed than the lifespan of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The nuclear powers of the Eurocene—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel—possess 97 percent of the 15,800 nuclear weapons around the planet. The beleaguered state of the arms control agenda means self-annihilation is still a very real possibility. As for plastic, the Texas-sized trash gyres that swirl in the world’s oceans are another reminder of what a cosmology of disposability and synthetic chemistry has wrought. Plastic may lack the longevity of carbon dioxide and irradiated earth, but for hundreds, maybe thousands of years it will continue to circulate, wreaking havoc throughout the food chain. We have post–World War II European development to thank for single-serve plastic shampoo pouches and bottled water—the latter needed only because nearby streams have been sold to Coca-Cola. Acknowledging the distinctively European history of our geological era serves a practical as well as a polemical end. Any democratic project must confront the geopolitics of the Eurocene because it challenges the very paradigm of equality. “In the Anthropocene,” Purdy writes, “environmental justice might also mean an equal role in shaping the future of the planet.” In fact, environmental justice will require unequal roles: significantly constraining, even repressing, the powers of the Eurocene. On the eve of the creation of the United Nations at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, W. E. B. Du Bois saw the failure of a dream before it had even been fully formed: the vast new international body was little more than the institutionalization of the global “color line.” The great powers had insisted upon a Security Council, and the General Assembly would be subordinated to its nuclear authority. Purdy’s suggestion that the planet could be governed equally ignores the vast systems of injustice—settler-colonialism, primitive accumulation, and violent power politics—that stand in the way, upheld by great powers that use nuclear weapons to deter change and deploy swarms of drones to hunt down those too small for the nuclear option. I would like to be part of Purdy’s ecological democracy, but he is wrong to say “There is no political agent, community, or even movement on the scale of humanity’s world-making decisions.” We share a world governed by a few states with the capability of ending all life on the planet. At the international scale, these states are essentially authoritarian; they rule by economic violence and warfare. That some of those states are not authoritarian at the domestic level is of little consequence to the rest of the world. It should come as no surprise that the leaders of the food sovereignty and anti–fossil fuel movements Purdy describes belong to marginalized groups that see no future in our current geopolitical order. Indigenous, black, and brown people are at the vanguard of political struggle not because they are more natural but because they have had front row seats in the making of this crisis. The Eurocene is not perpetrated by all people of European heritage, many of whom oppose the existing geopolitical order—myself included. This distinction—between being European and being an agent of the Eurocene—only intensifies the need to rethink democratization as demanding a politics of inequality rather than a politics of incorporation. Such a remaking of justice is as complex and difficult as the climate crisis itself, and just as worthy a struggle, irrespective of whether we can succeed. As Sylvia Wynter has said, “we must now collectively undertake a rewriting of knowledge as we know it. . . . because the West did change the world, totally.” To do so means exiting the Anthropocene as an idea, and collectively—even if not equally—exiting the Eurocene as a failed epoch. As Wynter says, we need to consider other “genres of the human.” Wynter explains she will not miss the Anthropos because she, among so many others, was never considered human to begin with. To invent a new species is the task that must be undertaken before there can be a “we,” an “our,” or a “cene” that is more than a requiem for the end.

### L – Realism

#### Restraint fails – their realist security documents establish a will to order that guarantees their approach fails

**Rythoven 15** [Eric Van Rythoven, Carleton University, Canada, “The perils of realist advocacy and the promise of securitization theory: Revisiting the tragedy of the Iraq War debate ,” European Journal of International Relations, published online September 8, 2015]

In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War and the subsequent excesses of the Global War on Terror, realist advocacy has gravitated towards a more active promotion of restraint. Walt’s (2006) Taming American Power makes the case to a popular audience for the value of the US exercising restraint on the global stage. Similarly, Posen (2013, 2014) has argued for a grand strategy of restraint against an increasingly expansive liberal hegemony. Rosato and Schuessler’s (2011: 813) realist foreign policy manifesto explicitly ‘counsels restraint’ in dealing with minor powers such as Iran. While less visible, a similar concern with restraint is also evident in securitization theory. Increasingly, its proponents are carving out a nuanced middle ground, where the dangers of intense patterns of threat construction mean that the practice of ‘desecuritization is preferable in the abstract, but concrete situations might call for securitization’ (Wæver, 2011: 469). Vibeke Schou Tjalve goes even further by pointing to how visions of civil society inspired by early 20th-century Atlantic republicanism could be used to curb, but never altogether eliminate, securitizing moves. She argues:

Ultimately, human beings can only restrain each other. The creation of a system of checks and balances, of playing interest against interest, was the only viable means of restraining the monopoly of ideas or the advance of uncontested demonizing, securitizing moves. (Tjalve, 2011: 446, emphasis in original)

Tjalve’s work represents a stark departure from the metaphor of the marketplace by focusing on an agonistic and competitive public sphere. Yet, it shares with US realists a distinct understanding of restraint as a virtue in security discourse. How one advocates for the importance of this virtue to contemporary forms of statecraft is possibly one of the most fruitful grounds for dialogue between these two approaches today.

Yet, restraint in security debates is typically held to be elusive, especially when such debates play to populist impulses such as fears over terrorism or nuclear proliferation. As noted in the previous section, both realism and securitization theory are beholden to a vision of fearful publics acquiescing to security arguments. The problem with this logic is that it artificially narrows the range of emotional dynamics at play. Reducing security debates to popular and elite fears ignores how such debates circulate and are sustained by a variety of different emotions and affects. Great power politics is frequently punctuated by a diplomacy of anger, which may escalate into conflict in the absence of conciliatory gestures (Hall, 2011). Honour and shame have powerful catalyzing effects for security policy, as exemplified by the broadly circulating feelings of shame in the US after 9/11 (Saurette, 2006). Humanitarian operations, such as the Western intervention in Libya, may be wellsprings of joy and jubilation for liberal internationalists, who envision them as heroic efforts that avert near-genocides and produce deeply grateful local populations (e.g. Kristof, 2011). Nor is the role of emotions purely facilitative in making security arguments.

In some cases, societies may come to fear the politics of fear itself as it allows for the ‘collective concentrations of power that make possible “institutionalized cruelty”’ (Williams, 2011: 455). Thus, the use of torture by the US may have left an enduring anxiety over how public fears have been manipulated to support and sustain institutionalized cruelty. The broader point is that as long as these emotional dynamics are part and parcel of security debates — in ways that both inhibit and expand the security agenda — they should be of special interest to both realist and securitization studies.21

Conclusion

The failure of realist advocacy, despite its hegemonic status within the discipline, to curb the expansion of national security agendas constitutes a genuine puzzle. Focusing principally on the 2003 Iraq War debate, this article has leveraged the tools of securitization theory to offer an explanation for this failure centred around three contributions. First, by viewing the expansion of the security agenda as a product of threat inflation in the marketplace of ideas, realists employed a liberal model of discourse that stressed efficient economical reasoning over questions of power. This was a model protected, in part, by the incommensurability thesis. Second, while generally competent interlocutors in eyes of securitization theory, a closer examination of realist advocacy reveals how ignoring identity and emotion ceded powerful cultural resources to their neoconservative opponents. Third, the article sketched a common research agenda for realism and securitization theory under the auspices of a shared interest in the statecraft of threat construction.

There is a sense in which this argument is unfair to Walt and Mearsheimer, as well as to other realists who opposed the 2003 Iraq War. Their advocacy may have failed but so, too, did a host of other institutions (Kaufman, 2004), including a lacklustre political opposition, particularly among elites, and an uncritical media. It may be more accurate to say that this was a failure of the collective public sphere, rather than any one actor or strategy (Tjalve, 2011). Yet, the significance of realist advocacy cannot be dismissed. The fact that neoconservatives spent so much time and energy engaging realist arguments, including agreeing to a public debate with Walt and Mearsheimer in February 2003, reflects how the intellectual architects of the war saw in realism a trenchant and potent source of opposition.

Equally important is the concern that calling on realists to engage with the role of identity and emotion in discourse challenges the traditional academia–policy divide. In the Weberian view, appropriate scholarly activism entails ‘entering the debate in a nonpartisan way, and confining [oneself] to disclosing “facts” rather than making pronouncements about “values”’ (Jackson and Kaufman, 2007: 95). Objectivity, in the Weberian sense, is crucial in ensuring the authoritative nature of academic ‘facts’. Yet, despite their ‘measured scholarly tones’, such efforts can easily be read as ‘obviously “political”’ by the public and therefore be dismissed as another partisan voice (Jackson and Kaufman, 2007: 99). This does not mean that objectivity and, thus, authority are unimportant, but that these concerns need to be balanced with a message sensitive to the vicissitudes of power in discourse. Instead, it may be ‘due to the very subjectivity that some perceive as a liability’ that some academics ‘are well positioned to issue the kinds of critiques that may resonate more deeply’ with popular audiences (Sucharov and Sasley, 2014: 177). Rather than pursue a ‘hygienic’ objectivity, we might consider our attachments to specific communities as reservoirs for thinking about richer forms of public engagement.


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
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
Roberts 15 - London economist citing PhD economists (Michael, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/the-marxist-theory-of-economic-crises-in-capitalism-part-two/)

Does Marx’s law fit the facts? Some Marxist critics of Marx’s law of profitability reckon that the law cannot be empirically proven or refuted because official statistics cannot be used to show Marx’s law in operation. But there are plenty of studies by Marxist economists that show otherwise. The key tests of the validity of the law in modern capitalist economies would be to show whether 1) the rate of profit falls over time as the organic composition of capital rises; 2) the rate of profit rises when the organic composition falls or when the rate of surplus value rises faster than the organic composition of capital; 3) the rate of profit rises, if there is sharp fall in the organic composition of capital as in a slump. These would be the empirical tests and there is plenty of empirical evidence for the US and world economy to show that the answer is yes to all these questions. For example, [Basu and Manolakos](http://gesd.free.fr/basumano.pdf) applied econometric analysis to the US economy between 1948 and 2007 and found that there was a secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall with a measurable decline of about 0.3 percent a year “after controlling for counter-tendencies.” In [my work on the US rate of profit,](http://gesd.free.fr/mr1213.pdf) I also found an average decline of 0.4 percent a year through 2009. And here is a figure by G Carchedi for the rise in the organic composition of capital (OCC) in the industrial sector of the US since 1947 versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V) versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V)


[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/arp.png)

There is a clear inverse correlation between a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit. Can Marx’s law explain crises? How does Marx’s law of profitability work as an explanation and forecast of slumps in capitalist economies? The law leads to a clear causal connection to regular and recurrent crises (slumps). It runs from falling profitability to falling profits to falling investment to falling employment and incomes. A bottom is reached when there is sufficient destruction of capital values (the writing off technology, the bankruptcy of companies, a reduction in wage costs) to raise profits and then profitability. Then rising profitability leads to rising investment again. The cycle of boom recommences and the whole ‘crap’ starts again, to use Marx’s colourful phrase. [There is a cycle of profit alongside the long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall.](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/cycles-in-capitalism.pdf)

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profit-cycle.png) The evidence of this causality between profit and investment is available. Jose Tapia Granados, using regression analysis, finds that, over 251 quarters of US economic activity from 1947, profits started declining long before investment did and that pre-tax profits can explain 44% of all movement in investment, while there is no evidence that investment can explain any movement in profits. I find a higher ‘Granger causality’ of 60% from annual changes in profit and investment (unpublished) and a correlation of 0.67 for the period since 2000. And see this by G Carchedi ([Carchedi Presentation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/carchedi-presentation.pptx)). In the period leading up to the Great Recession 2008-9, we can see the causality visually for US profits, investment and real GDP in the graphic below. The mass of US corporate profit peaks in mid-2006, investment and GDP follows two years later. Profits turn back up in late 2008 and investment follows one year later.

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profits-lead.png)

There are two basic regularities shown by the data: that a change in profits tends to be followed next year by a change in investment in the same direction; and that a change in investment is usually followed in a few years by changes in profits in the opposite direction. Thus we have a cycle. From these results, the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that profitability stagnated in 2013 and declined in 2014 (and now the mass of profits in 2015) after growing between 2008 and 2012, it can be concluded with some confidence that a recession of the US economy, which will be also part of a world economic crisis like the Great Recession, will occur again in the next few years. And Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall makes an even more fundamental prediction: that the capitalist mode of production will not be eternal, that it is transitory in the history of human social organisation. The law of the tendency predicts that, over time, there will be a fall in the rate of profit globally, delivering more crises of a devastating character. Work has been done by modern Marxist analysis that confirms that the world rate of profit has fallen over the last 150 years. See the graph below ([data from Esteban Maito](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/maito-esteban-the-historical-transience-of-capital-the-downward-tren-in-the-rate-of-profit-since-xix-century.pdfhttp:/gesd.free.fr/mrwrate.pdf) and ‘doctored’ by me).

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/world-rate-of-profit-maito.png) Maito’s data for the 19th century have recently been questioned ([DUMENIL-LEVY on MAITO](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dumenil-levy-on-maito.pdf)), but in a recent work using different sources and countries, I find a similar trend for the post-1945 period globally ([Revisiting a world rate of profit June 2015](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/revisiting-a-world-rate-of-profit-june-2015.pdf)). And earlier groundbreaking work by Minqi Li and colleagues, as well as by Dave Zachariah, show a similar trend. As Maito concludes: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its empirical confirmation highlights the historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit measures the vitality of the capitalist system, the logical conclusion is that it is getting closer to its endpoint. There are many ways that capital can attempt to overcome crises and regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to the capitalist mode of production and allow, ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This is a characteristic aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit over the long term. So the arguments claiming that there is an inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the rate of profit and its own vitality and which therefore considers the capitalist mode of production as a natural and a-historical phenomenon, are refuted by the empirical evidence.” So the law predicts that, as the organic composition of capital rises globally, the rate of profit will fall despite counteracting factors and despite successive crises (which temporarily help to restore profitability). This shows that capital as a mode of production and social relations is transient. Capitalism has not always been here and it has ultimate limits, namely capital itself. It has a ‘use-by-date’. That is the essence of the law of profitability for Marx. Alternative theories This is not to deny other factors in capitalist crises. The role of credit is an important part of Marxist crisis theory and indeed, as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall engenders countertendencies, one of increasing importance is the expansion of credit and the switching of surplus value into investment in fictitious capital rather than productive capital to raise profitability temporarily, but with eventually disastrous consequences, as The Great Recession shows ([The Great Recession](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/the-great-recession.pdf); [Debt matters](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/debt-matters.pdf)). Alternative theories of crisis like underconsumption, or the lack of effective demand, are taken from theories from the reactionary Thomas Malthus and the radical Sismondi in the early 19th century and then taken up by Keynes in the 1930s and by modern inequality theorists like Stiglitz and [post-Keynesian economists](http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15854). But lack of demand and rising inequality cannot explain the regularity of crises or predict the next one. These theories do not have strong empirical backing either ([Does inequality causes crises](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/does-inequality-causes-crises.pdf)). Professor Heinrich, after concluding that Marx did not have a theory of crisis and dropped the law of profitability, [does offer a vague one of his own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/the-two-michaels-heinrich-and-roberts-in-berlin-dogmatism-versus-doubt/): namely capital accumulates and produces more means of production blindly. This gets out of line with consumption demand from workers. So a ‘gap’ develops that has to be filled by credit, but somehow this cannot hold up things indefinitely and production then collapses. Well, it is a sort of a theory, but pretty much the same as the underconsumption (overproduction) theory that Heinrich himself dismisses and [Marx dismissed 150 years ago.](http://www.mcg-j.org/swp_arc/english/etheory/economics/eprm29-2.htm) It seems way less convincing or empirically supported that Marx’s own theory of crisis based on the law of profitability. No other theory, whether from mainstream economics or from heterodox economics, can explain recurrent and regular crises and offer a clear objective foundation for the transience of the capitalist system.

#### Profitability will hit zero by 2054---but converging tipping points ensure collapse much sooner

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.patreon.com/posts/socialism-is-now-37023695>)

That capitalism is unsustainable has long been empirically observable. Most obviously, manufacturing costs and consumer commodity prices are trending towards zero. For example, whereas the world’s fastest supercomputer in 1975 was worth $5m ($32m in 2013’s money), the price of an iPhone 4 released in 2010 with the equivalent performance was $400. Aerospace companies producing propulsion systems in 2010 for $24m in 24 months are now 3-D printing their engines for $2,000 in two weeks. And rather than having globalised supply chains, such companies foresee the entire rocket being built in ‘at home’ [7]. While ‘offshoring’ manufacturing jobs to the ‘low-income economies’ is said to save up to 65% on labour costs, replacing human workers with robots saves up to 90% [8]. Unlike workers, robots do not need wages, breaks, sick days, holidays or pensions. And they work quicker in the first place, too. While industrialisation, particularly in Asia, saw 83 ‘developing countries’ achieving growth rates by the early 2000s that were more than twice the rate of the ‘developed’ OECD members, the rest of the world has seen the same opportunity end ‘prematurely’. Latin America and Africa are already deindustrialising (shifting to services-based workforces) – from a much lower starting point than Asia [9]. Whereas industrialisation peaked in western European countries at income levels of around $14,000, India and many sub-Saharan African countries appear to have reached their peak manufacturing employment at income levels of $700 (both at 1990 levels) [10]. Not only do robots and 3D-printing increasingly remove the incentive for capitalists based in the US and Europe to exploit workers overseas, the incentive to exploit transit workers – who add production time/value to the commodities they transport around the world – is also removed [11]. The emergence of cellular agriculture (lab-grown food), with falling prices and rising quality estimated to see the beef industry go bust by 2035, is going to have the same effect [12]. For the past 145 years, the imperialist powers – the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan – have been increasingly compelled to export capital (invest) overseas in order to expand and cheapen their exploitable labour bases, thereby sustaining their own economies by living off profits generated by commodity-producing workers in the ‘developing world’. Britain, for example, exported capital equal to 560% of its GDP in 2014 [13]. Between 1980 and 2012 the net outflows of capital from ‘developing’ countries being funnelled into ‘developed’, ie imperialist nations, totalled $16.3 trillion [14]. But the economic relation that underpins imperialism is now unravelling. If prices are trending historically towards zero, so too must the ‘global’ aggregate rate of profit. According to Estaban Maito’s estimates, it fell in a secular trend from 43% in the 1870s to 17% in the 2000s, and is (as of 2014) on course to reach zero around 2054 [15]. Automation and absolute overaccumulation But as the criminally under-appreciated Polish Marxist Henryk Grossman warned in 1929, capitalism is bound to collapse “much earlier than a zero rate of profit” [16], because capital, inherently, does not accumulate harmoniously – the process tends to break down. Overaccumulated capital – surplus capital that has become unprofitable to reinvest – is inevitable. It causes every recession, a partial and temporary breakdown, and is at the same time an underproduction of surplus value; ie, too little profit has been generated to preserve and expand the value of total capital. (Surplus value, or surplus labour time, is the amount of value the capitalist appropriates from the worker, who, on average, keeps only what they need to subsist, their necessary labour time. Profit then is essentially unpaid labour, which tends to increase with innovation. Hence falling prices.) Debt therefore rises to ‘fill the gap’ caused by this underproduction, but can only cover the lag in profit for so long before recession becomes inevitable, since investors are bound to withdraw funds when growth becomes too stagnant, channelling this new surplus instead into tax havens, land and the competitive gambling of speculation that generates financial ‘bubbles’. Each breakdown is overcome through the sufficient destruction, cheapening and centralisation of capital. But the resulting innovation means fewer workers tend to remain employed relative to total capital. Despite the increased rate of exploitation that temporarily lifts profit rates, the next overaccumulation tends to be greater than the one which preceded it. There is no such thing as ‘technological unemployment’ though – alongside surplus capital grows unexploitable surplus labour (unemployment). Clearly, the closer we get to the completion of the historical trend towards fully-automated production, the closer capitalism gets to its final breakdown. Production is already highly automated. As James Manyika, McKinsey Global Institute director, said in June 2017: “Find a factory anywhere in the world built in the past five years  –  not many people work there.” But the services jobs – relatively unproductive since they tend to handle near-finished commodities, if they handle commodities at all – that replaced manufacturing work are now becoming increasingly automated, too. In Britain, where services count for 80% of economic activity, the number of supermarket checkout assistants fell by 25.3% between 2011 and 2017. At the end of March, after most countries had entered lockdown, almost half of company bosses in 45 countries said they were speeding up plans to automate their businesses. [17] Innovation always takes place most rapidly during a recession, when prices are low. With lockdown turning the home into the place of work, Microsoft could boast of having discovered a fresh way of reducing labour costs and extending absolute labour time as it announced “two years’ worth of digital transformation in two months”. As The Guardian reported at the end of April: “Bank branches were already closing in droves before the epidemic, but here is the perfect excuse to shut more. And that’s not all. The authors of an Oxford University study thought that by 2035 it would be possible to automate 86% of restaurant jobs, three-quarters of retail jobs, and 59% of recreation jobs. By unlucky coincidence, those are among the very industries hardest hit by an epidemic now demanding quantum leaps in efficiency if some companies are to avoid going under.” [18] But automation is abolishing the source of profit, ie, commodity-producing human labour. To be more precise, automation is the final expression of capitalism’s self-abolishing tendency. As Marx wrote in 1858: “As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure... Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [19] But this dissolution does not happen in a seamless falling rate of profit towards zero, since – as explained, and as indicated by both zig-zagging profit rates and the recessions that tend to strike roughly every 10 years – capital does not accumulate harmoniously. As the Soviet Russian philosopher Genrikh Volkov wrote in 1967, increasing automation eventually leads to “the breakdown, instead of the consolidation, of the existing relations ... of the private ownership of the means of production…. Its consummation is incompatible with capitalism.” [20] In Capital, Marx anticipates an eventual “absolute overaccumulation” of capital. “The limit of capitalist production is the excess time of the labourers,” says Marx. [21] But stretching the rate of exploitation of the working class to anywhere near 100% is obviously impossible – for starters, capital cannot even afford to exploit an ever-increasing part of it, a surplus population that grows alongside surplus capital, while workers in the growing services sector are also relatively unproductive. “As the capitalist mode of production develops, an ever larger quantity of capital is required to employ the same, let alone an increased, amount of labour-power.” But there are other limits too: “As soon as capital would, therefore, have grown in such a ratio to the labouring population that neither the absolute working time supplied by this population, nor the relative surplus working time, could be expanded any further (this last would not be feasible at any rate in the case where the demand for labour were so strong that there were a tendency for wages to rise); at a point, therefore when the increased capital produced just as much, or even less, surplus value than it did before its increase, there would be absolute overproduction of capital.” [22] From zero interest rates to worldwide hyperinflation If the rate of profit is on course to hit zero around 2054, but the final breakdown is bound to happen much earlier than that, it at least becomes impossible to dismiss the theory that we are entering this uncharted territory right now. But empirically, there also seem to be several approaching economic limits or ‘tipping points’ which cannot be converging at the same time merely by coincidence. For starters, average GDP growth rates in what the World Bank defines as ‘high income countries’ are already closing in on zero, having fallen every decade for the past half century: from 5.59% in the 1960s, to 4.15% in the 1970s, 2.93% in the 1980s, 2.35% in the 1990s, and 1.78% in the 2000s. The figure rose slightly to 1.97% in the years 2010-2017, but this minor reprieve has already proven to be unsustainable. GDP in the imperialist nations, though, is inflated by the profits leached from the rest of the world, since much of the profit from each commodity goes towards the GDP of the nation in which it is sold, rather than where it was made. [23] Productivity growth in the high income countries has itself, since 2011, spluttered below 1%. Aggregate global debt (the total debt of governments, corporations and households), already mountainous before the Great Recession, has hit new heights, indicating record-high overaccumulation [24]. According to the IMF, global debt fell by 1.5% of GDP in 2017 compared to a year earlier, but remained more than 11 percentage points of GDP above the previous high in 2009. In June 2019, the IMF said global debt stood officially at $184 trillion, 225% of global GDP. This averages out at $86,000 for every person in the world, 2.5 times average annual per capita income. But according to financial analyst Ron Surz, once ‘off-the-books’ net obligations such as social security and health care are taken into account, official figures are understated by a factor of 2.5, making actual global debt $460 trillion, 560% of GDP and $215,000 per person (as of July 2019) [25]. He put the US figure not at the official 105%, but 390%. Even that is without taking into account the serious accounting problem in the US Department of Defense. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion [26]. The US defence budget has ballooned to $748bn as the long-time imperialist superpower scrambles to hold on to its dying empire. Another financial analyst, Simon Thorpe, calculated in 2015 that global debt was 2.5 times higher than the global money supply (up from two times higher in 2013) [27]. This is despite the fact that the US’s monetary base exploded from $842bn in August 2008 to $2.9 trillion in January 2013 and then $4 trillion in August 2014. The sheer amount of debt is unsustainable since the tax base needed to pay it is obviously shrinking in relative terms. Though it has been socialised, it is now simply too large to work off. Something the capitalist state can do to ease the government’s ability to pay its debt is reduce interest rates, which also makes borrowing cheaper and stimulates lending, maintaining the circulation of money. But lifting the economy out of recession usually takes a 4-5% base interest rate cut. In the US and across Europe base rates are already at zero, having been cut by around only 2%. Central banks have said going negative would make the banks unviable. Therefore, it is highly probable – lockdown or no lockdown – that capitalism, as Pento says, is soon going to spiral for the first time in its history into a crisis of worldwide hyperinflation, since rates will have to start going back up to re-incentivise bond holding and sustain the tax base. But debt-to-GDP – already at record highs and rising – will surge, and so the tax base will continue to shrink; bondholders will realise that what they are owed cannot be repaid and increasingly transfer their funds into hard assets, especially precious metals. The only way to avoid hyperinflation is for states to default on their debt through hyperdeflation – which the record bailouts imply they are understandably trying to avoid – but that would happen after hyperinflation anyway. The US’s national annual deficit is now expected to soar from $984bn in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2020. The US has never meaningfully defaulted on its debt but, historically, countries that have failed to get their debt-to-GDP back below 90% have gone on to default, meaning they have had to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bail out (usually in the form of high-interest loans and on the condition of privatising state assets). But given that the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency – all oil must be traded in US dollars, for example, making the solvency of all countries dependent on their ability to purchase US dollars – the IMF effectively is the US. The US dollar has lost more than 96% of its value, its purchasing power, since 1913. The figure is more than 99.5% for British pound sterling, compared to 1694, the year it was founded [28]. This is why negative rates would make the banks unviable – they would finish off the depreciation of fiat currency. Many countries, including Russia and China, have started diversifying their foreign currency reserves in the past few years, meaning the main source of financing US debt is disappearing. Even the biggest US bank, JP Morgan, told its clients in August 2019 to sell the dollar. The world economy will likely soon be without a reserve currency. While smaller economies have survived defaults through bailouts in the past, the US and western European countries are the richest and most developed in the world. They represent monopoly capitalism, or imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. As mentioned, with their workforces now largely services-based, the imperialist nations have been largely living off of profit produced by the labour of commodity-producing workers in Africa, Asia and South America. If the imperialist economies collapse, it’s because the whole system has collapsed. Indeed, as of 7 March, investors had already pulled $83bn from developing markets, the largest capital outflow ever recorded, according to the Institute of International Finance. If all these converging factors – near-zero prices, flat productivity growth, unsustainably high debt, zero interest rates, exhausted currencies – do not constitute a final breakdown of the system, then what will?

### Cap Bad---Nuclear War

#### Capitalism ensures armed conflict---profit compels militaristic statecraft and escalating crises---nuclear war inevitable absent transition

Campbell 14 [Sally Campbell, “Why does Capitalism lead to war?,” September 2014, Socialist Review, http://socialistreview.org.uk/394/why-does-capitalism-lead-war]

The century since the slaughter in the First World War has been littered with endless more bloody wars. Sally Campbell argues the drive to war is not accidental but inherent in the logic of capitalism.

In the 20 years running up to the First World War there were approximately 100 binding agreements between the Great Powers promising peaceful coexistence. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague was set up in 1899 “with the object of seeking the most objective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments”. This was at the behest of the peace-loving Tsar Nicholas II of Russia (nickname: Bloody Nicholas).

It is fairly easy to understand why the ruler of a lesser power would want to stem an arms race he knew he couldn’t win. But there was a wider, less cynical belief that somehow war could be avoided by convincing the ruling classes of Europe to behave differently. After all, war, so destructive of people and property, is surely not in the interests of the system?

The left wing version of this notion was developed by Karl Kautsky, a leading member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), as the First World War was beginning. Kautsky argued that it was only a section of capitalism that benefited from war — finance capitalists, whose profits relied on export of capital and thus required ever-expanding empires, and arms manufacturers, who relied on war and the threat of war for their profits.

This minority of the capitalist class, according to Kautsky, had managed to convince the majority of industrial capitalists that they could only defend their interests in the colonies — raw materials and labour — through war and empire-building. In fact, said Kautsky, the capitalists of different nations could agree peacefully to divide up the world and exploit it.

He wrote in Imperialism and the War (1914), “There is no economic necessity for the continuation of the great competition in the production of armaments after the close of the present war. At best such a continuation would serve the interests of only a few capitalist groups. On the contrary capitalist industry is threatened by the conflicts between the various governments. Every far-sighted capitalist must call out to his associates: Capitalists of all lands unite!”

Kautsky was for peace, but he believed there could be a capitalist peace — that imperialism was just one of several options for the system.

His Russian contemporaries, Lenin and Bukharin, strongly challenged this idea. They developed the classic Marxist theory of imperialism, centrally in Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism and Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy. They argued that military competition for markets between capitalist nations is an inevitable development of peaceful competition. As the system aged it changed — the small units of capital characteristic of early capitalism swallow each other up into larger and fewer concerns and monopolies.

At this stage of development, Bukharin argued, economics is organisationally fused with politics. The sheer scale of production in the industrialising nations could no longer be contained within the geographical boundaries of the state and had to reach out beyond those limits. The interests of these large firms are increasingly merged with the state — and it backs them up politically and militarily in the name of the national interest. It builds up armies and weapons, invades countries where necessary to grab resources or to safeguard trade routes and markets, establishes spheres of influence and alliances — and it will go to war against other powers to defend any of these things.

Each war ends in a settlement, a new division of the world between the powers, but these agreements never hold. Capitalism is a system locked into relentless production, and this develops unevenly — some capitalist states will grow more quickly than others, and demand a re-division of the world to favour them.

This analysis of imperialism as “the method of competition between state capitalist trusts” was true of the First World War, and the 1920s and 1930s confirmed it at a new level. The unprecedented economic crisis of the period drove each national capital to turn to increasing degrees of state intervention and direction along with protectionism and closed trading blocks.

Nazi Germany was an extreme example of a state-directed economy in which the needs of individual capitalists were subordinated to the needs of national capital. Production was geared towards the military with the aim of breaking into nearby markets currently closed to it. As in the First World War, German capital took a gamble that, as a latecomer to the imperialist table, it could grab the markets it needed to compete with more established powers.

Churchill meets Stalin

The victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany paved the way for a new re-division of the world. Even before the Second World War was over, in October 1944, Churchill famously went to Russia to meet Stalin and proposed a post-war division of Europe between the Allies, hurriedly scribbled out on a note: “Romania: Russia 90% others 10%; Greece: Britain 90% Russia 10%; Yugoslavia 50-50…” Stalin marked the page with a tick and the agreement was made. But despite this, for the next 45 years the world would be locked into the Cold War, with the new great powers grating against each other in a new formation.

Though they had been allies in the Second World War, Russia and the US now took opposing sides, and though Churchill had carried the note to Stalin, Britain was already losing its position in the global hierarchy. The American H-bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima were as much about asserting US dominance as smashing the Japanese regime. They were not just a warning to Stalin, but to Britain, France and Germany too.

The shadow of the bomb hung heavy over the world in the immediate post-war years, and the fact that all-out nuclear war didn’t happen does not mean that the threat wasn’t real. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 was the first time in history that the US military went to DEFCON 2. It was a moment of real brinkmanship and, even though the US had many more nuclear warheads than Russia, both had more than enough to obliterate each other several times over.

The impact on society was huge. A whole number of films from the time testify to how close the possibility of annihilation felt. The War Game, a 1965 BBC film, told of a conventional war that escalated to nuclear confrontation; 1964’s Dr Strangelove and Fail-Safe both tell of unintended missile launches that lead to all-out nuclear war; The Bedford Incident (1965) ends with blistering celluloid as a nuclear submarine explodes; while Ladybug, Ladybug (1963) examines the distorting fear of living in a world so utterly out of our control.

This sense of alienation is important. As Lenin, and Marx before him, pointed out, the capitalists are trapped by the system as much as workers are. Each capitalist or group of capitalists represented in a state is locked into competitive accumulation versus other capitalists. Any capitalist who does not exploit in order to accumulate will be driven out of business by others. This relentless drive leads to economic crises, leaving some capitalists bankrupt while others benefit, while in the longer term the whole system tends towards stagnation and social crisis.

The consequences of this endless race are dire. It is clear today, for example, how such competitive accumulation is causing catastrophic climate change with unprecedented speed.

No individual capitalist controls the system and neither are they able to group together with all the other capitalists in what Kautsky called a “super-imperialism” to peacefully and rationally run the world. Any capitalist who tries to understand the destructive dynamic and change their behaviour would, again, be driven out of business by their competitors. As long as they stay in the game they benefit from it in wealth and power. So they tend to identify with their system, call it civilisation, and fight to defend it.

So while the notion of nuclear world war is in many ways completely irrational — missile madness — it also flows completely logically out of the level of development of capitalism in the 20th century. As Lenin wrote in 1917, “The capitalists partition the world, not out of personal malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to get profits.” Since the end of the Second World War this partitioning and repartitioning has been enforced through the threat of nuclear force among other things.

The fight against war

It is important to understand the systemic causes of war because it leads to particular conclusions about how to campaign against and how to end war. In the 1950s and 1960s a mass movement against nuclear weapons grew up, led by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). It involved hundreds of thousands of people in marches, protests, meetings and debates. “Ban the bomb” is a slogan that any decent human being can get behind, and they did. But it also suggests a particular kind of politics, namely that we can have capitalism without the bomb, if only we can convince a broad enough layer of society to reject it and politicians to legislate against it.

Socialists argued that the bomb is a class issue. We have to be part of peace and anti-war movements and build them. But we also have to do that by agitating for an anti-war, anti-imperialist position among workers who may not currently reject war — because it is they who have an interest in overthrowing the whole system. This is precisely what socialist John Maclean did in Glasgow’s Clydeside during the First World War.

The threat of nuclear war receded after Cuba and up until the “New Cold War” of the early 1980s. There were still wars, notably in Korea and Vietnam, and there were tensions within the blocs — China versus Russia, Western Europe failing to back the US in Vietnam. But the end of the world feeling dissipated. This was not because of any change of heart from the ruling classes, but because the post-war economic boom allowed all sides to expand without treading on each other too badly.

The US was able to win the Cold War in the end because it forced Russia into a new arms race in the 1980s, which bankrupted it. American capitalism used its military might to attempt to force a new division of the world. It wanted to defeat the Russian empire in order to stop it from grabbing more resources — e.g. West Germany with its skilled workforce and highly developed industries — and to extend its own influence further east, through expanding Nato. The US also sought to exert its influence over Western Europe and bring France and West Germany into line.

But Russia was also locked into this battle. It had to attempt to keep up with the West in order to defend its own markets and resources — even if the price was risking internal unrest as people’s living standards were driven down while all resources were poured into new missiles systems.

The Cold War was not a clash of ideologies, but a struggle between different competing sections of international capitalism. Military conflict can, of course, take on its own logic beyond the immediate parameters of economic competition, but the economic base always reasserts itself. It is the fundamental defining factor.

After the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War we have seen new missile defence systems put in place, such as George W Bush’s “Son of Star Wars” programme, which can nuke us from outer space. We’ve seen the neocons (who believed Nixon’s problem in Vietnam was his unwillingness to use nuclear weapons) running the US and instigating the “war on terror”. It seems likely that they were willing to use nuclear weapons against Iran — but were prevented by the massive worldwide movement against war in Iraq.

We have seen the US-backed settler state in the Middle East, Israel, attack Palestine again and again, and we have seen Nato’s rivalry with Russia played out once again in Ukraine. President Obama, though he seemed so different from George W, has been driven to engage in numerous wars in his six years in office.

For the most part, wars since 1945 have not played out in capitalism's heartlands; it has been millions of people in poorer parts of the globe that have suffered the most. In part this is because of the growing interpenetration of the wealthiest parts of capitalism — Europe, the US and East Asia. Most capitalists will avoid destroying their own capital invested in other states if possible. Nonetheless, the logic of imperialism remains and will always drive capitalists to clash with each other.

This does not mean that cataclysmic nuclear world war is inevitable, but it does mean that the only way to ensure against it permanently is to do all we can to foster working class self-emancipation. This was the conclusion Lenin’s theory of imperialism led to — and it was the reality of what the Bolsheviks did in Russia during the First World War. They built an anti-imperialist movement from the factory floor up — and it ended the war on the Eastern Front.

#### Profit motive drives nuclear security mismanagement---makes inadvertent escalation structurally inevitable

Jay ‘20 [Paul Jay, founder of The Real News Network, “Risking the Apocalypse for Dollars,” July 3, 2020, https://theanalysis.news/risking-the-apocalypse-for-dollars-paul-jay/]

The people I have interviewed, from Daniel Ellsberg to Larry Wilkerson, who used to be Colin Powell’s chief of staff; I’ve seen interviews with the former diplomats, military people. They all think that nuclear war is not likely. They think it is assured. It’s not that there’s a chance, they think, of nuclear war. They think there is 100 % certainty that if things continue as they are at some point sooner, it could be today or tomorrow or later, it could be some years from now, there will be, at the very least, accidental nuclear war. The safeguards simply aren’t safe enough, and that this new investment, the new nuclear arms race that has started under Obama, but it’s also happening under Putin, driven by the military-industrial complexes of Russia and the United States, although the Americans are certainly more the instigators. But these whole new whack of nuclear weapons are coming online and the old ones that still exist and in deteriorating situations that are not safe, the possibility of accidental nuclear war is not possible, it is certain. They think the possibility of some kind of terrorist attack using dirty bombs could be mistaken for an attack by a major power. And if the dirty bomb went off in New York, as someone would have put a small nuclear bomb in a container ship and it blows up in New York Harbor, there’s only a 10 second window. We’re still on a hair-trigger alert between Russia and the United States. 10 seconds for the militaries of both countries to decide, if what just happened was an attack or terrorist attack, an accident, ten seconds.

Michael

All the people are not talking 10 minutes. You’re talking ten seconds.

Paul Jay

Ten seconds. Hair-trigger that on a radar map they see blips coming in to decide whether it’s geese or bombers. Everyone uses the same phrase. It is a miracle we are still here. The miracle is because, on several occasions, I think it’s close to a dozen If the protocols had been followed the soldiers who saw the blips or depending on the case, what the situation was. But they didn’t follow orders. And that’s why we’re still here talking about it. And I know if you want, I can give a couple examples of those cases.

Michael

Please do.

Paul Jay

I know it’s out there in the press somewhat, but I learned more about it in talking with Daniel Ellsberg. I’m working on a film with Ellsberg, which is kind of why I’m into this topic because before I started interviewing Ellsberg, I was in nuclear war denial as much as everybody else was. It was just not anywhere near the front of my consciousness. You know, all of this, I think when the Cold War ended, just kind of the whole anti-nuclear movement went away, and people thought, oh, well, you know, Russia and United States are going to get along now. They’ll figure out the old nukes and all this, and it just receded as an issue. But all the people that know the issue say it’s actually more dangerous now than it was during the Cold War. But Ellsberg woke me up to this. And one of the stories in his book, Doomsday Machine, and this documentary series I’m going to be doing is based on that book, it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a Russian submarine underneath the American ships as the American ships were blockading Cuba. What the Americans didn’t know is that the Russians had a protocol that if the submarine was out of contact with Moscow for 48 hours, if they couldn’t establish radio communication, they should assume nuclear war had broken out and fire. They had some kind of nuclear-tipped small missiles, and they were only 40 miles off the coast of the United States. And they should fire into the United States, assuming that Russia had been attacked, the Soviet Union had been attacked.

Well, while the Americans didn’t know about that protocol, what the Russians didn’t know is the Americans had figured out how to jam communication between the submarine and Moscow. So the communication does go down for 48 hours because it’s being jammed. The Russians don’t know that that’s the reason. The 48 hours go by, and it’s time to break out the envelopes that give the trigger orders to shoot order. So they bring out the envelope, and the protocol is three senior officers have to sign that they’ve agreed it’s appropriate to fire. So the captain signs, number two in command signs and then it’s up to the number three. Number three is the guy who’s the party official, and he represents the Soviet Communist Party on the ship, and he has to sign and he refuses. He says, “What if this is a technical problem?” And he actually gets disciplined when he gets home, but it’s only because he refused to sign that nuclear war didn’t break out during the Cuban crisis. And then there’s other examples like this both in Ellsberg’s book, and other places. We’re only here because a few people refused to follow orders. And it is a miracle.

Michael

Who owns the nuclear weapons production industry? And is it very profitable?

Paul Jay

Well, profit is what it’s all about, and this is what’s ridiculous. People have to understand how systemically dangerous capitalism is now. And this nothing says it more than the fact that it purely profits driving the nuclear war strategy of the United States. Daniel Ellsberg has a line which he says the nuclear weapons program after World War Two was a commercial subsidy for the aerospace industry. That there simply was no military justification to develop a nuclear weapons program after World War Two. He points to the ICBM. The whole ICBM program is obsolete. Billions and billions invested in the existing ICBM and new ICBM are coming online. But ICBM is, according to all the military experts that I’ve read, are easy targets. Intelligence on both sides, Russia and the United States and Chinese, for that matter. The Chinese are a little bit of an exception here because the Chinese have not built their nuclear force out anywhere near to the extent of Russia and the United States. But they know where the ICBM is, They’re essentially targets and they’re not that effective as a deterrent. What is effective as a deterrent are nuclear-armed submarines because they move around. It’s hard to track where they are and they have more than enough armaments to end life on Earth. But ICBM continues because they’re very expensive and the armaments industry makes tons of money out of making them. But if you want to go to the beginnings of this and understand the profit motive, I interviewed a guy named Lester Ernest and he was part of a program at M.I.T. in around 1959/1960.

He had joined the army. He got into the early computer program of the U.S. Army. When he got out, M.I.T. asked him to come and he started working on something called the Sage Radar System. And the Sage Radar System is in the Dr. Strangelove movie and maybe in some others. And you see this great big board where they can track incoming airplanes and then they supposedly know everything. And the Stage Radar System was connected to bomarc missiles. And what Sage would do is if Russian bombers were flying in, the computer system, and this was the largest gathering of computer power in the history of the world, at the time. And in fact, some of the technology that led to the creation of the Internet came out of the work done to develop the Sage radar system.

And they were going to track these bombers and then hit them with bomb arc missiles. And this gave everyone the assurance that the United States would be safe with developing their own nuclear armaments threat. And this defense system, they didn’t have to worry. There was even an underlying suggestion that the United States could conduct a first strike against the Soviet Union and still be safe because of sage and the Bomarc missiles.

So anyway, Lester goes to work at M.I.T. and he gets there in two or three days. And he turns to one of his colleagues and he says, ‘How did you guys figure out the radar jamming systems?’ Because we know the Soviet planes and our planes, everybody’s got radar jamming now. And Lester told me and I have this on camera, Lester says, ‘There’s a long silence. And the guy says to him, well, we didn’t really figure that out. And Lester says, ‘Well, then none of this works. And the guy says, well, we don’t talk about that,’. The whole thing was a fraud. They spent in today’s dollars a trillion dollars over about 25 years. And the whole thing was a scam. And the manufacturers of the Sage Radar System, the manufacturer of the bomarc missiles, which they then, this is another great one. I love this one. Lesters has to go to Congress. And this is asked by the armaments people, some of the Pentagon people, to go to Congress and get them to agree that the Bomark missiles that are going to shoot down these Soviet planes should be armed with nuclear missiles, nuclear warheads. I said to Lester, I said, ‘hold on for a second, so you’re gonna go to Congress and get them to recommend that Soviet bombers flying over Canada and the United States with nuclear weapons are going to be hit by missiles with nuclear weapons’. And all this is going to happen over Canadian and American territory. And this is making everyone safe. I said, I’m sorry excuse my language, ‘That’s F’ing insane’, and Lester says, ‘Of course it’s insane’. I said, ‘did you do it?’ He said, ‘yeah, I went and they agreed. And the Bomarc missiles were armed with nuclear-tipped nuclear missiles’. I said, ‘why did you do it?’. He said, ‘you know, we were just at that point in it for the money. We all thought we were all going to die. We all thought nuclear war was going to end everything. And we were just so cynical and we were getting paid so much. And the whole culture was about money sloshing around the manufacturers of the radar, the weapons and so on. The Pentagon, everybody was in on it and we went along with it’. He’s since regrets at all. He became the founder of the artificial intelligence lab at Stanford University and fought for open source and against trademark and copyrights and things. It kind of woke him up eventually.

But this whole fraud is at the heart of nuclear war planning. As we know that that nuclear war doesn’t now just mean the destruction of all the major cities of the United States, the Soviet Union, of course, Europe is gone. But it used to be thought, oh, well, that’s only the northern hemisphere. At least humans will survive in the southern hemisphere. Well, that’s not true either. It’s now pretty clear that there’ll be something called nuclear winter and that the firestorms created by the burning of the cities will create so much smoke and ash in the atmosphere, that will be the end of agriculture all around the globe. And this business, the manufacturing of the nuclear weapons, the Pentagon strategists, Congress that buys into it, Obama and then Trump and of course, all of the presidents since Truman. They go along with this because of the pressure of the military-industrial complex and the whole culture of proving that America’s the greatest Hegemon and so on. It’s put life on Earth at risk. But while there are political considerations, geopolitical considerations, this is still the grand chessboard for the people that think about these things. The heart of it is money making.

Michael

We’ve got about ten more minutes, Paul. I’ve got three more questions for you. Does America’s dominant global commercial position depend on military might, including the nuclear arsenal?

Paul Jay

That’s a good question. It certainly doesn’t depend on the nuclear arsenal, really. But that’s not to say the nuclear arsenal isn’t used. It is used as a threat against non-nuclear countries. Take Iran. There’s always sort of in the back of the confrontational discourse between the United States and Iran, the threat that a tactical nuclear weapon could be used against Iran. And in fact, Sheldon Adelson, the billionaire who is the big supporter of the far-right forces in Israel, and he helped elect Trump, he’s the one that financed Trump. He’s actually said on a panel in 2013, in New York, that the United States should seriously consider dropping a tactical nuclear weapon in an Iranian desert to send the Iranians a message of what’s in store for them. And as insane as that is, and insane as Sheldon Adelson is. Sheldon Adelson has the ear of Donald Trump. And even before that, Adelson had the ear of very powerful Republicans that he would donate money to. So nuclear weapons are a threat to help enforce American dominance but it’s not needed. Is the military might needed? Well, look at the inroads China’s making. China’s become the greatest trading partner of Brazil. It’s the number two or number one trading partner of every other country in Latin America. It’s ahead of the United States now in Africa. It certainly competes with and in many countries is ahead of commercial relationships throughout Asia. So where is this great military machine preventing the growth of the commercial power of China? It’s not. So the competition for a commercial hegemony, commercial global dominance, the military may be in the older days played that kind of role where Americans would directly go intervene with American troops and do regime change and get a pro-American regime. But how’d that work out in Iraq? They not only did not get a pro-American government, they did not even get control of the oil in Iraq. Interestingly enough, Chinese oil companies last I saw had more contracts than the American ones did because of the great anti-American sentiment amongst the Iraqi people. They got a government in Iraq that’s at least as aligned with Iran as it is with the United States.

You know, those days of being able to just go in and get regime change, like look at Libya. Libya was a grab. Libyan war was about Libyan oil, obviously. Well, whichever’s chaos and the Russians are making a big inroad in Libyan oil. So where is it that the military supports such commercial dominance? I’m not saying it doesn’t do anything. I’m sure in some situations the power of the American armed forces, certainly in the Middle East, where they in Bahrain, where they have a big fleet. The fact that the army is right there, it helps prop up the monarchy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. It’s not that it doesn’t play any role, but it doesn’t play that significant role because every time they actually try to use the military to intervene, it’s a debacle.

Michael

Paul Jay. Why, in this time of the COVID 19 pandemic, the great civil unrest, 40 million people unemployed, why is this a good time to raise the issue of nuclear disarmament?

Paul Jay

Well, because the threat is so imminent and most people have no sense of it at all. Even on the left, when I tell people I’m working on a film with Ellsberg about the Doomsday Machine, they raise their eyebrows and say, well, we’ve lived we’ve survived it this long. There’s no reason to think we won’t survive it longer. And the climate is far more dangerous an issue with the climate crisis. And, well, I would say the answer’s two things. One is, would you do want to trust a class political institutions that couldn’t deal with a virus with nuclear weapons and Armageddon? You’re going to trust our fate to those people? They couldn’t prepare for a virus that they knew about for years. These are the people you’re going to trust with the survival of humans. The second reason I say why now is I think the pandemic has made the unthinkable thinkable. This idea, even though we knew there was a pandemic coming, it just wasn’t real, it was abstract. The same way climate change is still abstract for so many people. But it’s a dose of reality and it’s a shredding of the sort of bubble that entertainment culture creates that we’re all, you know, as long as you’re not poor, as long as you’re not a poor person of color, life is OK and okay, enough that it’s better to just live in the comfort of denial. Well, the pandemic has broken down a lot of that comfort of denial. The other thing about the issue of nuclear weapons, while there are some immediate issues that need to be demanded, for example, the elimination of ICBM’s, the reduction at the very least of nuclear weapons down to 10 or 20 at the max, enough that you could say there’s a deterrent because Ellsberg believes you just can’t win the argument at this stage of not having any weapons at all. But you make the situation so much safer if you’re down to 10 or 20 and not thousands.

So that’s an immediate issue. But when you go beyond that kind of issue, the solution to the problem of the nuclear threat is the same solution as it is for climate crisis. Frankly, it’s the same solution for dealing with future pandemics. It’s the same solution for dealing with poverty. We have to deal with who has power. We have to deal with democratizing the economy and the development of converting military production to green production and democratizing politics. And it’s all about developing, I think, public economic institutions, starting with banking as a public utility and eroding the power of Wall Street. Because you asked who owns the nuclear armaments manufacturing companies?

Well, the same companies that interesting enough on the media, the same institutional investors, BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, the other big asset managers and financial institutions that own 93% of the New York Times own Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, the 12 companies that are the major manufacturers of nuclear weapons are all primarily owned by the same institutional investors that control, ready for this, 90% of the S&P 500. The concentration of ownership that’s taken place since 2007/08 crisis where these massive asset management companies like BlackRock, led by this guy, Larry Fink, who might be Biden’s secretary of the Treasury.

BlackRock is the company that just got handed the contract by the Federal Reserve to dole out this trillion to 700 billion or trillion. I can’t remember the number, to corporations, and so on. They own the companies that make all the weapons, including nuclear weapons. The same companies own the majority controlling interest of all the major fossil fuel companies, except for Total from France. They owned all the major corporate media, with the exception of Bloomberg, which is privately owned, and the Washington Post, which is privately owned. But everything that’s publicly owned is controlled by the same massive asset management companies. And it’s not like this is the evil Dr. Strangelove. These guys are just, that’s what they do.

They invest and they need maximum return on their capital. Like whose money is BlackRock investing? Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, billionaires’ money. Between the three top asset management companies, they control 14 trillion dollars. That’s more than the GDP of China. Bloomberg says by 2020, their going to control more assets than the GDP of the United States. It’s a machine. It’s a blind machine. The way this capitalism works. The consciousness it creates in the people that are the elites and the people that manage these big institutions, they may individually understand how bloody insane it is, just the way Lester Earnest understood how insane the Sage Radar System was. But they can’t stop doing it. It’s just what it is and who they are. It only changes with a mass movement that demands these kinds of economic and democratic reforms with power in the streets that far surpasses what we’re seeing and far more conscious, not burning down buildings for no reason, but millions and millions of people in the streets combined with an electoral strategy to elect progressive candidates. And if we don’t do it, we’re doomed.

### FW---Creativity DA

#### Creativity DA---their model trains debaters never to question geopolitical, political, or economic structure, bc you can never have a true “cap good/bad” or “heg good/bad” debate under plan focus---that forecloses the ability to develop creative solutions to global problems, and is independently key to value to life

Herrine ’20 [Luke; September 14; PhD Candidate at Yale Law School; “A tribute to David Graeber,” https://lpeproject.org/blog/david-graeber-tribute/]

Graeber’s lesson is not that once we see the arbitrariness of our institutions we should come to realize that we have no obligations to each other and disobey anything that do not fully endorse in the moment. Rather, to borrow a trick from the Marxian account of (commodity) fetishism: we should not become alienated from our own (social) labor. We create/reproduce the social forms that shape our lives, and we can recreate them in an infinite number of ways. But that does not mean social forms do not have power over us. There is no way to create a world without social forms that are somehow outside of our power.

This account–to the extent I have done it any justice–names exactly the sort of dynamic that the American Legal Realists and their allies in Europe were getting at.

Realism is often treated as a pure form of functionalism: the internal logic of socio-legal forms should be ignored in favor of asking how a given legal rule serves broader policy goals. Law and economics has claimed the mantle of realism under this guise: all legal rules should be seen as instrumental to the maximization of an exogenously defined social welfare function. CLS has done so in a different way: taking legal forms too seriously is a form of false consciousness to avoid confronting the real, deep, existential-moral question of how to strive for a society totally free of alienation and domination. When liberal legal theorists talk about realism, it is usually just the slogan “every legal question is actually a policy question” that they have in mind.

Graeber’s essay on fetish should help to encourage the alternative possibility that being against the reification of existing legal forms is not to abandon the importance of forms altogether. Doing so requires embracing paradox, but the paradox is merely a feature of living in a world of our own creation. We need illusions and performances even if we know they are “only” illusions and performances.

It is not a coincidence that Karl Llewellyn, on page 454 of “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step” calls the “realistic” approach to legal analysis “of a piece with the work of the modern ethnographer.”

What Lewellyn was after was a way to make sense of the fact that legal practice depends on dividing up the world into relatively stable social forms and yet it must avoid the “tendency of the crystallized legal concept [or form] to persist after the fact model from which the concept [or form] was once derived.” What is required, then, is “constant back-checking of the category against the data, to see whether the data are present in the form suggested by the category-name.” For example: does the legal form/concept “employee”, developed, as it was, with certain assumptions about how industry would be organized, still serve in a fissured world when those assumptions no longer hold (assuming they ever did)?

Graeber goes much further than Llewellyn does–a different both of disciplinary and political proclivity. He wants not just a more flexible form of jurisprudence (which an older Llewellyn would refer to as “The Grand Style”), but a world more like that which existed on the northwest coast of Africa before the Europeans pillaged it:

a world of almost constant social creativity; in which few arrangements [are] fixed and permanent, and, even more, where there [is] little feeling that they really should be fixed and permanent; in which, in short, people were indeed in a constant process of imagining new social arrangements and then trying to bring them into being. Gods could be created, and discarded or fade away, because social arrangements themselves were never assumed to be immutable.

### FW---Revolutionary Possibility DA

#### Revolutionary Possibility DA---The assumptions that ground our debates predetermine the scope of alternative futures we can imagine, which means that you should accept the neg’s ability to fiat seemingly fringe possibilities to enable debaters to question basic assumptions and enable creative social transformations --- empirically these have thwarted imperialist warmongering

**Graeber 13** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse,” *The Baffler,* No. 22, April 2013, <https://thebaffler.com/salvos/a-practical-utopians-guide-to-the-coming-collapse>]

What is a revolution? We used to think we knew. Revolutions were seizures of power by popular forces aiming to transform the very nature of the political, social, and economic system in the country in which the revolution took place, usually according to some visionary dream of a just society. Nowadays, we live in an age when, if rebel armies do come sweeping into a city, or mass uprisings overthrow a dictator, it’s unlikely to have any such implications; when profound social transformation does occur—as with, say, the rise of feminism—it’s likely to take an entirely different form. It’s not that revolutionary dreams aren’t out there. But contemporary revolutionaries rarely think they can bring them into being by some modern-day equivalent of storming the Bastille. At moments like this, it generally pays to go back to the history one already knows and ask: Were revolutions ever really what we thought them to be? For me, the person who has asked this most effectively is the great world historian Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that for the last quarter millennium or so, revolutions have consisted above all of planetwide transformations of political common sense. Already by the time of the French Revolution, Wallerstein notes, there was a single world market, and increasingly a single world political system as well, dominated by the huge colonial empires. As a result, the storming of the Bastille in Paris could well end up having effects on Denmark, or even Egypt, just as profound as on France itself—in some cases, even more so. Hence he speaks of the “world revolution of 1789,” followed by the “world revolution of 1848,” which saw revolutions break out almost simultaneously in fifty countries, from Wallachia to Brazil. In no case did the revolutionaries succeed in taking power, but afterward, institutions inspired by the French Revolution—notably, universal systems of primary education—were put in place pretty much everywhere. Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world revolution ultimately responsible for the New Deal and European welfare states as much as for Soviet communism. The last in the series was the world revolution of 1968—which, much like 1848, broke out almost everywhere, from China to Mexico, seized power nowhere, but nonetheless changed everything. This was a revolution against state bureaucracies, and for the inseparability of personal and political liberation, whose most lasting legacy will likely be the birth of modern feminism. Revolutions are thus planetary phenomena. But there is more. What they really do is transform basic assumptions about what politics is ultimately about. In the wake of a revolution, ideas that had been considered veritably lunatic fringe quickly become the accepted currency of debate. Before the French Revolution, the ideas that change is good, that government policy is the proper way to manage it, and that governments derive their authority from an entity called “the people” were considered the sorts of things one might hear from crackpots and demagogues, or at best a handful of freethinking intellectuals who spend their time debating in cafés. A generation later, even the stuffiest magistrates, priests, and headmasters had to at least pay lip service to these ideas. Before long, we had reached the situation we are in today: that it’s necessary to lay out the terms for anyone to even notice they are there. They’ve become common sense, the very grounds of political discussion. Until 1968, most world revolutions really just introduced practical refinements: an expanded franchise, universal primary education, the welfare state. The world revolution of 1968, in contrast—whether it took the form it did in China, of a revolt by students and young cadres supporting Mao’s call for a Cultural Revolution; or in Berkeley and New York, where it marked an alliance of students, dropouts, and cultural rebels; or even in Paris, where it was an alliance of students and workers—was a rebellion against bureaucracy, conformity, or anything that fettered the human imagination, a project for the revolutionizing of not just political or economic life, but every aspect of human existence. As a result, in most cases, the rebels didn’t even try to take over the apparatus of state; they saw that apparatus as itself the problem. It’s fashionable nowadays to view the social movements of the late sixties as an embarrassing failure. A case can be made for that view. It’s certainly true that in the political sphere, the immediate beneficiary of any widespread change in political common sense—a prioritizing of ideals of individual liberty, imagination, and desire; a hatred of bureaucracy; and suspicions about the role of government—was the political Right. Above all, the movements of the sixties allowed for the mass revival of free market doctrines that had largely been abandoned since the nineteenth century. It’s no coincidence that the same generation who, as teenagers, made the Cultural Revolution in China was the one who, as forty-year-olds, presided over the introduction of capitalism. Since the eighties, “freedom” has come to mean “the market,” and “the market” has come to be seen as identical with capitalism—even, ironically, in places like China, which had known sophisticated markets for thousands of years, but rarely anything that could be described as capitalism. The ironies are endless. While the new free market ideology has framed itself above all as a rejection of bureaucracy, it has, in fact, been responsible for the first administrative system that has operated on a planetary scale, with its endless layering of public and private bureaucracies: the IMF, World Bank, WTO, trade organizations, financial institutions, transnational corporations, NGOs. This is precisely the system that has imposed free market orthodoxy, and opened the world to financial pillage, under the watchful aegis of American arms. It only made sense that the first attempt to recreate a global revolutionary movement, the Global Justice Movement that peaked between 1998 and 2003, was effectively a rebellion against the rule of that very planetary bureaucracy. Future Stop In retrospect, though, I think that later historians will conclude that the legacy of the sixties revolution was deeper than we now imagine, and that the triumph of capitalist markets and their various planetary administrators and enforcers—which seemed so epochal and permanent in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—was, in fact, far shallower. I’ll take an obvious example. One often hears that antiwar protests in the late sixties and early seventies were ultimately failures, since they did not appreciably speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. But afterward, those controlling U.S. foreign policy were so anxious about being met with similar popular unrest—and even more, with unrest within the military itself, which was genuinely falling apart by the early seventies—that they refused to commit U.S. forces to any major ground conflict for almost thirty years. It took 9/11, an attack that led to thousands of civilian deaths on U.S. soil, to fully overcome the notorious “Vietnam syndrome”—and even then, the war planners made an almost obsessive effort to ensure the wars were effectively protest-proof. Propaganda was incessant, the media was brought on board, experts provided exact calculations on body bag counts (how many U.S. casualties it would take to stir mass opposition), and the rules of engagement were carefully written to keep the count below that.

### FW---Agency DA

#### Agency DA---forcing teams to defend radical alternatives provides them with both the desire and ability to inaugurate change---only our model spills up

Rahman ’16 [K. Sabeel; June; Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School; Texas Law Review, “Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?,” 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1329]

The creation of new regulatory institutions to implement these economic policies and to govern the modern economy points to another set of strategies employed by Progressive Era thinkers to counteract domination: changes to the structure of the political process. The creation of regulatory agencies and commissions at state, local, and national levels offered reformers the hope of an effective new tool for managing the increasingly complex modern economy, asserting the public good against powerful private actors such as trusts or corporations, and sidestepping the problems of political corruption and capture within legislatures. To expand democratic agency to counteract economic domination, these reformers effectively reinvented the fundamental structure of the political process itself, creating new channels for the expression of popular sovereignty. Thus reformers succeeded in institutionalizing ballot, recall, initiative, and referendum procedures in many state constitutions from 1890 to 1912. 85 Others established, for the first time, home rule powers for local government bodies as a way to expand participation and bypass the corruption of state legislatures and party machines. 86

In a similar vein, today we might address the problem of disparate political power by seeking alternative vehicles for democratic collective action through which to build the power of ordinary citizens and communities. The battle for reviving democratic accountability and responsiveness is not exhausted by a sole focus on campaign finance reform or voting rights, though of course both are critical to rebalancing political power. There are other forms of building democratic political power. Today, we see a similar revival of interest in cities as spaces for policy experimentation, as offering smaller-scale footholds where reformers can put into practice alternative economic arrangements, with an eye towards larger national debate and eventual policy change. 87

Regulatory agencies, though often understood in technocratic, expertise-oriented terms, might similarly become spaces for democratic action, participation, and accountability. Recent developments in legal history document the ways in which regulatory agencies have served as critical spaces in which democratic politics have taken place, and modern policy regimes and normative understandings of rights have been forged out of contestation between different stakeholders and policymakers. 88 Administrative agencies are therefore routinely in the forefront of developing novel applications of moral and political claims that we might otherwise think are the province of legislatures and courts, from the administration of welfare benefits to the implementation of fair-housing principles. 89 Such "administrative constitutionalism" involves the creative interpretation and evolution of legal norms and moral-rights claims by bureaucrats faced with pressure from social movements, often operating beyond or even despite the commands of the President, Congress, or the courts. 90

Agencies can be reformed to provide more direct forms of stakeholder representation. 91 In both cities and regulation, we also see attempts to create more participatory policymaking processes that can help redress disparities of influence and power, from participatory budgeting to technology-facilitated modes of voice and citizen monitoring of government actions. 92

Finally, across both of these domains of economic and political restructuring, a key driver of redressing power comes from the mobilization and organization of social movements. If the reform politics of the Progressive Era and the critique of domination were interrelated with the emergence of the antitrust movement, labor republicanism, populism, and urban reformism, the prospects for economic and political restructuring today depend crucially on new forms of civic power developed by movements and civil society organizations. 93 Many activists and reformers in this period sought to mobilize citizens through political association as a way to create a more equitable balance of political power. 94

IV. Constitutional Political Economy and Fourth-Wave Legal Realism

This admittedly brief recasting of legal realist and Progressive Era thought highlights some valuable starting points for developing an alternative conceptualization of political economy. While there is much more to be said about how exactly we might adapt and apply antidomination regulatory strategies like antitrust and public utility or expand democratic agency through urban, regulatory, or social-movement-driven governance, for our purposes what matters is this central conceptual framework animating these different approaches to reconstituting economic and political processes. In this framework, the problem of capitalism is understood as a problem of domination and economic power. The response to such power must entail attempts to expand the democratic capacities of citizens. This approach to political economy offers a substantive alternative to the laissez-faire political economy of the Roberts Court. It also importantly departs from conventional traditions of New Deal liberalism. While the New Deal, in many ways, gave voice and reality to Progressive Era aspirations for expanded government regulation of the economy and for creating economic opportunity through the forging of the modern social contract, it also represented a significantly thinner vision of political economy, placing too much emphasis on economic growth and technocratic management in place of more robust commitments to full economic equality, inclusion, and democracy. 95 The focus on domination and democracy suggests a more far-reaching vision of political economy.

What, then, is the relationship between constitutionalism and this antidomination, democratic-agency account of political economy? The Progressive Era thinkers, referenced above as catalysts for constructing this vision of political economy, were also notably hostile to courts and judges. 96 While we may temper somewhat our own views of the judiciary in comparison to theirs, we can take note of the theory of change suggested by Progressive Era reformers. Certainly there are important points of tangency between the kind of economic and political restructuring needed to redress problems of domination and expand democratic agency and major interpretive battles over the Constitution itself, from campaign finance to voting rights to class actions and questions of congressional power and federalism, not to mention the continued battles over equality, discrimination, and fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But this account suggests a different mode of constitutionalism and social change - one where courts might still play a role, but a secondary and downstream one. At the level of ideas, it was the intellectual battle over laissez faire that was paramount; for the Progressives this meant unmasking the realities of power operating under the surface in the market economy and arguing for the value of popular sovereignty. At the same time, change also manifested through reforms that focused on the underlying structures of economy and politics - through attempts to shift the basic legislative, regulatory, and legal foundations of modern capitalism. The primary sites of contest are therefore in the realms of public philosophy, legislation, and regulatory governance.

Constitutionalism appears at two levels. First, it appears at the level of fundamental values. The critique of domination and the value of democratic agency help give further content to core moral values of equality, freedom, and democracy that animate so much of constitutional discourse. The second way in which this account of political economy is constitutional stems from its view of how power is distributed and can be reallocated: through radical changes to the basic structure of economic and political order. Thus, while many of the Progressive Era thinkers profiled above were deeply skeptical of judges and courts, they nevertheless offered a constitutional vision of political economy in this particular sense. Their constitutionalism was not the constitutionalism of text, interpretation, and doctrine. Rather, their account sought to make real fundamental public values of freedom, democracy, and equality; and it sought to do so through reforms that would literally reconstitute basic economic, political, and social structures to make these values real. From economic structural changes like antitrust and public utility regulation to radically different political structures like regulatory agencies and municipal Home Rule, the democratic political economy excavated above was thus deeply constitutional.

This is not the "big-C" constitutionalism of constitutional text, doctrine, or Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is rather what we might think of as the "small-c" constitutionalism of our basic economic and political structures: how we constitute the market economy through laws that define its basic forces and dynamics, and how we constitute the polity through regulations and processes that shape the allocation of political power. So on this understanding of constitutionalism, looking for a constitutional claim of right under the constitutional text is, in a sense, looking in the wrong place. Instead, constitutional political economy has its impact by informing diagnosis, critique, and reform through the vectors of legislation, regulation, and social movements. Thus, we might turn to the constitution of the market, looking to legislative and regulatory regimes like antitrust and public utility to curb private power. We might see the impact of constitutional political economy in efforts to rebalance the political power of new forms of worker association and grassroots social movements, and more democratically participatory vehicles for governance and policymaking through regulation and local government. We might also see shifting public discourse and norms through the contestation and mobilization of civil society and social movement actors.

There is an important reason why we might want to understand constitutionalism in this way - as values and as basic structure. Reconceptualizing constitutionalism and constitutional political economy in this vein helps pull the high politics of constitutionalism outside of its narrow province in the courts and in constitutional theory, deemphasizing the primacy of courts, doctrine, and text. It also helps to elevate legislation, regulation, public philosophy, and social movements as sites of law, politics, and contestation that implicate our most critical normative values and shape our most foundational economic and political structures. These are not merely domains of "ordinary politics" or technical public policy. Imbuing them with the stature of constitutionalism appropriately elevates the moral and structural concerns that are at stake in these domains.

Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's forthcoming The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution and the Essays in this Symposium represent exactly this kind of effort to reimagine our fundamental constitutional values of democracy and equality in context of our New Gilded Age of economic and political inequality. Their account of constitutional political economy is most compelling in these two senses: as engaging the fundamental moral questions of what freedom, opportunity, and democracy mean in today's society, and as securing this moral vision through laws that alter the basic structure of our economy and politics. Such moral and structural change can be accomplished through a particular approach to law and social change, prioritizing the synergies between normative arguments, social movements, and legislative and regulatory changes to the basic structure. Nor are Fishkin and Forbath alone in this. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and in the face of the Roberts Court, this emerging wave of legal scholarship can open up a variety of avenues for deeper critique and reform. While some of these legal and policy arguments do involve battles in the Supreme Court, many of them take place more directly on the terrain of regulation, legislation, state-and local-level policy, and social movement advocacy.

Indeed, this wave of legal scholarship might be considered another heir to the legal realism of the earlytwentieth century. Like the legal realists of a century ago, there is a growing cascade of scholarship that takes as its focus the investigation of the deep underlying structures of our economy and political process, and is closely linked with questions of public policy and social change. In addition to this very Symposium, consider for example the rich new scholarship unpacking the legal and intellectual foundations of political economy and modern capitalism, 97 or the booming scholarship since the 2008-2009 financial crisis on how law constitutes the financial system, and how this system can be reconstituted to create a better balance between private power and public values. 98 We also are seeing new literature on political-process design in the context of regulatory agencies, in particular, along the front lines of participatory and democratic institutional design. 99 Many other areas of law might be cited as well. The point is that, like the legal realists reacting to the First Gilded Age, we see in legal scholarship today a wide array of scholars in diverse subfields employing different methodologies to critique, unpack, and deconstruct contemporary political economy - all with an eye towards deconstructing problematic forms of economic and political power - and recovering the ideas, policies, and reforms that might shift us in a more democratic and egalitarian direction.

In context of the broader moral challenges of political and economic inequality, these trends suggest what we might call a "fourth wave" of legal realism. Conventionally, the legal realist movement is understood to have two primary successors, each of which revolutionized legal scholarship: law and economics, and critical legal studies. Each of these movements in turn developed a key aspect of the original legal realist method, yet faced important limitations as they developed. The turn to empirical social science and expertise is modeled by the rise of law and economics, while the antiformalist critique has helped fuel the deconstructive project of critical legal studies. 100 Yet the law-and-economics revolution of the late twentieth century, with its focus on efficiency, welfare, and neoclassical economic models, has been rightly criticized as a revived formalism. 101 Similarly, the antiformalism of legal realism was more deeply developed by the critical legal studies (CLS) movement, 102 which unmasked the many ways in which law reproduced hierarchies of power and unfreedom. Yet CLS suffered from its own limitations: while it was effectively disruptive of both legal-process and law-and-economics accounts, as a whole it ultimately did not provide a constructive alternative vision for a more egalitarian and democratic political economy. As Roberto Unger himself argued, CLS "largely failed in its most important task: to turn legal thought into a source of insight into the established institutional and ideological structure of society and into a source of ideas about alternative social regimes." 103

In the last twenty-five years or so, there has been a third wave of legal realism, a hybrid combination of these two heirs into a more pragmatic focus on policy and institutional design. Legal realism in this wave manifested itself, in the leveraging of behavioral, empirical, and institutional analysis, to suggest changes to policy-making processes to make them more efficient and just. 104 This third wave of legal realism repurposed the critique of formalism as a way to open space for policy expertise - expertise which can be achieved by leveraging the insights of social science, including law and economics. 105 The critical project of revealing how law constructs inequalities along racial, gendered, or class lines is, therefore, now paired with an analytical focus on policy design, and on assessing comparative institutional competencies. 106 Similarly, the insights of law and economics, on this view, can be seen not as a hostile ideology against democratic or egalitarian values, but rather as a way to analyze micro-scale behaviors and macro-scale costs and benefits of different institutional systems. 107

But as the anxieties about neo-Lochnerism and the Supreme Court underscore, the challenges for law and public discourse in this New Gilded Age of economic and political inequality go beyond the scope of pragmatic policy design. We need to harness these institutional design insights towards the substantive ends of counteracting domination, rebalancing economic and political power, expanding opportunity, and reviving democratic agency. The techniques of contemporary legal scholarship, from behavioral analyses to contextually rich studies of law and society to comparative institutional analyses, offer tremendous potential. But absent a fuller engagement with the normative question of values, these approaches risk falling into an overly narrow or seemingly neutral policy science. 108 A fourth wave of legal realism could build on these traditions, linking the analysis of underlying ideas and structures to a substantive moral vision of democratic political economy.

The import of this kind of a project points to a final mode in which we might understand this focus on values and structures as "constitutional" - in the political aspiration to literally reconstitute American political economy today. The timing of Fishkin and Forbath's project - and of the remarkable confluence of scholarly interest in issues of inequality, power, structure, and democracy on display at the symposium - suggests as much. Arguably we find ourselves in a unique moment today, often referred to as a "Second Gilded Age," where the country faces a confluence of economic and political inequality. But I suspect that the reason why so many scholars are gravitating towards these questions of inequality, exclusion, oligarchy, and power is because many of us sense that this moment is also unique in its capacity to shift - perhaps radically - our broad understandings and structures of political economy. We are living in a moment of rupture. And so the stakes of this moment are not just in its negative dimensions, in the problems of inequality and disparities of power and opportunity we see all around us. The stakes are in the as-yet-unrealized potential for the emergence of new constitutional understandings and basic structures. We may be in a Second Gilded Age, but done right, the politics and potential of this moment could be a Third Reconstruction - or a new refounding.

The Populists, Progressives, and Labor Republicans of the late nineteenth century certainly understood themselves as participating in a battle to redefine the fundamental and literal constitution of the country (the 1892 People's Party platform, for example, styled itself deliberately as a Second Declaration of Independence). This ferment eventually produced the ideas that became the New Deal settlement a generation later. These projects of constitutional political economy appearing in a variety of forms and disciplines in legal scholarship today could help contribute, in some small way, to a similar constitutional shift - one that, if we are lucky and if done right, would not merely recreate the New Deal settlement, but instead reinvent it for a radically different social, economic, and political context.

### Alt---AT: Vague Alts / Multi-Actor Fiat / Etc.

#### Alts should be able to fiat a general increase in the scope and intensity of their movements:

#### Their theory args perniciously reinforces ideologies that indoctrinate us into adapting elitist and nationalist values. Movement fiat is a more predictable basis for a model of debate than USFG action

**Graeber 18** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, *Bullshit Jobs*, Simon & Schuster: London, New York (2018), p. 270-1]

Another reason I hesitate to make policy suggestions is that I am suspicious of the very idea of policy. Policy implies the existence of an elite group—government officials, typically—that gets to decide on something (“a policy”) that they then arrange to be imposed on everybody else. There’s a little mental trick we often play on ourselves when discussing such matters. We say, for instance, “What are we going to do about the problem of X?” as if “we” were society as a whole, somehow acting on ourselves, but, in fact, unless we happen to be part of that roughly 3 percent to 5 percent of the population whose views actually do affect policy makers, this is all a game of make-believe; we are identifying with our rulers when, in fact, we’re the ones being ruled. This is what happens when we watch a politician on television say “What shall we do about the less fortunate?” even though at least half of us would almost certainly fit that category ourselves. Myself, I find such games particularly pernicious because I’d prefer not to have policy elites around at all. I’m personally an anarchist, which means that, not only do I look forward to a day sometime in the future when governments, corporations, and the rest will be looked at as historical curiosities in the same way as we now look at the Spanish Inquisition or nomadic invasions, but I prefer solutions to immediate problems that do not give more power to governments or corporations, but rather, give people the means to manage their own affairs. It follows that when faced with a social problem my impulse is not to imagine myself in charge, and ponder what sort of solutions I would then impose, but to look for a movement already out there, already trying to address the problem and create its own solutions. The problem of bullshit jobs, though presents unusual challenges in this regard. There are no anti–bullshit job movements. This is partly because most people don’t acknowledge the proliferation of bullshit jobs to be a problem, but also because even if they did, it would be difficult to organize a movement around such a problem. What local initiatives might such a movement propose?

#### That elite ideological indoctrination precludes the creative solution-building necessary to concoct alternative arrangements of global political economy

**Graeber 4** [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street who coined the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, teaches anthropology at the London School of Economics, activist whose direct action campaigns before OWS includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology,* Prickly Paradigm Press: Chicago, IL (2004), p. 9-10]

against policy (a tiny manifesto): The notion of “policy” presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on others. “Policy” is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can achieve is to limit the damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own affairs. So in this case, the question becomes: What sort of social theory would actually be of interest to those who are trying to help bring about a world in which people are free to govern their own affairs? This is what this pamphlet is mainly about. For starters, I would say any such theory would have to begin with some initial assumptions. Not many. Probably just two. First, it would have to proceed from the assumption that, as the Brazilian folk song puts it, “another world is possible.” That institutions like the state, capitalism, racism and male dominance are not inevitable; that it would be possible to have a world in which these things would not exist, and that we’d all be better off as a result. To commit oneself to such a principle is almost an act of faith, since how can one have certain knowledge of such matters? It might possibly turn out that such a world is not possible. But one could also make the argument that it’s this very unavailability of absolute knowledge which makes a commitment to optimism a moral imperative: Since one cannot know a radically better world is not possible, are we not betraying everyone by insisting on continuing to justify, and reproduce, the mess we have today? And anyway, even if we’re wrong, we might well get a lot closer.

#### Aff is utopian/vague/multi-actor fiat---it wouldn’t happen either---no threshold for when it becomes too utopian or too many private actors

#### The alt is less utopian

Ringsmuth et. al ’22 — Andrew, PostDoc at the Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change, the University of Graz; Illona Otto; Bart van den Hurk, Glad Lahn, Christopher Reyer, Timothy Carter, Piotr Magnuszewski, Irene Monsasterolo, Jeroen Aerts, Magnus Benzie, Emanuele Campiglio, Stefan Fronzek, Franziska Gaupp, Lukasz Jarzabek, Richard Klein, Hanne Knaepen, Reinhard Mechler, Jaroslav Mysiak, Jana Sillmann, Dana Stuparu, Chris West; January 11, 2022; “Lessons from COVID-19 for managing transboundary climate risks and building resilience”; Climate Risk Management; Vol. 35, pg. 7; Accessed via ScienceDirect

A growing literature is now exploring options for so-called degrowth, which aims to promote human wellbeing and ecological resilience without requiring GDP growth (Hickel et al., 2021; Kallis, 2017; Keyßer and Lenzen, 2021; Wiedmann et al., 2020; Kallis, 2020). The experiences of the last few years, including COVID-19, may have shifted public understanding and opinion on these issues, especially in richer countries, which are best placed to lead with new policies. In a recent survey of people in G20 countries, 74% of respondents supported the idea that their country’s economic priorities should move beyond profit and increasing wealth to focus more on human wellbeing and ecological protection (Gaffney et al., 2021). Overcoming the research-implementation gap remains a challenge, however. We do not yet know how degrowth policies could be adopted at scale or how they would interact with our current economic processes and patterns of behaviour. Nonetheless, our climate predicament demands openness to new approaches. To better understand the options, further research into basic relations between societal metabolism and social-ecological wellbeing is crucial (Haberl et al., 2019; Hagens, 2020; King, 2020; Leiva and Schramski, 2020; Schramski et al., 2015; West, 2018; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2015; Garrett et al., 2020; Giampietro et al., 2013; Ringsmuth et al., 2016). Although the many challenges and risks associated with a fundamental economic transition are formidable, arguably, they may be overcome on the time scale of a human life (decades).4 Conversely, the risks associated with ever more radiative forcing as we avoid adequately reducing emissions include transitions of the Earth system to inhospitable states that may not be reversible on the time scales of civilisations (centuries to millennia) (Lenton et al., 2019; Steffen et al., 2018). The growing literature on tipping dynamics in socioeconomic systems may offer reasons for optimism about societies’ potentials for a timely rise to the challenge of systemic transformation (Otto et al., 2020; Lenton, 2020).

#### Reasonability- anything could make debate marginally better, but their ad hoc theory interp crowds out important questionings of their reps

### Alt---AT: International Actor Fiat

#### American revolution goes global---serves as a shining city on a hill, removes obstacles, and offers assistance

PSL 8 (Party for Socialism and Liberation, <https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/>)

Experiences in socialist construction Thanks in great part to the practical experience of Lenin in making revolution, 21st-century socialists have a wealth of experience on which to base further conclusions. Marxists have been able to use accumulated theory and practice in order to lead revolutions in Russia, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Cuba and many other countries. While there have been vast differences in the experiences of those socialist revolutions, they share one common feature: The socialist revolutions of the 20th century took place in countries where the level of productive forces was very low compared to the imperialist countries. Every successful revolution faced the primary task of developing their economies—while under constant military threat by world imperialism. For that reason, Lenin described the challenges of building communism in 1920 in very practical terms: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” There was no hope in building socialism if the economy remained underdeveloped. Because of the combined challenges of developing the productive forces under the gun of world imperialism, no socialist revolution has yet reached a stage where the “withering away of the state” could be imagined. Imperialism has seized on any weakness in the revolutionary states in order to foment counterrevolution. Nevertheless, the working classes in the countries that have set out to build socialism have made tremendous gains. Russia’s working class in 1917 was 4 percent of the population. Within 50 years, it was the second-most powerful economy in the world. China had never been able to feed its entire population prior to the revolution. Millions died during famines in China prior to 1949. Yet after the 1949 revolution, for the first time the economy was able to feed the largest population in the world. Despite immense pressure from imperialism, Cuba has been able to achieve tremendous gains—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuban workers enjoy among the highest living standards of any of their counterparts in Latin America or much of the oppressed world. The continued military and economic dominance by world imperialism—first and foremost by U.S. imperialism—has made the transition to socialism that Marx and Lenin described so far impossible. The workers’ states have needed to devote a considerable part of their social development toward the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship—the army and police—in order to defend against invasion or counterrevolution. Taking that next step will require a society based on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the United States. Toppling the world’s dominant capitalist power would not only lift a tremendous burden from the workers around the world who are trying to engage in socialist construction. It would put at the disposal of the world working class the tremendous wealth produced by the U.S. working class. All the social wealth extracted from the oppressed world by U.S. corporations and mines could be used to reverse the effects of centuries of colonial and imperialist exploitation. A revolution in the United States would undercut the economic basis for divisions among the working class that promote racism, sexism and homophobia. Socialism is a system of peace, justice and equality. The road to socialism begins with revolution in the United States.

### Alt---AT: Communism Fails---Empirics

#### Past revolutions weren’t Marxist – impoverishment and socialism in one country caused failure

**Eagleton 11** [Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 16-18]

Marx himself never imagined that socialism could be achieved in impoverished conditions. Such a project would require almost as bizarre a loop in time as inventing the Internet in the Middle Ages. Nor did any Marxist thinker until Stalin imagine that this was possible, including Lenin, Trotsky and the rest of the Bolshevik leadership. You cannot reorganise wealth for the benefit of all if there is precious little wealth to reorganise. You cannot abolish social classes in conditions of scarcity, since conflicts over a material surplus too meagre to meet everyone’s needs will simply revive them again. As Marx comments in The German Ideology, the result of a revolution in such conditions is that ‘‘the old filthy business’’ (or in less tasteful translation, ‘‘the same old crap’’) will simply reappear. All you will get is socialised scarcity. If you need to accumulate capital more or less from scratch, then the most effective way of doing so, however brutal, is through the profit motive. Avid self-interest is likely to pile up wealth with remarkable speed, though it is likely to amass spectacular poverty at the same time. Nor did Marxists ever imagine that it was possible to achieve socialism in one country alone. The movement was international or it was nothing. This was a hardheaded materialist claim, not a piously idealist one. If a socialist nation failed to win international support in a world where production was specialized and divided among different nations, it would be unable to draw upon the global resources needed to abolish scarcity. The productive wealth of a single country was unlikely to be enough. The outlandish notion of socialism in one country was invented by Stalin in the 1920s, partly as a cynical rationalisation of the fact that other nations had been unable to come to the aid of the Soviet Union. It has no warrant in Marx himself. Socialist revolutions must of course start somewhere. But they cannot be completed within national boundaries. To judge socialism by its results in one desperately isolated country would be like drawing conclusions about the human race from a study of psychopaths in Kalamazoo. Building up an economy from very low levels is a backbreaking, dispiriting task. It is unlikely that men and women will freely submit to the hardships it involves. So unless this project is executed gradually, under democratic control and in accordance with socialist values, an authoritarian state may step in and force its citizens to do what they are reluctant to undertake voluntarily. The militarization of labour in Bolshevik Russia is a case in point. The result, in a grisly irony, will be to undermine the political superstructure of socialism (popular democracy, genuine self-government) in the very attempt to build up its economic base. It would be like being invited to a party only to discover that you had not only to bake the cakes and brew the beer but to dig the foundations and lay the floorboards. There wouldn’t be much time to enjoy yourself. Ideally, socialism requires a skilled, educated, politically sophisticated populace, thriving civic institutions, a wellevolved technology, enlightened liberal traditions and the habit of democracy. None of this is likely to be on hand if you cannot even afford to mend the dismally few highways you have, or have no insurance policy against sickness or starvation beyond a pig in the back shed. Nations with a history of colonial rule are especially likely to be bereft of the benefits I have just listed, since colonial powers have not been remarkable for their zeal to implant civil liberties or democratic institutions among their underlings. As Marx insists, socialism also requires a shortening of the working day—partly to provide men and women with the leisure for personal fulfillment, partly to create time for the business of political and economic self-government. You cannot do this if people have no shoes; and to distribute shoes among millions of citizens is likely to require a centralised bureaucratic state. If your nation is under invasion from an array of hostile capitalist powers, as Russia was in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, an autocratic state will seem all the more inevitable. Britain during the Second World War was far from an autocracy; but it was by no means a free country, and one would not have expected it to be.

### Alt---AT: Communism Fails

#### Communism works – reversing economic priorities produces new social arrangements

**Eagleton 11** [Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 27-29]

Some advocates of the participatory model hold that everyone should be remunerated equally for the same amount of work, despite differences of talent, training and occupation. As Michael Albert puts it, ‘‘The doctor working in a plush setting with comfortable and fulfilling circumstances earns more than the assembly worker working in a horrible din, risking life and limb, and enduring boredom and denigration, regardless of how long or how hard each works.’’∞≠ There is, in fact, a strong case for paying those who engage in boring, heavy, dirty or dangerous work more than, say, medics or academics whose labours are considerably more rewarding. Much of this dirty and dangerous work could perhaps be carried out by former members of the royal family. We need to reverse our priorities. Since I have just mentioned the media as ripe for public ownership, let us take this as an exemplary case. Over half a century ago, in an excellent little book entitled Communications,∞∞ Raymond Williams outlined a socialist plan for the arts and media which rejected state control of its content on the one hand and the sovereignty of the profit motive on the other. Instead, the active contributors in this field would have control of their own means of expression and communication. The actual ‘‘plant’’ of the arts and media—radio stations, concert halls, TV networks, theatres, newspaper offices and so on—would be taken into public ownership (of which there are a variety of forms), and their management invested in democratically elected bodies. These would include both members of the public and representatives of media or artistic bodies. These commissions, which would be strictly independent of the state, would then be responsible for awarding public resources and ‘‘leasing’’ the socially owned facilities either to individual practitioners or to independent, democratically self-governing companies of actors, journalists, musicians and the like. These men and women could then produce work free of both state regulation and the distorting pressures of the market. Among other things, we would be free of the situation in which a bunch of power-crazed, avaricious bullies dictate through their privately owned media outlets what the public should believe—which is to say, their own self-interested opinions and the system they support. We will know that socialism has established itself when we are able to look back with utter incredulity on the idea that a handful of commercial thugs were given free rein to corrupt the minds of the public with Neanderthal political views convenient for their own bank balances but for little else. Much of the media under capitalism avoid difficult, controversial or innovative work because it is bad for profits. Instead, they settle for banality, sensationalism and gut prejudice. Socialist media, by contrast, would not ban everything but Schoenberg, Racine and endless dramatized versions of Marx’s Capital. There would be popular theatre, TV and newspapers galore. ‘‘Popular’’ does not necessarily mean ‘‘inferior.’’ Nelson Mandela is popular but not inferior. Plenty of ordinary people read highly specialist journals littered with jargon unintelligible to outsiders. It is just that these journals tend to be about angling, farm equipment or dog breeding rather than aesthetics or endocrinology. The popular becomes junk and kitsch when the media feel the need to hijack as large a slice of the market as quickly and painlessly as possible. And this need is for the most part commercially driven.

#### A Marxist economy could be implemented through participatory economic planning

**Eagleton 11** [Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 25-26]

Education and state monitoring might diminish these dangers, but some Marxists look instead to an economy which would be neither centrally planned nor market-governed.π On this model, resources would be allocated by negotiations between producers, consumers, environmentalists and other relevant parties, in networks of workplace, neighbourhood and consumer councils. The broad parameters of the economy, including decisions on the overall allocation of resources, rates of growth and investment, energy, transport and ecological policies and the like, would be set by representative assemblies at local, regional and national level. These general decisions about, say, allocation would then be devolved downwards to regional and local levels, where more detailed planning would be progressively worked out. At every stage, public debate over alternative economic plans and policies would be essential. In this way, what and how we produce could be determined by social need rather than private profit. Under capitalism, we are deprived of the power to decide whether we want to produce more hospitals or more breakfast cereals. Under socialism, this freedom would be regularly exercised. Power in such assemblies would pass by democratic election from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Democratically elected bodies representing each branch of commerce or production would negotiate with a national economic commission to achieve an agreed set of investment decisions. Prices would be determined not centrally, but by production units on the basis of input from consumers, users, interest groups and so on.

### Alt---AT: Cap K/T Space

#### Socialism key to space

Phillips ’21 [Leigh Phillips is a science writer and EU affairs journalist, “We Don’t Need Elon Musk to Explore the Solar System,” Jacobin, May 2021, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/05/elon-musk-space-exploration-mars-colonization>]

A reasonable critique of Musk’s SpaceX endeavors might begin by noting that, regardless of how noble an aim Musk may have for his centibillions, there simply should not be centibillionaires (or even regular millionaires and billionaires). One might also echo Neil Armstrong’s criticism of private space flight — a criticism that once made Elon cry when 60 Minutes asked him about his hero arguing against the privatization of space. We might note how space exploration during the Cold War, despite the militarist overtones of the Space Race, was explicitly intended to be for all mankind rather than in service of the jollies of ultrarich space tourists.

A democratic and public redirection of Elon Musk’s billions might be spent differently. One might further assert that, given the non-identity of the set of all things that are beneficial and the set of all things that are profitable, space colonization will be a public-sector endeavor, or it will not happen — as such a private space travel has no near-term, medium-term, or even long-term prospect of any return on financial investment beyond servicing low-earth, medium-earth, or geostationary orbit. And, finally, we might denounce the union-busting at Musk’s factories or even argue that his “accumulation of resources” is less the product of his own efforts than it is primarily an upward redistribution of value created by his workers.

That is to say that there are a raft of progressive critiques of Musk that could be made that nevertheless still value space exploration and, one day, human colonization of the cosmos.

Indeed, if one values space exploration and looks forward to the time, as astronomer Carl Sagan put it, “when most human cultures will be engaged in an activity you might describe as a dandelion going to seed,” then a socialist critique is all the more necessary, given the irrational limitations markets impose on human endeavor.

But instead, there are thousands of snark-drenched tweets sneering at how crackpot, masculinist, and even childish Elon’s dream is. They argue that space travel is a waste of resources that would be better spent solving problems here on Earth, and that space colonization is a repetition of the colonization of the New World.

Even Bernie Sanders responded to Musk by saying: “Space travel is an exciting idea, but right now we need to focus on Earth and create a progressive tax system so that children don’t go hungry, people are not homeless and all Americans have healthcare. The level of inequality in America is obscene and a threat to our democracy.” At the time of writing, the senator’s tweet had received some 95,000 likes.

Bernie is, in this case, wrong.

Space exploration, including space travel, is one of the grandest tasks humanity has ever set for itself. It is a false dichotomy — and an austerian one at that — to say that we do not have enough money for both a space program and social justice or environmental protection. We can more than afford to do both. NASA’s budget is but a fraction of the Pentagon’s. It should not be difficult to imagine a democratic socialist economy, or even just one a little less neoliberal, that permits much more space and much less war.

We can have public health care and science. We can end homelessness and explore the cosmos. We can have unionized, family-supporting jobs for all and, one day, almost certainly some considerable time from now, colonies on other worlds.

#### Zero chance capitalist space efforts colonize space before

Phillips ’21 [Leigh Phillips is a science writer and EU affairs journalist, “We Don’t Need Elon Musk to Explore the Solar System,” Jacobin, May 2021, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/05/elon-musk-space-exploration-mars-colonization>]

One must distinguish here between the near-term impossibility of Musk’s dreams of cities on Mars and the very long-term necessity of humanity spreading itself throughout the cosmos sometime within the next eon in order to ensure our survival.

We do not need to escape Earth due to climate change or biodiversity loss. Resolving these two issues (and other environmental challenges) are far easier to solve than terraforming other worlds. Even at 6ºC of global warming — the upper but low-probability bound of the increase in average global temperature by century’s end that is projected by climate models — Earth would be far more inhabitable for humans than a Martian colony that would remain, for the foreseeable future, tethered to Earth-based life support systems. Even a terraformed Mars would still be less habitable for humans due to its incorrigibly low gravity.

In fact, if astronomers tomorrow discovered an Earth analogue exoplanet in a distant solar system that had similar or even identical atmospheric chemistry, mass, biospheric signatures, tectonic and magnetospheric activity — but was an average six degrees warmer than Holocene-era Earth, then this world would be hailed as eminently habitable.

And while near-Earth asteroids do present an ongoing existential threat, the technology required to track and divert them would again be a doddle compared to making a permanent, self-sustaining habitation on another planet viable.

The real existential threat is not anywhere close near-term. But it is real, and a legitimate reason why, at some point, humanity does need to spread itself beyond Earth.

In about 600 million years, the Sun’s increase in luminosity will in turn increase the weathering of silicate minerals — what make up about 90 percent of Earth’s crust. This will upset the carbonate-silicate cycle, which removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as weathered minerals are washed into rivers and oceans, buried in sediments and ultimately recycled back into the mantle as tectonic plates subduct at continental margins. The CO2 is then returned back to the atmosphere through volcanism. Also known as the inorganic (or slow) carbon cycle, it takes place over millions of years, while the organic (or fast) carbon cycle that cycles carbon from the biosphere to the atmosphere and back takes place on the scale of years. The shinier sun’s acceleration of silicate weathering will result in a sharp drop in the concentration of atmospheric CO2 (opposite to the problem we face with global warming), below the amount needed for trees and some other plants to live. Eventually, plant life as a whole will die off, and with it most animals. Within a billion years, the oceans will boil off, and the planet will return to a microbial world.

The reason we are acting to prevent climate change and biodiversity loss right now on this planet is to preserve the conditions that allow humans to flourish. It is not to save the planet. The planet has experienced far more extreme conditions in the deep past than what we are doing to it. Indeed, past mass extinction events were necessary for subsequent evolutionary radiation (increase in biodiversity as a result of speciation), just as death is for life. Without dinosaur extinction, mammals would never have filled all those ecological niches the dinosaurs left behind.

Instead, the purpose of preventing climate change and biodiversity loss is to arrest global change and preserve indefinitely a set of conditions that have existed only since the start of the Holocene epoch (since the end of the last ice age, about 11,000 years ago) and that are currently optimal for us humans.

Thus, for the same reason of human species preservation with respect to the climate and biodiversity emergencies, at some point within the next eon, but due to the solar-produced terminus of habitable conditions on Earth, humans need to establish themselves on other worlds. And on as many as possible — for those worlds, too, face their own limited span of habitability, and at any point, a star exploding as a supernova at the end of its life could sterilize any nearby biospheres (perhaps some extremophile microbes might survive, but the game would certainly be over for humanity).

Of course, we have a whopping 600 million years to worry about boiling oceans and the plant-pocalypse. There is no urgency at all, even if the moral imperative to prevent climate change and to colonize other worlds is the same.

But over the very long term, the cosmos is a dangerous place. Humans need to be a multi-planetary — and ultimately multi-solar-system — species in order to increase the chances of our survival. Musk is right to embrace this goal. That is not what he needs to be challenged on. Instead, we should ask whether his actions serve that laudable goal.

Venus or Mars?

We can get a more detailed understanding of what Musk means than his tweet or his interview commentary provide in his detailed, sixteen-page paper that appeared in 2017 in the academic journal New Space, which is dedicated to the burgeoning commercial space sector, “Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species.”

He opens the paper with a recognition that, at some point, if we stay on Earth, we will confront an eventual extinction event. “The alternative is to become a spacefaring civilization and a multi-planetary species.”

He alights upon Mars as the obvious first option for establishing a “self-sustaining city — a city that is not merely an outpost, but which can become a planet in its own right.” He rejects Venus due to it being, as he correctly puts it, a super-high-pressure, hot acid bath. He rejects Mercury due to it being too close to the Sun, and the Moon for lack of atmosphere and its twenty-eight-day “day” (a Martian day, or “sol,” for comparison, is an Earthling-friendly 24.5 hours). And he rejects, at least for now, the moons of Jupiter or Saturn, as they are much harder to get to.

Mars has more than its own share of habitability issues, but Musk does not mention them, other than to say that, while Mars is “a little cold” (in reality, -63ºC, or -81ºF, compared to Earth’s balmy 16ºC, or 57ºF), “we can warm it up.” The Martian atmosphere is “very helpful” because it’s primarily CO2, with some nitrogen and argon, meaning that “we can grow plants on Mars just by compressing the atmosphere.” Most cheery of all, Musk says it would be “quite fun” to be on Mars, because the gravity is about 38 percent that of Earth, making it easy to lift heavy things and “bound around.”

Mars, as seen from space. (WikiImages via Pixabay)

It’s all so simple. “We just need to change the populations because currently we have seven billion people on Earth and none on Mars.”

And so the paper is primarily devoted to explaining how to solve that sole problem: how to lower the cost of a trip to Mars from the current roughly $10 billion per person down to the median cost of a house in the United States. By making rockets reusable, refilling in orbit, producing propellant on Mars, choosing the right propellant, and improving system design and performance, Musk reckons he can get the cost of a ticket down to $200,000, perhaps as little as $100,000.

And Musk’s SpaceX has done a tremendous job so far of sharply reducing the cost of escaping Earth’s gravity well, primarily via deep vertical integration of the firm. It produces a whopping 70 percent of its components in-house, as opposed to the 1,200 different suppliers in the outsourced supply chain of its main competitor, the Boeing–Lockheed Martin partnership known as the United Space Alliance. Each of these suppliers extracts their own profit margin from every contract in the chain, jacking up the cost per launch to $460 million. SpaceX, by comparison, charges NASA and its other clients just $62 million per launch, and Musk says he has slashed the marginal cost of a reused Falcon 9 booster launch to a mere $15 million.

Well done, Elon. Or, rather, well done to all the engineers, logistical experts, and other workers who have done most of the labor, allowing SpaceX to revolutionize the business model of getting to space.

There is not really any mention of the enormous challenges of the atmosphere’s low pressure and toxic composition, the preponderance of deadly perchlorates in the soil, or the lack of magnetosphere to protect against solar and cosmic radiation. The current atmosphere of Mars is too thin to support most life: its pressure is only about 1 percent that of Earth. Only hypopiezotolerant microbes (those that live in low-pressure environments), such as ones that are lofted by winds into Earth’s stratosphere, would be able to survive. The atmosphere is also 95 percent carbon dioxide — fine for plants (if the pressure were able to be raised) but not for animals.

Musk does say that once Mars is warmed up, “we would once again have a thick atmosphere and liquid oceans.” Bioremediation using bacteria to clean up perchlorates already occurs on Earth, but we are talking about an entire planet here. There is no discussion of how any of this might happen, over what time period, and who would pay for it. Same with the construction of an artificial magnetosphere. Dealing with the perchlorates alone would likely be profoundly more challenging and expensive than the relatively straightforward process of decarbonizing Earth’s economy.

A 2018 NASA study found that there is insufficient CO2 and H2O from the Martian soil, polar ice caps, and minerals in the upper crust to get anywhere close to thickening the atmosphere and using it like a blanket to warm up the planet. All these sources combined would still only boost the pressure to about 7 percent of that of Earth. Carbon-bearing minerals deep in the crust might have enough CO2 to achieve the needed pressure, but nothing is known about their extent, and recovering them with current technology would be colossally energy intensive. Another idea is to direct comets or asteroids to crash into Mars and release their greenhouse gases that way. Again, these are fantastical ideas that will be impractical for many, many generations yet to come.

NASA astronauts in space. (NASA)

And there is likely no way of ever overcoming Mars’s low gravity. If you added all the mass of Venus to that of Mars, smashing the planets together, even then, you would still not quite achieve Earth’s gravity. It is true that we do not know what the physiological effects of 38 percent of Earth’s gravity are, either on humans or other life. We have two data points: Earth gravity, what we call 1G, and the 0G microgravity of the International Space Station (ISS). But from studies of astronauts who have spent extended periods aboard the ISS, we know that 0G is extremely bad for human health.

Muscles atrophy. Tendons and ligaments begin to fail. Facial and finger muscles, which cannot be worked out via onboard gyms or treadmills, weaken. The spine lengthens, with astronauts gaining an inch or two in height and suffering from back pain. Bones demineralize, losing density at a rate of 1 percent per month.

As Christopher Wanjek, a former NASA science writer and author of 2020 book Spacefarers — which is an optimistic volume on the viability of manned space travel — notes: “To visualize how bad that bone loss is, consider the fact that the major obstacle to fully recycling urine into drinking water on the ISS is that the filters get clogged daily with calcium deposits.” Wanjek writes how the rate of vision loss is such that a crew to Mars would need to pack eyeglasses with various prescriptions for “each phase of their gradual, inevitable, and permanent vision loss.”

Kidneys get confused by blood not being where it’s supposed to be and think there is an excess, so they start to remove what they believe to be excess water. The blood thickens, driving a reduced production of red blood cells, which in turn drives anemia, shortness of breath, lethargy, and greater likelihood of infection. Perhaps worst of all, brain compression resulting from microgravity negatively impacts regions responsible for fine motor movement and executive function — deteriorations that could be permanent.

A range of interventions, including exercise, drugs, and compression clothing can shave the sharp edges off some of these effects, but ultimately, the solution on a spacecraft is the simulation of gravity via centrifugal force — a spinning ship. This is not something that you can do with a whole planet.

It is for this reason that Venus, with its gravity not too far off that of Earth, may actually be a better terraforming candidate than Mars — one day — despite its currently inhospitable atmosphere.

The Real Business of SpaceX Isn’t Mars

One has to suspect that Musk knows all this. We have a hint of this when, at one point in his paper, Musk concedes that it will be difficult to fund his vision just by slashing the cost of getting to space. He admits that SpaceX expects to generate substantial cash flow from launching lots of satellites and servicing the International Space Station for NASA. Additional help for bankrolling the Mars project might come from the emergence of a market for really fast transportation of things or people around the world by rocket: cargo could be transported anywhere on Earth in forty-five minutes, and a trip from New York to Tokyo could take a mere twenty-five minutes (so long as takeoff and landing takes place where the tremendous noise, as he puts it in hip-CEO-speak, “is not a super-big deal”).

As a result, one gets the impression by reading between the lines that a self-sustaining Martian city is all just an impressive marketing maneuver taking advantage of most people’s sense of adventure and wonder; of our species’ ancient need to wander and explore. The real business of SpaceX was never a Martian colony but rather servicing a mature satellite market, stealing government space contracts from the likes of Boeing, and kicking off a terrestrial rocket transport sector. The dream of Mars is, in this case, not really any different from the adman’s fiction of romance and aspiration that sells a can of Pepsi or a Jeep.

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None of this is to suggest that establishing an outpost on Mars for the purposes of scientific exploration should not be attempted, even in the next couple of decades. But an outpost, as Musk himself makes clear, does not approach a self-sustaining city, and still less a multi-planetary species.

Because humans do need to exit Earth at some point in order to maintain the species, if we are to establish genuinely self-sustaining colonies, then terraforming will likely be necessary one day, as well as interstellar generation ships that take us to habitable exoplanets far beyond the solar system. For all of this, we will have to figure out how to take our ecology with us.

We are not really the collection of individuals we thought we were, but rather are deeply embedded within our ecosystems. Indeed, each of us is a microbial ecosystem whose edges are vague. Where does the bacterial, fungal, and viral multitude that is “me” stop and my equally microbiological environment begin? This does not mean that Earth will be the only home we ever have, but it does mean that the antiseptic, forestless, riverless Starship Enterprise would leave its inhabitants very sick before too long.

How much of our ecology do we need to take with us, though? We just don’t know yet. The science of ecology is very much still a young discipline. This is where fantastical science-fiction conceptions of vast ships made from hollowed out asteroids and packed with different biomes fills the gap of what we do not know. Likewise for novels like Becky Chambers’s To be Taught, if Fortunate, in which, instead of terraforming other worlds, adapting them to our needs, we genetically alter our bodies via “somaforming” to adapt ourselves to their conditions.

Plainly, then, there is no rush for any of this, even as there is a moral imperative for us, one day in the distant future, to permanently exit Earth. Our colonization of other worlds is akin to the building of the grandest cathedral we have ever envisaged: a project that will take centuries, or more likely millennia, many millennia. This is nothing that a private company can deliver. There is no near-term return on investment; indeed, there is no aim of profitability at all, but rather of our species’ survival through the eons.

Rocks Are Not People

There are those who argue, perhaps because space colonization and colonization of the New World have a word in common, that the desire to journey into space is expressive of a colonial mentality.

From a trivial point of view, it is indeed colonial, insofar as the object is to build colonies. But there is a big difference between the conquest of the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the Antipodes: the Moon and Mars are rocks, not human beings.

A view of Earth from the Moon’s surface.

Indeed, the equivalence of rocks and people, or rather the notion that the human inhabitants of these lands did not count as people, is precisely the moral calculus that was made by the genocidaires of colonialism.

If we find microbial life on Mars, again, microbes are not people. We, of course, must be very careful upon our early visits to other worlds that we do not accidentally introduce terrestrial microbes. We have one chance to see whether life evolved elsewhere. If we contaminate Mars with bacteria or archaea from Earth before we make this assessment, it may be difficult to tell Martian and Earth microbes apart.

Such contamination protocols, however, only need be carried out until the otherwise pristine conditions have been sufficiently studied. The only question here is how long and how much effort should be made. Following such research, there is no distinction between terrestrial microbes establishing themselves on Mars (or any other world) and what would have occurred had microbes caught a ride on a meteor from one world to another without any human contribution.

And, if terrestrial microbes later outcompeted Martian microbes as a result, again, this would be no different from competition for resources between species on Earth, which, along with predation and symbiosis and other inter-species interactions, form the basis for many ecosystem properties and processes. Again, that’s not colonialism. That’s life!

Carl Sagan’s Dream

In our critiques of centibillionaires like Elon Musk, we should be very careful not to argue that, whatever he wants, we simply want the opposite. That’s the case for much recent popular writing critical of the private space sector.

It’s true that our vision of space — as a commons for all humanity, driven by democratic states — is very different from that of Musk, and that, indeed, the capitalist class’s power is a barrier to that vision. But we should reject what the late philosopher Mark Fisher called capitalist realism: not merely the concession that there is no alternative to the current order but the inability to conceive that there can be one.

Market ideology is so ingrained even in the minds of its opponents that a public-sector program of space exploration, travel, resource extraction, and, at some point in the future, colonization, cannot be fathomed. The critique surrounding space should instead be that, so long as it is for profit or national pride, space programs will never be able to live up to Carl Sagan’s dream of our species as the dandelion of the cosmos.

We can learn something from the technological and humanist optimism of the first person in space. “Nothing will stop us. The road to the stars is steep and dangerous. But we’re not afraid,” Yuri Gagarin told Space World magazine. “Spaceflights can’t be stopped. This isn’t the work of any one man or even a group of men. It is a historical process which mankind is carrying out in accordance with the natural laws of human development.”

More Sputnik and less SpaceX, maybe, but ad astra per aspera nevertheless.

#### Every percentage point of existential risk reduction is equal to a delay of 10 million years

Bostrom 03 Nick Bostrom, philosopher at the University of Oxford, a Ph.D. degree in philosophy from the London School of Economics, and was a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Oxford, 2003, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development”, Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3, <https://nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html#_edn8>, EO

However, the true lesson is a different one. If what we are concerned with is (something like) maximizing the expected number of worthwhile lives that we will create, then in addition to the opportunity cost of delayed colonization, we have to take into account the risk of failure to colonize at all. We might fall victim to an existential risk, one where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.[8] Because the lifespan of galaxies is measured in billions of years, whereas the time-scale of any delays that we could realistically affect would rather be measured in years or decades, the consideration of risk trumps the consideration of opportunity cost. For example, a single percentage point of reduction of existential risks would be worth (from a utilitarian expected utility point-of-view) a delay of over 10 million years. Therefore, if our actions have even the slightest effect on the probability of eventual colonization, this will outweigh their effect on when colonization takes place. For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”.

### Impact---AT: CPT/Trade

#### No capitalist peace theory

Nagle 10 [John, “Nostrum or Palliative? Contesting the Capitalist Peace in Violently Divided Societies,” Civil Wars, Vol.12, No.3 (September 2010), p. 218–236]

The central thesis here is that ‘domestic institutions associated with capitalism, namely private property and competitive market structures, have promoted peace between states over the past two centuries’.84 The reason for this, it is claimed, is that states tightly bound together by mutually beneficial trade tend to look to settle conflicts peacefully as high levels of international commerce between states raised ‘the costs of military conflict to unacceptable levels for modern economies’.85 According to Bussmann, ‘[i]t is not in a country’s interest to go to war with a state with which its private economic agents maintain an extensive exchange of goods and capital’.86 There is a similar claim concerning how levels of foreign investment can contribute to pacific relations between states and even within states. Again, the idea here is that states will try to avoid violent conflict so as not to deter foreign investors. The threat or onset of violent conflict, on the other hand, disrupts not only trade but FDI flows. The decision of foreign investors to locate their capital is influenced not only by the economic policy of the host country, but also by the risk of violent conflict in that state. War deters investors because it creates insecurity leading even to the total loss of investments as factories are closed, raw materials are in short supply and employees are killed or are drafted into service.87 One example of how the lure of FDI can help provide a context for stability between formerly warring neighbours concerns Bosnia and Serbia. Although relations between the two states have remained volatile since the end of the war in the mid-1990s, in 2010 an attempt was made to ameliorate relations between these neighbours in order to lure FDI stock to the region. After a meeting between the two states to discuss a joint approach toward international markets, a member of Bosnia’s tripartite rotating presidency stated that ‘[b]adly needed investments will come only if there is security and stability’.88 There are some critiques that can be directed at the above proposition. First, while interdependent trade and the lure of FDI may make states highly wary of engaging in war due to its exorbitant cost, ironically it may encourage insurgents to mobilise. Calculating that the state may do anything, short of military action, to protect economic stability, insurgents may provoke violence in the reasonable hope that the state may give in to their demands to expedite a quick peace. For example, the British government’s fear of the IRA bombing the financial City of London led it to provide concessions to Irish republicans after one bomb cost damage estimated as £350 million.89 Second, it is not always the case that states will avoid war at all costs to protect FDI; far from it, they may resort to extremely coercive anti-insurgency methods precisely to guarantee the security of foreign investors. The region of Aceh in Indonesia provides a case in point here. In the early 1970s an abundance of oil and natural liquefied gas was discovered in the region by Mobile. In response, an industrial zone was created to allow the inflow of heavy foreign investment. As part of the development of the industrial zone the local Acehnese experienced severe disruption, including forced evictions and some loss of indigenous industry; moreover, the Acehnese received only a small percentage of the profits. Due in part to the disruptive impact of the industrial zone, an Acehnese secessionist movement emerged – the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) – and some of their attacks were targeted at Exxon Mobil facilities and migrant Javanese workers. In direct response to the attacks by GAM, Exxon Mobil threatened to suspend production in Aceh until security could be guaranteed. Taking action, the Indonesian government responded to the GAM campaign by initiating Operation ‘Red Net’: a brutal counter-insurgency initiative, which led to the deaths of up to 5,000 people. The counter-insurgency campaign did little to convince Exxon that their investment and employees were safe and the corporation cancelled operations in Aceh in 2001, which cost the Indonesian government an estimated $100 million per month in lost revenue. Later on that year, the International Labor Rights Fund, acting behalf of Acehnese villagers, filed a lawsuit against Exxon, accusing them of human rights abuses, including murder and torture, when they hired army units to protect natural gas fields.90 Third, and related to the last point, in regions characterised by extreme security problems due to the threat of violence, the carrot waved to attract foreign investors must be so great that it threatens to offset the potential balance between the local and international ownership of post-war reconstruction. This problem can be witnessed in Iraq. In the aftermath of the occupation, the US-run CPA decreed the privatisation of 200 state-owned Iraqi firms, the reduction of corporate tax from 40 to 15 per cent, and permission for foreign companies to own 100 per cent of privatised Iraqi assets, including the right to ‘transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including shares or profits and dividends’.91 All of this was passed without seeking consent from the Iraqi people, thus acting to ignite grievances and filling the ranks of a growing insurgency seeking to exploit ethnic conflict, especially since little was done by the CPA to deal with basic problems, like water sanitation, unemployment, security and electricity. Many Iraqis viewed the privatisation of the nation’s industry into the hands of foreign contractors as little less than colonisation, especially as oil contracts became the focus of bribery, price-fixing and embezzlement. Over $12 billion of oil revenue went unaccounted for and the CPA granted immunity from prosecution to US personnel.92 According to Whyte, the scale of the appropriation of Iraq’s oil revenue, in particular, was a ‘neo-liberal strategy of economic colonization’ carried out by the CPA, especially since the authority dismissed the universal principles of international law enshrined in the Hague and Geneva treaties, so that they could ‘privilege the primacy and autonomy of market actors over laws intended to enshrine universal protections for civilian populations in war and conflict’.93 Another problem here is that there is often an expectation that neoliberal processes will expedite a relatively speedy and tangible improvement in people’s everyday life. This is rarely so. Free-market economics largely relies on trickledown economics, with the profits garnered by the vanguard entrepreneurs eventually arriving to those located at the lower levels of society. The anticipation of immediate results may thus act to raise hopes only for them to be dashed when little seems to change. In fact, the situation in the short term may actually worsen as public workers are laid off as state spending declines and existing welfare systems are rolled back. This is a potentially inflammatory scenario, as protest mobilisation is most likely when expectations of improvement are generated but are ultimately deflated.94 In his analysis of peace building initiatives Roland Paris notes that in order to pave the way for divided societies to become fully functioning peaceful market economies, the IMF and World Bank typically initiate structural-adjustment programmes. In exchange for loans, states are required to instigate sweeping economic and institutional reform, including privatising strategies, deregulation, decreases in corporation tax, and austerity measures involving severe cutbacks in public spending to ensure budgetary balance.95 Rather than delivering any peace divided, in the short term the population of divided societies undergoing structural adjustment policies are subject to what is tantamount to a ‘peace penalty’ as public sectorworkers are laid off and public services are underresourced.96 This situation can exacerbate the ethnic security dilemma mentioned earlier in regard to rapid democratisation. If a particular ethnic group are overrepresented in the public sector (such as Serbs in Croatia) they will be obviously fearful for their future security and may resort to militant means to protect their interests. More broadly, the decrease in security wrought by rapid market reform may exacerbate social and ethnic tensions. Ironically, attempts to stimulate future prosperity may create a new ‘conflict trap’, reducing the recruitment costs for spoilers of the peace process. For instance, in the early 1990s the Rwandan government had implemented internationally mandated austerity measures (government spending cuts, reductions in price subsidies, and deregulation of the domestic economy) to help engender a market economy. These measures, Paris argues, ‘fostered an atmosphere of economic insecurity that strained intergroup relations in the vital period leading up to the genocide’.97 A related problem occurs when market reforms act to intensify socio-economic inequalities in a divided society, especially when such disparities have been a focus for violent ethnic mobilisation before. After years of civil war, during the 1990s the Chammoro government in Nicaragua initiated sweeping economic reforms (public sector lay-offs, privatisation policies, the liberalisation of the banking sector and a reduction of public spending) under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF. These reforms resulted in an absolute decline in living standards and exacerbated distributional inequalities between the rural, largely indigenous peasantry and the wealthy urban elite. Since these inequalities were at the root of previous periods of violence in Nicaragua, the transition to economic liberalism ‘worked against the goal of promoting a stable and lasting peace’.98 (229-32)

#### Rules based trade fails to solve war---perceived inequality increases ethnic conflict

Nagle 10 [John, “Nostrum or Palliative? Contesting the Capitalist Peace in Violently Divided Societies,” Civil Wars, Vol.12, No.3 (September 2010), p. 218–236]

Another strand to the global thesis is that ‘[d]isconnectedness defines danger’.51 That is states ‘dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence’,52 are viewed as more likely to engage in conflict since they do not have to worry about the costs (diplomatic and financial) associated with war. These ‘disconnected’ states are not harmonised with other neoliberal economies, especially in terms of trade regulations and human rights legislation. The idea here is that globalisation creates costly signalling by making communication convincing.53 When leaders make political decisions they have to weigh the economic costs and global markets act as a forum to signal resolve.54 Such is the pacific quality of economic globalism, that one proponent states: Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder . . . But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and – most important – the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists.55 There are numerous flaws to this globalism thesis. The argument that global cosmopolitan values are eradicating ethno-national differences is unconvincing so far. Although in strictly economic terms the power of most states organised at the national scale is eroding, national and ethnic identities are incredibly robust entities.56 As one theorist notes, although relatively discrete national economic systems have become enmeshed in global processes, ‘there are few grounds for thinking that a concomitant widespread pluralisation of political identities has taken place’.57 Globalism, while it offers the opportunity for identity to be a palimpsest upon which any number of associations can be penned, is also a profoundly disorientating process. Many ethnic conflicts are inspired by a backlash against globalism, especially ‘the disruptive effects of global integration, and the failure of markets to self-regulate in a way that protects the interests of the people’ in the poorer regions of the world.58 A point that will be returned to later. (225)

### ---AT: Gartzke

#### Gartzke’s model is trash

Choi 11 [Seung-Whan, PhD, “Re-Evaluating Capitalist and Democratic Peace Models,” International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 759–769]

The Capitalist Peace Model: Three Errors Based on a sample of all dyad years from 1950 to 1992, Gartzke’s (2007) work addresses the question of whether capitalism exerts a pacifying effect on the onset of international conflict.2 It proposes that the absence of militarized disputes between democracies is largely explained by the fact that since democracies tend to espouse capitalism, the likelihood of disputes is greatly reduced. More specifically, economic development, globalization of capital, and similar state policy interests are hypothesized to lead dyads to be less likely to experience a dispute. For empirical testing, the capitalist peace model is built on a replication of the democratic peace model proposed by Oneal and Russett [1997:278, Model 1, Table 2, as indicated in note 47 of Gartzke’s (2007:176) study], which ‘‘allows for ready comparison of results and diminishes the danger that [his] findings result from idiosyncrasies in coding or model specification’’ (Gartzke 2007:173). The model consists of a lower score of democracy, a higher score of democracy, capitalist variables, and several control variables.3 Model Specification Error: Peace Years Taking note of Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) methodological suggestion, Gartzke’s capitalist peace model includes three temporal spline variables (that is, spline1, spline2, and spline3) to control for time dependence. However, a peace year variable that measures the number of peace years since the last conflict and that serves as the base variable to create those three spline variables is left out. Since logit splines require that all four variables be included together, the exclusion of a peace year variable makes the estimates of the capitalist peace model untenable. Because Gartzke’s study does not control for the complete spline function for the years of peace, it obtains inconsistent parameter estimates and incorrect standard errors.4 Thus, **the capitalist model is misleading because its estimation suffers from omitted variable bias**. These omissions explain why the effect of democracy does not hold up in the capitalist peace model, rather than the capitalist variables winning over the democracy variable in competition. As demonstrated in the next section, when the model specification error is properly corrected, democracy re-emerges as a pacifying factor in a consistent manner, whether a crisis is related to a militarized dispute or a war. Observation Omission: Regional Dummies When statistical software drops some observations upon the execution of a model, it issues warning notes. Generally, researchers investigate whether those drops are a justifiable procedure in order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates. If researchers overlook critical error messages about observation drops and report coefficients and standard errors as they are, their findings may be misleading or even worse, erroneous. The next section illustrates how ignoring warning notes about observation drops can stymie one’s analysis. In particular, this relates to Gartzke’s study that does not analyze the implications of warning notes regarding dropped observations that are caused by the inclusion of regional dummy variables. Sample Selection Bias: All Dyads versus Politically Relevant Dyads Sample selection bias is caused by the selection of a particular sample instead of conducting a census of the population. Gartzke’s study examines the capitalism– conflict connection with a focus on all dyads but not on politically relevant dyads. However, the use of all possible dyads is open to two criticisms. The first is theoretical: for example, there is no reason to expect a militarized dispute between Malaysia and Uganda. The second is methodological, as the inclusion of all possible dyads makes the non-zero militarized dispute event extremely rare. Politically relevant dyads that either share a border or include at least one major power are considered more conflict prone than any other type of dyad because they are exposed to more opportunities to interact, increasing the likelihood of conflict. For this reason, students of conflict have emphasized the importance of politically relevant dyads over all dyads (for example, Lemke and Reed 2001; Russett and Oneal 2001). The next section demonstrates that when the capitalist peace model is fitted with politically relevant dyads, capitalist variables become less robust, and in some cases insignificant**.(**760-2)

#### Gartzke flawed

--meh

Drezner 5 [Daniel; Professor of international politics at Tufts; September 9; Foreign Policy, “The commercial peace?,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2005/09/09/the-commercial-peace/]

I’d really like for Gartzke’s theoretical conclusions to be true, and he makes a persuasive case in the paper. I have three small cavils, however:

1) What, exactly, makes governments decide to increase economic freedom in their own countries? One possibility is that democracies are more likely to do this than non-democracies. For example, Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota argue in “Why the Rush to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries” that:

Rising international trade flows are a primary component of globalization. The liberalization of trade policy in many developing countries has helped foster the growth of these flows. Concurrent with this rush to free trade, there has been a global movement toward democracy. We argue that these two trends are related: democratization of the political system reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support…. We provide empirical evidence to support our claim through econometric analysis of the developing countries from 1970-1999. Democracy seems to be associated for these countries with trade liberalization. Globalization may be fostered by democratization.

In other words, it’s possible that the best way for countries to promote economic freedom is to promote political freedom as the antecedent. 2) That said, the other thing that worries me about Gartzke’s finding is that trade openness is not significant in any of the regression results (though, as the appendix makes clear, trade metrics are included in the economic freedom score, so this could just be multicollinearity at work). Again, it could be that trade openness leads to more economic freedom across the board, which then leads to less violent behavior. But if that’s not the case, it’s profoundly disturbing, since besides democracy promotion, trade diplomacy is the primary engine through which the United States promotes economic freedom in the rest of the world. 3) One last musing — the economic freedom score is a composite of a series of measures, including rule of law (which is correlated with democratic regimes) low inflation (which is correlated with economic development) and low tariffs (which is correlated with economic openness). How much of the empirical results are driven by multicollinearity between the explanatory variable and the the control variables?

### ---AT: Mousseau

#### Mousseau’s method is bad faith, statistically illiterate guesswork

Ray ’17 [James Lee Ray and Allan Defoe, “Democratic peace versus contractualism,” Feb 6, 2017,

Conflict Management and Peace Science]

DOR (2013) is the most recent in a series of papers evaluating Mousseau’s claims about contractualism (and democratic peace) (Dafoe, 2011; Russett, 2011). The authors point out that one of the most important and dubious aspects of Mousseau (2013) involves missing data. The analyses reported in Mousseau (2013) rely crucially on contractualism operationalized with life insurance data, and those data were missing for 98% of the observations included in the study. That alone is enough to raise severe reservations about Mousseau’s results. Authoritative discussions of imputation warn about the dangers of imputing large proportions of data points, with 98% far beyond even an “extreme” degree of missingness (Rubin, 1996: 482). Further, Mousseau (2013)singly imputes missing data (using a command in Stata that is now obsolete, reflecting the dubious validity of this process), despite the methodological consensus (at the time and still today) that single imputation, as compared with the recommended multiple imputation, underestimates the uncertainty in the imputed values. In addition, Mousseau’s (2013) imputation model was not published anywhere, and can only be inferred from a close review of his replication files.

In short, 98% of the data on Mousseau’s (2013) key independent variable were imputed from a model that was not discussed or defended, and in a manner that was almost certain to produce erroneous estimates. DOR (2013) show that multiple imputations of that life insurance data produce significant coefficients for Democracy Low in virtually all plausible specifications of the models in question.

DOR (2103) discuss, in addition to the imputation of the life insurance variable, six other design choices made by Mousseau (2013) having to do with (a) the coding of conflicts lasting more than one year, (b) the analysis of all MIDS vs only MIDs with fatalities, (c) inclusion of Democracy High as a control variable, (d) inclusion of an interaction term focusing on democracy and contractualism, (e) the operationalization of Democracy, and (f) the choice of data on life insurance.

Regarding the first of these design choices, DOR point out that for Mousseau’s outcome measure of conflict, he set as 0 all years involving conflict after the first year. By this coding, a 5 year MID would be coded the same as a 1 month MID (1, 0, 0, 0, 0); a year of peace is coded the same as a year in conflict (after the first year). No scholar of whom we are aware, other than Mousseau (2018), has argued for such a measure of ongoing conflicts, although such authoritative sources as Bennett and Stam (2004) have argued against it. Bennett and Stam recommend that, if conflict onset is to be the dependent variable, then years of ongoing disputes should be excluded, rather than included as 0s, since “we should only include cases where all values of the dependent variable could actually occur” (p. 53). It is worth noting that “this one correction (to Mousseau 2013) restores the evidence for the democratic peace” (p < 0.1). So, DOR did not have to go very far to reveal the fragility of Mousseau’s analyses; the correction of a single dubious operationalization was sufficient to overturn his results.

While showing that Mousseau’s results disappear after one correction is informative, DOR might have generated hundreds of analyses and only reported the single result that supported their case. But in fact, they examine virtually all of the possible options dealing with the seven design issues specified above, producing 144 different specifications. Sixty-six percent produced highly significant coefficients for Democracy (p < 0.01); 89% were weakly significant (p < 0.1). The opposite side of this coin is the fragility of Mousseau’s reported finding regarding contractualism, democracy and peace. Almost any variation in design choices (most of which are defensible) reveals weaknesses in that finding.

Mousseau (2018) reviews DOR’s analyses, reports that 120 of them include contractualism as a variable, and argues that all but four of those analyses are invalid because of design choices made by DOR that are (according to Mousseau) “controversial or contrary to convention.” In order to produce the finding he prefers demonstrating that contract intensity, not democracy, has an important pacifying impact, he rejects all the relevant design choices regarding the seven issues in question, except the ones that he prefers.

As Simonsohn et al. (2015, Abstract) point out, “Empirical results often hinge on data analytic decisions that are simultaneously defensible, arbitrary, and motivated.” They offer a process they call “Specification-Curve Analysis” as a way of evaluating models according to their sensitivity to such data analytic decisions. It gives higher marks, so to speak, to models that prove to be more robust.

Mousseau’s own research history suggests that more than one of the available options we are discussing here are acceptable. Analysts can choose, for example, to include or exclude states that join in disputes after they have continued for some time. Mousseau (2018) argues that “By convention ‘joiners’ are participants who enter a conflict after it has already started by ‘originators.’ Standard practice is to observe only originators.” But Mousseau (2009: 65) explains that “Following standard procedure, I … included joiners.”

Another of these issues regarding which Mousseau (and many others) has been inconsistent involves ongoing disputes of the type we discussed above. Mousseau (2018: 180) asserts that DOR (2013) stipulate that years of ongoing disputes should be excluded from analyses, and that Mousseau’s (2103) inclusion of those years was a “major error.” In fact, as we have seen, what DOR criticize is not the inclusion of ongoing years of disputes. What they criticize is the coding of years of continuing disputes (when conflict onset is the dependent variable) as 0s rather than missing data. DOR (2013) specifically acknowledge that either including or excluding observations of disputes that continue for more than one year is “justified.” But Mousseau (2018) also concedes that in four of his papers published before 2013 (namely Mousseau, 2009, 2012a; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), years of ongoing disputes were excluded.

So, Mousseau and many other analysts have relied on more than one option regarding most of the design choices under discussion here. In spite of this copious evidence that there is considerable variety in the field regarding such design choices, Mousseau (2018) routinely designates one option as the “standard” or “conventional” practice, and accuses DOR (2013) of “errors” if they make different choices, or even just evaluate the impact of the alternative options. Ideally, models are able to produce consistent results in spite of variation in (often both or all acceptable) design choices. DOR (2013) demonstrate that the “contractualism” model tends to be sensitive to such variation.4

But a more fundamental point to be taken away from this debate has to do with the limits to which one can move toward resolution by focusing on dueling regression analyses of observational data. Those limits can be stretched to some degree by the derivation and testing of novel observable implications from a rich theory and the testing of these implications by causal process tracing, analyses of public opinion data, and micro-analyses.5 But observational data will always require substantial caution as a basis for claims about causal linkages.

Conclusion

For that reason, it is important to move the debate beyond the focus on such data. Their shortcomings can be addressed with some success by experiments, natural or otherwise.

Natural experiments are rare opportunities in history when some process manipulated a causal factor of interest in an as-if random way. These are extremely valuable, since (as-if) random treatment assignment guarantees that our estimates of causal effects will not be biased by the confounders that plague most observational studies. Natural experiments are rare, and often require extensive “shoe-leather” (subject matter expertise and fieldwork) to find them and collect the data to analyze them (Dunning 2012). But any serious research program ought to have seriously looked for them, and many have been found to study such elusive phenomena as the effects of extractive institutions on growth (Acemoglu et al., 2012), of armed combat on ethnic homogeneity (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012), of proportional vs representative government on well-being (Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidblom, 2014), of honor cultures on war (Dafoe and Caughey, 2016) and so forth. Where might we find a natural experiment for contract intensity?

### ---AT: Dafoe

#### Dafoe’s results are inconclusive at best

Dafoe 14 [Dafoe, A., Kelsey, N., “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” Journal of Peace Research 51, September 2014]

The stakes are large for researchers to better understand the mechanisms supporting the liberal peace. This study sought to do so by investigating the family of market-mediated signaling mechanisms purported to generate the observed correlation between mutually open capital markets and peace. We examined six most likely crucial cases to look for evidence of the mechanisms suggested by Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001): that open capital markets facilitate costly signaling through economic costs ex ante to militarized conflict. We employed a novel formal case selection strategy that maximizes the leverage and minimizes the bias of our cases. Because our case selection strategy was objective, other scholars may examine potential problems with our design and may extend our analysis to the next most promising cases. Our research finds some support for market-mediated signaling mechanisms, clarifies the means by which they may operate, suggests reasons why they may fail to obviate a conflict, and finds suggestive evidence for alternative explanations for the relationship between capital openness and peace.

Our case studies yield a mixed judgment on the plausibility of market-mediated signaling mechanisms. The two wars that we examined provide strong support for the existence of market-mediated signaling following highly conflictual events, though in both these cases it clearly failed to avert the conflict. This seemingly paradoxical result may, however, arise from our selecting ‘high leverage’ cases for which the relevant scope conditions were absent. We find it plausible that market-mediated signaling could help to avert conflicts arising from asymmetric information in other circumstances where escalation is more gradual, issues are more divisible, and leaders have not become locked-in to the conflict.

However, in the other cases, which were selected in a manner less likely to retrieve cases outside the scope conditions of the mechanism (non-fatal MIDs and high risk dyad-years), we found little conclusive evidence of market-mediated signaling. These cases did suggest several supplemental or alternative accounts for the capitalist peace association. We found evidence for anticipation of costs as a factor in actors’ thinking. We saw instances of third-party intervention that may have been encouraged by the economic openness of parties involved. Several of our cases suggested that the causal relationship may be reversed: open capital markets may indicate a state’s acceptance of the regional status quo and peace. Peace-oriented leaders may instrumentally use the pacifying effect of capital openness to reinforce their desired peace. These additional mechanisms suggest possibilities for future research.

# Aff Answers

## AT: Will To Tech & Modules

### AT: Aesthetics---2AC

#### Aesthetics doesn’t solve anything but attempting to endorse it both reentrenches capitalism and enables racialized capitalist oppression

Bromberg 13 (Svenja Bromberg PhD - social theorist and philosopher with expertise in French and German thought from the 19th to the 21st century, “THE ANTI-POLITICAL AESTHETICS OF OBJECTS AND WORLDS BEYOND”, MetaMute, 25 July 2013, <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond>, MG)

There is at first a very material sense in which its advocates justify the turn to objects. We are at a point where our faith in the powers of the subject to critique and subvert reality, as grounded in Enlightenment theory, **has been truly defeated**, not least by capitalism’s now much discussed ability to demand precisely subjective – emotional or affective – investments in its exploitative machinery.[5](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote5sym) Thus, it is not only the fact that ‘**subjects are always already subjected’**, which we have learned from Foucault, Butler and other poststructuralists.[6](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote6sym) But if capitalism wants us to be ever more alive, happy and truly engaged in shaping our own lives on the basis of the endless possibilities this world has to offer, then the critique offered by vitalist theories, aesthetic modes such as Bourriaud’s ‘**relational aesthetics’** and more critical forms of emancipated spectatorship against an objectifying and alienating capitalist reality **appear assimilated and defused**.[7](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote7sym) As Diedrich Diederichsen outlines in a recent e-flux article, it is precisely what was still antithetical to the Fordist assembly line – different modes of dreaming ‘dangerously’ or living authentic or alternative lives – that seems to have become part of the post-Fordist ‘imperative to produce a perfect self as a perfect thing’.[8](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote8sym) Smiles or grins, day-dreams and ways of being that could formerly help alleviate or escape the alienated existence of the labourer have themselves become reified as part of the **requisite service we are compelled to provide**.[9](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote9sym) Diederichsen describes a sense, similar to the German theatre director René Pollesch in his play *Love is Colder than Capital* in which **all relations have become toxic and emotions have been rendered cold objects for capital.**[10](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote10sym) Thus, the primary concern seems to be with oppressive, exploitative and reified capitalist social relations and how to break out of them – but the solutions we’re confronted with from the diverse strands of the ‘new materialisms’ no longer lie in the critique of these relations, but rather in a nonrelational and un-dialectical gesture that posits the world of matter against the man-made disaster of a neoliberal existence.[11](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote11sym)

The search for what Diederichsen calls ‘de-reification’ ventures towards that which evades representation, which is not rendered object *qua* instrumental reason but *qua* its own force, the dark, the mystic, the animate but soul-less – something that is more truly cold and yet not cold at all. This line of argument, however – which is echoed in Hito Steyerl’s emphatic call for us to finally accept the death of the subject and embrace the forces of construction and destruction, of violence and the possibility stored within things – problematically **sidelines the classed, racialised and gendered oppressions of capitalist reality.** Within this, masses of people have never been granted any ‘subject status’ in the first place and are, instead, rendered mere objects or even superfluous, because not productive, for capital. From the point of view of these relations, the move towards accepting or even embracing objectification as in itself emancipatory can be **nothing more than a bad joke.**

This sentiment, which shares its focus with the new materialisms, tends to uphold a mind-body dualism in which the subject is associated with the mind and the bad effects of Enlightenment rationalism, whereas the physical body with its pre-cognitive responses and movements is often, and rather miraculously, able to maintain a certain independence from worldly subjections. Even if there is an investment in overcoming this dualism and a certain caution against glorifying ‘nature’ as the unchanging outside of the human world to be called upon when attempts to elevate culture fail, the new materialisms’ emphasis on pre-cognitive affects, feelings and touch in the realm of the natural, or as moments of ‘matter receiving form’, **cannot escape the body’s prioritisation.****[12](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote12sym)** This tendency towards an ‘aesthetics through embodiment’[13](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote13sym), which finds its theoretical anchor in Brian Massumi’s work and other thinkers in the field of Affect Studies, is still very much entangled with the human body and its ability to be drawn into new relational and animate fields through or as part of an artwork.[14](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote14sym)

#### Aesthetics as a method is dead in the 21st century

Zubatov 19 (Alexander Zubatov - practicing attorney specializing in general commercial litigation, “Politics vs. Aesthetics: Why Great Art Cannot Conform to Our Political Views”, Aero Magazine, 26 July 2019, <https://areomagazine.com/2019/07/26/politics-vs-aesthetics-why-great-art-cannot-conform-to-our-political-views/>, MG)

The Aesthetic Achieves Lift-Off and Comes Back Down with a Thud

This exalted vision of the purity and autonomy of art, in which the artist is a creative visionary, a Promethean hero, gave rise to the Romantic sensibility of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and to much that followed. It informs Swinburne’s bold pronouncement, “Art for Art’s sake first of all, and afterwards the rest shall be added to her … but from the man who falls to artistic work with a moral purpose shall be taken away even that which he has”; the Russian formalists’ elevation of the self-referential patterns of aesthetic form as art’s singular guiding light; and even Carl Jung’s vision of the artist as the expression of the highest truths of our collective unconscious, “the unwitting mouthpiece of the psychic secrets of his time.”

This reverential tradition led to the canonization of aesthetic works as academic literature departments took shape in the late nineteenth century. These masterpieces, T. S. Eliot writes in his 1919 essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” are monuments in an imaginary library and “form an ideal order among themselves.” By Eliot’s time, Shiner tells us, art and culture—and their accompanying norms of manners and refinement—had become a great dividing line, replacing an earlier divide between the large mass of common folk and a tiny hereditary aristocracy:

The emergence of new art institutions like art museums, literary reviews and secular concerts led to the use of cultural choices to mark social ascension, and a consequent withdrawal of art from lower-class culture, so that whereas in 1500, popular culture was everyone’s culture, by 1800, the clergy, nobility, merchants and professional men and their wives had **abandoned popular culture to the lower classes** …

By the late nineteenth century, the kind of multilevel culture with which we are now familiar began to emerge. One could identify a person’s social class in part by what papers or books they read, what music they listened to, what plays they saw, what sort of pictures they preferred.

But this is becoming less and less true today; art and culture have **ceased to serve** as the dividing line between the elites and the unschooled, unwashed masses. Art lost that status when, as I argue here, the vaguely literate but entirely uncultivated post-war techno-financial elite **replaced the old literary intelligentsia**, whereupon literature and other hallmarks of high culture began to undergo a first gradual and then more rapid rot on the vine. Marxist and Marx-inspired class prejudice, together with Dadaism and postmodernism, leveled the distinctions between high and low, avant-garde and kitsch, originality and banality and ultimately between art and everything else, resulting in profound and sweeping biases against perceived elites and difficult elite culture. Ultimately, conventional aesthetic merit ceased to matter.

But banal or low art differs fundamentally from high art: it **lacks the visionary gleam**; it can only **reflect society back to itself**. Such art could no longer be credibly thought to **fulfill anything like the transformative**, redemptive function attributed to art by Schiller and his followers. The special status of the great artist, the creative genius, the echo of divinity, quickly fell away, to be replaced by market values, which equate genius with worldly success and relegate the true geniuses toiling in obscurity to the realm of oddball quackery, making them figures of ridicule. And woe be to those effete intellectuals and elitist critics that still dare abide by the traditional distinction between high and low and speak ill of comics, comic book films, sitcoms, reality TV, pop music, hip hop and so on.

### AT: Calculaton K---2AC

#### They link to their K of “flows” bc they read evidence

#### Util calculations good -- ensures compassion to the other.

Williams ’5 [Michael; 2005; Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa; *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*,“The Tyranny of False Polarities,” p. 165-166; GR]

Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness.On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by-- at least initially -- reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited -- both epistemically and politically -- in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of modus Vivendi.

#### Ethics demands we make tough choices -- deontological imperatives are catastrophic.

Weiss ’99 [Thomas; 1999; Former Professor of international Relations at CUNY Graduate Center; *Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action*, *Ethics and International Affairs*,“13.1,” GR]

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to **the** lesser of evils.

Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help,it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.

Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions— required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others.

“30The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed.It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.

Principles in an Unprincipled World.Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post--Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.

“33 This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast.

International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference. Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there! “3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

#### Their definition of calculation is hopelessly broad---it castigates all action targeted toward an end, like reading their K

Davison ‘1 [Aidan; 2001; Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania; *Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Heidegger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably ontological and corporeal.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend long hours meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

### AT: Deleuze K---2AC

#### Role experimentation should orient our politics. Viewing the world through the lens of a policymaker can alter our perception in ways that catalyze micro and macro political action. This link turns neg offense---our reading of Deleuze better enables lines of flight allowing for liberatory potentials

Connolly 13 [William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism, Duke University Press, 2013, 186]

There is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances. Obedient performances in cumulative effect tend to support the existing regime as they insinuate its dictates into our collective habits of perception, judgment, and action. Unless a dissident group of workers meticulously “works according to rule” to disrupt production through excruciating obedience in a way that discloses how tangled formal rules can become. Or a group creatively improvises on the performance of Bartleby the Scrivener, posing endless questions about the orders given to it until the machine overflows itself or is jammed. These indeed are creative role experimentations. So was the practice in Eastern Europe during the late stages of Soviet rule to clap endlessly when a Soviet stooge spoke, until the bewildered speaker was moved to sit down amid the roar around him. I recently attended a faculty meeting with the president of my university at which the entire faculty remained silent after his Ceo-style talk ended and he departed slowly up the aisle. Sometimes silence sends a message to power. Our lives are messages.5 Role experimentation can disrupt and redirect the flow of authority, habit, institutional regularity, and future projection. It can also encourage others to look more closely at their own performances in this or that domain. Such experiments can also set the stage for more adventurous and larger scale actions. My examples will be limited to con- stituencies who are the most apt to read this book, though they could easily be adjusted to a broader array. Suppose a constellation of students, studying to enter professional life, forms study groups to explore more closely how those professions presuppose and enforce a set of practices that contribute to the fragility of things as they simultaneously draw attention away from that contribution. The students may pose untimely questions in their political science, economics, engineering, medical, business, legal, and biology classes. If in a secular institution, they may seek out courses that complicate the assumptions of secularism. If in a religious school, they may organize a group to explore the history of atheism or of minority faiths that eschew the theme of a per- sonal God. They can engage experimental artistic work that stretches their habitual patterns of perception and judgment. The nature- and soundscape compositions of John Luther Adams have salutary effects on many in this respect. Such activities can also prime you to experiment with other role performances once you enter professional life. If a lawyer, you may organize to rethink your connections to the ugly prison system and to adjust your practice to protest its ugliness. Or you may give a portion of your time to challenge corporations, localities, and states that defile the environment. If a doctor, you may organize voluntary medical care for the poor and publicize what you are doing. In both cases these experimentations make a modest difference on their own, prime our capacities for more sensitive perception in other domains of life, and may prepare us to participate with others in yet more adventurous activities. These are minor moments, but an accumulation of minor moments can jostle settled habits of perception; they can encourage a readiness to become more exploratory; and they can extend the time horizon within which we think and act. Suppose, now, you are middle- or upper-middle-class citizens in a polity that has competitive elections. You have become increasingly dissatisfied with the course your society is taking. Voting, while pertinent, seems radically insufficient to the issues involved. Its time horizon is too short and the strategic place of ill-informed undecided voters in electoral politics skews campaigns too sharply. Inequality has been extended. The lower reaches of society are left out in the cold and often blamed for the suffering they undergo. The news media are organized around scandal and a brief time horizon. Racial differences are exploited to break up potential coalitions on the left. A large slice of the population is periodically suscep- tible to war fever. Climate change is widely subjected to deferral, denial, or formal acceptance disconnected from action. And the right wing actively promotes filibusters and legislative stalemates to encourage more and more people to withdraw from citizenship and to tolerate the privatization of more and more of life. The sciences and professions with which you are familiar are often too narrowly defined. Too many churches either provide refuges from the world or serve as sites of aggressive attack on ecological concerns, homosexu- ality, carriers of alternative faiths, or poor minorities. You know what po- litical party you support; you vote regularly; and you give time and money to your party. But you also find it difficult to connect the sentiments you profess to the role expectations sedimented into your practices of work, church, consumption, neighborhood association, investment portfolio, children’s school, artistic pursuits, and local news reporting. Now is the time to join others in becoming role experimentalists. You may actively support the farm-to-table movement in the restaurants you visit; you may support the slow food movement; you may frequent stores that offer food based on sustainable processes; you may buy a hybrid or, if feasible, join an urban zip-car collective, explaining to friends, family, and neighbors what effect such choices could have on late modern ecology if a majority of the populace did one or the other; you may press your neighborhood association and workplace to buy solar panels and install them yourself; you may use writing and media skills developed in school to write for a blog; you may shift a large portion of your retirement account into investments that support sustainable energy; you may withdraw from aggressive investments that presuppose an unsustainable growth pattern, threaten economic collapse, and/or undermine the collec- tive future; you may bring new issues and visitors to your church, temple, or mosque to support rethinking about interdenominational issues and the contemporary fragility of things; you may found, join, or frequent a repair club, at which volunteers collect and repair old appliances, furni- ture, and vehicles to cut back on urban waste and increase the longevity of these items; you may probe and publicize the multimodal tactics by which twenty-four-hour news stations work on the visceral register of their viewers, as you explore ways to counter those techniques; you may travel to places where unconscious American assumptions about world entitlement are challenged on a regular basis; you may augment your pattern of films and artistic exhibits attended to stretch your habitual powers of perception and to challenge some affect-imbued prejudgments embedded in them; you may seek out new friends who are also moving in these directions. You may regularly relay pregnant essays you encounter to friends, colleagues, and relatives. A series of minor role experiments. As we proceed our aspirational selves may now begin to exceed our operational selves, and the shame we feel about the discrepancy between these two aspects of the self may generate energy to enter into yet new modes of role experimentation.6 We thus begin to make ourselves and our engagements more experimental rather than simply falling into a ready- made set of role expectations. We have begun to become what Nietzsche calls “our own guinea pigs” rather than merely being the guinea pigs of those in charge of these institutions. As such experiments accumulate, the ice in and around us begins to crack. First, the shaky perceptions, feelings, and beliefs with which we started these experimentations now become more refined and more entrenched. Second, we are now better situated to forge connections with yet larger constituencies engaging in similar experiments. Third, as these connections accumulate we may be more inspired to join macropolitical movements that speak to the issues. Fourth, as we now join protests, slowdowns, and confrontational meetings with corporate managers, church leaders, union officials, university officials, and neighborhood leaders, we may now become more alert to the institutional pressures that propel these constituencies forward too. They are also both enmeshed in a web of roles that en- able and constrain them and often more than mere role bearers. These roles too exhibit varying degrees of pressure and slack as they link the details of daily conduct to the strategic practices of the larger political economy.

#### Saying that the state is always bad is a terrible misreading of Deleuze – piecemeal reform is important and you should affirm it – rejecting the state in a totalizing way means the aff links to itself, since they turn difference into opposition – creativity with democratic politics solves all their offense

**Patton, ’05** (Paul Patton, *Deleuze and Democracy*, Contemporary Political Theory, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v4/n4/full/9300236a.html)

Mengue turns this difference into opposition in suggesting that the position of majority is by nature opposed to the creativity of the minoritarian: majoritarian democratic politics inevitably 'crushes' creative becomings (Mengue, 2003, 102). According to this view, to adopt the standpoint of the majority is always to abandon the standpoint of the untimely and the creative in favour of the state and established values. This is a misrepresentation of Deleuze and Guattari's view and an implausible view of democratic politics. Legislative measures introduced in a number of democracies in recent years have served to broaden the standard to include non-whites, non-males and even to allow equal rights to homosexual partners. These measures suggest that, far from 'crushing novelty' as Mengue suggests, democratic politics can have its own forms of creativity. No doubt such measures have been implemented in response to micropolitical changes already underway. For this reason, William Connolly reminds us that in order to be responsive to new claims for the reconfiguration of the standard democratic political life needs to be infused with a public ethos of critical engagement (Connolly, 1999, 51). For Deleuze and Guattari, the different forms of minority becoming provide the impulse for change at the level of social and political institutions, but this change only occurs to the extent that there is adaptation and incorporation on the side of the majority. When they say that the power of minorities 'is not measured by their capacity to enter into and make themselves felt within the majority system, nor even to reverse the necessarily tautological criterion of the majority', they mean that the majorities do not determine the limits of the potential for transformation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 471). They do not mean to suggest that minorities do not enter into and produce effects upon the majority. On the contrary, they insist upon the importance of piecemeal changes to the form and content of a given majority: 'molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes and parties' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 216–217).6 Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on the transformative potential of minoritarian becomings does not imply a refusal of democratic politics, much less a rejection of democratic principles. The irreducible character of the difference in kind between majority and minority aligns them firmly with the proponents of democratic pluralism such as Connolly, for whom the key to an open-ended democratic process lies in the 'productive tension' between majoritarian governance, rights and recognition on the one hand, and minoritarian becoming on the other (Connolly, 2002, 172). For Deleuze and Guattari, it is precisely those excluded from the majority as defined by a given set of axioms who are the potential bearers of the power to transform that set, whether in the direction of a new set of axioms or an altogether new axiomatic. These are the source of minoritarian becomings that carry the potential for new earths and peoples unlike like those found in existing democracies.

#### Critique alone without action won’t do anything to mobilize lines of flight or political possibility.

Adkin 16 (Laurie, teaches Political Science at the University of Alberta, “Political Ecology and Counter-Hegemonic Politics” in A World to Win, ed. by Carroll and Sarker, 2016, p. 109-110)

Political ecology is integral to a counter-hegemonic reform agenda because it offers a substantive set of directions for a post-capitalist, ecologically sustainable model of development. Returning to the brief discussion of resource sector workers, above, and to Raymond Williams's insistence that people need to be able to believe that “practical alternatives” are available, it is clear that political ecologists must build coalitions to develop and negotiate transitional plans as well as new institutions. The starting points for such coalitions may be municipal or regional; the ways in which national and global institutions (treaties, trade and investment agreements, WTO rules, jurisdictional division of powers, etc.) constrain, obstruct (or occasionally enable) changes at the local level will become clear soon enough, and will point the way toward the coalitions and reforms needed at other scales. What is important, as Williams observed, is that: “while certain principles can be established, all actual policies have to depend on new and difficult audits of resources, which must by definition be specific. We can look first at the principles, but their full practical bearings cannot be set down except in this place and that, by [END PAGE 109] this enquiry and that, in a sustained and necessarily negotiated process” (1983: 256). This conclusion directs our attention to what are, in my view, the critical tasks of the organic intellectuals of counter-hegemonic politics. There is, of course, the need to **root political discourse** in shared values and a common agenda of democratic reforms. Research must construct a solid account of the political, economic, cultural and ecological relationships operative within a **given frame of action**, including the ways in which these relationships cross multiple scales (from the local to the global). This foundation is essential to identifying the agency of change and the resources needed to strengthen civil society, and to develop a program and strategy for change. All of the social movements, including the unions, have important, **necessary** roles to play in such planning and negotiation.

Williams argued further that criticism of capitalism or enumeration of the many horrors of the times (salient then, the fear of nuclear war) would, **alone, do little to mobilize people** to undertake collective action for a better world. When he wrote these words, climate change and peak oil were hardly on our radar, nor the risks of genetically modified organisms, nor imminent mass extinctions of other species due to human demands on the planet's carrying capacity. Chernobyl hadn't happened yet. Today, more than ever, counter-hegemonic politics must be about “making hope practical, rather than despair convincing” (Williams, 1983: 240). Political ecology offers many of the tools we need to build a world in which humans and all of nature are no longer treated, as Williams put it, as “raw material for production,” but in which there is a “new orientation of livelihood: of practical, self-managing, self-renewing societies, in which people care first for each other, in a living world” (1983: 262, 266).

### AT: Deleuze---CTP---2AC

#### The alt cedes the political and turns us insular---turns their offense and feeds climate disasters.

David E. **McClean 1**, Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” <http://www.american-> philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, **leftist critics continue to cite and refer to** the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida**,** Deleuze**,** Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, **who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions** (when they actually do suggest them) **aimed at curing the ills of** homelessness, poverty, market greed, **national belligerence and racism**. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "**When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either** philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . T**hese futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left** retreats from activism **and adopts a** spectatorial approach **to the problems of its country.** Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).[(1)](file:///C:\WINDOWS\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.IE5\OTKXU3YH\the%20city.htm#N_1_) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that **philosophy in America will be** lost **between chewing a historical cud** long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . **or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of** successful action."

Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, **the Cultural Left**, in this country, **too often** dismiss American society as beyond reform **and redemption**. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think **it may also be** disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain.

**Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their** cynicism **about America's social and political prospects and help** forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. **We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves** and from within our ranks **a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to** move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" **but** more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) **This means going down deep into the guts of our** quotidian social institutions**, into the** grimy pragmatic details **where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where** the officers and **bureaucrats** of those institutions **take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples'** lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This **might help keep us from being slapped down** in debates **by** true **policy pros who actually know what they are talking** about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Deleuzian philosophy cedes the political – the abstract and immaterial nature of the alternative is a utopian distraction

**Hallward 6** – Professor of Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University, London (Peter, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p161-162)

Now Deleuze understands perfectly well why ‘most of the objections raised against the great philosophers are empty’. Indignant readers say to them: ‘things are not like that […]. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not’ (ES, 106). Rather than test its accuracy according to the criteria of representation, ‘the genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts’ (LS, 6). In reality then, Deleuze concludes, ‘only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question’, that it ‘does not force the nature of things enough’ (ES, 107; cC WP, 82). Deleuze certainly forces the nature of things into conformity with his own question. Just as certainly however, his question inhibits any consequential engagement with the constraints of our actual world. For readers who remain concerned with these con­straints and their consequences, Deleuze’s question is not the best available question. Rather than try to refute Deleuze, this book has tried to show how his system works and to draw attention to what should now be the obvious (and perfectly explicit) limita­tions of this philosophy of unlimited affirmation. First of all, since it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, there is no place in Deleuze’s philosophy for any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by actuality. In the end, Deleuze offers few resources for thinking the consequences of what happens within the actually existing world as such. Unlike Darwin or Marx, for instance, the adamantly virtual orientation of Deleuze’s ‘constructivism’ does not allow him to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials and tendencies. No doubt few contemporary philosophers have had as an acute a sense of the internal dynamic of capitalism — but equally, few have proposed so elusive a response as the virtual ‘war machine’ that roams through the pages of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Like the nomads who invented it, this abstract machine operates at an ‘absolute speed, by being “synonymous with speed”’, as the incarnation of ‘a pure and immeasurable multiplicity; an irruption of the ephemeral and of the power of metamorphosis’ (TP, 336, 352). Like any creating, a war machine consists and ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses’ (T~ 360). By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state — by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth — the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction. Although no small number of enthusiasts continue to devote much energy and inge­nuity to the task, the truth is that Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent to the politics of this world. A philosophy based on deterritorialisation, dissipation and flight can offer only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world. Deleuze’s philosophical war remains ‘absolute’ and ‘abstract’, precisely, rather than directed or ‘waged’ [menee]. Once ‘a social field is defined less by its conflicts and con­tradictions than by the lines of flight running through it’, any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation or life. And since these dynamics are themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict or solidarity, i.e. relations that are genuinely between rather than external to individuals, classes, or principles.

### AT: Deleuze Alt---2AC

#### Micropolitics fail---if they’re right that power is a structural constraint they can’t articulate new modes of existence

**Bayet 13**, PhD, Catherine and Bruce Bastian Professor of Global and Transnational Studies at the Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, (Assef, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Second Edition, Stanford University Press, pg. 41-46)

The dearth of conventional collective action—in particular, contentious protests among the subaltern groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the developing countries, together with a disillusionment with dominant socialist parties, pushed many radical observers to "discover" and highlight different types of activism, however small-scale, local, or even individualistic. Such a quest, meanwhile, both contributed to and benefited from the upsurge of theoretical perspectives, during the 1980s, associated with poststructuralism that made micropolitics and "everyday resistance" a popular idea. James Scott's departure, during the 1980s, from a structuralist position in studying the behavior of the peasantry in Asia to a more ethnographic method of focusing on individual reactions of peasants contributed considerably to this paradigm shift.27 In the meantime, Foucault's "decentered" notion of power, together with a revival of neo-Gramscian politics of culture (hegemony), served as a key theoretical backing for micropolitics, and thus the "resistance" perspective. The notion of "resistance" came to stress that power and counterpower were not in binary opposition, but in a decoupled, complex, ambivalent, and perpetual "dance of control."28 It based itself on the Foucauldian idea that "wherever there is power there is resistance," although the latter consisted largely of small-scale, everyday, tiny activities that the agents could afford to articulate given their political constraints. Such a perception of resistance penetrated not only peasant studies, but a variety of fields, including labor studies, identity politics, ethnicity, women's studies, education, and studies of the urban subaltern. Thus, multiple researchers discussed how relating stories about miracles "gives voice to popular resistance";29 how disenfranchised women resisted patriarchy by relating folktales and songs or by pretending to be possessed or crazy;-"-1 how reviving extended family among the urban popular classes represented an "avenue of political participation."31 The relationships between the Filipino bar girls and Western men were discussed not simply in terms of total domination, but in a complex and contingent fashion;32 and the veiling of the Muslim working woman has been represented not in simple terms of submission, but in ambivalent terms of protest and co-optation—hence, an "accommodating protest."33 Indeed, on occasions, both veiling and unveiling were simultaneously considered as a symbol of resistance. Undoubtedly, such an attempt to grant agency to the subjects that until then were depicted as "passive poor," "submissive women," "apolitical peasant," and "oppressed worker" was a positive development. The resistance paradigm helps to uncover the complexity of power relations in society in general, and the politics of the subaltern in particular. It tells us that we may not expect a universalized form of struggle; that totalizing pictures often distort variations in people's perceptions about change; that local should be recognized as a significant site of struggle as well as a unit of analysis; that organized collective action may not be possible everywhere, and thus alternative forms of struggles must be discovered and acknowledged; that organized protest as such may not necessarily be privileged in the situations where suppression rules. The value of a more flexible, small-scale, and unbureaucratic activism should, therefore, be acknowledged.31 These are some of the issues that critiques of poststruc-turalist advocates of "resistance" ignore.3' Yet a number of conceptual and political problems also emerge from this paradigm. The immediate trouble is how to conceptualize resistance, and its relation to power, domination, and submission. James Scott seems to be clear about what he means by the term: Class resistance includes a«/act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (tor example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinatc classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-a-vis these superordinate classes.36 (emphasis added) However, the phrase "any act" blocks delineating between qualitatively diverse forms of activities that Scott lists. Are we not to distinguish between large-scale collective action and individual acts, say, of tax dodging? Do reciting poetry in private, however subversive-sounding, and engaging in armed struggle have identical value? Should we not expect unequal affectivity and implications from such different acts? Scott was aware of this, and so agreed with those who had made distinctions between different types of resistance—for example, "real resistance" refers to "organized, systematic, preplanned or selfless practices with revolutionary consequences," and "token resistance" points to unorganized incidental acts without any revolutionary consequences, and which are accommodated in the power structure.37 Yet he insisted that the "token resistance" is no less real than the "real resistance." Scott's followers, however, continued to make further distinctions. Nathan Brown, in studying peasant politics in Egypt, for instance, identities three forms of politics: atomistic (politics of individuals and small groups with obscure content), communal (a group effort to disrupt the system, by slowing down production and the like), and revolt (just short of revolution to negate the system).38 Beyond this, many resistance writers tend to confuse an awareness about oppression with acts of resistance against it. The fact that poor women sing songs about their plight or ridicule men in their private gatherings indicates their understanding of gender dynamics. This does not mean, however, that they are involved in acts of resistance; neither are the miracle stories of the poor urbanites who imagine the saints to come and punish the strong. Such an understanding of "resistance" fails to capture the extremely complex interplay of conflict and consent, and ideas and action, operating within systems of power. Indeed, the link between consciousness and action remains a major sociological dilemma." Scott makes it clear that resistance is an intentional act. In Weberian tradition, he takes the meaning of action as a crucial clement. This intentional-ity, while significant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual and collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond. In Cairo or Tehran, for example, many poor families illegally tap into electricity and running water from the municipality despite their awareness of their behavior's illegality. Yet they do not steal urban services in order to express their defiance vis-a-vis the authorities. Rather, they do it because they feel the necessity of those services for a decent life, because they find no other way to acquire them. But these very mundane acts when continued lead to significant changes in the urban structure, in social policy, and in the actors' own lives. Hence, the significance of the unintended consequences of agents' daily activities. In fact, many authors in the resistance paradigm have simply abandoned intent and meaning, focusing instead eclectically on both intended and unintended practices as manifestations of "resistance." There is still a further question. Docs resistance mean defending an already achieved gain (in Scott's terms, denying claims made by dominant groups over the subordinate ones) or making fresh demands (to "advance its own claims"), what 1 like to call "encroachment"? In much of the resistance literature, this distinction is missing. Although one might imagine moments of overlap, the two strategies, however, lead to different political consequences; this is so in particular when we view them in relation to the strategies of dominant power. The issue was so crucial that Lenin devoted his entire What Is to Be Done? to discussing the implications of these two strategics, albeit in different terms of "economism/trade unionism" vs. "social democratic/party politics." Whatever one may think about a Leninist/vanguardist paradigm, it was one that corresponded to a particular theory of the state and power (a capitalist state to be seized by a mass movement led by the working-class party); in addition, it was clear where this strategy wanted to take the working class (to establish a socialist state). Now, what is the perception of the state in the "resistance" paradigm? What is the strategic aim in this perspective? Where does the resistance paradigm want Lo lake its agents/subjects, beyond "preventing] the worst and promising] something better"?40 Much of the literature of resistance is based upon a notion of power that Foucault has articulated, that power is everywhere, that it "circulates" and is never "localized here and there, never in anybody's hands."'11 Such a formulation is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the ordinary and in recognizing their agency. Yet this "decentered" notion of power, shared by many poststructuralist "resistance" writers, underestimates state power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to see that although power circulates, it does so unevenly—in some places it is far weightier, more concentrated, and "thicker," so to speak, than in others. In other words, as a system of power. It is, therefore, not accidental that a theory of the state and, therefore, an analysis of the possibility of co-optation, are absent in almost all accounts of "resistance." Consequently, the cherished acts of resistance float around aimlessly in an unknown, uncertain, and ambivalent universe of power relations, with the end result an unsettled, tense accommodation with the existing power arrangement. Lack of a clear concept of resistance, moreover, often leads writers in this genre to overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result is that almost any act of the subjects potentially becomes one of "resistance." Determined to discover the "inevitable" acts of resistance, many poststructuralist writers often come to "replace their subject."42 While they attempt to challenge the essentialism of such perspectives as "passive poor" "submissive Muslim women," and "inactive masses," they tend, however, to fall into the trap of essentialism in reverse—by reading too much into ordinary behaviors, interpreting them as necessarily conscious or contentious acts of defiance. This is so because they overlook the crucial fact that these practices occur mostly within the prevailing systems of power.

#### Ethical projects of self-creation must be tethered from the outset to advocacy for institutional change---the alt lapses into new-age individualistic therapy, which demolishes collective political action

**Myers ‘13** [Ella; 2013; Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Utah; *Wordly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World*, p. 44-45]

Unfortunately, Connolly is inconsistent in this regard, for he also positions Foucauldian self- artistry as an “essential preliminary to,” and even the necessary “condition of,” change at the macropolitical level.104 That is, although Connolly claims that micropolitics and political movements work “in tandem,” each producing effects on the other,105 he sometimes privileges “action by the self on itself” as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change. This approach not only avoids the question of the genesis of such reflexive action and its possible harmful effects but also indicates that collective efforts to alter social conditions actually await proper techniques of the self. For example, in a rich discussion of criminal punishment in the United States, Connolly contends that “today the micropolitics of desire in the domain of criminal violence has become a condition for a macropolitics that reconfigures existing relations between class, race, crime and punishment.”106 Here and elsewhere in Connolly’s writing the sequencing renders these activities primary and secondary rather than mutually inspiring and reinforcing.107 It is a mistake to grant chronological primacy to ethical self-intervention, however. How, after all, is such intervention, credited with producing salient effects at the macropolitical level, going to get off the ground, so to speak, or assuredly move in the direction of democratic engagement (rather than withdrawal, for example) if it is not tethered, from the beginning, to public claims that direct attention to a specific problem, defined as publicly significant and changeable? How and why would an individual take up reflexive work on the desire to punish if she were not already attuned, at least partially, to problems afflicting current criminal punishment practices? And that attunement is fostered, crucially, by the macropolitical efforts of democratic actors who define a public matter of concern and elicit the attention of other citizens.108 For reflexive self- care to be democratically significant, it must be inspired by and continually connected to larger political mobilizations. Connolly sometimes acknowledges that the arts of the self he celebrates are not themselves the starting point of collaborative action but instead exist in a dynamic, reciprocal relation with cooperative and antagonistic efforts to shape collective arrangements. Yet the self’s relation with itself is also treated as a privileged site, the very source of democratic spirit and action. This tendency to prioritize the self’s reflexive relationship over other modes of relation defines the therapeutic ethics that ultimately emerges out of Foucault’s and, to a lesser degree, Connolly’s work. This ethics not only elides differences between caring for oneself and caring for conditions but also celebrates the former as primary or, as Foucault says, “ontologically prior.” An ethics centered on the self’s engagement with itself may have value, but it is not an ethics fit for democracy.

#### Ascribing violence to metaphysical concepts like the subject is essentialist and wrong---ontology does not determine politics

**Schwartz 8** [Joseph M., professor of political science at Temple, *The Future of Democratic Equality*, p 59-60, google books]

To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the democratic project. It is to contend that one’s epistemology determines one’s politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed “reactionary” and “left cultural conservatism” to belief in “reactionary” “foundationalist humanism”42 Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity. For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace the post-structuralist “non-definability of woman” as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a “woman.”43 But this is itself a “closed” position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves: has there ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary “ethical” values as being those of “instability and flux”? Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women’s and gay and lesbian movement would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist “anti-essentialist epistemology.” Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan “ethics” are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can rightfully ban certain forms of “agonal” (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.¶ A politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice and struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Sosuan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti-) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), post-structuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy.

#### Their theory is over-reductionist and can’t ever materialize

Oduor 21 (John Baptiste Oduor, Editor at Jacobin Magazine, 12-21-21, Jacobin Magazine, "How Leftist Theory Stopped Making Sense",)

Playfulness and a general lack of seriousness became another hallmark of theory. French philosophers Deleuze and Félix Guattari, perhaps the most infamous innovators of the genre, insisted that their anti-psychoanalytic tract Anti-Oedipus was not a work of philosophy, in any traditional sense. By this they meant it did not seek to produce a unified worldview or to answer age-old questions about the reality of freedom or the legitimate authority of the state. The task of philosophy was instead, the duo claimed in What is Philosophy?, the creation of problems. Lost in this reformulation was any vision of philosophy as an attempt to make sense of the human life, understood as limited by specific anthropological or historical constraints. Philosophy-as-theory was, Guattari claimed, ideally addressed “to people who are now between 7 and 15 years old.” Clearly disingenuous, Guattari’s comment did, however, say something about the co-authors’ commitment to a child-like playfulness, taking as much from geology and mathematics as they did from philosophy. Unlike the socialist political economy and philosophy of the early 20th century, postwar theory was propelled not by any kind of practical engagement but by a constant demand for innovation and newness, needed to keep up with a postwar political landscape that was thoroughly fragmented. The social transformations that theory attempted to make sense of—disillusionment with communism, anti-colonial movements, women’s liberation, the existence of an underclass, the continued existence of capitalism—undermined so many assumptions about the world held across the political spectrum that it was hard to see how any overarching ideas could synthesize them, or whether theorists’ inability to do so should be considered a failure. Consequently, the portrait that Philipp Felsch painted in The Summer of Theory: History of a Rebellion, 1960-1990, is that of an open-ended journey rather than a decisive verdict on the value and usefulness of theory. Felsch’s account largely focuses on the radical publishing house Merve, which made its name as a popularizer of theory in the German-speaking world. Founded in 1970, Merve was created by a generation for which the recent memory of the second world war was still strong. The divide between parents and their children, many of whom perceived their elders to be bystanders to fascism, motivated many postwar Germans to take up the political task of creating a liberal public sphere in the present. A key feature of this public sphere was an emphasis on discussion as conducive of civility and as an antidote to authoritarianism. Throughout this period, the country’s leading intellectuals engaged in fierce public debates around the relationship between fascism and German culture. Theory, in Felsch’s account, emerges out of an attempt to take seriously that which “the bourgeois relegate to non-working hours as ‘culture,’” as the German philosopher Theodor Adorno writes in Minima Moralia. Art, literature, and music would, in the publishers’ catalogue, receive the same critical scrutiny previously reserved for politics, following the example set by Adorno. Adorno’s book, subtitled Reflections on a Damaged Life, was a lodestar for a generation of young Germans such as Merve co-founder Peter Gente, for whom the desire for discussion had not yet broken down the traditional hierarchical boundaries between intellectuals and their readership. These new readers were still willing to look for validation in traditions incapable of keeping up with the pace of societal transformation. (Felsch neatly illustrates this new incongruence between past and present by recounting episodes of various members of the growing public sphere seeking out Adorno’s advice on everything from sexual alienation to depression. Adorno’s response to these letters speaks both to the gap between himself and his readership, and the sincerity with which he sought to understand this chasm. One correspondent remarked, after meeting Adorno in person, that she realized she had not been “looking for hope, but for solidarity in my hopelessness.”) The desire for community, already present in the cultishness that developed around the work of Adorno, remains inextricable from the story of theory. This is the source of the ambivalence Felsch wrestles with throughout his narrative. Theory responded to a desire, completely understandable in the context of postwar Germany, of many leftists to be part of a community of the like-minded. It was a desire exacerbated by the Social Democratic Party’s abandonment of socialism in 1959 and consolidated by the hopelessness of left-wing terrorism during 1977’s “German Autumn.” But was it powerful enough to compel those would-be community members to ignore any scruples they would otherwise have about the intellectual or political value of the community created? Did theory advance a genuine critique of society, or did it simply create subcultures unified by an increasingly self-referential use of language? The specter of theory as mere fashion already loomed over Merve as a negative exemplar. Merve’s editors were, up until their last days, insistent on describing themselves not as “professionals” but as “bookworms.” Merve’s self-appointed task was, in Felsch’s words, to “jump-start German Marxism out of its dogmatic standstill with boosts from Italy and France.” Not content with abstract theorizing, Merve understood itself as pursuing revolutionary politics through letters. The political project the publisher sought to animate was one that afforded special privilege to theoretical discussion. Never willing to abandon the bourgeois idea of a public sphere being conducive to the healthy functioning of a society, the collective, motivated by their radical politics, sought interlocutors among the migrant workers propping up postwar German industrial capitalism. In the northern city of Wolfsburg, Merve’s editors descended on the 6,000 odd Italian guest workers employed in the local Volkswagen factory with the aim of discussing the latest Marxist theory in proletarian pubs. Their hope was that they would find there soil as fertile for political tumult as that which existed in the European coffee shops of the 17th century. Not only did this project in revolutionary outreach fail miserably, proximity to the migrant workers during this sojourn exposed differences in outlook between Merve’s members. Shockingly, while the collective lay on shared mattresses placed on the floor, one of its members admitted a secret dream of having a family, children, and a garden. Bourgeois society had clearly not been transcended. Fractures within the private sphere continued to affect the project of building a public sphere. In the mid-70s, Gente became romantically involved with a young student, Heidi Paris, with whom he collaborated as a fellow editor. His wife at the time, Merve Lowien, who lent her name to the publishing house, would document the often-unsurprising gender dynamics at the company in Feminine Productive Power—Is There Another Economy? Experience in a Left Project. Market imperatives forced Merve to look for fresh theory, a search that proved incompatible with the strictures of Marxist politics, traditionally conceived. Of course, temperamentally Merve’s editors were already prone to searching for new trends. Drug addicts, social rejects, and those deemed insane became the foci of Merve’s books and radical theory in the 1970s. Jean-François Lyotard, author of The Postmodern Condition, could proclaim during this period that all thinking about universal subjects, such as the working class, the human being, or the citizen, was “obsolete.” A hostility to the guidance sought by Adorno’s readers had started to emerge, and a general skepticism towards the discipline present in education took the place of this early desire for instruction. Subsequently, the writer as sage was replaced by the reader as the participant. The shift here was that the pace of production of new text meant that the only thing that remained fixed was the readership. The latter were active as consumers of cultural content while writers had to struggle to keep up with the latest trends. Unmoored from any fixed institutions or political worldview, theory was free to turn to areas that its origin as a response to the trauma of the second world war had previously prevented it from engaging with. By the late ‘70s, Merve was publishing books rehabilitating the conservative philosopher Ernst Jünger and the Nazi legal philosopher Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s anti-liberal decisionism would have run afoul of Merve’s early discussion-centered conception of politics. In the heady days of theory, however, the far-right thinker’s conceptualization of politics in terms of opposition between friends and enemies proved perfectly amenable to the iconoclasm of the 1980s. In The Summer of Theory’s closing sections, Felsch paints a portrait of an intellectual world completely detached from any real constituencies: American artists and musicians schmoozing in Berlin bars and discotheques with radical theorists speculating about the end of art. The social forces that made this dealignment possible are not, in Felsch’s account, brought to the fore. What we are presented with instead is an image of theory as a series of waves appearing above a body of water, beneath which the quotidian realities of politics and everyday culture clash vigorously. The goal of eliminating the distinction between culture and politics results, ironically, in theory distancing itself from both. Consequently, Felsch’s narrative arc leaves the reader with a decidedly pessimistic view of the relationship of theory to politics and culture. At its very best theory seems to be a balm for the despair caused by politics; at its worst, an accommodation with an increasingly disorientating world. Unsurprisingly, it was theory’s separation from Marxism, a worldview that thought seriously about the relationship between ideas and politics, that left it ill-equipped to understand the causes of its own transformations. The same holds true of attempts made by contemporary progressives to overturn sedimented prejudice and inequality by introducing concepts from the classroom. Marxism has always contended that social structures and institutions constrain the way we think, not the other way around. We would do well to take this insight seriously if we are to try to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

### AT: Future Military Tech Impacts---2AC

#### No impact to future military tech – it’s non-unique and inevitable – but, testing and safeguards solve.

Ackerman, 15—senior writer for IEEE Spectrum’s award-winning robotics blog, Automaton (Evan, “We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why,” <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/we-should-not-ban-killer-robots>, dml)

The problem with this argument is that no letter, UN declaration, or even a formal ban ratified by multiple nations is going to prevent people from being able to build autonomous, weaponized robots. The barriers keeping people from developing this kind of system are just too low. Consider the “armed quadcopters.” Today you can buy a smartphone-controlled quadrotor for US $300 at Toys R Us. Just imagine what you’ll be able to buy tomorrow. This technology exists. It’s improving all the time. There’s simply too much commercial value in creating quadcopters (and other robots) that have longer endurance, more autonomy, bigger payloads, and everything else that you’d also want in a military system. And at this point, it’s entirely possible that small commercial quadcopters are just as advanced as (and way cheaper than) small military quadcopters, anyway. We’re not going to stop that research, though, because everybody wants delivery drones (among other things). Generally speaking, technology itself is not inherently good or bad: it’s what we choose to do with it that’s good or bad, and you can’t just cover your eyes and start screaming “STOP!!!” if you see something sinister on the horizon when there’s so much simultaneous potential for positive progress.

What we really need, then, is a way of making autonomous armed robots ethical, because we’re not going to be able to prevent them from existing. In fact, the most significant assumption that this letter makes is that armed autonomous robots are inherently more likely to cause unintended destruction and death than armed autonomous humans are. This may or may not be the case right now, and either way, I genuinely believe that it won’t be the case in the future, perhaps the very near future. I think that it will be possible for robots to be as good (or better) at identifying hostile enemy combatants as humans, since there are rules that can be followed (called Rules of Engagement, for an example see page 27 of this) to determine whether or not using force is justified. For example, does your target have a weapon? Is that weapon pointed at you? Has the weapon been fired? Have you been hit? These are all things that a robot can determine using any number of sensors that currently exist.

It’s worth noting that Rules of Engagement generally allow for engagement in the event of an imminent attack. In other words, if a hostile target has a weapon and that weapon is pointed at you, you can engage before the weapon is fired rather than after in the interests of self-protection. Robots could be even more cautious than this: you could program them to not engage a hostile target with deadly force unless they confirm with whatever level of certainty that you want that the target is actively engaging them already. Since robots aren’t alive and don’t have emotions and don’t get tired or stressed or distracted, it’s possible for them to just sit there, under fire, until all necessary criteria for engagement are met. Humans can’t do this.

The argument against this is that a robot autonomously making a decision to engage a target with deadly force, no matter how certain the robot may be, is dangerous and unethical. It is dangerous, and it may be unethical, as well. However, is it any more dangerous or unethical than asking a human to do the same thing? The real question that we should be asking is this: Could autonomous armed robots perform better than armed humans in combat, resulting in fewer casualties (combatant or non-combatant) on both sides? I believe so, which doesn’t really matter, but so do people who are actually working on this stuff, which does.

In 2009, Ronald C. Arkin, Patrick Ulam, and Brittany Duncan published a paper entitled “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System,” which was about how to program an armed, autonomous robot to act within the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. h+ Magazine interviewed Arkin on the subject (read the whole thing here), and here’s what he said:

h+: Some researchers assert that no robots or AI systems will be able to discriminate between a combatant and an innocent, that this sensing ability currently just does not exist. Do you think this is just a short-term technology limitation? What such technological assumptions do you make in the design of your ethical governor?

RA: I agree this discrimination technology does not effectively exist today, nor is it intended that these systems should be fielded in current conflicts. These are for the so-called war after next, and the DoD would need to conduct extensive additional research in order to develop the accompanying technology to support the proof-of-concept work I have developed. But I don’t believe there is any fundamental scientific limitation to achieving the goal of these machines being able to discriminate better than humans can in the fog of war, again in tightly specified situations. This is the benchmark that I use, rather than perfection. But if that standard is achieved, it can succeed in reducing noncombatant casualties and thus is a goal worth pursuing in my estimation.

One way to think about this is like autonomous cars. Expecting an autonomous car to keep you safe 100 percent of the time is unrealistic. But, if an autonomous car is (say) 5 percent more likely to keep you safe than if you were driving yourself, you’d still be much better off letting it take over. Autonomous cars, by the way, will likely be much safer than that, and it’s entirely possible that autonomous armed robots will be, too. And if autonomous armed robots really do have at least the potential reduce casualties, aren’t we then ethically obligated to develop them?

If there are any doubts about how effective or ethical these systems might be, just test them exhaustively. Deploy them, load them up with blanks, and watch how they do. Will they screw up sometimes? Of course they will, both during testing and after. But setting aside the point above about relative effectiveness, the big advantage of robots is that their behavior is traceable and they learn programmatically: if one robot does something wrong, it’s possible to trace the chain of decisions that it made (decisions programmed into it by a human, by the way) to find out what happened. Once the error is located, it can be resolved, and you can be confident that the robot will not make that same mistake again. Furthermore, you can update every other robot at the same time. This is not something we can do with humans.

I do agree that there is a potential risk with autonomous weapons of making it easier to decide to use force. But, that’s been true ever since someone realized that they could throw a rock at someone else instead of walking up and punching them. There’s been continual development of technologies that allow us to engage our enemies while minimizing our own risk, and what with the ballistic and cruise missiles that we’ve had for the last half century, we’ve got that pretty well figured out. If you want to argue that autonomous drones or armed ground robots will lower the bar even farther, then okay, but it’s a pretty low bar as is. And fundamentally, you’re then placing the blame on technology, not the people deciding how to use the technology.

And that’s the point that I keep coming back to on this: blaming technology for the decisions that we make involving it is at best counterproductive and at worst nonsensical. Any technology can be used for evil, and many technologies that were developed to kill people are now responsible for some of our greatest achievements, from harnessing nuclear power to riding a ballistic missile into space. If you want to make the argument that this is really about the decision to use the technology, not the technology itself, then that’s awesome. I’m totally with you. But banning the technology is not going to solve the problem if the problem is the willingness of humans to use technology for evil: we’d need a much bigger petition for that.

#### Increasing informatization of war net reduces violence---alternative’s worse

Thomas **Rid 13**, THOMAS RID is a Reader in War Studies at King’s College London, 12-1-2013, "Cyberwar and Peace," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-10-15/cyberwar-and-peace

Cyberwar Is Coming!” declared the title of a seminal 1993 article by the RAND Corporation analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who argued that the nascent Internet would fundamentally transform warfare. The idea seemed fanciful at the time, and it took more than a decade for members of the U.S. national security establishment to catch on. But once they did, a chorus of voices resounded in the mass media, proclaiming the dawn of the era of cyberwar and warning of its terrifying potential. In February 2011, then CIA Director Leon Panetta warned Congress that “the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyberattack.” And in late 2012, Mike McConnell, who had served as director of national intelligence under President George W. Bush, warned darkly that the United States could not “wait for the cyber equivalent of the collapse of the World Trade Centers.” Yet the hype about everything “cyber” has obscured three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb the future. Indeed, rather than heralding a new era of violent conflict, so far the cyber-era has been defined by the opposite trend: a computer-enabled assault on political violence. Cyberattacks diminish rather than accentuate political violence by making it easier for states, groups, and individuals to engage in two kinds of aggression that do not rise to the level of war: sabotage and espionage. Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers. Computer-assisted attacks make it possible to steal data without placing operatives in dangerous environments, thus reducing the level of personal and political risk. These developments represent important changes in the nature of political violence, but they also highlight limitations inherent in cyberweapons that greatly curtail the utility of cyberattacks. Those limitations seem to make it difficult to use cyberweapons for anything other than one-off, hard-to-repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might even prove counterproductive. And cyber-espionage often requires improving traditional spycraft techniques and relying even more heavily on human intelligence. Taken together, these factors call into question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will usher in a profoundly new era. THE THIN CASE FOR CYBERWAR One reason discussions about cyberwar have become disconnected from reality is that many commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare? Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, still offers the most concise answer to that question. Clausewitz identified three main criteria that any aggressive or defensive action must meet in order to qualify as an act of war. First, and most simply, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have some kind of political goal or intention. For that reason, acts of war must be attributable to one side at some point during a confrontation. No known cyberattack has met all three of those criteria; indeed, very few have met even one. Consider three incidents that today’s Cassandras frequently point to as evidence that warfare has entered a new era. The first of these, a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, would count as the most violent cyberattack to date -- if it actually happened. According to a 2004 book by Thomas Reed, who was serving as a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council at the time of the alleged incident, a covert U.S. operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that the CIA managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigged valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that, according to Reed, the U.S. Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device. But aside from Reed’s account, there is hardly any evidence to prove that any such thing happened, and plenty of reasons to doubt that it did. After Reed published his book, Vasily Pchelintsev, who was reportedly the KGB head of the region when the explosion was supposed to have taken place, denied the story. He surmised that Reed might have been referring to a harmless explosion that happened not in June but on a warm April day that year, caused by pipes shifting in the thawing ground of the tundra. Moreover, no Soviet media reports from 1982 confirm that Reed’s explosion took place, although the Soviet media regularly reported on accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. What’s more, given the technologies available to the United States at that time, it would have been very difficult to hide malicious software of the kind Reed describes from its Soviet users. Another incident often related by promoters of the concept of cyberwar occurred in Estonia in 2007. After Estonian authorities decided to move a Soviet-era memorial to Russian soldiers who died in World War II from the center of Tallinn to the city’s outskirts, outraged Russian-speaking Estonians launched violent riots that threatened to paralyze the city. The riots were accompanied by cyber-assaults, which began as crude disruptions but became more sophisticated after a few days, culminating in a “denial of service” attack. Hackers hijacked up to 85,000 computers and used them to overwhelm 58 Estonian websites, including that of the country’s largest bank, which the attacks rendered useless for a few hours. Estonia’s defense minister and the country’s top diplomat pointed their fingers at the Kremlin, but they were unable to muster any evidence. For its part, the Russian government denied any involvement. In the wake of the incident, Estonia’s prime minister, Andrus Ansip, likened the attack to an act of war. “What’s the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?” he asked. It was a rhetorical question, but the answer is important: unlike a naval blockade, the disruption of websites is not violent -- indeed, not even potentially violent. The choice of targets also seemed unconnected to the presumed tactical objective of forcing the government to reverse its decision on the memorial. And unlike a naval blockade, the attacks remained anonymous, without political backing, and thus unattributable. A year later, a third major event entered the cyber-Cassandras’ repertoire. In August 2008, the Georgian army attacked separatists in the province of South Ossetia. Russia backed the separatists and responded militarily. The prior month, in what might have been the first time that an independent cyberattack was launched in coordination with a conventional military operation, unknown attackers had begun a campaign of cyber-sabotage, defacing prominent Georgian websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and launching denial-of-service attacks against the websites of Georgia’s parliament, its largest commercial bank, and Georgian news outlets. The Georgian government blamed the Kremlin, just as the Estonians had done. But Russia again denied sponsoring the attacks, and a NATO investigation later found “no conclusive proof” of who had carried them out. The attack set off increasingly familiar alarm bells within American media and the U.S. national security establishment. “The July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar,” an article in The New York Times declared. Richard Clarke, a former White House cybersecurity czar, warned that the worst was yet to come: the Georgian attack did not “begin to reveal what the Russian military and intelligence agencies could do if they were truly on the attack in cyberspace.” Yet the actual effects of these nonviolent events were quite mild. The main damage they caused was to the Georgian government’s ability to communicate internationally, thus preventing it from getting out its message at a critical moment. But even if the attackers intended this effect, it proved short-lived: within four days after military confrontations had begun in earnest, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had set up an account on Google’s blog-hosting service. This move helped the government keep open a channel to the public and the news media. What the Internet took away, the Internet returned. ISTOCK.COM / -ANTONIO- Overblown: keyboard as grenade. IN CODE WE TRUST? Perhaps the strongest evidence presented by advocates of the concept of cyberwar is the Stuxnet operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel. Stuxnet, part of a set of attacks known as Operation Olympic Games, was a sophisticated multiyear campaign to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz by inserting a harmful computer worm into the software that ran the facility’s centrifuges, causing them to overload. American and Israeli developers started designing the project as early as 2005, and it launched in 2007, growing more sophisticated until its discovery in 2010. The attack was groundbreaking in several ways. The developers built highly target-specific intelligence into the code, enabling the Stuxnet software to make autonomous decisions in its target environment. Most important, Stuxnet represented the first and only physically destructive cyberattack launched by one state (or, in this case, two states) against another. Yet even cyberattacks that cause damage do so only indirectly. As an agent of violence, computer code faces a very basic limit: it does not have its own force or energy. Instead, any cyberattack with the goal of material destruction or harming human life must utilize the force or energy embedded in its target: for example, shutting down an air traffic control system and causing trains or planes to crash or disrupting a power plant and sparking an explosion. Yet besides Stuxnet, there is no proof that anyone has ever successfully launched a major attack of this sort. Lethal cyberattacks, while certainly possible, remain the stuff of fiction: none has ever killed or even injured a single human being. Thanks to its lack of direct physical impact, code-induced violence also has less emotional impact. It would be difficult for a cyberattack to produce the level of fear that coordinated campaigns of terrorism or conventional military operations produce. Owing to their invisibility, cyberweapons also lack the symbolic power of traditional ones. Displays of weaponry, such as the elaborate military parades put on by China and North Korea, sometimes represent nothing more than nationalist pageantry. But revealing one’s arsenal can also serve tactical and strategic ends, as when countries deploy aircraft carriers to demonstrate their readiness to use force or carry out operations designed to intimidate the enemy, such as using military aircraft to conduct deliberately low flyovers. Indeed, displaying weapons systems and threatening to use them can prove more cost-efficient than their actual use. But cyberweapons are hard to brandish. Perhaps the most crucial limitation of violence in cyberspace is its almost entirely destructive quality: unlike traditional political violence, which can maintain trust in institutions and states as well as undermine it, violence in cyberspace can do only the latter. Any established political order comes with a certain degree of inherent violence; consolidated states, after all, survive only if they maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force. By encouraging trust in the ability of state institutions to protect property and safeguard citizens, this inherent violence buttresses a state’s power and allows the state to establish the rule of law. But cyber-violence lacks this ability, since it does little or nothing to build up trust in institutions; indeed, it is very difficult to imagine how cyberattacks could be used to enforce rules or laws, either domestically or internationally. Digital surveillance presents a more complicated picture. In democracies, intelligence agencies tread a thin line between providing security and eroding public trust in the state, as demonstrated by the recent controversy over the U.S. National Security Agency’s data-collection practices. In authoritarian countries, digital surveillance can assist the state’s coercive use of force, but it cannot replace it. Such limitations, however, should not lead anyone to dismiss the corrosive potential of cyberattacks. Indeed, such assaults can undermine social trust in a more direct way than traditional political violence. Cyberattacks are more precise; they do not necessarily undermine the state’s monopoly of force in a wholesale fashion. Instead, they can be tailored to attack specific companies or public-sector organizations and used to undermine those groups’ authority selectively. Stuxnet provides a good example of this dynamic. Putting aside the question of whether the attack was an act of war, its primary intention was to undermine the trust of the Iranian scientists in their systems and in themselves and the trust of the Iranian regime in its ability to build nuclear weapons. The original intention was to cause physical damage to as many Iranian centrifuges as possible. But the American and Israeli attackers knew that the physical effect could be exploited to unleash a much more damaging psychological effect. “The intent was that the failures should make them feel they were stupid, which is what happened,” an American participant told The New York Times. The Americans and the Israelis hoped that once a few machines failed, the Iranian engineers would shut down more machines because they distrusted their own technology or indeed their own skills. At the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, rumors circulated that the Iranians had lost so much confidence in their own systems and instruments that the management of the Natanz facility took the extraordinary step of assigning engineers to sit in the plant and radio back what they saw to confirm the instrument readings. “They overreacted,” one of the attackers revealed to David Sanger of The New York Times, “and that delayed them even more.” The Iranians also began to assign blame internally, pointing fingers at one another and even firing some personnel. DIGITAL UNDERGROUND Damaging though it may have been, Stuxnet, along with the cyber-scuffles in Estonia and Georgia, represents not a new form of warfare but something more akin to other, less lethal forms of aggression: sabotage and espionage. Unlike acts of war, these political crimes, which are often committed by nonstate actors, need not be violent to work. And although saboteurs and spies do act politically, they often seek to avoid attribution, unlike those who launch acts of war. For those reasons, the cyber-era has been a boon for political crime. Consider sabotage. Before the computer age, saboteurs had trouble calibrating and controlling the effects of their actions. Sabotage had to target physical property and relied on physical violence, which often proves unpredictable. During postal and railway strikes in France in 1909 and 1910, for instance, saboteurs cut signal wires and tore down telegraph posts. Destroying property risked running afoul of public opinion, and the tactic ultimately divided the workers. The strikes themselves, as a form of sabotage, also ran the risk of leading to unpredictable violence: indeed, labor demonstrations often intensified into riots, making it easier for opponents to portray the strikers as uncompromising radicals. It is much easier for saboteurs to avoid counterproductive side effects in the age of computer-assisted attacks, which can contain violence and generally avoid it altogether. Cyberattacks can maliciously affect software and business processes without interfering with physical industrial processes, remaining nonviolent but sometimes still causing greater damage than a traditional assault. A 2012 attack against the computer network of the oil company Saudi Aramco illustrates this potential. The attack physically harmed neither hardware nor humans. Yet by allegedly erasing the hard disks of some 30,000 computers, the attackers likely did much more monetary damage to Saudi Aramco than they could have through an act of traditional sabotage against machinery in one of the company’s plants. The oil giant reportedly had to hire six specialized computer security firms to help with its forensic investigation and post-attack cleanup. Despite such potential, it is also important to remember the inherent limitations of computer-assisted political crime and to note that human agents remain critical in the age of digital violence. Even Stuxnet, the most successful example of cyber-sabotage, demonstrates this fact. For the United States and Israel, the “holy grail,” in the words of one of the attack’s architects, was getting a piece of malicious software into the control system at Natanz. The Americans and Israelis needed fine-grained data from inside the Iranian plant to develop their weaponized code. The problem was that the control system was protected by an air gap: it was not connected to the Internet or even internal networks. As a result, the attackers had to deliver the malicious code via a removable hard drive such as a USB flash drive -- delivered by a human hand. To make this happen, U.S. intelligence operatives first obtained a list of the people who were visiting the targeted plant to work on its computer equipment and who could carry the payload there. “We had to find an unwitting person on the Iranian side of the house who could jump the gap,” one planner later told Sanger. The list of possible carriers included engineers from the German company Siemens, who were helping their Iranian colleagues maintain the control system -- work that required the Siemens engineers to bring portable computers into the plant. Precisely how the U.S.-Israeli team managed to exploit this vulnerability remains unknown. Suffice it to say that although “Siemens had no idea they were a carrier,” in the words of one U.S. official quoted by Sanger, “it turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the thumb drive in their hand.” SAFETY IN ONES AND ZEROS If cyberattacks reduce the amount of violence inherent in conflict, and if they often take the form of sabotage or espionage, then many officials and commentators who have been warning about the dawn of cyberwar have been ringing false alarms. Digital violence does have implications for ethics and for national security strategy, however. Weaponized code, or cyberattacks more generally, can achieve goals that used to require conventional force. The most sophisticated cyberattacks are highly targeted, and cyberweapons are unlikely to cause collateral damage in the same way conventional weapons do. Therefore, in many situations, the use of computers would be ethically preferable to the use of conventional weapons: a cyberattack might be less violent, less traumatizing, and more limited.

#### No offense: norms

David **Lonsdale 17**, School of Law and Politics, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Lonsdale, David J. “Warfighting for Cyber Deterrence: A Strategic and Moral Imperative.” Philosophy & Technology, Feb. 2017. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/s13347-017-0252-8.

3.4 The Failure of Cyber Deterrence? The potency of cyber deterrence is difficult to judge. This is partly because there exists no consensus on what constitutes an act of sufficient cyber aggression. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what is to be deterred. Where exactly the threshold for response should be will be discussed in section three of this paper. For now, we can state that low-level nuisance attacks are a daily occurrence. For example, U.S. military networks are probed and scanned millions of times each day (Work 2015, 1). Similarly, acts of cyber espionage are reasonably common. However, what is also evident is the lack of major cyber attacks. For a while, Stuxnet, Wiper, Shamoon and Bronze Soldier appeared to signal the rise of cyber attack as a potent new instrument of policy. However, medium to large-scale attacks have essentially dried-up. Indeed, reflecting the empirical evidence, and marking a shift in tone, in his September 2015 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, talked down the possibility of an ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’. Instead, he focused on ongoing ‘low-to-moderate’ level threats (Clapper 2015, 2). What does this all tell us? Is deterrence working? If one considers low-to-moderate threats as deterrable, then the answer would seem to be no. From this perspective, and according to some policy makers, deterrence is already failing. In a 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Chairman John McCain was scathing in his assessment: ‘Our adversaries view our response ... as timid and ineffectual. Put simply, the problem is a lack of deterrence. The administration has not demonstrated to our adversaries that the consequence of continued cyber attacks against us outweigh the benefit.’ (Takala 2015) However, if we take the view that cyber deterrence should really concern itself only with large-scale attacks, the picture is more positive. Indeed, Valeriano and Maness (2015) have identified considerable levels of restraint in state cyber behaviour. This could be due to a lack of confidence in the strategic utility of cyber attack. It may also reflect the development of norms against aggressive forms of cyber behaviour and the efficacy of deterrence. Indeed, norms increasingly form part of ‘complex deterrence’, within which military and non-military elements operate together. In cyberspace, although a settled understanding of universal rules of behaviour is still lacking, norms appear to be crystalising around acceptable forms of intrusion rather than a blanket non-use position (Stevens 2012, 25). This may explain the continuance of lowlevel probes whilst large attacks have trailed off.

#### It causes a net reduction in violence

**Nayyar et al 17**, Hira Nayyar, Samuel Wakerley, Pritha Banerjee, Boboi Rahedi, Student Conversations about Professional Responsibilities of the Engineer @ The University of Sheffield, “THE ETHICS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY: SHOULD WE EXPECT BAE SYSTEMS TO CARE?”, https://prestudentconversation.wordpress.com/2017/04/07/group-2/

BAE Systems engages in sales of advanced weaponry to the United Kingdom’s allies globally, directly contributing to the 7,665 airstrikes that have hit Syria in the last two years. Is it ethically accountable for the UK to be a leading power in creating advanced weaponry when it gives rise to unfavorable impacts on human life? Or are the net benefits of weapons as deterrents and economic stimuli a force for good? This article aims to create discussion around BAE Systems’ role as a weapons manufacturer and its impact around the world. Weapons as deterrents “There is, in the world in which we all live, the principle of speaking softly but carrying a big stick – and that very often encourages people to negotiate” argued Sir Roger Carr at the recent BAE Systems annual general meeting – “we try and provide our people, our government, our allies with the very best weapons, the very best sticks they can have, to encourage peace.” Applying ethics of care principles to the business of warmongering is useless in the realm of engineering, rather, one must take a pragmatic view of the ethical cycle. The question of whether BAE Systems conducts its advanced weaponry business ethically is grounded by the principle that conflict will always exist; as such, it is human nature for distrust to fester. Hence, a case can be made that to cease the supply of advanced weaponry to responsible nations would in fact not be principled martyrdom, but ethical suicide. As Carr points out, advanced weaponry can often prove a very effective deterrent to conflict in the first place – but furthermore, as an influential western arms dealer, BAE Systems also has the opportunity to minimize collateral damage in war zones. The supply of advanced weaponry with high levels of precision allows for targeted airstrikes that eliminate the specific threat to life posed by the target, with a minimal loss of civilian life. Now contrast this with the alternative of withdrawing supply. Undoubtedly, unprincipled arms distributors would step into cover the gap in the market, supplying less precise weaponry. The most recent major example of aging, unguided weaponry being supplied to a war zone is Russian support of President Assad’s disputed and morally reprehensible regime in Syria – which has since caused a humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. Permitting the growth of such regressive means of conflict (potentially including the rise of chemical weaponry) is the alternative to BAE supplying advanced weaponry, and so abandoning western influence on the global arms market can only lead one way – to a greater disregard for international humanitarian law. In any case, **this cannot be considered a morally acceptable action** – and so by default, if nothing else, the alternative of BAE Systems supplying sophisticated weaponry must be considered ethical. Such rationality illustrates why ethics of care fails to provide an acceptable moral solution in this case. Utilitarianism and regulation of the arms market From a utilitarian viewpoint, the sustainment of powerful weaponry enables a country to defend its people and provide assistance in foreign conflicts where there is a suffering population. Doing so arguably protects a majority of people. Furthermore, with the FTSE 100 index about to suffer from Brexit uncertainty, the nation’s industrial future is at risk. BAE System’s economic contribution is critical for jobs in turbulent times. The UK defence industry employs 300,000 people, supplies 10 per cent of the country’s manufacturing and engineering jobs, and has a turnover of £35bn through 9,000 different companies. BAE Systems has a pivotal role in ensuring the UK economy’s prosperous future by being the real driver of the next skills generation: promoting STEM subject pathways, through which graduates get into engineering. Additionally, as a result of the profits from the manufacture and sale of arms, BAE Systems provides a backbone of technical support to other market sectors – for example building solutions for other industries such as transport; including the digital transformation of the UK rail network. There are a number of key international weapons regulations, whereby some governments have very robust arms trade control systems in place, but other governments are fuelling the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms by having weak control systems or none at all. BAE Systems ensures risks like this are minimised by implementing an Arms Trade Treaty that reduces and prevents excessive conflict, via making it difficult for armed groups that commit human rights abuses to acquire a ready flow of arms. The treaty provides an important framework for well-regulated defence trade and the reduction of illegal arms sales around the world. Money should be invested in diplomacy instead of fuelling war and destruction. BAE Systems deals with numerous countries which do not rank favorably on the human freedom index. The sale of advanced weaponry demonstrates, solely, an archaic form of diplomacy which is not apt for the modern world, where conflict is rife and human life is priceless. Arms do not have to be the prime medium through which diplomacy is navigated. The UK should explore other avenues; China for all its prowess utilizes Pandas as a bargaining tool to advance their agenda with other world powers. Joseph Nye, named this “Soft Power”. By using civilian instruments of national security such as strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction – relationships are built on the exchange of culture and knowledge as opposed to exploiting their perceived insecurity. BAE Systems could incorporate promotion of this moral intellectualism into their budget, where exchange of intelligence and civic action lead to stronger mutual relationships developing without the transfer of arms. Destruction created by the weaponry not only physically affects those that are targeted but also creates a long-term drop in quality of life for citizens. Millions of civilians have fled Syria due to the destruction of their homes and lack of basic amenities. Around two million people struggle to find clean water in Aleppo, as airstrikes have been targeted the water infrastructure of the city and this has cut civilian access to clean drinking water. Furthermore, refugee camps such as those in Za’atari camp in Jordan contain only temporary solutions for progressively longer-term issues such as maternity centres and wash blocks. This is the environment the next generation are being born into and are therefore starting life with an inherent ~~handicap~~. BAE Systems could adopt an ethics of care framework which would allow them to reconsider and understand the severity of the consequences of their actions; principally selling such weapons. There is no foolproof way of determining the end user of advanced weaponry, or of usage intentions – but by not producing such weaponry, BAE Systems could avoid any risk of misuse.

### AT: Kroker---2AC

#### Kroker’s thesis is wrong and they devolve into the same humanistic principles he criticizes

James **Steinhoff 16**, The University of Western Ontario, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2016, p. 533-536

In Exits to the Posthuman Future (2014), Arthur Kroker deploys a mutant strain of Marshall McLuhan’s (McLuhan and McLuhan 1988) medium theory to paint a dark picture of high-technology capitalist societies. At its most dire points this book appears to be an affirmation of Friedrich Nietzsche (1964) and Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) theses that God is dead and meaning is impossible. Advanced technology is the primary cause of this condition, which is the posthuman era. Kroker contends that previous conceptions of the posthuman were misguidedly optimistic and that the posthuman must be grasped as a state of total indeterminacy in which a literally living technology dominates human agency. Yet, there is a tension. Throughout the text there are moments of tangible hope for a traditionally humanistic future and, perplexingly, the book closes with an explicit call to recover the social and ethical values lost in the ravages of capitalism. In the end, it is hard to say what this book is intended to do. Kroker’s dark posthumanist prognosis stands starkly juxtaposed with his latent humanism. Arthur Kroker is a postmodernist Canadian theorist who has been studying the intersections of technology and culture since the mid-1980s. This new book consists of several essays comprised of original material and new versions of previously presented material. It is wide-ranging in topic, roving from drone warfare to Obama’s political rhetoric to media theory. In a high-speed and prolix style that recalls William Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction and the work of McLuhan and Paul Virilio, Kroker sets out a way of thinking about contemporary high-technological society' that follows the McLuhanian insistence on the constant and unavoidable influence of media on humans—but inverts it. The theoretical linchpin of this text is the “dark tetrad” (p. 25), Kroker’s inversion of McLuhan’s four laws of media. McLuhan asserted that all media have four effects on individuals and societies: to enhance something, to obsolesce something, to retrieve something that was previously obsolesced, and to intensify something to the point of its reversal (McLuhan & McLuhan, 4988). Kroker presents another side to the tetrad, which he describes, following Jacques Derrida (2006), as “hauntological” (p. 193). The dark tetrad describes disappearance instead of enhancement, substitution instead of obsolescence, abandonment instead of retrieval, and stasis instead of reversal (Kroker, 2014). These four functions describe the actions of media from a non-anthropomorphic standpoint. This dehumanization of McLuhan is necessary, Kroker asserts, because a fundamental feature of the posthuman era is that technology has “in the most literal sense ... now come alive” (p. 28). Yet Kroker’s main interest here is not the autonomous artificial intelligences of transhumanist speculation, nor is it the academic posthumanisms of Katherine Hayles (2008) or Donna Harraway (2000). Kroker’s posthuman age is “that historical moment when the power of technology turns back on itself, effectively undermining traditional concepts such as subjectivity, privacy, and bounded consciousness in order to render all things truly uncertain and unknowable” (p. 7). It is a “dystopian phase of information technology” in which “the informatics of domination has appropriated the resistance spirit of the borderlands” (p. 96). Kroker argues that the permeable human/machine boundaries of Hayles and Hanaway have been superseded by7 all-encompassing machinic control. Kroker’s posthuman is thus a dark time for beings that still think of themselves as human. It is also a dark time because it is quite literally haunted. Kroker holds that: “the essence of the posthuman axiomatic inheres in the fact that technology now eagerly seeks out that which was previously marginalized as simultaneously ways of mobilizing itself as it effectively recodes every aspect of social and nonsocial existence” (p. 6). This is the hauntological aspect of media: that which was previously marginalized is resurrected by technologies to serve as their contents and reasons for being with no logic discernable to humans. The result is the bewildering posthuman era, which Kroker adumbrates using the concepts of acceleration, drift, and crash. Acceleration will be familiar to readers of other postmodernist technology theorists, such as Virilio, and needs little elaboration. Crash depicts the collision between accelerated technologies and traditional human qualities. Drift is Kroker’s most compelling contribution to thinking the posthuman. Drift describes the perturbations of a society no longer directed by human intention, but by myriad, incremental, and unpredictable mutations in the codes that underlie molar reality. Code drift “is the spectral destiny of the story of technology,” (p. 50) but it is also “nothing new,” (p. 52) in that human evolution is a history of sampling errors. The posthuman era is described as one of “drift culture” in that the randomness and non-teleological nature of the molecular realm takes over the molar. The dark tetrad is thus to be understood as a schematic of how code drift rearranges the world without intention or consciousness. Code drift converts humans to “data flesh” that fully absorbs the primary modernist disavowal—the sense of the absurd in all the great referentials—as its key conditions of possibility” (p. 53). Drift culture is the technological proof of existentialism. Kroker is quite brief on suggesting how we ought to proceed with social life in the drifting absurdity of the posthuman era. He devotes only a four-page epilogue to the question of what is to be done now. Not surprisingly, given the existentialist tone of the work, he advocates an aesthetic comportment toward the posthuman. Specifically, he endorses an aesthetics based on Jean-Frangois Lyotard’s (2011) notion of the “figural” or adiscursive gestalt—presumably adapting it to grasp the adiscursivity of ubiquitous code: “Art of this (posthuman) order recodes the question of aesthetics by the creation of a mode of perception that fully opens to the discontinuous, tire fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal” (Kroker 2014, P-197)- This call for extreme openness evokes Nietzsche’s Dionysian mode of being, in which destruction and creation possess equal valence, but Kroker quickly qualifies this, asserting that since: the posthuman condition has revealed decadence ... as the basic ontology of late capitalism, the point of a figural art that would “harden, worsen, accelerate decadence” would be precisely the reverse, that is to say, it would draw into a greater visibility those intangible, but very real, impulses to social solidarity and ethical probity that haunt the order of the real. (p. 198) This foray into the supposedly posthuman ends with a call for the reinstatement of the most humanistic of principles. The idea seems to be that the novel form of living in the posthuman era is analogous to the collective yearnings of the “spirit of ’68.”

#### AND, it’s biologically impossible---the thing that makes humans not chimpanzees is instrumental rationality <<< – they’ll assert that this argument naturalizes our model of thinking BUT that’s not a bad thing since we’re right – it’s their burden to prove efficacy in the short-term or the case obviously outweighs >>>

Søren Riis 11, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” 2-8-2011

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

#### Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable

Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, <https://dasein42.medium.com/arthur-krokers-the-will-to-technology-97057aab9f7d>, MG)

Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public **not actually versed** in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is **far different** — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re **not even at the point** where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished.

Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward.

The human genome project has taught us plenty of things, but the most important of those is that most genes or gene combinations are interpreted dynamically in some way based on the environment, and since we know **neither the meaning of most of the genetic code, nor how the interpreter works**, and we have no Rosetta Stone to give us a clue to either, bio-engineering at the human level is going to remain relatively simplistic for some time. We’re not in the bionic age quite yet, though Kroker appears to believe we are. There are genes that map directly to phenotypes, such as eye colour, but that appears to be largely true only in phenotypes that are relatively unimportant, again such as eye colour, which makes little difference to anyone other than cosmeticians.

I won’t go into the number of more important predictions made by Heidegger in particular that **Kroker is apparently completely oblivious to**, despite many of them having already come to pass in the short time since his death in 1976, or in danger of coming to pass imminently. However omissions such as the identity of the ‘last god’; the ‘thin wall’ that separates our pure imagination (as in dreams) with our experience of reality; and the notion of Being as change are somewhat unforgivable. Of course, that takes us back to the omission of Hegel and the light Hegel’s work shines on the three thinkers Kroker does deal with.

Kroker seems to miss that for Heidegger technology is a ‘destining’, i.e. a dispensation of Being itself (and in some senses the most overt manifestation of Being in postmodern times), and therefore **not something to be either for or against**, but something one needs to discover a “free relation” to. This destining subverts the title of the work itself, in that technology as a dispensation of Being has nothing to do with will in Nietzsche’s sense, where will to power reverts almost immediately to will to will, since power is only the ability to will more.

He also skims over the important notion of the ontological transparency of technology, i.e. given an iPhone, nearly **anyone can see almost immediately how it could be better**, how it doesn’t (yet) quite substitute for the essence of technology, though we do use specific technological artifacts of that kind in substitution for technology as a whole in our daily speech without thinking much if anything about it. The same cannot be said when we look at a tree or a horse, for instance.

The book is written in a fast-paced style apparently intended to get average readers interested in the work of these thinkers and how it both affects and is affected by events in the world since their work was written. In some ways it works, in others it seems to cause Kroker to skim over some of the **most crucial concepts**.

### AT: Spanos---2AC

#### Calculative, instrumental thinking castigated by the neg as “instrumentalization” is key to prevent foolish wars---militarists love the alt tho

Stanescu ‘14 [James, January 7, Professional Lecturer in Philosophy at American University, in Washington, D.C. Critical Animal, “Abstraction, Calculative Thinking, Global Warming, and Environmental Ethics; or the Polar Vortex of Thinking!,” http://criticalanimal.blogspot.com/2014/01/abstraction-calculative-thinking-global.html]

Moreover, we will not be saved by virtue, infinite responsibility for the infinite other, or voluntarism. What we need is better abstractions, more calculative thinking, more en-framing, and stronger institutional responses. As David Wood has shown, when it comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Katrina, global warming, and a variety of other events, it has been the conservative response to embrace the impossibility of calculative thought. Perhaps our project going further is to, as Isabelle Stengers has argued, to calculate again. This is not the calculative thought of the capitalist cost-benefit system, but a different calculation. It is, to steal a phrase from Jane Bennett, about mutually enabling instrumentalizations. Long quotation from Stengers ahead, so bear with me: The cosmopolitical Parliament is not primarily a place where instantaneous decisions are made, but a delocalized place. It exists every time a "we" is constructed that does not identify with the identity of a solution but hesitates before a problem. I associate this "we" with the only slogan Leibniz ever proposed: Calculemus. Let us calculate. It's an odd expression, constructed to conceptualize the possibility of peace during a time of war. But Leibniz was a mathematician, not an accountant or statistician. For him, calculation was not a mere balance sheet contrasting homogeneous quantities, calculations of interest or benefits that were presented as being commensurable. For a mathematician, the accuracy of a calculation and the validity of its result are relatively simple questions, "trivial" in the language of mathematics. What is important, and which is not in the least trivial, is the position of the problem that will, possibly, allow it to be calculated, the precise creation of relationships and constraints, the distinction between the various ingredients, the exploration of the roles they are liable to play, the determinations or indeterminations they engender or bring about. There is no commensurability without the invention of a measurement, and the challenge of Leibniz's calculemus is, precisely, the creation of a "we" that excludes all external measures, all prior agreements separating those who are entitled to "enter" into the calculation and those subject to its result. [...] Calculemus, therefore, does not mean "let us measure," "let us add," "let us compare," but, first and foremost, let us create the "we" associated with the nature and terms of the operation to be risked. It is not a question of acting in the name of truth and justice, but of creating commensurability. It is a question of knowing that the "truth" of the created common measure will always be relative to what such creation will have been capable of, knowing also that a radical heterogeneity preexists such creation, the absence of any preexisting shared measure among the ingredients to be articulated. (Cosmopolitics II, pp. 399-401).

#### Calculative paradigms are good and solves extinction

**Milne and Kinsella, 17**—Faculty of English, University of Cambridge AND School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University (Drew and John, “NUCLEAR THEORY DEGREE ZERO, WITH TWO CHEERS FOR DERRIDA,” Angelaki, 22:3, 1-16, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

A further line of political deflection is the accelerationist strategy. There are quasi-leftist accelerationists (Mackay and Avanessian). We should take seriously the proposition that the only way to save the planet is to accelerate the pace of technological innovation. On one view, the only way to save the planet from global warming is by developing nuclear fusion technology. This points down the pathway of the Hadron collider and big science. But there is another acceleration that would decommission all forms of nuclear technology, and rather than imitating the sun, seek renewable forms of symbiosis with solar energy. A global diversion of military and industrial resources into renewable and sustainable energy forms would constitute a technological acceleration coupled with a radical deceleration in fossil fuel consumption, perhaps even putting the brakes on the fallacy of economic growth. What quickly emerges is that there are choices to be made across contested terrains. The forms of acceleration are political choices, choices of great urgency, but to thematise “acceleration” as such provides scant critical purchase on different forms of acceleration. What is needed are nuanced mediations of the science and technology currently available, along with global democratic decision making on those technologies we choose to accelerate or slow down.

Another version of the “accelerationist” argument captures some of the ideological workings of the term. In Marxist circles, an “accelerationist” is someone who thinks that the collapse of capitalism will be hastened by allowing reactionary forces to speed up capitalism’s self-destruction. There are occasions when such an argument has validity: nothing about the form of the argument makes it inherently or structurally wrong. There are revolutionary moments when allowing capitalism to collapse in order to rebuild a socialist society is a better path than propping up a failing capitalist regime. The judgement is political rather than philosophical. In most contexts, however, the accelerationist argument, especially as a political principle, is deeply dangerous. It would be better, for example, to preserve a failing US capitalist regime while building social forces to take it over, than to allow the nuclear weapons of the United States to fall into the hands of a suicidal [self-destructive] military rearguard or some counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation. Preserving the possibility of human life might involve propping up collapsing capitalist institutions, not least the nuclear safety inspectorate, rather than allowing humanity to be swallowed up by some death spiral of presidential dictators in fear of being toppled. These are critical judgements that could arise at any moment, with real risks that poor judgements will hasten a nuclear confrontation that leads to mutually assured annihilation. The formal shape of an accelerationist argument needs to be understood strategically and politically if it is to address nuclear questions.

The accelerationist view that the deepening of capitalism could hasten its self-destructive tendencies and lead to its collapse is not inherently suicidal, but consideration of what the collapse of capitalism might mean for the global stock of nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations indicates dangers. Amid the collapse of capitalism, securing the safety of nuclear resources is a fundamental priority, and preparing a decelerationist strategy is an essential political position for any radical formation serious about nuclear safety. Against the horizon of nuclear crisis, we rely on workers to know how to manage and decommission nuclear weapons, silos and power stations. This requires “good” science and ongoing struggles to control the decision making around weapons and energy systems. Concrete consideration of what happens to ageing nuclear systems in an imploding political system has been tested in the fall of the Soviet Union. Imagine the retrenchment of reactionary forces around nuclear installations threatening suicidal political terrorism on a global scale. The risks of a collapsing capitalist system taking the world down with it are clear. Chernobyl and Fukushima, moreover, stand as metonyms of the risks involved in systems that were apparently functional and yet spiralled out of control even in what might be called peacetime. The risks of the US or the Chinese nuclear androids imploding involve different decisions. Again, the need is for nuanced political judgements and strategies, involving scientific expertise along with solidarity between scientists, workers and new social formations.

The need for nuanced political engagement with “good” science suggests some of the risks in any thematisation of science within archaic philosophical paradigms. One form of nuclear denial is the reluctance to engage with the concrete consequences of scientific knowledge, preferring to retreat behind the limited competence of the humanities scholar. It takes some hubris of philosophical interpretation to suggest that literary studies can offer to understand the fictional heart of the nuclear threat despite knowing very little about the science and technology involved. There will, doubtless, be philosophical, ontological and metaphysical questions that science and technology cannot answer. Nuclear arguments may carry within their forms and conditions of possibility the illusions of Western metaphysics, and decommissioning nuclear metaphors could turn out to be as significant as criticising the public lies of nuclear policy: but the nuclear android also imposes less philosophical imperatives to engage with science, from medical science to nuclear waste disposal, and through the critique of the political economy of the nuclear android. None of this suggests that metaphysics should or could be deleted. To deflect engagement with the existing mess of the nuclear android back into metaphysical and literary questions nevertheless threatens to evade the existing threats, not just of nuclear annihilation but of Indigenous rights, environmental politics, and the raft of mediations and regulative practices on which any amelioration of nuclear damage depends. Nuclear war remains an imminent threat, but so does the persistence of practices and strategies that contribute to maintenance of the spectacle of the nuclear rather than its disarmament and decommissioning. To reduce the problem to the “threat” of nuclear war is to imagine that the actually existing industrial behemoth of nuclear production is a fiction. It isn’t. Nuclear weapons testing and the history of nuclear accidents were not just fables, and nor was the arms race a war of sophistry and rhetoric, however much sophistry and rhetoric were deployed to disguise the ecocidal tendencies of the nuclear android.

#### Their definition of “instrumental thought” is hopelessly broad---it castigates all action targeted toward an end, like reading their K

Davison ‘1 [Aidan; 2001; Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania; *Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Heidegger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably ontological and corporeal.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend long hours meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

#### The alt’s rigid ideological rejection precludes any serious attempt at anti-militaristic politics---engagement is crucial to successful political pressure

Schulman 18, Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, co-host of the national security podcast Bombshell, held senior staff positions at the National Security Council and Department of Defense (Loren DeJonge Schulman, 12-4-2018, "Policy Roundtable: The Future of Progressive Foreign Policy ⁠— Progressives Should Embrace the Politics of Defense," Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-progressive-foreign-policy/)

These policy positions require little analytical effort or political capital, and let Democrats occasionally posture as morally superior by emphasizing “non-military tools” of foreign policy. The opposite alternative of a more rigid pacifism and anti-militarism, though common in the grassroots progressive community, has no consistently organized political presence on the Hill and thus also escapes thorough interrogation.75 For those outside the Beltway, opposition to all things military offers the refuge of principle without critical justification or analysis. For many Democrats, the Obama model was a strangely tolerable middle ground: a bipartisan budget mess made while a “responsible” president ramped up security interventions in enough secrecy to avoid nagging scrutiny or self-examination. Re-Politicizing Defense Despite the valiant efforts of some individuals, there is no political home for responsible defense debate, oversight, and accountability.76 Yet, with determination, the left might find a real foothold in defense policy — without compromising progressive values. To be clear: There is substantial work to be done on figuring out what cohesive view of America’s role in the world the left can tolerate and advance. There is even greater work to be done on determining how to renew, reuse, and reform international institutions.77 But any such agendas would be well served by embracing a set of principles that make clear~~-eyed~~ debate and evaluation of defense policy and execution an asset, not an unforgiveable sin. Critical analysis of defense affairs is too often left to the technocratic and comparatively powerless “blob,” which can write a mean op-ed or tweet, but has limited ability to engage the American people on its will and interests. And although Congress has willfully declawed itself so that it cannot maintain meaningful oversight of national security,78 its ability to stage and amplify policy debate for the American people is without parallel, and it has tremendous latent potential to restore greater balance in civil-military relations. Congress’s absence and the associated de-politicization of national security affairs is costly. For instance, the American public is deeply ambivalent about the 17-year conflict in Afghanistan and generally ignorant of the widespread activities of the war on terror.79 This is unsurprising: Congress, too, is disaffected, often ignorant of where the U.S. military is even engaged,80 and has made little headway into questioning or shaping this intervention. The most substantive and serious debate about executive war authorities and the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism strategy has resulted in little more than a reauthorization proposal that still failed to move forward.81 Too many examples of political leaders’ stand-off or superficial approach to defense policy and execution abound. Military superiority is generally viewed as sacrosanct, placed on “so high a pedestal as to render real debate meaningless.”82 That reverence infantilizes defense budget debates. Thanking troops for their service is a politicized ritual that divorces politicians and their constituents from the intent and costs of that service. With decisions on the needs of the U.S. military and sustaining legacy systems openly linked to the economies of congressional districts, it’s understandable that skeptics of utilizing military tools have been unwilling to evaluate their merits. These must all change. While, at its worst, the political right treats the use of force abroad as a metric of patriotism and the size of the force as the measure of one’s love of America, the political left ought to draw from its skepticism toward intervention and its faith in institutions to advance a more rational and accountable approach to national security. For years, Robert Farley has highlighted that “progressives consistently underestimate the importance of discussions about military doctrine and technology,”83 taking what Michael Walzer calls “shortcuts”84 in their critiques of defense policy that relieve them from contributing to key debates. Instead of excusing themselves, the left should instead propose legitimate questions about major shifts in force employment and development: Will it work? What are its goals? What is the U.S. national security apparatus learning? Why didn’t it work? Were U.S. objectives wrong? What did America change when it didn’t work? Will America do it again? What could be improved? What should America do now? Joining the Conversation Jackson’s notion of what a progressive “wager” on national security might look like in practice is useful, filling the gap between the “Republican-lite” default and the stubbornness of anti-militarism. But the left’s diversity of thought can accommodate a wider playing field of potential alternative approaches to security than even he proposes. A true pacifist movement on the Hill and on the campaign trail, dedicated to the advancement of non-military approaches but premised on analysis and logical arguments, would be a serious advancement in national security and should be welcomed by the most ardent military advocates. Likewise, a more prudent middle ground approach — one that is skeptical of, but open to, military might and intervention and demands a better return on investment of national security tools — should play a more prominent political role. The full range of the left’s national security spectrum should forcefully engage in oversight of the rationale for and quality of American forces and interventions abroad. The left should therefore consider adopting a series of principles on defense matters — including criteria for the use of force — that apply to the military-friendly and anti-militarist left alike. In practice, this means acknowledging that there are valid political positions on matters of defense that lie somewhere in between “yes, and” and “no never” and that trivializing them is harmful to America’s national security. There are alternatives to today’s counterterror strategy and it would not be an insult to the military to debate them. It’s entirely legitimate to study whether the military is equipped to face today’s threats without being accused of retreating from the world or starting with an artificial budget cut. It’s sensible to consider whether the planned growth of ground forces, a 350-ship Navy, or a 386-squadron Air Force are the right investments or political benchmarks.85 These questions involve choices and values and should not be avoided under the umbrella of a supposed technocratic bipartisan agreement. Just as important, it’s essential that the left avoid becoming a caricature of itself that promotes simplistic and superficial positions that set rigid, unserious standards. The left may not agree on the size or purpose of the military, but it can agree America should strive for informed oversight and accountability.

### AT: Spanos – Alt Fails---2AC

#### State sabotages the alt

Schepers 17 (Emily Schepers, veteran civil and immigrant rights activist, doctorate in cultural anthropology from Northwestern University, September 18, 2017. “Agents provocateurs and the manipulation of the radical left.” https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/agents-provocateurs-and-the-manipulation-of-the-radical-left/)

Right now, there is considerable discussion going on about the best way to do all these things. Tactics that make us feel good because they are exhilarating are not necessarily the same as effective tactics. They can, in fact, be precisely the opposite. History teaches us is that the ruling class, the state and non-state institutions it controls, as well as the right have learned the political judo whereby the left’s actions may be turned around and used to strengthen the right and weaken the left. Specifically, we should learn from the history of the agent provocateur, a specialist in manipulating conflict so as to benefit our enemies. Agents provocateurs are not merely enemy spies within the people’s movement. The provocateur has an even more sinister mission, which sometimes has deadly results. What the provocateur frequently provokes is actions that either discredit the left or the people’s movement in the eyes of large numbers of people, or which entrap the unwary into acts that will allow police to pounce, accuse activists of plotting violent or other anti-social acts, and then lock them up. Agents provocateurs have been known for well over a century, in many countries; the breed was especially rife in tsarist Russia in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In the United States, agents provocateurs often targeted labor union organizing efforts. Since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, there are many accounts of the FBI, other police bodies, the military, and private right-wing vigilante groups sending agents provocateurs into people’s organizations with the purpose of dividing, disrupting, and discrediting them and then laying them open to arrest and prosecution, or worse. More radical than thou In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a great outpouring of grassroots rejection of the policies, domestic and international, of the Cold War. The Civil Rights Movement, plus the movement against the Vietnam War, brought millions into the streets protesting courageously against the many injustices of our society. The Cold Warriors and the ruling class did not like this, as they saw their interests threatened. So they developed open and covert strategies for undermining the new radicalism as well as the “old left” (communists and socialists). The idea was to make sure that the left did not continue to win over the support of the mass of the people of the United States to progressive and ultimately, revolutionary, socialist ideas. The “new left” tendencies that arose at this time included many positive features but had some dangerous flaws also. One flaw was that too often, a fetish was made of the absolute right of anybody involved in an organization to express his or her opinion no matter how divergent from the main goals of the organization, or to engage in any activity which was “radical” regardless of whether it helped or harmed the cause. This extreme liberalism laid many organizations open to manipulation of some of their weakest elements by agents provocateurs. There was also a tendency to compete to see who was most radical. The competition for revolutionary “cred” was a godsend for agents provocateurs, who actively encouraged such competition. The lack of connections, especially among campus-based white radicals, to the working class and its politics exacerbated this trend by eliminating an important reality check. Picking off leaders and undermining public support There also tended to be a cult of leadership within many radical organizations which put their leaders into a vulnerable position in which they could be targeted for neutralization so as to undermine the whole movement. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, for instance, put a huge amount of effort into neutralizing leaders. The agents provocateurs were deployed in such a way as to discredit the leaders and their organizations, to create splits in the movement, and in some cases to provoke violence which would lead to physical elimination of leaders plus a societal repudiation of the movement. The 1960s campus-based movement against the Vietnam War was a top target for agents provocateurs. There were several at work, but one, known as “[Tommy the Traveler](https://jeffsharletandvietnamgi.blogspot.com/2011/04/tommy-traveler.html)” was particularly memorable. He, too, concentrated on enticing impressionable young would-be “revolutionaries” to commit acts that would divide the movement while landing them in jail. Hoover, a crusading anti-communist and paranoid racist, paid particular attention to disrupting the [highly-effective](http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/want-to-punch-a-nazi-think-twice/) African American people’s movement, often employing agents provocateurs to create friction within and between liberation organizations. This led to several murders. In 1967, for example, agents provocateurs, especially a certain [William O’Neal](https://www.thenation.com/article/was-fred-hampton-executed/), described in a Nation article as “infatuated with weapons,” played a role in the police murder of Illinois Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. Hampton had been suspicious of O’Neal because of his violent talk, but others did not see through him, with tragic results. O’Neal’s promotion of crackpot violent schemes should have been a giveaway. When O’Neal set up Hampton and Clark for a brutal murder by police acting under the orders of Cook County State’s Attorney Ed Hanrahan, the perpetrators were able to convince sectors of the public that the Panthers were prone to violence and shot first, which was untrue. Another example was the crime of Cerro Maravilla, in Puerto Rico, on July 25, 1978. An agent provocateur, [Alejandro González Malavé](https://nacla.org/article/cerro-maravilla-deaths-police-cover-rock-puerto-rico), working undercover for the Puerto Rican police, enticed two idealistic young supporters of independence for Puerto Rico into a reckless act that cost them their lives. One was Carlos Enrique Soto Areví, the son of one of Puerto Rico’s most important literary figures, the novelist Pedro Juan Soto. The second was a self-taught worker, Arnaldo Dario Rosado. Both were on fire with indignation at the colonialist treatment that Puerto Rico received at the hands of the United States (treatment which continues today). They wanted to demonstrate this indignation in some dramatic way. Their lack of practical political experience made them easy prey for González Malavé. He persuaded them that a noble act for their homeland would be to destroy some communications towers on the top of a hill called “Cerro Maravilla.” This was supposed to express solidarity with some imprisoned Puerto Rican independence fighters. The three kidnapped a taxi driver and forced him to drive them up to Cerro Maravilla. But when they arrived, they found they had been led into a police ambush. As the armed police approached, González Malavé identified himself as an agent, but Soto and Rosado were killed, and the “official” story was put out that they had been shot in a firefight with the cops. The right-wing, pro-statehood governor at the time, Carlos Romero Barceló, hailed the police as heroes, and the FBI helpfully pitched in to support the Puerto Rican Justice Department with the cover-up. However, the police had left a “loose end,” namely the taxi driver, who spoke to the press and revealed that in fact González Malavé was a police agent and that the two young men were still alive when he left the place. The police had entrapped the two men, then murdered them after they surrendered. This became a big scandal, and eventually led to prosecutions and the defeat of Romero Barceló’s party in the next elections. But the use of agents provocateurs to divide and isolate the Puerto Rican left has been unrelenting, both before and after that incident. Disrupting today’s movements Such agent provocateur tactics surfaced again during the protests against the Iraq War, and in the “Occupy” movement. In each case, glib charismatic strangers wormed their way into protest organizations, and then entrapped inexperienced young radicals to get involved in plans, which were sometimes really just talk, to engage in violence. A typical case is that of the “[Cleveland bomb plot](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/02/nation/la-na-nn-fbi-stings-20120502)” of 2012. Another is the San Francisco [Mission District riot](https://missionlocal.org/2012/05/occupysf-reacts-to-monday-nights-destruction-of-valencia/) of May 2012, when a mysterious black-clad contingent hijacked part of a peaceful “Occupy” demonstration and turned it toward random violence. In both cases, the purpose of the provocateurs was to discredit the movement in the eyes of the public, which otherwise might have been receptive to Occupy’s “99 percent versus one percent” message. This kind of manipulation still continues by all accounts. As before, the purpose is to discredit the movement, divide it, deprive it of allies, and set up leaders and organizations for repressive action while making sure that this repression will not produce a wave of public indignation, as happened with the Cerro Maravilla case. The right and the ruling class always try to portray these people’s movements as violent, because this is the alchemy best suited to turn public opinion against them. This is the main lesson to be learned from the agent provocateur experiences of the past. In the conditions of our country today, injecting violent tactics into the mass movement of protest undermines that movement and plays the enemy’s game. Loose talk about violence can be just as dangerous. This danger is multiplied by the development of online communications and social media—there are no secrets now. Hijacking other people’s protest actions to “move them to a higher level,” meaning toward violent confrontations, is really a dirty kind of pseudo-left politics. What is needed now is to build the movement into a great wave of rejection against the reactionary policies of the ruling class, the right, and the Trump administration and its allies. Let us work on that basis and avoid tactics that undermine it.

#### Alts that fiat substantial private actors are a voting issue---not assumed in the literature, disincentivizes good research, and overdetermines the debate

#### The ALT is a politics of ‘white noise’---that creates cruel optimism which turns the case

Lauren **Berlant 11** (Lauren Berlant, Rest in Peace to a great theorist, “Cruel Optimism,” 2011)//Townes

Yet Bush’s wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He wants the public to feel the funk, the live intensities and desires that make messages affectively immediate, seductive, and binding.3 In his head a public’s binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 The transmission of noise performs political attachment as a sustaining intimate relation, without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged. In The Ethical Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of “maieutic listening” in constructing the intimate political publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition. This process involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire. The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of shared worldness, apart from whatever aim or claim the listening public might later bring to a particular political world because of what they have heard.

From Hirschkind’s perspective the social circulation of noise, of affective binding, converts the world to a space of moral action that seems juxtapolitical—proximate to, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of power that govern social life.6 Speaking above the filter would confirm to Bush’s whole listening audience that they already share an affective environment; mobilizing “the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear”7 would accomplish the visceral transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the media’s anxiogenic sensationalist analysis. This vision locates the desire for the political in an alternative commons in the present that the senses confirm and circulate as though without mediation.

What exactly is the problem with “the filter”? The contemporary filtered or mediated political sphere in the United States transmits news 24/7 from a new ordinary created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to discussions about tactics for survival and who is to blame. The filter tells you that the public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know. It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis, unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and stories about institutions that have lost their way.8 It is a moment on the verge of a postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and effect.

Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does and does not seem to have a transformative impact. Living amid economic crisis, people are shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics? Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things didn’t work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling. But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event. The affective structure of the situation is therefore anxious and the political emotions attached to it veer wildly from recognition of the enigma that is clearly there to explanations that make sense, the kind of satisfying sense that enables enduring.

Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket. His desire for a politics of ambient noise, prepropositional transmission, and intuitive reciprocity sought to displace the filtered story of instability and contradiction from the center of sociality. He also wishfully banished self- reflexive, cultivated opinion and judgment from their central public- sphere function. In short, as Jacques Rancière would put it, Bush’s wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such.9 In so doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which the affective feedback loop of the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity between politicians and their public. Foucault used to call “sexuality” that noisy affectivity that Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political is best lodged in the appetites.

These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps when Bush uttered his desire for affective communication to be the medium of the political, he was trying cynically to distract the public gaze from some of his particular actions. But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic, and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of immediacy, he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes who have long produced intimate publics to provide the feeling of immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an affective register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to.

Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness. But an intimate public is more specific. In an intimate public one senses that matters of survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were the participants in the room together.11 An intimate public promises the sense of being held in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen and to be interested in the scene’s visceral impact.12 You might have been drawn to it because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something, or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering, humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case, any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong. They can be passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of sovereign freedom.

Indeed, in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from the obligation to pay attention to much, whether personal or political—no- one is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living. Amidst all of the chaos, crisis, and injustice in front of us, the desire for alternative filters that produce the sense—if not the scene—of a more livable and intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political.

This is why an intimate attachment to the political can amount to a relation of cruel optimism. I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: but its life- organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes. It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes. Voting is one thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others. All of these modes of orientation and having a feeling about it confirm our attachment to the system and thereby confirm the system and the legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it, even if the manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression.

How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair? The exhausting repetition of the politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from expectation and demand.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain one’s attachment to the political as such and to one’s sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtual—but sensual, not abstract—space of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new freedoms.

Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of recognition, representation, or return a profoundly ethical act.15 His exemplary case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the relation between the “Yes We Can!” optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of Obama’s optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed, especially given any President’s limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally, political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feeling—an identification with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself. But maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate visions of the better good life. The atrophy of these skills is at risk when politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic aims. Add to this the possibility that “the political” as we know it in mass democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation. Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many kinds of the cruelest optimism.

### AT: Spanos ‘4---2AC/1AR

#### Objectivity in debate is good:

#### Ks of objectivity present themselves as objectively true – this offense links to them

#### It creates the best model of debate – it forces detachment which creates a safer space for minority debaters to present the facts of their existence AND means we have to evaluate the implications of our ethical paradigms – appealing to non-objective outcomes means people agree with the War on Terror while objectivity and testing mean we can see its inevitable violent conclusions

#### Disinterested scholarship is good – it is hubiristic to assume one truth claim is the universal truth – we should open to change and contingency of belief or we lock in neoconservative ideology

**Mitchell 2010** – associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh (Gordon, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 13.1, “SWITCH-SIDE DEBATING MEETS DEMAND-DRIVEN RHETORIC OF SCIENCE”)

. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might **otherwise remain sedimented** in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate” differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community’s eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue **against their convictions**, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Re

### AT: Will to Mastery K---2AC

#### They also link, which demonstrates the alt’s futility---the structure of their argument, the process through which it was written and the context in which they are articulating it in pursuit of the ballot obviously technologize communicative thought---AND their ability to dismiss this by saying sure, but self-awareness and reflexivity inoculates us is precisely why we the perm solves

James Tully 6, “Communication and Imperialism,” CTheory, 2-22-2006, http://ctheory.net/communication-and-imperialism/

Arthur Kroker suggests that the genetic engineering of the “codes” of life in humans and other organic resources, at one end, and the monitoring, surveillance and precision targeting of the global population in space-based network warfare through full spectrum global dominance at the other, represent the two extremes of this way of being in the world (legitimated in terms of “openness” of scientific inquiry and “security” of individuals and the species). Here life itself is pictured as both a network and an object of manipulation and control by informational technologies. Human nature and the environment are absorbed into culture, and so culture/nature is pictured as a kind of standing reserve of manipulable networks. [21] [22] This is not a form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that a person bears in one particular role among many. It is a communicative habitus that communicators tend to operate within at work and leisure, on the home computer, the cell phone, the wireless laptop, and the BlackBerry. When networkers put these more interactive modes of communication down, they tend to turn to the technology of the communication of “affects”: radio, television, movies and videos. As a result, this worldview and skill set is carried into other areas of life, either colonizing them or disregarding them if they are inaccessible through the network technology. The form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity of network communicators is not an ideology or a worldview in the traditional sense. It is rather the opposite: a mode of being that is skilled in and accustomed to “worldviewing” — surfing through, interacting with and negotiating a kaleidoscope of shifting ideologies and worldviews. Secular modernists, western scientists, indigenous peoples, neo-liberals, non-governmental organizations, anti-globalization activists, hyper-globalisers, deep ecologists, apocalyptic religious fundamentalists in the Bush administration and Bin Laden terrorist networks are all at home in this habitat. Yet, it is not a neutral, all-inclusive medium of communication. It substantially modifies the pre-network forms of subjectivity it includes, transforming them into contingent and malleable worldviews, civilizations, codes, programs, and “scapes”, yet, paradoxically, placing beyond question its own background horizon of disclosure of the world as a complex system of contingent and programmable networks. This taken-for-granted form of subjectification tends to come with the network and goes without saying. It is the characteristic form of subjectivity of network imperialism. We are just beginning to study and make explicit the tacit ways communication networks are re-organizing human subjectivity. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and other critical sociologists of network communication and control argue that the net brings with it, in tandem with programmability, other taken-for-granted ways of organizing and imagining experience, privileging certain forms of communication, communicative rationality, knowledge, problem solving, cooperation and competition, and production and consumption, and discounting or excluding others.[23] Finally, although this is a powerful new form of subjectivity and social ordering, it is one form among many that we bear as modern subjects, and we are not passive recipients of it (as we will see in section 3).

### AT: Vattimo and Zabala/Framed Democracy---2AC

#### Making truth claims is inevitable, vital to solve either team’s impacts, and unrelated to “imposing” truths violently

**Eagleton ‘3** [Terry; 2003; Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University; *After Theory*, Basic Books: New York, NY, p. 105-9]

If it is true that a situation is racist, then it is absolutely true. It is not just my opinion, or yours. But of course it may not be true. Or it may be partially true - in which case it absolutely is partially true, as opposed to being completely true or not true at all. Defenders of absolute truth are not necessarily dogmatists. In any case, dogmatism does just not mean thumping the table with one hand and clutching your opponent by the throat with the other. It means refusing to give grounds for your beliefs, appealing instead simply to authority. There are plenty of courteous, soft-spoken dogmatists. Holding something to be absolutely true does not mean affirming it against all conceivable evidence and argument, and refusing in any circumstances to concede that you are mistaken. Those who believe in absolute truth may well be the kind of people who are pathologically cautious about accepting anything as true unless it seems plainly undeniable. They may stumble through life in a haze of scepticism and a miasma of doubt. It is just that when they do, perhaps once every decade or so, come grudgingly to accept a proposition such as ‘The head gardener has just shot himself through the foot’ as true, they recognize that its opposite cannot also be true, and that its being true for them means its being true for everyone else as well. Nor does ‘absolutely true’ mean true independently of any context. We can only judge the world from within some kind of framework. But this does not necessarily mean that what is true from one viewpoint is false from another. Elephants may be sacred for you but not for me, if this represents a difference between our ways of signifying them. But it cannot be true that elephants really are sacred, in the same way that they really have four legs, and that they are in the same sense not sacred. Cultures make sense of the world in different ways, and what some see as a fact others do not; but if truth simply means truth-for-us, then there can be no conflict between us and other cultures, since truth is equally just truth-for-them. This is tolerable enough when it comes to the sacred status of elephants, as well as being extremely convenient for us if we hold that forcing sexual relations on toddlers contributes to their emotional well-being and psychological stability in later years, and the culture next door does not. Since their view is entirely relative to their own way of life, it can naturally have no effect on our behaviour. In any case, if each cultural framework constructs the world differently enough, it is hard to see how they could share the same proposition in common. A different world yields a different meaning. Absolute truth has nothing to do with fanaticism. It does not necessarily mean the kind of truth to which you are fervently committed. ‘Erlangen is in Germany’ is absolutely true, but one would not go to one’s death for it. It is not the kind of truth which sets the blood coursing and quickens the heartbeat. It does not have the same emotional force as ‘You strangled my great-aunt, you despicable bastard!’ Most absolute truths are pretty trivial. Much the same goes for the word ‘absolute’ when used in some moral discourse. For Thomas Aquinas, ‘absolutely wrong’ does not necessarily mean ‘very, very wrong’. The word ‘absolute’ here is not an intensifier. It just means ‘shouldn’t be done under any circumstances’. Aquinas thought rather strangely that lying was absolutely wrong, but not killing; but he did not of course believe that lying was always more grievous an offence than killing. Being of reasonable intelligence, he appreciated well enough that lying is sometimes pretty harmless. It was just that for him it was absolutely wrong. Absolute truth is not truth removed from time and change. Things that are true at one time can cease to be true at another, or new truths can emerge. The claim that some truth is absolute is a claim about what it means to call something true, not a denial that there are different truths at different times. Absolute truth does not mean non-historical truth: it does not mean the kind of truths which drop from the sky, or which are vouchsafed to us by some bogus prophet from Utah. On the contrary, they are truths which are discovered by argument, evidence, experiment, investigation. A lot of what is taken as (absolutely) true at any given time will no doubt turn out to be false. Most apparently watertight scientific hypotheses have turned out to be full of holes. Not everything which is considered to be true is actually true. But it remains the case that it cannot just be raining from my viewpoint. Why does any of this matter? It matters, for one thing, because it belongs to our dignity as moderately rational creatures to know the truth. And that includes knowing the truth about truth. It is best not to be deceived if we can possibly help it. But it also matters because a ludicrous bugbear has been made of the word 'absolute' in this context; and because if the relativist is right, then truth is emptied of much of its value. As Bernard Williams points out, relativism is really a way of explaining away conflict.2 If you maintain that democracy means everyone being allowed to vote, while I maintain it means that only those people may vote who have passed a set of fiendishly complicated intelligence tests, there will always be a liberal on hand to claim that we are both right from our different points of view. If true loses its force, then political radicals can stop talking as though it is unequivocally true that women are oppressed or that the planet is being gradually poisoned by corporate greed. They may still want to insist that logic is a ruling-class conspiracy, but they cannot logically expect anyone to believe them. The champions of Enlightenment are right: truth indeed exists. But so are their counter-Enlightenment critics:

### FW---2AC

#### The imagination and debate over competing words is artistic, playful, and scholarly simultaneously.

**Chia, 96.** (Robert Chia, University of Stirling. “The Problem of Reflexivity in Organizational Research: Towards a Postmodern Science of Organization” Organization, Volume 3, No. 1, February. SAGE Journals. Online.)

One more recent development in organizational theorizing results from taking the problem of reflexivity seriously. Such organizational writers accept that both their own accounts and those generated by others are first and foremost linguistic constructions which operate according to established conventional linguistic codes. Theories of organization are deemed to be self-­justifying 'intelligible narratives' which enable a community of inquirers to arrive at some consensus regarding their social experiences. As Gergen (1992) puts it: If there is one theme that unites most of those confronting the postmodern irony, it is a **certain sense of ludic humility. The view of knowledge‑making as a transcendental pursuit removed from the trivial enthralments of daily life, pristinely rational and transparently virtuous**, becomes so much puffery. We should view these bodies of language we call knowledge in a lighter vein‑as ways of putting things together, some pretty and others petty. (Gergen, 1992: 215) **Hence, 'irony', 'self‑reflection' and 'playful seriousness' replace the rational quest for 'certain' or even 'partially true' knowledge of an external organizational reality. For these 'meta­reflexive' theorists, both the bodyof‑knowledge claims in organization theory and their own claims are to be understood in a lighter vein as artistically crafted pieces of work in their own right. Theories generated mirror the concerns and preoccupations of the theorists themselves and do not, as such, claim any absolute, groun­ded connexion with a reality beyond. Such writers would argue that these crafted pieces of 'linguistic web' contribute to the making of our organizational reality.**

### Perm---2AC

#### Perm do both – macropolitical and micropolitical action are compatible - the perm solves all their offense

**Massumi and McKim 08.** Brian Massumi, professor of communication science at the University of Montreal, and Joel McKim, professor of film, media, and cultural studies at the University of London, Birkbeck (UK), “Of Microperception and Micropolitics,” Micropolitics : Exploring Ethico-Aesthetics. Inflexions: A Journal for Research-Creation. No. 3. October 2009. [www.inflexions.org](http://www.inflexions.org), 19-21

JM: One of the things that I think is interesting about the approach is that it is both concerned with the creative limitations required for producing an event, and also concerned with how various events resonate with each other and amplify each other. This seems to bring us back to the problem we discussed earlier regarding how an affective politics may have a global presence, or work up to a scale larger than a single event. BM: Yes, a micropolitical event can have broad range. What qualifies it as micropolitical is the way it happens, not the dimensions it takes. By micropolitical we mean returning to the generative moment of experience, at the dawning of an event, to produce a modulatory commotion internal to the constitution of the event. It’s a question of reconnecting processually with what’s germinal in your living, with the conditions of emergence of the situations you live. The idea is then to find a mechanism to pass that reconnection forward. Not impose it, not even suggest it as a general model. Rather, to give it as a gift, a gift of self- renewing process. This question of event-propagation, of processual seeding as part of a gift economy of revivifying experience, is the problem of a large-scale micropolitics. The process itself has to be self-valorizing. It has to have a value in itself because the situation of the world, Obama notwithstanding, is not overall one of hope. The situation of the world is desperate. There’s no rational ground for hope. If you look at things rationally, if you look at the increasing disparities of wealth and health in the world, if you look at the spreading environmental destruction, if you look at the looming disasters in the foundations of the economy, if you look at the the energy crisis and the food crises affecting the globe, and especially if you look at the way they interrelate, if you look at the virulence of renascent nationalist sentiment and of the culture of war, there is no hope. So the micropolitical question is how to live more intensely, live more fully, with augmented powers of existence, within the limits of that desperate situation, while finding ways to continue nevertheless, chipping away at the macro problems. There’s a certain incompleteness to any micropolitical event, like the events I was talking about. A lot of things that you feel were on the verge of taking shape didn’t quite happen. Potentials that you could just glimpse didn’t come into focus. The goal is not to overcome the incompleteness. It’s to make it compelling. Compelling enough that you are moved to do it again, differently, bringing out another set of potentials, some more formed and focused, others that were clearly expressed before now backgrounded. That creates a small, moveable environment of potential. The goal is to live in that moveable environment of potential. If you manage to, you will avoid the paralysis of hopelessness. Neither hope nor hopelessness—a pragmatics of potential. You have to live it at every level. In the way you relate to your partner, and even your cat. The way you teach a class if you’re a professor. The way you create and present your art if you’re an artist. If you participate in more punctual events like the ones I was describing, this will provide a continuous background for what comes of those events to disseminate into and diffuse through. A symbiosis of the special event and the day-to-day, in creative connivance. This is not to say that operating in a more macro, top-down manner, is wrong or should not be undertaken. It’s just to say that if it’s done to the exclusion of micropolitical activity it’s mortifying, even when it’s done for survival’s sake. Sometimes there is no alternative but to centrally impose certain enabling constraints. For example, I’d be very happy if the transition to a renewable energy future or a global redistribution of wealth or a non-growth paradigm were imposed on the capitalist system. But high-level solutions of that kind are only part of the political equation, and it’s not the part that the affective politics we’ve been talking about specifically addresses. Micropolitics is not programmatic. It doesn’t construct and impose global solutions. But it would be naïve to think that is separate from that kind of macro-activity. Anything that augments powers of existence creates conditions for micropolitical flourishings. No body flourishes without enough food and without health care. Micropolitical interventions need macro solutions. But success at the macropolitical level is at best partial without a complementary micropolitical flourishing. Without it, the tendency is toward standardization. Since macropolitical solutions are generally applicable by definition, by definition they act to curtail the variety and exuberance of forms of life. Macropolitical intervention targets minimal conditions of survival. Micropolitics complements that by fostering an excess of conditions of emergence. That inventiveness is where new solutions start to crystallize. The potentials produced at the micropolitical level feed up, climbing the slope that macropolitics descends. Micropolitical and macropolitical go together. One is never without the other. They are processual reciprocals. They aliment each other. At their best, they are mutually corrective. Even macro solutions designed to curtail micropolitical activity often end up feeding it by making it a necessity to invent new ways of getting by and getting around. Creative variation is the only real constant of politics. Deleuze and Guattari often made this point, for example in their slogan that that the State is built on what escapes it. It has become a commonplace recently to say that we are in a situation where the end of the world is now imaginable—but the end of capitalism isn’t. That is definitely one “solution” that is not likely to come programmatically, top-down— given who’s on top. The dismantling of capitalism is a “corrective” that will only come from a breaking of the reciprocity I was just talking about between the macro- and micropolitical. The prevailing operating conditions of macro/micropolitical reciprocity should not be taken to imply that the symmetry is never broken, that a bifurcation can never occur. The complementarity can be broken in both directions. When macrostructures miniaturize themselves and work to usurp the ground of the micropolitical with scaled-down versions of the dominant generalities, that is fascism. When micropolitical flourishings proliferate to produce a singularity, in the sense of a systemic tipping point, that’s revolution. The ultimate vocation of micropolitics is this: enacting the unimaginable. The symmetry-breaking point, the point at which the unimaginable eventuates, is but a cut, “smaller” than the smallest historically perceivable interval. That is to say, qualitatively different. A moment of a different color, one you never see coming, that comes when it’s least expected. Inevitably, a next micro/macro complementarity will quickly settle in. But it will take a form that could not have been predicted, but is now suddenly doable and thinkable. Micropolitics is what makes the unimaginable practicable. It’s the potential that makes possible.

#### Perm do the aff and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt- Glezos concludes that totalizing accounts are bad

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 11-12", )//guyB

What is more, our discussion in the previous section of the kinds of tools which can help deal with the political problem of urgency makes clear the **variety of tempos** at which such political practices take place. Sometimes it is a matter of embracing techniques and technologies which can accelerate our response times. **Sometimes** it is a matter of working vigorously to **introduce institutional and political mechanisms** which can **slow down** the pace of events. **Sometimes** it is a matter of creating **slow spaces** which can **allow us to cultivate particular affects** and habits through which we can respond effectively to an accelerating and uncertain world. Most importantly, it always involves pushing for circumstances in which questions of technological acceleration are increasingly subject to democratic control rather than the vicissitudes of the market, or control of the militaristic wings of the state. Again, Wajcman is thoughtful on the question of accelerating technology: I want to argue that **a more well-rounded understanding** of the relationships between temporality and technology must inform an emancipatory politics of time. This involves the democratization of technoscience, deciding what sort of technologies we want and how we are going to use them. Resisting technological innovation and calling for deceleration or a digital detox is an inadequate intellectual and political response. Indeed, wistfully looking back to idealized slower time and mourning its passing has long been the preserve of conservative political theory. (26–27) Again, this does not mean an uncritical embrace of accelerative technologies. It means, rather, an approach which refuses to presume a fundamental or necessarily ‘human’ pace which requires a unilateral deccelerationist stance. Indeed, if at times this text seems to be more of a ‘pro-speed’ manifesto, this is only because, as Sharma points out, it is fighting against a more broadly ‘anti-speed’ tendency in the literature. But **this should not be mistaken for an uncritical or unthinking accelerationism**. Indeed, at several points throughout the text, I will point to either specific contexts in which we might wish to reject or challenge accelerative technologies, as well as provide general theoretical rubrics which might help us to judge the value and desirability of certain types of technological change. This **rejection of an ‘either/or’** response to the question of speed and politics is another case in which our historical approach to speed is enlightening. Recognizing the reoccurring engagement with the political problem of speed throughout human history helps to show the insufficiency of either a pro- or anti-speed approach. It shows the way in which anti-speed accounts’ nostalgia for the slowness of the past was rarely experienced by the actual participants of those periods themselves. And for those who wish a vision of social acceleration as tied to a vision of human progress, we see how repeated human societies articulate questions of speed in terms of danger and violence. Ultimately what this means is that, in interrogating the question of speed and politics, **we must go beyond fast and slow**. We must refuse to see it as a matter of either embracing speed or negating it but rather developing a nuanced and complex account of the ways in which social acceleration shapes bodies, minds, communities, and futures, and develop theories and tools which can tell us when we might want to accelerate and when we want to slow down, when we want to embrace speed and when we want to reject it

### Tech Good---2AC

#### Using technical data and information to drive policymaking is good

Reiter 15—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” *War on the Rocks*, 27 Aug, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>, accessed 11 Jan 2017]

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies.

Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations.

Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions.

Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

#### Unsustainability claims are suspect because our brains are wired for techno-pessimism – digital synchronicity can fix racism embedded in cybernetics thru human ingenuity and make the world materially better

Reinhart 18 (Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. 10-10-2018. <https://techliberation.com/2018/10/10/in-defense-of-techno-optimism/> //shree)

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore. Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems. But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism. In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright. And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties. When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all: Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course. Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late. Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

## AT: Cap/Security/Etc

### Fiat Good---2AC

#### Debating about hypothetical political action improves the capacity, motivation, and ability to inaugurate change in myriad areas of human activity

Leek ’16 [Danielle; November; MBA, PhD, instructor in the MA in communication program at Johns Hopkins University; Communication Education, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” https://edgemont.paperlessdebate.com/wp-content/uploads/Policy-debate-pedagogy-a-complementary-strategy-for-civic-and-political-engagement-through-service-learning.pdf]

Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement. Information literacy While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem- solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowl- edge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are chal- lenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process. Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well- rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011). Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically con- textual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engage- ment. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For stu- dents to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motiv- ation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014). Arguing facts In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policy- making for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good. While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence. This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to service- learning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Fur- thermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research high- lights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of insti- tutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place. I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experi- ences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes: ... the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61) Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind. Political engagement through policy debate This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives. To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cul- tivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learn- ing combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely. Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discus- sion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world. Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situ- ates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

### Impact D – 2AC

#### No ‘environment stress’ impact.

Kerr et al. 19 – Dr. Amber Kerr, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub. Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab. Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1. Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. [Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence, 6-4-2019, https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/]

Scientists who reviewed IFLScience’s story found that it failed to provide sufficient context for this report—differentiating, for example, between speculative claims and descriptions of peer-reviewed research. In particular, the story’s headline (“New Report Warns ‘High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End’ Within 30 Years”) misrepresents the report as a likely projection rather than an exploration of an intrinsically unlikely worst case scenario.

See all the scientists’ annotations in context.

REVIEWERS’ OVERALL FEEDBACK

These comments are the overall assessment of scientists on the article, they are substantiated by their knowledge in the field and by the content of the analysis in the annotations on the article.

Amber Kerr, Researcher, Agricultural Sustainability Institute, University of California, Davis:

The content of the IFLScience article is mostly an accurate representation of the contents of the Breakthrough report, but the article tends to gloss over important caveats and probabilities that are given in the report. The least accurate part of the IFLScience article is the headline, which is an outright misrepresentation of the report. The article title states that there is, overall, a “high probability” of human civilization coming to an end in 30 years. This is extremely misleading. What the Breakthrough report actually says is that, in the most unlikely, “long-tail” biophysical scenario where climate feedbacks are much more severe than we expect, THEN there is a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end. But the report authors explicitly state that this “high-end scenario” is beyond their capacity to model or to quantitatively estimate.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

The article uncritically reproduces claims from a recent report released by an Australian thinktank regarding the purported “end of human civilization” due to climate change over the next 30 years. While there is plenty of scientific evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society and to key global ecosystems, even these dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “annihilation of intelligent life,” as is claimed in the report.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

The report this article is based on describes a scenario which is unlikely, but several aspects of what is included in the report are likely to worsen in coming decades, such as the occurrence of deadly heatwaves. The conclusion of a high likelihood that human civilisation will end is false, although there is a great deal of evidence that there will be many damaging consequences to continued global warming over the coming decades.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

I don’t think it’s so easy to discount the essential warning of this report. However, it would have been stronger if the authors were more careful not to mention the unsupported concept of near-term human extinction, and the unsupported probabilistic claim that there is a “high likelihood” of their 2050 scenario which includes the collapse of civilization. I do not understand why non-scientist writers (neither report author is a scientist) feel a need to exaggerate sound scientific findings, when those findings are already quite alarming enough. I feel that humanity should undertake urgent climate action just as the report authors do, but I feel that misrepresenting the science is unhelpful and unnecessary.

#### ‘Inequality’ can be ameliorated by economic forces.

Wright et. al ’19 [Joshua D., Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick, and Jan M. Rybnicek; University Professor and Executive Director, Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School; Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips, United States Federal Trade Commission; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Counsel in the antitrust, competition, and trade practice of Freshfields, Bruckahus Deringer LLP; Arizona State Law Review, “REQUIEM FOR A PARADOX: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust,” vol. 51; KP]

2. The Empirical Evidence: Is Inequality Really Growing?

All of the papers discussed above assume that inequality has increased in recent years. This view is fairly common among economists and would seem to be borne out as seen in Figure 2 below, which presents the Gini coefficient for U.S. incomes for the last fifty years.166

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 3, which plots the ratio of the share of US income among the fifth quintile of income-earning households to the share among the first quintile of households167 tells a similar story.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Robert Kaestner and Darren Lubotsky underscore the point that inequality measures can be significantly affected by a failure to account for government transfers and employee benefits that presumably substitute for cash income.168 Given that healthcare costs have grown faster than inflation in recent years, a failure to account for health insurance benefits could significantly affect economic inequality measures. Reviewing estimates from the literature, Kaestner and Lubotsky find that including health insurance substantially reduces the gap between incomes at the high end of the distribution and those at the low end.169 Interestingly, however, the authors find that there is still an upward trend in inequality over time when the cash equivalent of health insurance and government transfers are included.170 The trend, however, is substantially muted.171 Specifically, including government transfers and the imputed value of employer subsidized health insurance, Kaestner and Lubotsky indicate that the ratio of income between households at the ninetieth percentile and the tenth percentile was about five in 1995, growing to 5.2 in 2004 and to 5.6 in 2012.172

Although yearly estimates of this more complete measure of income inequality are not available, and the time series span is somewhat limited, another approach might be to examine consumption inequality since consumption will be a function of effective income, and consumption data are more readily available. Also, consumption might be a better measure of welfare as argued by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan.173 When determining the desirability of antitrust enforcement to address economic inequality, presumably one not only wants to examine the indirect effects on people’s incomes and wealth, but also the direct effect on consumer welfare, for which consumption might be a useful proxy.

Considering the arguments raised above regarding the desirability of using antitrust to fight inequality, one might reason that higher prices coming from increased concentration make both the well-off investors and executives and the lowly consumer worse off, but the investors and executives are compensated through high incomes due to their monopoly profits. Under these arguments, we should see an upward trend in the consumption ratio between the haves and the have-nots. Figure 4, which uses data on average consumption by households in the various income quintiles from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey,174 shows that while the ratio has grown over time, the growth is much smaller than that found for income itself. Further, unlike income, the growth is not nearly as consistent with periods of increasing inequality and decreasing inequality alike.

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### AT: Alt---2AC

#### Alt has zero chance of success---prefer quantitative studies that analyze one-thousand years of data---gradual reforms

Calnitsky ’21 [David; August 8; Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western University; *Critical Sociology,* “The Policy Road to Socialism,” Sage Online]

David Calnitsky, Published August 8, 2021

I do not, however, think that the revolutionary road is implausible. Rather, it is impossible, at least inside the rich capitalist democracies. And between the implausible and the impossible the choice is clear.

Again, this can be framed as an empirical hypothesis: You do not see revolutions in developed capitalist democracies. As Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have written, there has never been a revolution in a moderately middle-class democracy (see also Przeworski, 2019). Drawing on a thousand years of data, cumulatively collected across 37 democratic countries, they show that not one had collapsed with a per-capita GDP higher than that of Argentina in 1976. Among countries with half that figure, collapse was exceedingly rare. Even a modest GDP brings with it an enormous amount of regime stability. These data in fact include any kind of regime collapse; narrowing the data to socialist revolution makes the empirical case against it even more impressive. Any case for revolution must begin by acknowledging rather than ignoring this evidence.

To look at this question in a different way, I draw on the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which contains information on revolutions (rather than government collapse) for over 200 countries since 1919. Their definition of revolution is very broad (see footnote 7) and includes “attempts” to overthrow government as well as “unsuccessful” rebellions. The data were compiled from newspaper sources and warrants caution, but nonetheless constitutes the most systematic evidence available for these questions. In Figure 9, I present the GNP per capita distribution of revolutions, from 1919, where GNP is first available, to the present. By considering only those country-years with revolutions I reduce the observation count from 17,520 to 184. Unlike Przeworski, I do not further restrict the data to democracies. The graph displays an extreme skew: The vast, overwhelming majority of cases of revolutionary threat occur in countries with a per capita GNP below $5,000 USD. For reference, the figure for the US in the data is about $65,850 in 2019. The hypothesis above—that we do not see revolutions in developed democracies—seems borne out by the evidence.

figure

Figure 9. Histogram of country-years with revolutions.

Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Data drawn from 200 plus countries between 1919 and 2018 are then restricted to country-years (N = 184) in which there were “revolutions,” as well as a “major government crisis” and “anti-government protests.”

Why exactly is this true and what are the mechanisms to explain it? Why is the revolutionary strategy impossible for a country like the US? There are, at bottom, three reasons, each of which stands alone as a sufficient condition to snap the last threads of one’s revolutionary faith.23 The first two suggest that revolution is unachievable, and the last suggests that even if it is achievable, socialism by revolutionary means is unachievable. The revolutionary road is closed on the following grounds:

(1) Workers do not want it

(2) Capitalists would sooner grant reforms

(3) A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny than deep democracy

Not only has there never been a successful revolution in a developed democracy, there has never been a working class that has wanted one (e.g. Erikson and Tedin, 2015; Sassoon, 1996).24 There are no clear cases where the dominant inclination of the working class in a developed democracy was revolutionary. Recall that the above graph also includes attempts and unsuccessful cases. It is self-evident that workers have not joined revolutionary groups en masse at any point in the context of a rich democracy. Nor were their aspirations to join such groups thwarted by violence or ideology. When gains inside a capitalist democracy are available—either individual or collective ones, and this has been true even through the neoliberal period, where median living standards have continued to (slowly) go up and not down—it is not worth risking everything for an uncertain future (Thewissen et al., 2015).25 More important than the dynamic point is the static one: When standards of living are moderately high, as shown in Figure 9, the modal worker has more to lose than her chains. This is not an argument against socialism; but to revise Werner Sombart, the life raft of revolution really was shipwrecked on shoals of roast beef and apple pie.

Therefore, the reasons workers are not revolutionary are materialist in character. Explaining their reformist politics does not require appeal to venal trade union leaders or false consciousness. Most people wish to minimize risk in their lives, and revolution involves taking on colossal risks. For example, home-ownership in the developed world hovers around 70%; this means that a lot of people have a lot to lose.

By contrast, the materialist case for revolution proposes that people favor it when their expected post-revolutionary standards of living are greater than their current standard (Roemer, 1985). But when we add moderate risk- and loss-aversion the calculation changes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Say you have a low income, but own a few assets, maybe a house, a car, and perhaps you also have a child; what risk profile would you require to gamble your modest holdings for an uncertain future which might be better but might be worse? Even if you are certain that the probability of better is greater than the probability of worse, you have to envision workers as a class of inveterate gamblers to take the bet. Moderately cautious people who prefer a bird in the hand will still view the downside risk as too great. Equal gains and losses are not experienced equally. This is the loss aversion phenomenon. But the assumption of a population confident about improved standards of living—and a willingness to take risky strategies to achieve them—is itself unwarranted. This is the risk aversion phenomenon. The modal worker is of course correct to suspect that her post-revolutionary welfare is uncertain; socialists after all do not have satisfactory answers to the problems of coordination, motivation, and innovation under socialism (for attempted answers that are provocative and oftentimes brilliant, see Albert, 2004; Cottrell and Cockshott, 1992; Corneo, 2017; Roemer, 1994; and Wright and Hahnel, 2016). When one compares the status quo to a future where both heaven and hell are seemingly plausible, it is perfectly rational that people everywhere would abandon the barricades. And abandon them they did.

Now perhaps the revolutionaries have persuaded us that negative outcomes are far-fetched, that we are very confident that revolution will usher in, eventually, the land of milk and honey. It is still the case that in this model the promised land will only be reached after a social breakdown of unknown duration: A complete overhaul in the organization of production will lead to some middle period of deteriorating material welfare as capitalists rapidly exit the economy. This means chaos and uncertainty, but it could also mean war. The interregnum could last a year, but it might last two decades, and however optimistic we are about the end point, we cannot in advance know how long this interim phase will persist. In the meantime, revolutionary enthusiasm will wane, erstwhile supporters will decamp, a “stay-the-course” electoral strategy will be outflanked by competitor parties promising a return to normalcy, and the desire to consolidate gains will make the authoritarian impulse greater. From a materialist perspective, the uncertain passage through what Przeworski (1986) calls the “transition trough” makes the journey less appealing.26

To my mind, these factors explain why all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation. The reason why revolutionary socialism has always been marginal in rich capitalist economies—and will always be outflanked by reform-oriented socialism—is that only the latter consistently deliver high (and usually increasing) standards of living and low (and usually decreasing) levels of risk. As long as the Mad Max world of catastrophic collapse can be avoided, reform-oriented parties will always better capture the enthusiasm of poor and working people.

Thus, when we try to explain the non-revolutionary attitudes of our working-class friends and family, we do not need to lean on the false consciousness account, for there is a more parsimonious materialist explanation. As such, any case for revolution must be non-materialist in character: You can be a materialist or a revolutionary, but not both.

This is the dilemma the revolutionaries must consider: Revolution is only possible when the forces of production are underdeveloped, but it can only be successful when they are sufficiently developed to make socialism (or communism) objectively viable.27 As Elster (1986) has argued, the circumstances under which revolutions spark and succeed never coincide.

What about the capitalists? Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that they will fight far harder against a revolution than they would against reformist drives. Indeed, ignoring the response from capitalists violates Elster’s first law of political rationality: Never assume your opponent is less rational than you. If revolution were the alternative, employers would grant every imaginable reform, from far higher taxes to the rejiggering of power relations in the workplace. In a mugging, most people will surrender their wallet before their life.

Actors in the state ought to respond in more or less the same way—that is, as long as you admit your adversary the competence to read the situation as well as you. If our theory of the state suggests that it acts on behalf of the capitalist class, its apparatchiks would anticipate and preempt any revolutionary crusade with a cocktail of concession and repression. And while it will certainly contest reforms, it will devote all of its resources to break the revolution. Nonetheless, this means that revolutionaries can play a crucial role, even if it is not to foment revolution. Militancy is a powerful strategy to foment reform (for an argument about the history of social democracy along these lines, see Piketty, 2014).

Thus far, the main reason revolution is off the table is because no one wants it—not workers, nor employers, nor the state.

The third point above asks us to imagine the prospects for revolutionary success even if we ignore the wrinkle that workers have neither an interest nor capacity to make it. But let us pretend they did: Why then would we imagine that total social breakdown would prompt a deepening of democracy rather than authoritarian entrenchment? This happy outcome has never before emerged in the wake of social collapse, and there is little reason why the final showdown with the American military ought to produce fertile ground for deepening democracy in all spheres of life. In fact, evidence from the General Social Survey suggests that in response to recession and economic downturn people tend to become less altruistic and less concerned with questions of fairness.28 After situations of economic crisis, voters tend to shift to the right (Lindvall, 2014). The old union song cries out that “we can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old,” but life is not birthed on ash. None of the historical case studies track this narrative, and indeed everything we know about human psychology suggests that social devastation makes people more, not less, prone to demagoguery. This means that even if a revolution were achievable, it is probably undesirable.

The argument I have thus far laid out against revolution contends only that it is off the table in middle-class democracies. I have in mind social dynamics within developed capitalist democracies, countries “like the US,” but the premise no longer holds true if we imagine a society that has already suffered some sort of catastrophic societal disintegration—at that point all bets are off. We are of course now talking about a world we are not living in, but it is worth considering the thought experiment nonetheless.

It is possible that America, after some world-historic environmental or economic collapse, begins to look something more like Russian feudalism than contemporary developed capitalism. Revolution then might again be on the table, but the context of desperation and scarcity in this scenario gives little reason to expect it would incubate an egalitarian democratic society. The historical evidence is unambiguous: None of the communist revolutions of the 20th century ushered in deeply democratic egalitarian social structures. Not only are there no examples, but there are also no clear mechanisms on offer.

The fact that this scenario generates an interest in bringing about an egalitarian society by means of revolution does not mean there will be a capacity to do so. The theory is little more than “where there is a will there is a way.” But, as Elster (1980: 124) argues, the general interests of society do not secrete the conditions for their fulfillment. Interests and capacities need not overlap.

There is a final reason to be skeptical of non-evolutionary strategies: The highly dubious premise that the system we erect the morning after will actually work. A socialist economy, if plopped down tomorrow, would be so rife with unintended consequences and pathologies that it is easy to imagine a democracy voting its way back into capitalism. This is true even if we believe (mistakenly, in my view) that the socialist calculation debate is solvable in the age of big data (Morozov, 2019). Interlocutors in the calculation debate have had very little to say about the politics of transition. Indeed, it is hard to imagine success of any kind without a slow and incremental transformation, experimenting with bits and pieces along the way—as we have been doing for the past century. An experimental approach is likely the only way to avoid devastating blunders that undermine the whole project. Moments of institutional upheaval and big change may at times be necessary, but to be successful they will have to rest on a foundation of smaller changes that have been tested.

#### Sudden transition kills two-thirds of the world within two weeks---ONLY gradual transition via reformism is possible in the modern world---prefer ev from the world’s most famous living Marxist

Harvey ’20 [David; 2020; Distinguished Professor of Anthropology & Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York; *The Anti-Capitalist Chronicles*, Pluto Press: London]

Global Unrest

There are many contradictions in the capitalist system, and some are more salient than others. The incredible class and social inequalities and collapsing environmental conditions are obvious priorities. But then comes the “too big to fail, too monstrous to survive” contradiction. Neither the social inequality nor environmental degradation issues can be addressed without taking on this underlying contradiction. A socialist and anti-capitalist program will have to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving that which services the world’s population and which appears too big and foundational to fail while confronting the fact that it is becoming too monstrous to survive without sparking geopolitical conflicts that will likely turn the innumerable small wars and internal struggles already raging across the planet into a global conflagration.

This is the core of the problem. In Marx’s time, if there was a sudden collapse of capitalism, most people in the world would still have been able to feed themselves and reproduce. They were reasonably self-sufficient in their local area procuring the kinds of things they needed to live and reproduce. People could put some sort of breakfast on their table irrespective of what was going on in the global economy and in global markets. Right now, that’s no longer the case in many parts of the world. Most people in the United States, in much of Europe, in Japan, and now increasingly in China, India, Indonesia, and in Latin America are depending more and more on the delivery of food through the circulation of capital. In Marx’s time, perhaps 10 percent of the global population was vulnerable to disruptions in the circulation of capital, as opposed to many more who were subject to famines, droughts, epidemics, and other environmental disruptions. The crisis of European capitalism in 1848 was part a product of harvest failures and part produced by a speculative crash focused on railroad finance. Since then, capital operating in the world market has largely eliminated the prospect of starvation due to supposedly natural causes. If there is famine the underlying causes (as opposed to the immediate triggers) can invariably be traced to failures in the social and political system of capitalist governance and distribution. Much of the world’s population is now dependent upon the circulation of capital to procure and ensure its food supply, access the fuels and the energy required to support daily life, and to maintain the elaborate structures and equipment of communication that facilitate the coordination of basic production requirements.

Capital, right now, may be too deeply implicated in the reproduction of daily life to fail. The economic consequences and social impacts and costs of a massive and prolonged failure in the continuity of capital circulation will be catastrophic and potentially lethal for a significant portion of the world’s population. To be sure, indigenous and peasant populations in the Andean highlands may survive quite well, but if the flow of capital shuts down for any prolonged period, then maybe two-thirds of the world’s population would within a few weeks be threatened with starvation, deprived of fuel and light, while being rendered immobile and deprived of almost all capacity to reproduce their conditions of existence effectively. We cannot now afford any kind of sustained and prolonged attack upon or disruption of capital circulation even if the more egregious forms of accumulation are strictly curbed. The kind of fantasy that revolutionaries might once have had – which was that capitalism could be destroyed and burned down overnight and that something different could immediately be built upon the ashes – is impossible today even supposing there ever was a time when such a revolutionary overthrow might have happened. Some form of the circulation of commodities and therefore of money capital has to be kept in motion for some considerable time lest most of us starve. It is in this sense that we might say that capital appears to be now too big to fail. We may aspire to make our own history, Marx observed, but this can never be done under conditions of our own choosing. These conditions dictate a politics that is about sustaining many existing commodity chains and flows while socializing and perhaps gradually modifying them to accommodate to human needs. As Marx noted in his commentary on the Paris Commune,

in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it the higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they [the working classes] will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society is pregnant.

The task is to identify that which lays latent in our existing society to find a peaceful transition to a more socialist alternative. Revolution is a long process not an event.

### AT: Graeber/Miola---2AC

#### Utopianism fails – without the ability to compare proposals they have no method for spill-up, and their refusal to engage the process of imaginative hypothesis generation proves they either leave things in the hands of useless elites or they spill up to a new society that’s more likely than not to fail

Wilkinson, 17—Vice President for Policy at the Niskanen Center (Will, October 24, “PUBLIC POLICY AFTER UTOPIA,” <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/public-policy-utopia/>, dml)

Many political philosophers, and most adherents of radical political ideologies, tend to think that an ideal vision of the best social, economic, and political system serves a useful and necessary orienting function. The idea is that reformers need to know what to aim at if they are to make steady incremental progress toward the maximally good and just society. If you don’t know where you’re headed—if you don’t know what utopia looks like—how are you supposed to know which steps to take next? The idea that a vision of an ideal society can serve as a moral and strategic star to steer by is both intuitive and appealing. But it turns out to be wrong. This sort of political ideal actually can’t help us find our way through the thicket of real-world politics into the clearing of justice. I’ve discussed the problems with ideal theory at length, in the context Gerald Gaus’ tremendous book The Tyranny of the Ideal, in a Vox column. This piece will be easier to understand if you read that first. Jacob Levy’s paper, “There’s No Such Thing as Ideal Theory,” is an outstanding complement. And, on the more technical side, the work of UCSD’s David Wiens is state of the art, and adds texture to Gaus’ critique. A major paradigm shift in political theory is underway, and it’s all over but the shoutin’ for ideal theory. But it takes a while for the shoutin’ to peter out. New paradigms can take a generation or more to trickle down through the intellectual culture. So we’ve barely begun to grasp what it means to give up on ideal theory, especially in public policy. It’s a bit dramatic to say that the death of ideal theory changes everything, but it changes a lot. It definitely changes what it means to be an ideologically principled think tank. If you agree with Gaus, as I do, then you will think that there’s a pretty major intellectual mistake lurking within the ideal-theoretic version of libertarianism that the most prominent institutions of the “freedom movement” were built to promote. Again, this has nothing to do with libertarianism, per se. Gaus’ argument is general. It doesn’t matter which normative standard you use to rank possible social systems. It could be the orthodox libertarian conception of freedom as non-coercion, John Rawls’ two principles of justice, or a radically egalitarian conception of material equality. It doesn’t matter. In order to say that any particular system is the best in terms of your chosen normative standard, you’ve got to be able to rank rival systems against that standard. Doing that ranking in a principled, non-arbitrary way requires evidence of what the realization of your favorite possible social world would actually look like. Otherwise you can’t really say that it does better in terms of your chosen standard than competing systems. Utopia is a guess The fact that all our evidence about how social systems actually work comes from formerly or presently existing systems is a huge problem for anyone committed to a radically revisionary ideal of the morally best society. The further a possible system is from a historical system, and thus from our base of evidence about how social systems function, the more likely we are to be mistaken about how it would work if it were realized. And the more likely we are to be mistaken about how it would actually work, the more likely we are to be mistaken that it is more free, or more equal, or more socially just than other systems, possible or actual. Indeed, there’s basically no way to rationally justify the belief that, say, “anarcho-capitalism” ranks better in terms of libertarian freedom than “Canada 2017,” or the belief that “economic democracy” ranks better in terms of socialist equality than “Canada 2017.” You may think you can imagine how anarcho-capitalism or economic democracy would work, but you can’t. You’re really just guessing—extrapolating way beyond your evidence. You can’t just stipulate that it works the way you want it to work. Rationally speaking, you probably shouldn’t even suspect that your favorite system comes out better than an actual system. Rationally speaking, your favorite probably shouldn’t be your favorite. Utopia is a guess. Again, this is a general problem. But it does hit especially hard for those who appreciate the unpredictability of complex systems and the inevitability of unintended consequences. It’s no coincidence that Gaus is a Hayekian. As my colleague Jeffrey Friedman argues, expert predictions about the the likely effects of changing a single policy tend to be pretty bad. I’ll use myself as an example. I’ve followed the academic literature about the minimum wage for almost twenty years, and I’m an experienced, professional policy analyst, so I’ve got a weak claim to expertise in the subject. What do I have to show for that? Not much, really. I’ve got strong intuitions about the likely effects of raising minimum wages in various contexts. But all I really know is that the context matters a great deal, that a lot of interrelated factors affect the dynamics of low-wage labor markets, and that I can’t say in advance which margin will adjust when the wage floor is raised. Indeed, whether we should expect increases in the minimum wage to hurt or help low-wage workers is a question Nobel Prize-winning economists disagree about. Labor markets are complicated! Well, the comprehensive political economies of nation-states are vastly more complicated. And that means that our predictions about the outcome of radically changing the entire system are unlikely to be better than random. If your favorite system is quite a bit different from any system that has existed, then even if it were true that it would rank numero uno in terms of your favorite normative standard, you’re not in a position to rationally believe it. Clearly then, it’s not actually useful to aim toward a distant ideal when you don’t really have a good reason to believe that it’s better than actually existing systems in terms of liberty or equality or nationalist solidarity or whatever it is you care about. This is a hard lesson for ideologues to swallow. I still haven’t totally digested it. But a number of things have become much clearer after giving up on my sinful, ideal-theoretic ways. Analysis after ideal theory: measurement and comparison The death of ideal theory implies a non-ideological, empirical, comparative approach to political analysis. That doesn’t mean giving up on, say, the value of freedom. I think I’m more libertarian—more committed to value of liberty—than I’ve ever been. But that doesn’t mean being committed to an eschatology of liberty, a picture of an ideally free society, or a libertarian utopia. We’re not in a position to know what that looks like. The best we can do is to go ahead and try to rank social systems in terms of the values we care about, and then see what we can learn. The Cato Institute’s Human Freedom Index is one such useful measurement attempt. What do we see? Look: Every highlighted country is some version of the liberal-democratic capitalist welfare state. Evidently, this general regime type is good for freedom. Indeed, it is likely the best we have ever done in terms of freedom. Moreover, Denmark (#5), Finland (#9), and the Netherlands (#10) are among the world’s “biggest” governments, in terms of government spending as a percentage of GDP. The “economic freedom” side of the index, which embodies a distinctly libertarian conception of economic liberty, hurts their ratings pretty significantly. Still, according to a libertarian Human Freedom Index, some of the freest places in on Earth have some of the“biggest” governments. That’s unexpected. This is why we need to try to rank social systems in terms of our prized political values. Our guesses about which systems lead to which consequences are likely to be pretty bad. Suppose we were to poll a bunch of American libertarians, and ask them to tell us which country enjoys more freedom, according the Cato Institute’s metrics. The United States or Sweden? The United States or Germany? The United States or Canada? The United States or Lithuania? I’m pretty sure almost all of them would get it wrong in each of these pairwise comparisons. Why? Because typical libertarians carry an ideal-theoretic picture of the “the free society” around in their heads, and (for some reason!) a minimum of taxation and redistribution is among the most salient aspects of that picture. And that means that Denmark, say, doesn’t seem very free relative to that picture. But there’s a great deal more to freedom than fiscal policy. And we see that, as a matter of fact, the country with the biggest-spending government in the world is among the freest countries in the world, and ranks first in personal freedom. That is our basic data. It doesn’t necessarily imply that the United States ought to do more redistributive social spending. But when a freedom index, built from libertarian assumptions, shows that freedom thrives in many places with huge welfare states, it should lead us to downgrade our estimate of the probability that liberty and redistribution are antithetical, and upgrade our estimate of the probability that they are consistent, and possibly complementary. That’s the sort of consideration that mainly drives my current views, not ideal-theoretical qualms about neo-Lockean libertarian rights theories. Though libertarianism is of personal interest to me, I want to emphasize again that my larger point has nothing to do with libertarianism. The same lesson applies to alt-right ethno-nationalists dazzled by a fanciful picture of a homogenous, solidaristic ethno-state. The same lesson applies to progressives and socialists in the grip of utopian pictures of egalitarian social justice. Of course, nobody knows what an ideally equal society would look like. If we stick to the data we do have, and inspect the top ranks of the Social Progress Index, which is based on progressive assumptions about basic needs, the conditions for individual health, well-being, and opportunity, you’ll mostly find the same countries that populate the Freedom Index’s leaderboard. Here: The overlap is striking. And this highlights some of the pathologies of ideal theory: irrational polarization and the narcissism of small differences. Some pathologies of ideal theory, both personal and political Ideal theory can drive political conflict by concealing overlapping consensus. Pretty much any way you slice it, Denmark is an actually-existing utopia. But so is Switzerland. So is New Zealand. The effective difference between the Nordic and Anglo-colonial models, in terms of “human freedom” and “social progress” is surpassingly slight. Yet passionate moral commitment to purist ideals of justice can lead us to see past the fact that the liberal-democratic capitalist welfare state, in whatever iteration, is awesome, and worth defending, from the perspective of multiple, rival political values. We miss the fact that these values fit together more harmoniously than our theories lead us to imagine. I suspect this has something to do with the fact that utopia-dwellers around the world seem to be losing faith in liberal democracy, and the fact that “neoliberalism” can’t get no love, despite the fact that they measurably deliver the goods like crazy. Yet ideologues interpret this loss of faith as evidence of objective failure, which they diagnose as a lack of satisfactory progress toward their version of utopia, and push ever more passionately for an agenda they have no rational reason to believe would actually leave anyone better off. It is intellectually corrupt and corrupting to define liberty or equality or you-name-it in terms of an idealized, counter-factual social system that may or may not do especially well in delivering the goods. Commitment to a vision of the perfect society is more likely than not to lead you astray. Consider how unlikely it is for a typical libertarian to correctly predict more than a couple of the top-ten freest countries on the libertarian freedom index. The fact that ideological radicals are pretty unreliable at ranking existing social systems in terms of their favored values ought to make us skeptical of claims that highly counterfactual systems would rank first. And it ought to lead us to suspect that ideal-theoretical political theorizing leads us to see the actual world less clearly than we might, due to cherry-picking and confirmation bias. If you’ve already irrationally ranked a fanciful social system tops in terms your favored value, you’ve effectively committed to the idea that the world works in a certain way without sufficient evidence that it actually does. This is almost always a commitment of identity and group membership rather than a judgment of reason. And it leads you to cast about for evidence that the world does work the way it would need to work in order to vindicate your ranking. You end up lending a great deal of credibility to comforting evidence, while ignoring and dismissing evidence that the world doesn’t work that way you’d like it to work. The result is that your ideal-theoretic commitment ends up driving your model of the world. But if your ideal theory is likely to be wrong in the first place, using it as a filter for evaluating evidence is going to leave you with a disastrously distorted picture of the way the world actually works. And that means you’re going to make systematically terrible predictions about the likely consequences of this or that policy change. You may want to identify reforms most likely to promote liberty or equality, or whatever, but you’ll end up really bad at this because your distorted ideological model of the world will leave you unable to evaluate evidence objectively. Progress in policy requires idealistic moral passion without preconceived ideals For me, the death of ideal theory has meant adopting a non-speculative, non-utopian perspective on freedom-enhancing institutions. If you know that you can’t know in advance what the freest social system looks will look like, you’re unlikely to see evidence that suggests that policy A (social insurance, e.g.) is freedom-enhancing, or that policy B (heroin legalization, e.g.) isn’t, as threats to your identity as a freedom lover. Uncertainty about the details of the freest feasible social scheme opens you up to looking at evidence in a genuinely curious, non-biased way. And it frees you from the anxiety that genuine experts, people with merited epistemic authority, will say things you don’t want to hear. This in turn frees you from the urge to wage quixotic campaigns against the authority of legitimate experts. You can start acting like a rational person! You can simply defer to the consensus of experts on empirical questions, or accept that you bear an extraordinary burden of proof when you disagree. I think the reign of ideal theory in political philosophy turned lots of incredibly smart, principled, morally motivated people into unreliable, untrustworthy ideologues. This has left the field of rational policy analysis to utilitarian technocrats, who have their own serious problems. Long story short, we ended up with a sort of divide in public policy between morally passionate advocates trapped in epistemic bubbles and technicians capable of objective analysis but devoid of guiding vision. What we need are folks who are passionate about freedom, or social justice (or what have you) who actively seek solutions to domination and injustice, but who also don’t think they already know exactly what ideal liberation or social justice look like, and are therefore motivated to identify our real alternatives and to evaluate them objectively. The space of possibility is infinite, and it takes energy and enthusiasm to want to explore it. Imaginative hypothesis generation is the great intangible without which progress is impossible or maddeningly slow. The technicians, the quants, the lab rats tend to be awful at dreaming up hypotheses. Ideological moral passion is the perfect wild horse to harness; it could power the exploration of the near frontier of the feasible. But thanks to the tyranny of the ideal, it’s a source of intellectual energy more often wasted hooked up to a wagon train headed off the map to Shangri-La.

#### Link turn---researching policy debates teaches you why the government WONT do good things---doesn’t make you naïve and means there’s no link

### AT: AI/Cyber Link---2AC

#### Centralized planning fails, even with perfect tech---but the alt ensures digital authoritarianism that wrecks innovation.

Bennett ’22 [Michael Timothy and Sean Welsh; Jan 16; PHD student who works in AI research at the ANU; author and PhD in philosophy; Quillette, “Will AI Spell the End of Capitalism?,” https://quillette.com/2022/01/16/ai-and-the-end-of-capitalism/]

As is commonly said, artificial intelligence is brittle (but fast) whereas human intelligence is robust (but slow). If the task is to land a drone, provide song recommendations, or even predict protein folding, then mimicry can work well, given a sufficiently varied quantity of training data. If, on the other hand, rationality or the ability to provide nuanced reasoning for past decisions is required, mimicry flops. The ability to deal with the unexpected is one of the great strengths of Homo sapiens.

Feng’s claim is simply that AI oligarchs are bad and the only credible fix is a “socialist market economy” governed by a Marxist one-party state. This is a false dichotomy; our choice is not between these two extremes. We agree that AI oligarchs are an unattractive prospect. However, there are existing remedies for cartels, monopolies, and harmful AI products in the pluralist West. Targeted regulation is a better fix for capitalism’s defects than a revolution led by an alliance of workers and peasants. As a result of Frances Haugen’s testimony, many in the US Congress are looking to clip the wings of social media. The EU has led the world in regulating AI products, introducing rights to explanations, rights to be forgotten, and rights to data privacy. The Australian government has released draft legislation to expose anonymous trolls to defamation actions by removing the “platform” shield of social media and making them “publishers” accountable for the views their users post just like traditional media. The “wild west” days of the information age are over.

But Feng offers a typically Marxist “all or nothing” argument. To fix the problems of competitive capitalism, his solution is a Marxist political monopoly based on the revolutionary expropriation of the expropriators. His argument is unconvincing because it is based on a hopelessly dated caricature of capitalism. “Laissez-faire capitalism as we have known it,” he says, “can lead nowhere but to a dictatorship of AI oligarchs who gather rents because the intellectual property they own rules over the means of production.”

The obvious problem with this argument is that laissez-faire capitalism is extinct, long since abandoned in favour of regulation, anti-trust legislation, and redistribution through the welfare state. Feng overstates the market power of the AI oligarchs, most of whom make their money selling ads in a competitive market. He says nothing about the coercive power of a political monopoly, that can silence policy competition by throwing it into the gulag.

The most sinister aspect of current AI is what a one-party state can do with it. Silicon Valley has given China the technical tools to set up the world of 1984. Now the party telescreen can monitor the likes of Winston Smith 24/7. Instead of a screen on the wall, it’s the mobile phone in your pocket connected to the Internet that can be used to track you and monitor what you click on, who and what you message, and keep you and all your fellow citizens under constant surveillance for “counter-revolutionary” views. In China, the Internet and social media have evolved to be a tyrant’s dream. Comrade political officers in technology firms monitor online posts for “objectionable” material and have unlimited powers of “moderation.”

The Achilles heel of this political strategy is that it creates a culture in which people are afraid to think and speak freely. When you have to filter every word you say in case it offends the powers that be, you are strongly motivated to avoid risky creative thinking. In a society where the state can control everything and purge celebrity and wealth, talented people vote with their feet and migrate to places where they can get rich and famous and say what they think. Those that remain settle for the safety of government-approved groupthink. As a result of this systemic dampening of creativity, the economy stagnates in the long run.

Aspects of contemporary AI theory align with the intuitions of Karl Popper as expressed in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Driven mostly by reaction to the totalitarian horrors of fascism and communism in World War II, Popper intuited that social truth is best served by policy competition and piecemeal social engineering not policy monopoly. Contemporary AI, in the form of discussion of the exploration/exploitation tradeoff in reinforcement learning (a variant of ML), explains why.

Exploitation is a strategy whereby the AI takes a decision assumed to be optimal based on data observed to date. In essence, it is about trusting past data to be a reliable guide to the future, or at least today. Exploration, by contrast, is a strategy that consists of not taking the decision that seems to be optimal based on existing past data. The AI agent bets on the fact that observed data are not yet sufficient to correctly identify the best option. Obviously, exploitation works better in closed and well-understood systems, but exploration is a better bet in those that are open and poorly understood.

Even if decisions are made by the most generally intelligent AI possible, the optimal strategy for that AI is to subdivide tasks, duplicate itself, and specialize for local conditions. In other words, a swarm of individuals each making their own choices can learn from the best of what its population tries. If all individuals are constrained, then the ability of the swarm to learn and change is crippled. There are exceptions, particularly where the cost of an individual failing is so high it is comparable to the whole population failing (for instance, letting more people have access to a button that ends the world is worse than letting fewer people have access to this button). But, generally speaking, more distributed control consistently beats more centralised control. By employing many different, often contradictory policies at once, we constantly explore as we exploit. Applying this recent technical insight retrospectively to history, it explains the sustained stagnation of Marxist economies.

Presently, no functioning state has either completely central or distributed control. We are all somewhere in between. In the mid-19th century, when The Communist Manifesto was published, there was hardly any spending on social services. Income tax was three percent in the UK, there was no such thing as company tax, and the welfare state did not exist. What existed was the parish and the poorhouse. In the days of Gladstone and Disraeli, with property-based suffrage and a budget than went mostly on the Army, the Navy, and servicing debt incurred during the Crimean War, one could plausibly claim, as Marx and Engels did, that “the executive of the modern state was nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.” In the 19th century, spending by the UK government was less than a 10th of GDP. Today it is a third. Half the UK budget, one-sixth of GDP, goes on health, education, and welfare.

A degree of central planning is desirable to provide infrastructure, to support basic research, and to ensure that everyone has access to education and health services. Regulation is required to enforce contracts, to facilitate cooperation, to provide minimum standards for products and services, and to enforce rules on safety, pollution, and so on. However, as an overall policy, maximising individual autonomy within reason, erring towards computational efficiency and distributed control, will yield dramatically better outcomes than central control by the AI of a one-party state.

Central planning ignores what is arguably the greatest advantage of distributed control and local adaptation: error correction. It also ignores the fact that “fairness” is notoriously hard to define in AI terms, assuming resources are to be fairly allocated. A central planner might select what is best for an average human, but what is best is often far from obvious. Humans are quite dissimilar from one another. We share goals only in the most general sense (for example, we seek to avoid pain, find food, take shelter, and so forth). We rarely agree on what we want to do today or any other day, and our beliefs about how to achieve things are often inconsistent.

The best possible central planner, mathematically, is a pareto-optimal super-intelligence. This is a software agent that learns faster to predict more accurately than any other agent, on average across all possible tasks. This is the theoretical upper limit of intelligence (allowing for debate over the exact definition of intelligence itself). However, even this theoretical perfection will always be out-performed by those with a more specifically relevant inductive bias toward a given task (those who are less intelligent in general, but more suited to the task at hand). In other words, even the most intelligent being possible would make mistakes when compared with the possibilities presented by distributed control, localised adaptation, and selective evolution. The same goes not just for correcting mistakes, but for improving our lot in life. Every beneficial innovation in history was an instance of an individual breaking ranks to correct a perceived flaw in the norm, to adapt to the specific situation at hand. Innovation requires disobedience. To centralise control is to encourage stagnation.

The problem with state-run monopolies is that they are inherently inefficient because they lack the error correction provided by competition. Markets provide error correction in the form of people deciding products suck and buying elsewhere. In the realm of ideas, error correction occurs when people say a party’s policy does not work, but this option is removed when free speech is curtailed. In China, those who criticise government policy (or government officials) disappear and get silenced. Only a lucky few like Peng Shuai have global profiles high enough to get noticed. Notwithstanding their claims about “participatory” democracy, in the one-party state, dissidents and innovators are purged in darkness.

The history of the communist world is replete with economic disaster. Millions died as a result of famines caused by Stalin and Mao. Marxist doctrine underlies the economic underperformance of China compared to Taiwan. AI cannot save Marxism, but it can be used by Marxists to serve their agendas of surveillance and social control. AI can be used to bring about the death of democracy and enable the rule of a digital Big Brother.

#### Private telecom is key---their alt wrecks global cybersecurity

Marar ’20 [Satya; October 17; policy analyst at Reason Foundation and a Young Voices tech policy fellow; “5G nationalization will leave America behind,” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/521502-5g-nationalization-will-leave-america-behind]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently considering a proposal that’ll effectively nationalize 5G technology and networks in the United States. By abandoning the market-driven strategy that won the 4G race for the nation, America would merely be undermining its own progress — and losing to China.

This is especially concerning since China sees itself as a rival to U.S. hegemony and is increasingly exerting its diplomatic and military influence in a brazen way. It has launched cyberattacks and attempted to acquire sensitive military secrets and intelligence. It has already made strides in the 5G race and is rapidly acquiring key 5G patents. Its flagship telecommunications giant is propped-up by $75 billion in subsidies and was slated to build the UK’s 5G network this year. The British government only reneged after U.S. diplomatic pressure.

Concerningly, Chinese laws effectively compel Huawei to hand over user data and to assist it in industrial espionage and state surveillance. If the world becomes increasingly reliant on Chinese government-controlled and operated telecommunications infrastructure, then that will leave U.S. manufacturers and innovators at an ever-increasing disadvantage. With 5G technology expected to contribute $2.2 trillion, roughly 5 percent of global GDP, to the world economy within 15 years, this is a race America must win.

Troublingly enough, the DOD suggests a move that mirrors China in many ways. It’d replace the existing Federal Communications Commission (FCC) plan to auction off frequency ranges within the mid-band spectrum to private companies who can then develop the necessary infrastructure networks, which is ideal for 5G development. Instead, a network built and deployed by the U.S. government would act as a wholesaler to telecommunications companies who could turn around and sell 5G plans to retail consumers.

But national 5G networks are already being built across the country with private investment totaling billions of dollars. Why would taxpayers pay such a hefty sum for something that American companies are already developing? Conversely, government agencies have already compromised the nation’s position in the 5G race by allocating mainly less-than-ideal low-band and high-band frequencies for 5G development. Unlike the mid-band spectrum that the U.S. military largely monopolizes, low-band frequencies mean slow connections. High-band frequencies are localized and require significantly more infrastructure investment to cover the same range. By contrast, China has utilized its mid-band spectrum for 5G deployment.

This is why a lone Chinese cellular tower now covers the same range as 100 high-speed American towers.

The U.S. should be auctioning frequency ranges within the mid-band spectrum to companies that are already equipped to build infrastructure. If the U.S. wants to “catch-up” with China, then it should be taking advantage of the already robust American private sector instead of adopting China’s strategy of state control, debt-funded subsidies and loans.

A federal government 5G network could take decades to build and could be replete with setbacks — at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Take a look at South Africa and Mexico for proof. Those are two countries where nationalized telecommunications networks failed.

Or look to Australia, where the “National Broadband Network” turned into a financial disaster. Originally projected to cost $29.5 billion in 2013, it was completed only this year, with the final cost running past $51 billion. And that’s not counting a recently announced $4.5 billion upgrade since the technology is out of date already. But it’s not politicians and bureaucrats’ own money they’re playing around with. It’s taxpayers’ dollars on the line.

Conversely, proponents of a nationalized 5G network claim that auctioning off spectrum to private network builders could leave consumers worse off, since there’s theoretically nothing stopping them from charging high prices once they own the network. After all, American mobile services are relatively more expensive than those in many European nations.

Yet, this can hardly be blamed on privately owned network infrastructure when infrastructure in European countries with significantly cheaper mobile service is also privately owned. After all, American prices are influenced by the relatively higher costs of extending coverage across a nation that’s so vast, unevenly populated and geographically diverse.

Moreover, European regulations that are designed to lower prices for consumers by boosting retail competition (such as the UK rule requiring network owners to sell access to competitors at cost) come at the expense of decreased network investment that left Europe years behind the United States in 4G development. This trade-off may be undesirable, given how important fast, reliable and expansive 5G networks are for keeping innovative companies and industries in the United States competitive.

Nationalization also won’t uphold security since a single nationwide network, government-owned or otherwise, is even more vulnerable to hacking. Furthermore, infrastructure builders and equipment providers who raise national security concerns are already prohibited from purchasing spectrum licenses.

### AT: Innovation K / Innovation Links---2AC

#### Group their critiques of innovation---any less capitalist or less growth-oriented model wrecks it, which impoverishes society and ensures violent conflict

Tudoreanu ’20 [Mihnea; 9/23/20; doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; David M. Kotz; professor emeritus of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; "Stable Jobs or iPhones? The Dilemma of Innovation in Socialism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 52, Vol. 4, p. 642-649]

**Note: DPS = Democratically Planned Socialism**

One of the advantages for innovation in DPS is that it can effectively take into account social and environmental costs, including the jobs lost or disrupted by the introduction of a new technology.8 But this can also be problematic, in that it is likely to make innovation slower in socialism than in capitalism. Democratic majorities are not immune to some of the same factors that caused Soviet managers to be technologically conservative.

On the one hand, DPS should not suffer from taut planning, unrealistic plan targets imposed from the top down, or an incentive structure that discourages risk-taking by trying out new technologies. But on the other hand, innovation is always disruptive in any kind of economic system. As old technologies are superseded, product lines become obsolete and production processes are changed, and as a result certain kinds of jobs are no longer needed. Even with an employment guarantee, the loss of one’s job may have to involve retraining, changing careers, or moving across the country. So, it is reasonable to expect that workers will resist new technologies.9 Yet at the same time, in their capacity as consumers, they will demand new and better products.

This is the “Stable jobs or iPhones?” dilemma. We can prioritize cutting-edge consumer products, or we can prioritize stable employment, but perhaps not both.10 In DPS, the people will be able to decide between one and the other, on a case-by-case basis, so that some innovations will be pursued, others will be scrapped because of their disruptive effects, and some will be introduced at a deliberately slow pace. Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor of the iPhones despite the conflict with stable jobs. Since socialism will not always do this, it is likely that socialism will have more job security but fewer cutting-edge consumer products than capitalism.

If there is an international rivalry between socialism and capitalism, the citizens of the two kinds of societies will be able to compare their lifestyles with those in the other economic system. Workers living under capitalism may be attracted by the stable jobs, shorter working hours, democratic workplaces, and social benefits provided by socialism. However, those living under socialism will likely also be attracted by the rapid introduction of new consumer goods under capitalism. Moreover, as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower than that in capitalism, the “consumer gap” with capitalism would grow over time.

This may not be considered a problem for socialism if most of the population value stable jobs more than iPhones, but there would likely be a minority who do not. If the consumer gap is large enough, and/or that dissenting minority has an overriding preference for new consumer goods, then we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting capitalism, which values a new technology over job stability, even though they are part of the working class.

A common response to the flaws of Soviet socialism has been to propose other models of socialism that would not have those flaws. But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not one that can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to the overly centralized or undemocratic nature of Soviet socialism.

Furthermore, there is a military aspect to the innovation problem. Innovations that aid the military are also likely to have a disruptive effect on employment, as in the case of consumer-oriented innovations. This is a problem because it might put DPS at a military disadvantage with respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in international relations even if no military conflict takes place. If one side knows it would lose any war that did take place, then that side will act timidly and avoid even nonviolent confrontation, so as to avoid provoking the other side into war. For both sides to stand a good chance of success in a peaceful rivalry, they must be more or less evenly matched militarily, so that neither feels that it can do whatever it wants with impunity or that it must tread lightly to avoid confrontation.

The Cold War was a multifaceted struggle between two different systems. Any future socialist economic order will most likely face capitalism in a somewhat similar struggle. Can such a struggle be won by socialism without matching capitalism’s rate of technological development? That is the question.

### Space---2AC

#### Commercial space solves extinction

Beames ’18 [Charles; July; Chairman of the SmallSat Alliance, Executive Chairman of York Space Systems, former Principal Director of Space and Intelligence in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)), active early stage investor in entrepreneurial space, former President of Vulcan Aerospace where he was responsible for asset allocation within a privately held aerospace investment portfolio exceeding $1B, Col. (ret.) in the USAF where he served 23 years in space & intelligence leadership positions around the world; SpaceNews Magazine, [https://spacenews.com/op-ed-smallsat-alliance-is-on-a-path-toward-a-new-space-horizon]](https://spacenews.com/op-ed-smallsat-alliance-is-on-a-path-toward-a-new-space-horizon%5d)

We find ourselves still at the dawn of a new space century, mindful of the victories and setbacks of our past, eager to pass the torch to the next generation of space visionaries, scientists, engineers, and enthusiasts. We look to the future not just to see how much bigger, faster, or higher we can reach, but also how the United States, and specifically the U.S. space community, can again inspire the nations of the world to align with us, as it did in the 20th century.

The SmallSat Alliance is an alliance of companies developing, producing, and operating in all segments of the ‘next generation’ space economy; championing renewed U.S. leadership in the burgeoning commercial space economy, and advocating for the transformation of government-led space capabilities. We are experienced space professionals who have chosen to join with others leveraging our decades of hard-won experience, to develop smarter ways to explore space in the 21st century.

A wonderful outgrowth of the legacy space program is the commercial, entrepreneurial, and job-creating commercial space business that it bequeathed. These next-generation enterprises range from multi-million-dollar startups providing rideshare opportunities or components for small satellites to multi-billion-dollar space data-analytic platforms reinventing urban car service and agricultural production. The early returns of this economic revolution are already on our doorstep: space data capabilities are exponentially growing elements of the 21st century world economy.

Beginning with the dreams and funding by successful tech entrepreneurs, enormous venture investments are already delivering wondrous benefits to the world.

Commercial Space – Profit and Non-Profit

There are really two major categories in the commercial sector, the profit driven and the non-profit. The classic for-profit companies include not only those designing, building, launching, and operating satellites but also the tech sector that is turning that raw space data into gold through machine-learning analytics. Since for-profit companies are no longer dependent upon the revenues generated by the Cold War space race culture of a bygone era, this new generation of space companies is able to more efficiently capitalize on Moore’s Law, the nonstop exponential growth in chip density, and the associated networking technology co-evolving with it. This new generation is building profitable businesses helping to clean up our oceans of garbage and debris with satellite surveillance, reconnoitering to assist in enforcing laws that protect our oceans from illegal, unregulated, unlicensed fishing, something that is rapidly depleting the world’s most valuable and essential lifeforms. It’s leading in the innovative use of low-cost satellite constellations to produce ubiquitous remote-sensing data, enabling small business owners to be more profitable and less wasteful. For example, precise timing signals from space are already optimizing transportation of people, goods, and services, with even further gains anticipated with the introduction of artificial intelligence to assist drivers, perhaps even someday replacing them entirely.

The non-profit sector is the other side of commercial space, concerned more for the general welfare of society, but every bit as integral to this new space enterprise. Much like every century before it in human history, ours is not without its unique challenges, some of which have been a consequence of the last, and all of which the space data domain can be leveraged to help solve. Examples are endless, but one challenge that this new space community is uniquely well-adapted for is to further inform worldwide resource allocation for the 21st century and beyond. These two primary resources are sustainable water and the materials needed for adequate housing for an ever-increasing human population. As cities and urbanization continue to expand, governmental planning challenges such as transportation design optimization for goods and services are only the beginning. Additionally, through using inexpensive remote sensing technologies, some members are designing space data analytics to mitigate human suffering from plagues, contain outbreaks, and combating illegal poaching. Some are connecting with other non-profits to curtail human trafficking for the sex trade or forced labor for migrant debt repayment. Still others are helping non-governmental organizations in their work to expose the use of children as soldiers. Addressing these challenges has little to do with resuscitating dreams conceived by long deceased science-fiction writers and much more to do with turning “swords back into plowshares” to solve real threats to humanity.

Other non-profit initiatives include pursuing an even more foundational understanding of who we are and how to be the best custodians of our environment. Much as exploring and monitoring the world’s oceans has advanced civilization through a better understanding of human life and the planet, so too does exploring and monitoring from space. Low Earth orbit (LEO) provides a unique vantage point to look back on the planet and understand what is happening, anticipate what might happen and prepare for the future. In addition to better understanding Earth, responsible and rapid exploitation of the low Earth orbit domain will enhance the understanding of the solar system and the rest of the universe. Small satellites already offer low-cost platforms to study and explore what lies beyond the Earth. Other members are pioneering the use of zero-carbon, hydrogen-based reusable propulsion systems to ensure we don’t worsen our atmosphere using kerosene-fueled rockets for the coming tsunami of satellite launches. Finally, a mission ensuring the general welfare and planet survival for the next thousand years is finally confronting the existential threat that asteroids and comets pose to humanity. These extra-terrestrial, deep-space threats are passing dangerously close to our planet, and today we have no solar map of them and no defense.

#### Space resource extraction solves sustainability.

Whittington ’20 [Mark; November 22; writes frequently about space and politics, has published a political study of space exploration entitled Why is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon and is published in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Hill, USA Today, the LA Times, and the Washington Post, among other venues; The Hill, “How space exploration will help to address climate change,” https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/527058-how-space-exploration-will-help-to-address-climate-change/]

The Biden approach to NASA seemed to be expressed best by Lori Garver, who served as NASA’s deputy administrator during the Obama administration. According to the Space Review, she said, “If we don’t put some really significant resources into allowing humanity to be sustained on this planet, we’re not going to have the time to leave it. You can’t really do one without the other.”

That last sentence is truer than, perhaps, Garver realizes. An article in Astronomy Magazine suggests that the ultimate solution to climate change will be to move resource extraction and heavy industry off the planet. The notion seems like science fiction, but some very serious people are looking at the idea of a space-based industrial revolution. Jeff Bezos, who made his billions from Amazon.com and now runs a space launch company called Blue Origin, suggests “zoning” Earth for residential areas and “light industries.” Mining and manufacturing, two of the biggest sources of environmental pollution, would move off the planet.

The moon and asteroids are the sources of untold mineral wealth. A single asteroid, 16 Psyche, is said to contain 10,000 quadrillion dollars’ worth of metals. The quoted figure is somewhat misleading. If one were to bring all the gold on 16 Psyche to Earth, its price would collapse, making it into a cheap, industrial metal.

The point, however, is that only by turning humankind into a space-faring civilization can we avoid environmental catastrophe while maintaining technological progress. The fact further suggests that the Artemis program has an environmental dimension that Team Biden would do well to recognize and to consider when formulating space policy for the incoming administration.

American law already recognizes the right of companies to extract resources from the moon and other celestial bodies, thanks to Title IV of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. The act was passed in 2015 on a bipartisan basis and signed into law by Obama.

Currently, NASA has been attempting to gain international recognition of Earth humans’ right to extract and own space resources as part of the Artemis Accords. The accords have been signed by nine nations, besides the United States, with more to follow.

The point of all of this, going back to what Garver said, is that climate change and space exploration are inseparably linked. She likely meant that Earth needs to be sustained so that humankind can expand into space. However, the opposite is also true. Humankind must expand into space so that the Earth, the pale blue dot that the late-Carl Sagan once celebrated, can be preserved.

### Space Internal---1AR

#### Socialist space development is designed to fail and results in disasters that shut down the space program.

Nelson ’20 [Peter Lothian and Walter Block; 2020; professional engineer; Space Capitalism: How Humans will Colonize Planets, Moons, and Asteroids, Palgrave McMillan, ch. 1-2]

Precisely. You will not find, ever, capitalist entrepreneurs ignoring a price tag. Or, if you do, you will find them soon in the throes of bankruptcy, therein no longer able12 to effectively serve their customers.

It cannot be denied that millions of people, nay, hundreds of millions, were thrilled that members of their species walked on the Moon. Such persons were particularly proud that "we," our nation, had performed this adventure. But, they had no way of plunking down any cash on the barrel-head to demonstrate (Rothbard 1997a) that this was so. In contrast, every time they go to a movie, or a Super Bowl, matters are entirely different. In these latter cases, we have direct, objective evidence as to the benefits of these expenditures. In the case of the moon landing, we did not.

Of course, the Challenger and Columbia debacles must be counted on the debit side of the ledger for NASA. Were a calamity of this sort to have taken place in the private sector, it might well have spelled the death knell for the company responsible. But this rarely occurs in the so-called public sector. There, catastrophes abound, and there is no automatic feedback mechanism of profit and loss that all but guarantees the exit of those responsible.

The fact to keep in mind is that Challenger, and even Columbia, by itself does not represent half the problem. The Space Shuttle is designed to fail and do so spectacularly with excessive bells and whistles. The first obvious failure mechanism is lift-off. Once achieved, it allows no escape method for about two minutes until booster separation. Even then the crew could not simply stop. They would have had to burn off excess fuel from the external tank prior to jettisoning it, which is then followed by nearly impossible maneuvers (Dunn 2014). Engineers call a system with no way out or no backup plan: "designed to fail." For two minutes, on the most dangerous part of the flight, there was no plan B.

As if that were not bad enough, there is really no reasonable way to retro-fit an escape mechanism. Since the crew cabin was an integral part of the spaceship, such a system would require the ability to lift the entire unit with payload. Presumably, the external fuel tank and boosters could be jettisoned at the same time, but then NASA would have had two uncontrolled rockets doing cartwheels in the sky with a massive explosive bomb (the external fuel tank) in the middle of it all. Any Mercury-style escape tower would have had to be sufficiently large compared to the size of the vehicle to lift it out of the maelstrom prior to the impending collision of one of the missiles with the tank. The only genuine answer would have been a complete redesign to include an escape pod for the astronauts. One wonders whether a good system would also include the ability to recover the payload when the launch was aborted.

In addition, the practicality of the entire spaceplane is questionable for simple tasks. It has a huge cargo bay plus a seven-person crew cabin. Thus, it is an exceedingly large and expensive transportation system that can only achieve low earth orbit. In addition to being impractical, with a 1.5% failure rate, it can be regarded as unreliable.

A less spectacular NASA failure is represented by the Liberty Bell. This Mercury capsule splashed down in the Atlantic Ocean on July 21, 1961. The official, disputed, story is that the hatch malfunctioned and admitted sea water causing it to sink. Gus Grissom narrowly managed to escape (NASA 2000).

A hair-raising event on Apollo 13 garnered worldwide attention when a liquid oxygen tank exploded. The crew managed to survive by using the lunar lander as a "lifeboat." Prior to the flight, the problem container had suffered numerous glitches, but was deemed "safe" and used anyway (NASA 2009).

A truly bad day for NASA and the European Space Agency was when the Hubble Space Telescope started to broadcast images from space. They were blurry. The device was proclaimed to be able to produce exceptionally clear photographs free from atmospheric distortion. These pictures were anything but. The Hubble became the butt of jokes (Fox News 2009). Its mirror had the incorrect focal length making it nearsighted. Some people suggested it had been designed by Mr. Magoo. This was an optical error, of the most basic, bone-headed variety, rendering the exceedingly expensive instrument useless. Fortunately, it could be fixed by the installation of some corrective lenses. Oops, that meant an additional high-cost, high-risk, space shuttle launch and spacewalk to install the fix (Pearce 2012).

#### Commercial space is crucial---their ev makes fun of revolutionary tech changes that socialists could only dream of innovating.

Rinehart ’21 [William and Adam Thierer; August 5; “Why Capitalists in Space Are Good for Americans’ Future,” https://regproject.org/blog/why-capitalists-in-space-are-good-for-americans-future/]

But the harshest critics have the story backwards. We are on the precipice of an epochal shift that will help make space travel cheaper, safer, and more accessible. Thanks to nearly two decades of reform at NASA, American entrepreneurialism and ingenuity are flourishing in space. The story is told as a failure, but it is actually a sign of success.

While many praised Bezos, Branson, and Elon Musk of SpaceX for using their fortunes to advance private space travel and exploration, with the goal of even getting to Mars, a vocal group of detractors blasted these capitalists for having the audacity to look toward the stars at all.

Discouraging private space exploration would be a step backwards and undo positive reforms that have made space more accessible and affordable. The way that NASA did things changed dramatically in 2005 when Mike Griffin took over as Administrator. In early 2006, the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program was announced, which aimed to spend $500 million to develop and demonstrate commercial space launches. It was unlike anything NASA had tried before. Instead of detailed requirements which were typical at the time, COTS spent only three pages to lay out broad cargo and crew transportation capabilities. Private industry was left to innovate on their own to meet those requirements.

These contractual tweaks seem minor, but they’ve been revolutionary for NASA and for the space industry. COTS pushed SpaceX and Blue Origin to begin developing reusable rockets. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket has since become a workhorse, supplying the International Space Station (ISS) and launching satellites into orbit. Another milestone was reached last year when Americans were launched to the ISS on a reused Falcon 9, the first time a U.S.-built space vehicle accomplished this feat since the shuttering of the Shuttle program.

COTS and its follow-on programs demonstrate what innovation can accomplish when coupled with policy reforms. About a decade ago, NASA ran the numbers on Falcon 9 and estimated its traditional system of contracting would have cost taxpayers $4 billion. SpaceX did it for $443 million, a tenth of the cost. NASA estimated that COTS’ successor, the Commercial Crew program, saved the agency some $20 billion to $30 billion over its lifetime, ultimately reducing the cost of launching hardware into space.

Cheap launches mean Starlink broadband internet is potentially feasible for rural regions. Cheap launches mean satellites like Sentinel 6 which track climate change are easier to deploy. They mean more experiments in space and a better understanding of our world. But yes, cheap launches also mean billionaires can hitch a ride to space, even if some mistakenly claim it’s just the rich living out their fantasies.

#### Commercial space is vital to developing efficient and resilient techs capable of developing space.

Nelson ’20 [Peter Lothian and Walter Block; 2020; professional engineer; Space Capitalism: How Humans will Colonize Planets, Moons, and Asteroids, Palgrave McMillan, ch. 1-2]

This entire history of space launches illustrates the problem with all government programs. A letter from von Braun to Lyndon Johnson (Von Braun, W. 1961) marvelously demonstrates the ossified thinking that afflicted the plans for space travel of both Russia and the United States. In a missive intended to answer questions put forward by John F. Kennedy and forwarded by Johnson, von Braun spelled out the capabilities and needs of the space program as compared to the Soviet Union. In this letter, there are alternatives suggested: multi-stage super-rockets with liquid fuel, rendezvous in Earth's orbit to enable the use of smaller launch vehicles, strapping together several small rockets, nuclear fuel, and solid chemical propellants. This document goes on to discuss work hours, shifts, and whether "we are making a maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?"

The "ossified" response dismisses these alternatives to a large, multistage, liquid-fueled super-rocket, though it would be fair to say that some previous investigations might have looked more extensively at those approaches. In other words, the dismissals might not have been totally cavalier. More to the point, there is no mention at all of achieving space travel using any method other than vertical take-off rocketry. However, as history amply demonstrates, other methods are not only conceivable, but eminently viable.

But are not the present authors guilty of foisting on our readers a sort of self-contradiction with our previous comments? A critic might say of us that on the one hand we maintain that private rocketry is good, the governmental version thereof bad. And, that we use von Braun as an example of the former. On the other hand, we also maintain that his thinking was "ossified," and this phenomenon must of course be placed not in the asset column, but in the debit one. No, we reject this possible criticism. We want to have our cake and eat it too; we stick to both sides of this story. Yes, this rocket scientist initially worked mostly on his own separated from government, and we welcomed this occurrence. On the other hand, when he later worked for government, he became fossilized, and there was little or nothing that backward-looking institution could or did do to counteract this difficulty.

Market Competition

Adolf Hitler had it all wrong. He was a power junky. As such, he had to control everything in which he was involved, using a top-down approach. He needed to win the war. To accomplish that task, he collected brilliant people to perform the necessary tasks. One such person was Wernher von Braun who had made noteworthy progress based on his own prior interests in rocketry. Rockets had enormous potential in military applications. If anyone could bomb enemies of Germany from the sky without warning, using methods that at the time were the stuff of science fiction, von Braun would be the man. He was that brilliant and creative. So the Chancellor appointed him to pursue that goal. The mistake is the classical assumption shared by all central planners that their system of command, control, and regulate can better accomplish an arduous task than can the free-enterprise system. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. fell right into that very same trap, demanding their own V-2's and continued manufacturing bigger, vertical-launch, liquid-fueled launch platforms well past the time when they made sense.

The better way, and one of the main reasons your authors advocate private space exploration, is market competition. Rather than search for "the one best" creative innovator, let anyone interested develop his own solution to the problem. Of course, the statists of the world will misinterpret that statement. Their half-way response will be to host a contest wherein people will submit ideas to accomplish a given goal. Why is that half-way? The authorities will still leave themselves in charge of selecting "the best" alternative. One could argue that at least it would open more potential designs to consideration; that may be, but in the end only one program is executed, or attempted. Inevitably using cronyism, the supposed best theory is that presented either by the finest salesman or the most well-known, good old boy—not the most efficient concept.

Real market competition, not a crony capitalist approach, means that the individuals set the agenda. A Howard Roark (Rand, A. 1943) may conceive of a new product. He can, if he wishes, research the market to find whether anyone is interested and proceed by implementing this idea. If not self-financed, he would seek venture capitalists who for their own protection vet his creation and determine its practicality.

The mistake made by the statists in this regard is to fail to realize that the free-enterprise system constitutes an ongoing process. Government bureaucrats may choose an entrepreneur who has succeeded in the past.

But this is no guarantee of future attainment. In the marketplace, the businessman must prove himself every moment. Previous profitability is no guarantee of a good bottom line even the very next day. The Fortune 500 changes, drastically, every decade. Where are the Packards or Trans World Airlines and their ilk nowadays? This brutal market test of profit and loss is ongoing. A businessman selected by the state apparatus no longer must please customers, employees, suppliers. He is himself now a bureaucrat, no longer a part of the marketplace.

Rather than focus the entire space effort on a rather silly adolescent goal such as beating Russia to the Moon, this book affirms that the private entrepreneur should set up shop there for no other reason than that he thinks it has exciting potential. In his view, numerous people would want to go there and harvest all that green cheese. More seriously, there are many legitimate reasons that potential customers may wish to travel to that brilliant orb; and entrepreneurs able to do so will step up to provide that service. Given economic freedom, many programs will operate in parallel. As time passes, some of those will fall by the wayside. The most efficient and resilient will remain. Some may even be found to address profitable goals other than space travel. It is impossible to know before- hand what inventions might come to the fore, but two speculative launch platforms, which we shall now discuss, are aircraft and elevators.

### Space Impact---1AR

#### Capitalist space development solves extinction.

Nelson ’20 [Peter Lothian and Walter Block; 2020; professional engineer; Space Capitalism: How Humans will Colonize Planets, Moons, and Asteroids, Palgrave McMillan, ch. 1-2]

Pretty much anything touched by government comes with fatal flaws starting with corruption and compulsion. Eliminating state involvement in space frees people rather than limits them. Besides, the ruling powers notoriously mismanage all enterprises. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, because that very incompetence makes the venture appear far more expensive than it really needs to be.

The record of "picking winners" on the part of governing establishments does not engender much confidence in government's capacity to promote this goal. Nor is "contracting out" to private interests likely to provide efficiency in this context. If government cannot do the job itself, there is no reason to believe it will be effective in choosing and funding collaborators. In addition, we believe that even if the state could be effective in promoting such tasks, it would still be improper for it to do so, since its funds are mulcted, unwillingly, from their rightful owners, the long-suffering taxpayers (Rothbard, M. 1998).

In addition to the two primary themes, in a third we note that our species, while admirable in many ways such as the need to explore, is also often quite silly and even more destructive. We have developed weapons of mass destruction, and one despicable government apparatus, venerated by many worldwide, even used them, twice, in 1945. But we do not need to resort to such high technology to murder our fellow creatures. We are fully capable of doing so on a massive scale, without such sophistication. Estimates are that governments have done away with almost 200 million of their citizens in the twentieth century, and this is apart from wars8 and traffic fatalities on public highways.

In support of this contention, much in the following pages details the violent nature and destructive results of states. The same applies to would- be governments like ISIS and others that go around shooting police officers. In recent days and months, the evening news (of whichever source the reader consults) has been filled with graphical depictions of bombings and shootings. These are being done by those who do not so much disapprove of government per-se but who do not like this state and wish to substitute their own. In addition to being anarchists, we do not approve of would-be states either. As Shaw (1903) said: "He who slays a king and he who dies for him are alike idolaters." We concur completely that one who ambushes or kills or purposely injures policemen simply lowers himself to the level of these idolaters. To be libertarian requires adoption of the Non-Aggression Principle. That in turn does not admit of murder, assault, or aggression in any way whatsoever against even those of whom we most strongly disapprove.

How will space travel help alleviate mankind's tendency to kill us? Simple. If we can establish colonies starting with the Moon, Venus, and Mars, and then later, as improved technology will permit, on other planets and moons, the odds will improve that if people blow up any one home of the human race, there will still be others, so that our species will still "live long and prosper."

#### Only commercial space can facilitate space-for-space industry---that solves economic sustainability.

Sarang ’21 [Mehak and Matt Weinzierl; Feb 12; Research Associate at Harvard Business School and the Lunar Exploration Projects Lead for the MIT Space Exploration Initiative; Joseph and Jacqueline Elbling Professor of Business Administration at HBS and a Research Associate at the NBER; Harvard Business Review, “The Commercial Space Age Is Here,” https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here]

In 2019, 95% of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is, goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure, earth observation capabilities, national security satellites, and more. This economy is booming, and though research shows that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource, projections for its future are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market, and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services.

In contrast, the space-for-space economy — that is, goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots — has struggled to get off the ground. As far back as the 1970s, research commissioned by NASA predicted the rise of a space-based economy that would supply the demands of hundreds, thousands, even millions of humans living in space, dwarfing the space-for-earth economy (and, eventually, the entire terrestrial economy as well). The realization of such a vision would change how all of us do business, live our lives, and govern our societies — but to date, we’ve never even had more than 13 people in space at one time, leaving that dream as little more than science fiction.

Today, however, there is reason to think that we may finally be reaching the first stages of a true space-for-space economy. SpaceX’s recent achievements (in cooperation with NASA), as well as upcoming efforts by Boeing, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic to put people in space sustainably and at scale, mark the opening of a new chapter of spaceflight led by private firms. These firms have both the intention and capability to bring private citizens to space as passengers, tourists, and — eventually — settlers, opening the door for businesses to start meeting the demand those people create over the next several decades with an array of space-for-space goods and services.

Welcome to the (Commercial) Space Age

In our recent research, we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth.

In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised settlement on Mars.

Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry.

This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing.

Made In Space, Inc. has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a $74 million contract to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive.

Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently announced that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also awarded a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it).

This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a $142 million contract from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools.

And of course, the private sector isn’t just about industrial products. Creature comforts also promise to be an area of rapid growth, as companies endeavor to support the human side of life in the harsh environment of space. In 2015, for example, Argotec and Lavazza collaborated to build an espresso machine that could function in the zero-gravity environment of the ISS, delivering a bit of everyday luxury to the crew.

To be sure, people have dreamt of using the vacuum and weightlessness of space to source or make things that cannot be made on earth for half a century, and time and again the business case has failed to pan out. Skepticism is natural. Those failures, however, have been in space-for-earth applications. For example, two startups of the 2010s, Planetary Resources, Inc. and Deep Space Industries, recognized the potential of space mining early on. For both companies, however, the lack of a space-for-space economy meant that their near-term survival depended on selling mined material — precious metals or rare elements — to earthbound customers. When it became clear that demand was insufficient to justify the high costs, funding dried up, and both companies pivoted to other ventures.

These were failures of space-for-earth business models — but the demand for in-space mining of raw building material, metals, and water will be enormous once humans are living in space (and are therefore far cheaper to supply). In other words, when people are living and working in space, we are likely to look back on these early asteroid mining companies less as failures and more as simply ahead of their time.

Seizing the Space-for-Space Opportunity

The opportunity presented by the space-for-space economy is huge — but it could easily be missed. To seize this moment, policymakers must provide regulatory and institutional frameworks that will enable the risk-taking and innovation necessary for a decentralized, private-sector-driven space economy. There are three specific policy areas we believe will be especially important:

1. Enabling private individuals to take on greater risk than would be tolerable for government-employed astronauts.

First, as part of a general shift to that more decentralized, market-oriented space sector, policymakers should consider allowing private space tourists and settlers to voluntarily take on more risk than states would tolerate for government-employed astronauts. In the long run, ensuring high safety levels will be essential to convince larger numbers of people to travel or live in space, but in the early years of exploration, too great an aversion to risk will stop progress before it starts.

An instructive analogy can be found in how NASA works with its contractors: In the mid-2000s, NASA shifted from using cost-plus contracts (in which NASA shouldered all the economic risk of investing in space) to fixed-price contracts (in which risk was distributed between NASA and their contractors). Because of private companies’ greater tolerance for risk, this shift catalyzed a burst of activity in the sector — sometimes referred to as “New Space.” A similar shift in how we approach voluntary risk-taking by private-sector astronauts may be necessary in order to launch the space-for-space economy.